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Abstract 
This thesis reviews in detail the powers, practice and 
effectiveness of the United Nations in the maintenance of 
international peace and security since its inception over forty 
years ago. 
The work not only contains an examination of the 
constitutional powers of the the two United Nations' organs 
responsible for this area 
- 
the Security Council and the General 
Assembly 
- 
and of how these powers have been developed in 
practice, but also of the significant political factors operating 
to limit the ambit and effectiveness of those powers. 
To this end Part 1 of the work examines the Security Council, 
Part 2 the General Assembly, whilst Part 3 contains a study of the 
peacekeeping function of the United Nations. Each Part is roughly 
divided into an analysis in terms of political factors, 
constitutional considerations and finally effectiveness. 
Peacekeeping is examined separately because it raises a host 
of particular problems 
- 
both constitutional and political 
- 
which 
would be difficult to encompass in the other two Parts. 
Generally, each chapter contains a conclusion at which point 
the various threads are drawn together not only to produce a 
summary but also to provide guidance as to the future use and 
development of the powers possessed by the United Nations in this 
field. 
General Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to fill a lacuna in the area of 
international legal literature devoted to analysing the United 
Nations in its role of maintaining international peace and 
security. 
Throughout its life the Organization has been studied in two 
main forms. First, there is the approach that utilises the 
Charter's Articles as its basic framework (1). Secondly, there is 
the method which takes a chronological or case study approach (2). 
To adopt an Article by Article analysis fails to deal 
adequately with a great deal of United Nations' practice. For 
example peacekeeping is only mentioned in passing in both the 
major commentaries which use this method (3). This approach also 
tends to label items of United Nations' practice as being derived 
from particular Articles when such practices like peacekeeping or 
voluntary measures, can either be said to be based on general 
powers rather than particular provisions, or can be placed equally 
well within several different Charter provisions. The point is 
that analysis by Article creates a conceptual straitjacket into 
which the commentators try to force all United Nations' practice 
when quite clearly a significant amount of it will not fit. 
Generally, such commentaries are concerned with the whole of 
the United Nations' Charter and so go far beyond the 
organization's role of maintaining international peace and 
security. For such an undertaking it may be that a restrictive 
conceptual framework is needed in order to prevent the work from 
becoming unwieldy. 
The case or conflict analysis approach has the advantage of 
looking in greater detail at United Nations' practice in this 
particular area. However, it fails to impose any overall 
conceptual framework on that practice. Each individual conflict, 
dispute or situation may be analysed, inter alia, in terms of 
constitutional powers, political considerations and effectiveness, 
but overall comparison and evaluation is missing. 
This thesis represents an attempt at synthesising these 
approaches in order to produce a conceptually based but 
comprehensive analysis of the United Nations' powers, practice and 
effectiveness in the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 
The first two Parts of the work, on the Security Council and 
the General Assembly, perhaps lean more towards the conceptual 
approach than the conflict analysis method. In Part 1, after an 
Introduction (which incidentally can be used as an historical 
introduction to the work as a whole since in 1945 it was envisaged 
that the United Nations' role in the maintenance of peace would 
fall almost entirely on the Security Council) an attempt is made 
in Chapter 1 to extract the powerful political factors operating 
on the Security Council. 
The next chapter purports to examine constitutional 
limitations free from the distorting effect of politics. It may 
be that this attempt to remove all political influences in order 
to leave the area free for legal examination is unduly idealistic. 
Realistically, the aim is to consider and identify the political 
factors in order that when the legal or constitutional issues are 
considered the reader is already cognisant with the political 
motivations, factors and influences behind them. 
Part 1 then ends with an analysis of the effectiveness of the 
Security Council in terms of the powers it uses in practice. Most 
of these powers are derived from the provisions of Chapters VI and 
VII of the United Nations' Charter. However, because of the 
political factors operating on it, the Security Council has 
developed and expanded some of its powers whilst modifying, 
refining or virtually discarding others. 
A similar approach is taken in Part 2 to the General Assembly 
except that the political element is considered in general terms 
in the Introduction. Chapter 4 contains an analysis of the 
constitutional issues in order to ascertain, amongst other things, 
how the Charter deals with the problem of the separation of powers 
between the Security Council and the General Assembly in the field 
of international peace. Then the political factors are 
reintroduced to show the actual division of competence between the 
two bodies in Chapter 5. Finally, in relation to the Assembly, 
Chapter 6 examines the Assembly's development of a very general 
set of Charter provisions into a number of specific powers which 
are assessed in terms of effectiveness. 
Part 3, on the peacekeeping function of the United Nations, 
veers more towards the casebook approach. However, the wide 
conceptual framework, in terms of considering, first the operative 
political factors, secondly the legal issues and finally the 
question of effectiveness, remains. Chapter 7 contains the 
political factors which limit the global ambit of peacekeeping. 
Chapter 8 then considers the legal questions by working through 
the various United Nations' forces and then arrives at a 
considered conclusion as to the legal nature of peacekeeping. 
Finally, Chapter 9 ascertains each force's effectiveness, not only 
in terms of fulfilling its mandate but also in terms of its 
contribution to world peace. 
The peacekeeping function is separated and analysed in this 
way because it was born of political necessity and is to a certain 
extent a constitutional oddity. Peacekeeping is also different 
from most of the other powers of the United Nations, which are 
sometimes rather cynically referred to as paper powers, because it 
involves a physical presence. These points led me to separate the 
peacekeeping function from the analysis of the Security Council 
and the General Assembly. The more case-orientated approach is 
utilised because of the ad hoc nature of each force. Generally, 
each force is different politically, legally and in terms of 
effectiveness from the others. 
The final aim of the work is to create an up-to-date and 
comprehensive account of the powers and practice of the United 
Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security 
throughout its life. The main bulk of the work (Parts 1,2 and 3) 
takes account of developments up to the end of 1987. The 
concluding chapter looks at recent developments up to the end of 
March 1988 as well as containing an overall assessment (4). 
Notes 
(1) See for example Goodrich, L. M, Hambro, E, and 
Simons, P. S, Charter of the United Nations (1969) and 
Cot, J. P, and Pellet, A, La Charte des Nations Unies (1985). 
(2) See for example Murphy, J. F, The United Nations and the 
Control of International Violence (1983); Urquhart, B, A 
Life in Peace and War (1987), and to a certain extent 
Franck, T. M, Nation against Nation (1985). See also in 
relation to peacekeeping, Higgins, R, United Nations 
Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary Vol 1 (1969), Vol 2 
(1970), Vol 3 (1980), and Vol 4 (1981). 
(3) Supra note (1). 
(4) Although, for reasons of space, the office of the 
Secretary General does not receive a separate analysis, 
the significant contributions of the various Secretary 
Generals in this area are highlighted throughout. 
PART 1: THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
Introduction 
The main aim of the United Nations is to maintain 
international peace and security (1). Throughout the complex 
Great Power negotiations which led to the conference at San 
Francisco, the emphasis was on a particular body within the United 
Nations 
- 
the Security Council 
- 
performing that role. Indeed, 
this is reflected within the provisions of the Charter, which, 
inter alia, give the Security Council "primary responsibility" (2) 
for the maintenance of international peace accompanied by 
comprehensive powers to enable it to fulfil that role. The Great 
Powers did not intend to grant the General Assembly any 
substantive powers, intending merely to have it as a meeting place 
for the representatives of states. However, the smaller powers at 
San Francisco managed to secure sufficient provisions in the 
Charter to enable the Assembly to develop an increasingly 
important subsidiary role in the maintenance of international 
peace (3). 
This introduction is mainly concerned with giving a 
background to the United Nations viewed in the light of the League 
experience and the Great Power negotiations which preceded the 
adoption of the Charter. It must be remembered that throughout 
these negotiations it was the Security Council which was intended 
to embody the aims of the United Nations as regards the 
maintenance of international peace. 
The United Nations is a product of the second attempt by the 
international community to create a world body capable of ensuring 
collective security; 
"In the present age, a world organization to 
smooth out conflicts among nations and to save 
mankind from the scourge of war is not only 
desirable but necessary. The League of 
Nations and the United Nations emerged from 
the chaos and despair of two world wars, 
respectively, and both stemmed from the 
pressing need of the time. Both global 
organizations were built around the idea of 
collective security. Other objectives also 
figured prominently, but the hope of 
establishing a successful collective security 
system was the primary motivating factor. "(4) 
The Security Council was established within the United Nations 
Organization to fulfil the ideal of collective security. 
The League of Nations (5) had failed to keep world peace 
primarily because the idea of collective security was far weaker 
than the individual state's desires to protect their national 
interests. This was particularly so as regards the world's most 
powerful nations. Although President Wilson was one of the 
statesmen behind the League of Nations, paradoxically, it was the 
United States' refusal to join which could be said to be the first 
example of a powerful state believing that collective security was 
not in its best interests. Wilson saw the League system replacing 
the previous balance of power system, 
there must now be not a balance of 
power, not one powerful group of nations set 
off against another, but a single overwhelming 
powerful group of nations who shall be the 
trustee of the peace of the world. " (6) 
Although the Covenant of the League of Nations did contain 
provisions for collective security (7) and provided for the 
imposition of embargoes and possibly collective military sanctions 
against offending states (8), the League was doomed to failure 
because sovereign states naturally saw national interests as 
paramount over collective interests. Such considerations of 
national power resulted in the dilution of the League's power to 
such an extent that the question of imposition of sanctions under 
Article 16 became not one for the consideration of the League's 
Council or Assembly, but for each individual member (9). 
Piecemeal and ineffective sanctions were imposed in this manner 
against Italy after its invasion of Abysinnia in 1935 (10). The 
failure to impose any sort of collective measures against 
aggressors meant the inevitable demise of the League. 
Sarkensa writes, "the League experience was an abortive 
attempt to translate the collective security system into a working 
system" (11). The United Nations, in particular the Security 
Council represented the world's second attempt at developing a 
feasible system of collective security. The Organization had its 
origins, indirectly, in the "Declaration by the United Nations" of 
January 1,1942 (12) which did not refer to any world body, 
instead it concentrated on spelling out the allied programme to be 
pursued against the Axis powers. Nevertheless, the idea of the 
United Nations continuing after the war was outlined in the Moscow 
Declaration of October 1943 (13), in which the Big Four - China, 
the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union 
recognised 
"... the necessity of establishing, at the 
earliest possible date, a general 
international organization based on the 
principle of sovereign equality of all peace 
loving states, and open to membership by all 
such states, large and small, for the 
maintenance of international peace and 
security. "(14) 
The ideal of collective security was behind this statement, though 
by juxtaposing the notion of a world body with that of state 
sovereignty, the clash between collective and national interest 
had not been removed. The major lesson of the League had not been 
learned. Nevertheless, to give collective interests primacy over 
national interests would be to have created a world government. 
In practice, the most that could be done was to give the world 
body, through the Security Council, greater powers for collective 
measures which might weigh more heavily on the scales against the 
counter-balance of national interests. 
Indeed as the major powers strove towards the creation of a 
new body, they were preoccupied with giving it more teeth, 
"In fact, the enforcement aspect of security 
so dominated most governmental thinking on 
this subject that the peaceful settlement 
aspect was not given the attention it deserved 
until relatively late. This situation no 
doubt reflected the fact that the provision of 
continuing machinery for enforcement purposes 
was the most radical innovation to be written 
into the new charter, in comparison with the 
Covenant of the League of Nations. The 
provision of settlement machinery presented a 
less novel task. "(15) 
Comprehensive proposals from the Big Four were discussed by those 
states at Dumbarton Oaks between August and October 1944 (16), 
resulting in a far reaching and detailed agreement concerning the 
Organization (17). They agreed that the Security Council should 
have the function of maintaining international peace through 
collective measures if necessary. However, they also decided that 
the Great Powers should have a special position on the Council 
consisting of permanent representation with special voting rights 
which would ensure that no substantive decisions would be taken by 
the Council without their unanimous concurrence. The right of 
veto was further refined at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 
(18). 
Whether one regards the necessity of Great Power unanimity as 
an idealistic attempt to continue where the Allies finished after 
the end of the war, or more cynically, as a recognition by those 
Powers of each others and their own national interests being 
paramount over any collective interests, it is realistic to state 
that without the power of veto the Organization would probably not 
have been born, and even if created, it would not have been able 
to take enforcement action against the Great Powers, particularly 
the Soviet Union and the United States, without devastating 
effects (19). At San Francisco the right of veto was accepted by 
the other states with little challenge, possibly because most 
delegates preferred, at least publicly, to lean towards the 
idealistic, 
"... the peoples of the world would not 
forgive their leaders if they returned to a 
policy of balance of power, which would 
inevitably result in a race of armamants 
heading for another war. The protection of 
peace can only be insured on the basis of 
collective security. " (20) 
Generally the delegates were enthusiastic about collective 
security but unduly optimistic about Great Power unanimity (21), 
"Hopes of great power cooperation had largely 
been based on Allied unity during the war, 
which left the misleading impression that 
international collaboration was easy to 
achieve. But actually Allied unity, so far as 
the Soviet Union was concerned, was a 
remarkable achievement due mainly to the 
intense opposition that Hitler aroused 
... 
"(22) 
Indeed, President Roosevelt recognised this in a speech in which 
he said that, 
"The nearer we come to vanquishing our enemies 
the more we inevitably become conscious of the 
differences among the victors. "(23) 
The marriage of convenience which resulted in unanimity during the 
war was terminated after a brief honeymoon in San Francisco. 
Within two days of the Council's first meeting the Cold War, in 
the form of a complaint by Iran of the Soviet Union's presence in 
its country, was on the Council's agenda, followed two days later 
by a Soviet complaint of the British presence in Greece. 
The idea that the United Nations could prevent the 
resurrection of the balance of power system was not even 
achievable before the end of the war (24), a fact that was to be 
emphasised with great clarity when the Security Council began to 
function. Collective security was subservient to the national 
interests of the Great Powers, particularly the superpowers, who 
protected those interests by the power of veto. The geopolitical 
division of the world into two competing power blocs has 
effectively set the limits as to the areas in which the Security 
Council can properly carry out its functions of maintaining 
international peace and security. These global political 
considerations will be the subject of the first chapter. 
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(22) Hiscocks, R, The Security Council: a study in adolescence 
(1973) p. 67. 
(23) Message on the State of the Union 6.1.1945. 
(24) See Campbell supra note (16) at Ch 3. 
CHAPTER 1 
A GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
Before analysing the jurisdiction of the Security Council in 
terms of the Charter, it will be helpful to identify the major 
geographical limitations imposed on the effective jurisdiction of 
the Security Council by political factors. Factors arising, in 
particular, as a result of the global and strategic interests of 
the superpowers, which often cause a paralysis in the Council as 
those interests are protected by the veto. It must be remembered 
however, that the veto, along with another geopolitical limitation 
- 
regionalism 
- 
are provided for in the Charter. In this sense 
they are legal limitations, but they must be realistically viewed 
as geopolitical limitations because they are operated for 
political motives with the result that large areas of the globe 
are excluded from Security Council action. In addition the use of 
the power of veto and of the various regional organizations is 
often in contradiction to the terms of the Charter so that one 
cannot really say that they are legal rather than geopolitical 
limitations. 
1 The power of veto 
The power of veto is contained in Article 27 of the Charter. 
After stating in paragraph 2 that "decisions of the Security 
Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote 
of" nine members (previously seven) out of the fifteen (previously 
eleven) (1), paragraph 3 provides, 
"Decisions of the Security Council on all 
other matters shall be made by an affirmative 
vote of nine members including the concurring 
votes of the permanent members; provided that, 
in decisions under Chapter VI., and under 
paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to the 
dispute shall abstain from voting. " 
As has been brought out in the Introduction, the power of veto had 
its genesis in the desire to prevent the permanent members from 
being the potential objects of collective measures (2). However, 
Article 27(3) was drafted on a much wider basis after the Yalta 
Conference. It was clear after Yalta that Great Power unity was 
destined to be an unachieved ideal in that the power of veto 
extended beyond the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII, to 
Chapter VI, which gave the Council general, recommendatory powers 
for pacific settlement, unless one of the permanent members was a 
party to the dispute. 
Indeed, the Yalta formula, presented to the San Francisco 
conference in explanation of the right of veto, illustrated the 
permanent members' desire to leave no loopholes to prevent their 
use of the veto. The Yalta formula introduced the prospect of the 
"double veto": 
the decision regarding the preliminary 
question as to whether or not such a matter is 
procedural must be taken by vote of seven [now 
nine] members of the Security Council, 
including the concurring votes of the 
permanent members. "(3) 
However, the smaller powers' objections at San Francisco were not 
directed at the double veto, but at the "chain of events" theory 
outlined in the Yalta formula. The smaller powers demanded that 
the veto should be confined to questions concerning enforcement 
action. The Australian delegate argued that "the Council has the 
duty rather than a right to conciliate disputants" and that it was 
essential that no member should have the right to veto resolutions 
aimed solely at pacific settlement of disputes (4). The major 
powers stuck to the somewhat fallacious argument presented in the 
Yalta formula that any pacific measures "may initiate a chain of 
events which might in the end require the Council under its 
responsibilities to invoke measures of enforcement" (5). It might 
well be that such a chain of events could occur, but it did not 
appear necessary to allow the veto to occur at the pacific 
settlement stage as long as the permanent members could operate it 
at the enforcement stage. The "chain of events" theory was, in 
reality, a mechanism whereby the whole field of Council action 
would be the subject of the veto. The smaller powers continued to 
object, but it became clear that Article 27 would have to be 
accepted as the "Big Five decided to let it be known that unless 
the voting provision was accepted, there would be no organization" 
(6). It was no longer a question of preserving Great Power 
unanimity but of preserving the Organization (7). 
The applicability of the double veto and the chain of events 
theory peppered exchanges in the Council during its first decade. 
These have been thoroughly reviewed by Bailey (8) and it is not 
proposed to discuss them as a separate issue here. Such debates 
have, in any event, petered out in the face of the permanent 
members developing a practice which enables them to use the veto 
to defeat any sort of proposal under Chapter VI or Chapter VII, 
unless it is clearly procedural. 
In stating the chain of events theory the sponsoring powers 
still deferred to their obligation to abstain if they were parties 
to a dispute being dealt with by the Council under Chapter VI. In 
practice the permanent members have disregarded this provision (9) 
thus destroying the general aim of this aspect of Article 27(3) to 
separate "law as it is invoked by the claimants to the dispute and 
law as it is employed by [the Council] when passing its decision" 
(10). The drafting of the provision allows a member to argue, if 
it wants, that it only has an "interest" in the dispute which is 
insufficient to make it a "party" or that the proposed resolution 
is only dealing with a "situation" and not a "dispute" (11), or 
does in fact envisage Chapter VII rather than Chapter VI action. 
In practice the permanent members rarely raise such arguments. 
The power of veto is exercised according to considerations of 
interests rather than in accordance with the letter of the Charter 
(12). 
Permanent member, particularly superpower, interests and 
influences are so pervasive that the veto has effectively debarred 
the Security Council from taking action or recommending measures 
of any sort in many areas of the globe, 
"If there had still been, as occasionally 
occurred, in the inter-war period, 'disputes' 
or 'situations' that were wholly local, 
distinct and unrelated to global ideological 
conflict, there might occasionally have been a 
possibility of 'great power unanimity': joint 
action by the five permanent members acting in 
concert. But in the post 1945 world, there 
were virtually no such conflicts. A proposal 
for UN action in any dispute in whatever part 
of the world 
- 
over Greece, Berlin, Indonesia, 
Guatemala, Laos, Lebanon, the Dominican 
Republic, Vietnam or Angola - must have 
inevitably affected the interests of great 
powers and so invited the veto. " (13) 
Indeed, in many cases, the superpowers operate the veto not to 
protect "vital" interests but in order to curry favour with other 
states or as a reflex reaction to oppose the other superpower's 
voting intentions. The case of Goa in 1961 (14) is a reasonable 
example of the Soviet Union using its veto not for any vital 
protective purpose but to express support for India, the Third 
World and anti- colonialism (15). 
Even when a great power appears to be a "party" to a 
"dispute" within the spirit of Article 27(3), it has disregarded 
its obligation to abstain when faced with the possibility of being 
subject to a recommendatory Chapter VI-based resolution. The 
French and British could hardly deny that they were "parties" to 
the Suez crisis in 1956, but they did not have to as they vetoed 
draft resolutions proposed by the United States and the Soviet 
Union calling for Israel to cease fire and withdraw (16). The 
proposers of the draft resolutions deliberately refrained from 
invoking Chapter VII for fear of justifying Anglo/French 
intervention (17). Nevertheless, the British and French vetoes 
were not challenged on the grounds of Article 27(3). 
An even clearer case of a disregard of Article 27(3) occurred 
in 1982 when the United States vetoed the mildest recommendatory 
resolution which seemed to be proposed with Article 33 in mind 
(18). The draft resolution merely called for non-interference and 
negotiations in the troubled area of Central America (19). 
During the Falklands crisis in 1982, the Panamanian 
representative thought that the last operative paragraph of 
resolution 502 placed it under Chapter VI, in that it called for 
pacific settlement of the dispute, in which case, he argued, the 
United Kingdom should be debarred from voting on the resolution 
(20). Sir Anthony Parsons stated that the resolution came under 
Chapter VII, namely Article 40, and so the obligation to abstain 
was not applicable. Although no members challenged Sir Anthony 
further on this point (21), the very fact that he had to justify 
his vote was a rarity. Perhaps it can be explained by the fact 
that the Security Council approached the Falklands free from any 
overt superpower concern (22), and consequently discussions and 
resolutions were clearly based on considerations of international 
and Charter law rather on considerations of power and zones of 
interest. 
Indeed, the Falklands represents one of the few occasions on 
which the Council briefly acted in a manner approaching that 
envisaged in 1945 (23). In many other cases the Security Council 
is paralysed by considerations of power manifesting themselves in 
the form of the veto. The main areas from which the Security 
Council is effectively excluded, in terms of taking any positive 
measures, even recommendations, are the power blocs. 
2 Intra-bloc situations 
In a world dominated by two superpowers with their own 
hemispheric or bloc domains there emerges a distinction between 
intra-bloc and inter-bloc conflicts. In intra-bloc conflicts such 
as Guatemala 1954 and Hungary 1956, the veto is operated by the 
relevant bloc leader to allow the dispute to be settled within 
that bloc, combined, in the case of the United States, with 
arguments in favour of the regional organization (24). Inter-bloc 
conflicts often occur on the "power frontiers" (25) between the 
"spheres of influence" (26) of the superpowers, usually as a 
consequence of a miscalculation by one of them as to the ambit of 
its hemispheric control. Good examples of such disputes are the 
Berlin Blockade 1948 and the Cuban Missile crisis in 1962. In 
these two cases, it will be argued, the Security Council did play 
a significant role. The polarized positions taken by each side 
before the Council were gradually whittled down behind the scene 
until a common ground was achieved. In inter-bloc conflicts the 
stark choice is between annihilation or "peaceful coexistence" 
(27). Both superpowers have to make concessions if peaceful 
coexistence is to continue. As has been pointed out by Luard 
above (28), there are few areas in the world where the superpowers 
do not exert an influence, particularly when taking into account 
China's emerging superpower status (29). The world is thus 
distilling into a system of three superpowers, analogous to three 
continental plates sometimes rubbing together, sometimes 
overlapping, sometimes drawing apart as their influences alter; in 
each case, instead of producing earthquakes or volcanic eruptions, 
they result in conflicts. 
During the initial Cold War period (1945-1955) (30), the 
United Nations was dominated by the West (31) which managed to 
manipulate the whole organization to further its political and 
strategic ends. The case of Guatemala in 1954 (32) is 
illustrative of how that manipulation often occurred to protect 
American interests. It also shows how the Soviets were often 
forced to use their veto in the early years because of the 
American dominance of the Council. 
As will be seen later, the Guatemalan episode involved the 
question of whether regional bodies should have priority over the 
world body (33). Articles 52(4) and 103 of the Charter clearly 
answer the question negatively and yet the Soviet Union was forced 
to use its veto to uphold this view after Brazil and Columbia had 
proposed a resolution which would have left the matter to the OAS 
(34). The United States was in such a strong position in the 
Security Council that it did not have to use its veto to protect 
its interests 
- 
it merely relied on its allies on the Council to 
outvote any proposal which was deemed to be against Western 
interests (35). Its dominance of the Guatemalan debate was 
highlighted when the US President of the Council effectively 
prevented further consideration when he proposed to take a 
procedural vote on the question whether to keep the item on the 
agenda. The item was duly removed despite the negative Soviet 
vote (36). 
As with several of the earlier intra-bloc disputes involving 
the United States, that country was so confident of its position 
on the Council that it did not feel it necessary to veto what 
appeared to be constructive Council resolutions. Resolution 104 
(37), proposed by France, called for the "immediate termination of 
any action likely to cause bloodshed, and requests all members 
.... 
to abstain from giving assistance to any such 
action". It was essentially a neutral, valueless resolution but 
by voting for it along with the Soviet Union, the United States 
reinforced the view that it was the upholder of the Charter even 
where the principles contained therein seemed to be operating 
against US interests, whereas the Soviets were portrayed as only 
voting for resolutions criticising the United States and as using 
their veto when there was even a hint of criticism of the Soviet 
Union. Nevertheless, such illusions should not hide the real fact 
that the United States was manipulating the Council to protect its 
hemispheric interests. Its representative made this very clear, 
"I say to the representative of the Soviet 
Union, stay out of this hemisphere and do not 
try to start your plans and conspiracies over 
here. "(38) 
This amounted to a reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine and 
constituted "a declaration which reciprocal practice over the next 
two decades was to stamp with an almost jural quality" (39). 
The tacit agreement between the Great Powers at Potsdam (40) 
that Eastern Europe was within the Soviet Union's sphere of 
influence was put beyond doubt after the Soviets intervened in 
Hungary in 1956 (41). The Western powers were unwilling to help 
Nagy when he announced on November 1 the withdrawal of Hungary 
from the Warsaw Pact accompanied by a declaration of its 
neutrality, and requested the United Nations and the four other 
permanent members to defend its neutral status. The Soviet Union 
also saw it necessary to protect its interests by using its veto 
in the Security Council to defeat a United States' sponsored draft 
resolution (42) calling for Soviet withdrawal and respect for "the 
independence and sovereignty of Hungary". Ambassador Sobolev of 
the Soviet Union explained the action in terms of defence of the 
Soviet Union's strategic zone, 
"The relations between the Soviet Union and 
the people's democracies are based primarily 
on the Warsaw Pact, under which they assume 
certain political and military obligations, 
including the obligation to take such 
concerted action as might be necessary to 
reinforce their collective strength. "(43) 
Just as the United States sees the creation of a "communist" 
government 
- 
whether created by popular assent or by outside 
interference 
- 
as an attack on Western principles and interests, 
so the Soviet Union views "capitalism" as an attack on its bloc 
solidarity. Both powers view the removal of each respective 
threat from their respective zones as a legitimate defence of 
their strategic interests (44). 
Intra-bloc interventions are often challenged by the other 
superpower in the Security Council to show rhetorical political 
support for the people of the country being intervened in. By 
allowing the other side to verbally vent its anger, it could be 
argued that the Security Council reduces the chance of that side 
counter-intervening leading to a global conflict. The United 
States complained of Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956. The 
compliment was repaid in 1965 when the Soviet Union complained of 
"armed intervention" by the United States in the Dominican 
Republic (45). The Soviets introduced a draft resolution (46) 
condemning the intervention and demanding that the United States 
withdraw. Western support was still strong enough in the Council 
to ensure that the proposal only secured two votes in its favour 
(47). The United States treated the situation on a similar basis 
to Guatemala a decade earlier by allowing a resolution to be 
adopted calling for a cease-fire (48) but not prejudicing the 
OAS's role in the situation (49). Again the world saw the United 
States refraining from using its veto in contrast to the Soviet 
Union's use of its power to block resolutions on Hungary and later 
on Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, it is clear that the United 
States would have used its veto to prevent criticism of its 
action, or to prevent proposals for peaceful settlement of the 
situation, or to prevent the establishment of machinery to 
facilitate a cease-fire such as peacekeeping - in other words 
anything that would have vaguely hindered or criticised the US/OAS 
operation. Ambassador Stevenson's statement in the Council made 
it clear that there was not any room for the United Nations to 
play a role, 
"... revolution in any country is a matter 
for that country to deal with. It becomes a 
matter for hemispheric action only 
..... 
when 
there is the establishment of a communist 
dictatorship. "(50) 
On August 28,1968, Western States brought the situation in 
Czechoslovakia to the attention of the Council (51). The Soviet 
intervention (52) led to the enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine 
of limited sovereignty within the Socialist commonwealth (53), 
paralleling the various interventionist doctrines expounded by 
American Presidents. Ambassador Malik made a weak attempt to 
justify the intervention by referring to it as self-defence 
against an "imperialist" attack. However, in the same speech he 
mentioned the real reason, 
"The further aggravation of the situation in 
Czechoslovakia affects the vital interests of 
the Socialist countries including the Soviet 
Union. "(54) 
The Soviet Union views the use of the veto in the Council to 
prevent criticism of its actions as a necessary corollary to the 
protection of its vital interests by intervention. There is no 
question even of allowing weak, neutral resolutions to be adopted, 
an attitude that probably can be explained by a "knee-jerk" 
reaction produced by its minority position on the Council plus the 
fact that it has no regional organization equivalent to the OAS to 
give its intra-bloc actions an air of legality (55). The Soviet 
Union vetoed a Danish draft (56) which condemned Soviet "armed 
intervention" as well as a Canadian draft which was aimed at 
achieving limited measures and took the form of a request to the 
Secretary General to send a representative to Prague "to ensure 
the personal safety of the Czechoslovak leaders under detention" 
(57). 
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1980 was different 
in geopolitical terms from its previous interventions in 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary because it represented the first time 
the Soviet Union had pushed its troops beyond the zone inherited 
after the Second World War (58). This was reflected in the large 
number of states 
- 
Non Aligned as well as Western 
- 
which 
requested the convening of the Security Council to discuss the 
situation in Afghanistan (59). A draft resolution was proposed by 
the Non Aligned group on the Council which deplored the "recent 
armed intervention" and called for "the immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan". 
The draft resolution also called for respect for Afghanistan's non 
aligned status reflecting the Western view that the Soviet Union 
had stepped beyond its zone as well as the Non Aligned movement's 
fear of its members being the subjects of superpower intervention 
(60). The Western view was further reflected in President 
Carter's statement; 
"Any attempt by any outside force to gain 
control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded 
as an assault on the vital interests of the 
United States of America, and such an assault 
will be repelled by any means necessary, 
including military force. "(61) 
Afghanistan illustrates the fine line between intra-bloc conflicts 
in which the other superpower will be content with rhetorical 
confrontation, and inter-bloc conflicts which may escalate into a 
global military confrontation. The Carter Doctrine drew the line 
at the Afghan border suggesting that the United States was 
treating the intervention as politically allowable. However, 
President Reagan has redrawn the power frontier closer to the 
Soviet Union by authorising material support for the Afghan rebels 
(62). As we shall see, in cases of superpower confrontation on a 
power frontier, paralysis in the Security Council may lead to a 
climb down by one superpower in the course of diplomatic moves. 
Recent talks on Afghanistan between the Soviet Union and a 
representative of the Secretary General are evidence of a possible 
Soviet reappraisal of the extent of its zone of influence (63). 
The intervention in Grenada in 1983 which was legally 
justified on three grounds by the United States 
- 
the protection 
of nationals (and wider arguments of humanitarian intervention to 
protect the whole population), the invitation of the Governor 
General and regional action by OECS (64) 
- was, in reality, an 
application of the so-called Reagan Doctrine. This doctrine or 
policy encompasses support for anti-communists 
- 
whether 
established governments or rebels 
- 
not only in the American 
hemisphere but throughout the world (65). Consequently, the 
present United States' administration supports the Contras 
fighting in Nicaragua; the Khmer Rouge fighting the 
Vietnamese-imposed government in Kampuchea; Savimbi's UNITA 
guerrillas fighting the Soviet/Cuban backed MPLA government in 
Angola and the Afghan mujahedin (66). These interventions do not 
fit the historic pattern of superpower behaviour in that they are 
indirect and are sometimes extra-hemispheric (67). The Reagan 
Doctrine is offensive, it aims to "recover communist controlled 
turf for freedom" (68) and so goes beyond the intra-bloc 
interventions so far discussed which were aimed at maintaining 
bloc cohesiveness. In effect the United states is trying to stand 
the dominoes back up. Thus with at least one of the superpowers 
positively asserting influence in areas under the other's control, 
there is the potential for more inter-bloc confrontations leading 
to further paralysis in the Security Council. The more the 
superpowers try to exert world influence the less chance the 
Council has of taking action. 
In the Council, ambassador Kirkpatrick of the United States 
also argued that the United States was defending the principle of 
self-determination by its action towards Grenada, whereas when the 
Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan it was denying that 
principle (69). Such arguments are fallacious because the United 
States also supports anti-communist dictatorships such as in Chile 
and Pakistan (70). The Grenada intervention was excessive because 
by no stretch of the imagination did the tiny island represent a 
strategic threat to the security of the United States (71). Even 
the United States closest ally 
- 
the United Kingdom 
- 
refused to 
support it in vetoing a draft resolution condemning the "armed 
intervention" and calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops 
(72). Unlike the cases of Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, 
the United States was unable to avoid using the veto to protect 
its interests. 
Indeed, the United States has had to use its veto power 
increasingly over the past decade to prevent the Council adopting 
resolutions against what it believes are its strategic interests. 
As has already been mentioned (73) it has vetoed any action by the 
Council as regards Central America unless the resolution expressly 
leaves the matter of pacific settlement to the Contadora group of 
states (Mexico, Columbia, Panama and Venezuela) (74). This proved 
to be a sufficient amount of regionalism to enable the United 
States to allow the adoption of resolution 530 (75) which 
expressed support for Contadora's efforts. 
However, any proposed draft resolutions which have purported 
to criticise United States' actions towards Nicaragua have 
attracted the American veto (76). After the International Court 
found that the United States had illegally intervened militarily 
against Nicaragua by, inter alia, supporting the Contras (77), the 
United States predictably used its power of veto to defeat draft 
resolutions urgently calling for full and immediate compliance 
with the World Court's judgement (78). The representative of the 
United States stated that his country's policy towards Nicaragua 
would continue to be based on the protection of the United States 
and of Nicaragua's neighbours due to Nicaragua's close military 
and security ties with Cuba, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact 
(79). The preponderance of strategic over legal justifications in 
the United States' argument before the Council highlights that 
country's view that any world bodies such as the International 
Court or the Security Council are to be excluded from acting 
within its bloc (80). 
So far we have seen the permanent member status of the two 
superpowers effectively excluding the Security Council from taking 
any action regarding disputes within their respective hemispheres. 
However, this does not represent the full extent of the 
hemispheric restriction on the Council. There are suggestions 
that another permanent member - China - has a hemispheric 
influence over parts of the Far East (81); an area where the 
Soviet Union has substantial influence, for example in Vietnam. 
Consequently, when in 1979, Vietnam invaded Kampuchea to overthrow 
the Chinese supported Pol Pot regime and to instal a puppet 
regime, the Chinese saw that as a threat to their security and 
part of a "greater Soviet hegemonism" (82). The Chinese resorted 
to a punitive attack against Vietnam (83). The Security Council 
became a verbal battleground between the Soviet Union and China. 
The Soviet Union operated its veto on two occasions during the 
debate to protect Vietnam from criticism (84). Interestingly, 
China did not use its veto even though the second draft resolution 
referred obliquely to its attack against Vietnam. This is 
probably a part of China's policy of aligning itself with the 
Third World rather than regarding itself as a superpower. A 
denial of that status has probably led to Communist China limiting 
the use of its veto since taking the permanent seat (85). 
3 Inter-bloc situations 
The superpowers' pervasive global interests mean that 
potentially there are very few areas in the world in which the 
Council can utilize fully the powers at its disposal. It is 
axiomatic that where there is a case of direct East-West 
confrontation there will be little possibility of a Security 
Council resolution. Nevertheless, there is evidence to the effect 
that in these inter-bloc disputes, the Security Council can 
sometimes play a significant role. 
As has been mentioned (86), Great Power unanimity collapsed 
almost immediately with the inscription of the Iranian crisis on 
the Council's agenda on January 28 1946 (87). The crisis arose 
out of the continued Russian occupation of the region of 
Azerbaijan in the north of Iran following the end of the Second 
World War (88). The Iranians supported by the United States 
desired to involve the Security Council. The situation concerned 
the extent of the Soviet Union's zone of influence which, in this 
area, was still in a state of flux (89). The United States saw a 
danger to the vital oil supplies and the threat of Soviet 
expansion to the Gulf. The situation was the first classic case 
of East-West confrontation. The Secretary General, Trygve Lie, 
foresaw that debate in the Security Council would not produce 
anything concrete by way of settlement of the dispute, 
"... open disagreements openly arrived at are 
not necessarily preferable to processes of 
diplomacy of a more discrete and effective 
character. "(90) 
Nevertheless, the Iranians requested a meeting of the Security 
Council (91), which prompted the Soviet Union to walk out saying 
that the dispute would be settled by bilateral negotiations 
between the Soviet Union and Iran (92). The United States was 
left free to manipulate the Council into adopting a resolution 
(93) which directed the Secretary General to discover the progress 
of negotiations and the Soviet intentions as to withdrawal. Lie 
reported that the Soviets would withdraw on May 6 (94) at which 
point the Iranians wanted the question to be removed from the 
Council's agenda. However, the United States insisted on keeping 
the item on (95) illustrating that the situation was really a 
confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. The 
Soviets withdrew. 
Franck sees the Council's involvement with the Iranian 
question as harrassing rather than facilitating the solution to 
the problem. He criticises the "institutionalised crisis 
management technique" of the Council which "conduces to the 
striking of poses and the taking of rigid positions" that seem to 
take on a "metaphysical reality", which was heightened in this 
case by the "agenda question" (96). Nevertheless, the 
manipulation of the Council by the United States indicated that 
country's serious intent. From the striking of poses in the 
public forum, the Soviet Union could climb down quietly in private 
under the aegis of the Secretary General's diplomatic efforts 
(97). 
The combination of Council debate and the Secretary General's 
diplomacy also helped to settle another early East-West 
confrontation in the life of the United Nations. By 1948 it was 
becoming clear that there was going to be no agreement between the 
Western powers and the Soviet Union over the creation of a unified 
Germany (98). The Western powers began creating the Federal 
Republic, the Soviets responded by blockading West Berlin. This 
blockade was successfully circumvented by a massive airlift. The 
Security Council was convened at the request of the West, although 
the Soviet Union denied the Council's jurisdiction and vetoed any 
resolutions (99). Instead, Secretary General Lie's "quiet 
diplomacy" induced the Soviets to agree to stop the blockade. 
Franck expresses the view that the United Nations "provided a 
setting for very quiet informal diplomacy" in which each party 
"could measure the intentions of the other without having to pay 
the diplomatic price for initiating negotiations". Indeed, this 
corridor diplomacy is sometimes very effective in that it creates 
a "UN smokescreen" (100) which facilitates settlement and relaxes 
tensions which are partly created by the heated debate in the 
deadlocked Council. It appears that the venting of anger and the 
taking of inflexible positions in a public forum are possibly 
necessary prerequisites, on occasions, to private settlement. 
One must not underestimate the role of the Council in one of 
the most dangerous situations to threaten world peace since 1945. 
In 1962 the Americans purported to use the forum as a tactical 
measure with no real intention of using it to negotiate with the 
Soviets over the withdrawal of missiles from Cuba (101). The 
United States convened the Council and introduced a draft 
resolution which had no chance of being adopted (102). It 
reasserted its demand "for immediate dismantling and withdrawal 
from Cuba of all missiles and other offensive weapons" and the 
dispatch to Cuba of a "United Nations observer corps to assure and 
report on compliance". Only after the affirmative "certification 
of compliance" would the quarantine imposed by the United States 
be terminated. The call for withdrawal of the missiles was 
expressly stated to be "under Article 40", that is a "decision" of 
the Council having binding force under Article 25. The Soviet 
draft resolution (103) was equally uncompromising in that it 
condemned the actions of the Americans and called for the 
immediate revocation of the "decision to inspect the ships of 
other states bound for" Cuba, and for an end "to any kind of 
interference in the internal affairs of" Cuba. 
There appeared little chance of settling the issue through 
these kind of polarised proposals, but the draft resolutions did 
overlap in one area; they both called for bilateral negotiations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union to remove the 
threat to the peace. Acting Secretary General U Thant seized on 
this common area in a letter to Kennedy and Khruschev in which he 
called for the "voluntary suspension of all arms shipments to Cuba 
and also the voluntary suspension of the quarantine.... for a 
period of two to three weeks" (104). On October 26,1962, 
President Kennedy agreed to the proposal (105). The Soviets 
indicated their willingness to accept by stopping the shipments. 
This eventually led to a tacit agreement by which the Soviets 
would remove their missiles already emplaced in Cuba in return for 
the American withdrawal of missiles from Turkey (106). 
It may appear that it was the Secretary General's diplomatic 
moves which helped to settle the dispute, whereas moves in the 
Council were a failure. This view is founded on the belief that 
the Security Council is an adjudicative body. The Council, being 
a political organ, very rarely acts in this fashion, especially 
when the parties to the dispute are the Soviet Union and the 
United States. In these situations it establishes the often 
extreme positions of the parties, which obviously cannot be 
reconciled in the public forum, so necessitating the supplementary 
aid of diplomacy. Rhetorical confrontation in the Council can be 
a forerunner to the successful settlement of the dispute by 
diplomacy. 
The inter-bloc situations examined so far 
- 
the Iranian 
situation 1946, the Berlin Blockade 1948, and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis 1962 
- 
all involved, more or less, direct confrontation 
between East and West. However, a large preponderance of modern 
warfare concerns the indirect involvement of the superpowers, in 
which one or both will confront the other by the use of proxy 
armies 
- 
often in the form of national liberation fronts (107). 
In these situations the danger of escalation is less because the 
superpowers are effectively two steps away from all out war 
- 
indirect confrontation must turn into direct confrontation which 
in turn must escalate. Thus with this cushion the superpowers are 
less willing to compromise. As with the situation of direct 
East-West confrontation, this renders the Security Council a 
barren place, but unlike direct inter-bloc disputes, there is 
often little possibility of diplomacy filling the vacuum. Two 
conflicts will be examined to illustrate how indirect superpower 
confrontation limits Council action, namely Angola and Vietnam. 
The conflict in Vietnam has lasted in various forms from 1946 
to the present day if one includes the North's takeover of the 
South in 1975 (108) and the Vietnamese expansion into Kampuchea in 
1979 (109). This analysis will be confined to the period 
1946-1973 (110) when the conflict was an indirect confrontation 
between East and West (111). It was a battle on the edge of the 
"zones of influence", in this case the 17th parallel. The United 
States was determined to hold the line for if Vietnam fell to 
communism the "domino theory" (112) suggested that neighbouring 
countries would fall as communism spread through Indo-China. The 
United States did not distinguish between the Chinese and the 
Soviets who both supported the North Vietnamese, but with 
hindsight, the American defeat can be seen as an expansion of the 
Soviet sphere (113). 
The period 1946-1954 saw the French fighting the North 
Vietnamese communist movement until the French were heavily 
defeated at Dien Bien Phu (114). Although the French were 
fighting to maintain their colonial empire in this period, by 1954 
the conflict was taking on a Cold War aspect with the United 
States paying 75% of the French costs in fighting the war (115). 
After Dien Bien Phu, a conference was held at Geneva in July 1954 
to consider the future of French Indo-China (116). A cease-fire 
agreement divided Vietman at the 17th parallel, while the Final 
Declaration of the Conference (117) provided for elections to be 
held leading to a single Vietnamese state. The elections did not 
come about mainly because of South Vietnamese opposition (118), 
and so the scene was set for a conflict between North and South 
with Sino-Soviet aid to the former and American military 
commitment to the latter. 
The Security Council, indeed the United Nations, had little 
to do either with the 1954 Conference or the preceding period 
(119). After French involvement was replaced by American 
commitment the Security Council played a peripheral role. That 
role will be briefly examined. 
In September 1959, the government of Laos complained to the 
Secretary General that foreign troops had been crossing its 
north-eastern border, and identified those elements as belonging 
to the Hanoi regime (120). It asked for assistance, including the 
dispatch of a United Nations emergency force to halt the 
"aggression" and to prevent it from spreading. The Council 
considered the matter and decided to send a four-nation 
sub-committee to investigate and report on the facts of the case 
(121). The sub-committee reported in November that most of the 
attacks against Laos "were of a guerrilla character" and so did 
not constitute a crossing of the frontiers of Laos by the North 
Vietnamese (122). 
In May 1964, the government of Cambodia complained to the 
Security Council of alleged acts of "aggression" directed against 
it by South Vietnamese and United States' forces (123). These two 
states denied the charge, and suggested that the non-demarcation 
of the boundary between Cambodia and South Vietnam was the reason. 
The United States representative suggested that the answer would 
be a role for a United Nations force, emplaced to observe the 
integrity of the boundary (124). South Vietnam indicated its 
willingness to accept such an observer force on its territory, but 
Cambodia was opposed to having it on its side of the border (125). 
No observer or peacekeeping forces were sent. 
In August 1964, the United States requested that the Council 
consider the attacks on American vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin by 
the North Vietnamese (126). The Hanoi regime was unwilling to 
state its case before the Council and declared via the Soviet 
Union (127) that consideration of the problem did not lie with the 
Security Council, but with the members of the 1954 Geneva 
Conference. 
In January 1966, the United States requested a meeting of the 
Security Council and submitted a draft resolution calling for 
"immediate discussions without preconditions", with the priority 
being the arrangement for a cessation of hostilities (128). The 
Soviet representative objected to a Council meeting to discuss the 
Vietnam war. He stated that the move by the United States was a 
diversionary tactic to cover the expansion of its aggressive war 
in Vietnam as evidenced by the resumption of its "barbaric" air 
raids on the North (129). The overwhelming atmosphere of distrust 
between the superpowers meant that the American proposal was not 
even voted on. 
Although many other complaints and correspondence were 
directed to the Security Council, Vietnam was only discussed by 
the body on the four occasions outlined above, in which no 
concrete measures were adopted. Yet the situation was so grave in 
Vietnam that although it was not on the agenda of the 21st session 
of the General Assembly, 107 out of 110 speakers referred to it. 
It was a virtual poll of international public opinion. All of 
those who spoke on the subject recognised the conflict in Vietnam 
as a serious threat to international peace and security which had 
the potential to spread beyond south-east Asia and ignite a Third 
World War (130). 
There were certain factors which restricted the ability of 
the Security Council or General Assembly to deal with the threat 
to the peace which Vietnam posed. At the Geneva Conference in 
1954, very few of the participants envisaged United Nations' 
involvement, particularly the North Vietnamese and Chinese (131). 
These two countries maintained a strong desire to exclude the 
United Nations from being involved, for as the "Peking Review" 
remarked, 
"The United Nations is manipulated and 
controlled by the United States; it has 
degenerated into a US tool for aggression and 
has done many evil things. "(132) 
It had some justification for feeling this in that the West had 
dominated and, to a certain extent, had manipulated the United 
Nations in the early years particularly, as regards the Chinese, 
in the case of Korea in 1950 (133). The United States had also 
prevented the Communist Chinese from taking the permanent seat 
(134). The Chinese and North Vietnamese, not being represented at 
the United Nations, felt a deep distrust for the Organization 
(135), which when combined with the mutual distrust between the 
Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War, had the 
result of giving the United Nations little possibility of taking 
positive steps to solve the conflict in Vietnam. 
The United States relied on a similarity between the Korean 
War and the conflict in Vietnam to justify its support for the 
South (136). In the case of Korea, the United States was willing 
to turn its support for South Korea into a United Nations' action 
at the outset of the war, whereas in Vietnam, the United States 
only showed a willingness to involve the United Nations when the 
war was going against them, by which time the position of the 
opposing parties and their respective superpower backers had 
become too intransigent for the United Nations to intervene. 
While in the case of Korea, the Communist attack from the north 
was a clear breach of Article 2(4) and a "breach of the peace" 
within Article 39, the Vietnamese situation was more complicated, 
evidenced by the fact that there was considerable support for the 
Vietcong in the South (137). There was no discernable initial 
aggression by the North and no significant event which would have 
enabled a collective response as in the case of Korea, and 
certainly the Soviet Union was not going to absent itself and so 
allow the collective response to become a collective United 
Nations' response. Vietnam could best be described as a gradually 
escalating, internationalized civil war which was a "threat to the 
peace" rather than a clear "breach of the peace" as in Korea. The 
gradual escalation of the conflict in Vietnam severely limited the 
potential of United Nations' action. It had not really dealt with 
the situation at its origin 
- 
either in 1946 or by participating 
in the 1954 Conference, and thereafter it was in the untenable 
position of having to deal with the conflict from the outside. 
The Secretary General 
-U Thant - supported this view. In 
his New Year message in 1966, he pointed out that just as the 
parties to the conflict had decided in 1954 to negotiate the end 
of the war outside the framework of the United Nations, the 
conflict could not be settled in 1966 under the auspices of the 
United Nations because only the United States, of all the parties 
to the conflict, was a Member of the United Nations (138). U 
Thant preferred diplomacy rather than open debate in the Security 
Council and at several points in the conflict made proposals for 
settlement (139). 
The Vietnam War only involved one superpower directly and so 
the other 
- 
the Soviet Union 
- 
was quite content to block any 
diplomatic moves initiated by the Security Council or in the 
United Nations as a whole, because by indirectly encouraging the 
North Vietnamese, it was partly tying up the United States 
militarily and politically, and also embarrassing it. The North 
Vietnamese showed considerable independence evidenced by the aid 
received from both the Soviet Union and the Chinese, whereas the 
South Vienamese were to all intents and purposes "puppets" of the 
United States. The Soviets did not control the North Vietnamese, 
a fact illustrated by the Hanoi regime's refusal to appear before 
the Security Council after that body had adopted a Soviet proposal 
to that effect (140). The asymmetry of the conflict in Vietnam 
- 
in other words the difference in commitment between the two 
superpowers 
- 
meant that it was virtually impossible to solve in 
the United Nations (141). 
One must remember that at the outset of the Vietnam War, the 
United States was the dominant world power. It had a vast nuclear 
superiority over the Soviet Union and so felt able to draw power 
frontiers fairly close to the Soviet frontiers in order to prevent 
communism spreading. The Soviet Union's inferiority was reflected 
in the indirect manner of its support for North Korea and North 
Vietnam. It was only when nuclear parity was achieved that the 
Soviets felt able to confront the United States in the 
intermediate areas between the power blocs 
- 
in the Middle East 
and Africa (142). 
Moscow saw an MPLA ruled Angola as giving them "a promising 
zone of influence in a vast, rich and strategically located 
country just south of Zaire, a staunch US ally" (143). Its 
initial intervention 
- 
using Cubans on the side of the MPLA in 
1976 was based on a accurate assessment of United States' 
reaction. The United States was unwilling to counter-intervene 
because of the so-called "Vietnam syndrome" prevalent in the 
American public and government which effectively prevented the 
United States from intervening in foreign civil wars (144). Since 
1980, however, the United States' Administration has sufficiently 
regained its confidence to repeal the Clark Amendment banning aid 
to Angolan insurgents (145) as part of the so-called Reagan 
Doctrine (146). The scene has been set for another indirect 
superpower confrontation but this time the Soviets are the more 
committed. 
The situation is made more complicated by the involvement of 
South Africa (147), which since 1976 has, for lengthy periods, 
occupied parts of Southern Angola and has supported UNITA in its 
continuing attacks against the MPLA. The Security Council has 
repeatedly condemned South African "aggression" (148), the 
superpowers finding that such resolutions are a useful smokescreen 
for covering up their own activities in the region. In their 
speeches before the Council the representatives of the Soviet 
Union and the United States recognize the underlying power 
conflict. The ambassador of the United States has criticised the 
presence of 13,000 Cuban troops as an example of foreign 
intervention in a civil war (149), and has abstained on 
resolutions which have recommended the furnishment of military 
assistance to Angola (150). The United States has not gone so far 
as to publicly support the activities of Pretoria in relation to 
Angola, but has tried to take the edge off any resolution which 
might go beyond condemnation. The Soviet Union, on the other 
hand, has persistently criticised the United States and other NATO 
countries for supporting South Africa and for preventing the 
application of mandatory sanctions against that state. It sees 
sanctions not only as a method of punishing South Africa for its 
aggressions but also as a means of ending apartheid (151). It 
suits the Soviet Union to condemn South Africa and to urge 
effective measures against an economy in which it has very little 
interest, not only to curry favour with the Non Aligned, but also 
to strengthen and defend its base in Angola. 
Superficially, the Security Council appears not to be 
excluded from considering the situation in Angola. However, it 
only concentrates on the regional elements, it is effectively 
excluded from dealing with the fundamental problem 
- 
the power 
conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
4 Regionalism 
So far we have seen how the influences and interests of the 
superpowers effectively preclude the Council from taking action in 
relation to disputes within large areas of the globe. Another de 
facto limitation on the Council's sphere of operation is 
regionalism, which is often, but not always, related to the 
spheres of influence claimed by the superpowers. 
De jure, however, the United Nations Charter does not permit 
regionalism to be paramount over globalism (152). The Charter, in 
Chapter VIII Article 52(1), recognises "the existence of regional 
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to 
the maintenance of international peace and security as are 
appropriate for regional action". It even provides, in Article 
52(3), that the Security Council "shall encourage the development 
of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional 
arrangements" (153). However, the provisions of Chapter VIII make 
it plain that the Security Council is supreme in matters relating 
to international peace and security. In relation to the pacific 
settlement of disputes, the Council's paramouncy is maintained by 
Article 52(4), whilst Article 53(1) provides, 
"The Security Council shall, where 
appropriate, utilize such regional 
arrangements or agencies for enforcement 
action under its authority. But no 
enforcement action shall be taken under 
regional arrangements or by regional agencies 
without the authorization of the Security 
Council.. " 
Articles 52(4) and 53(1), read together, mean that the Security 
Council retains supremacy over matters coming within Chapter VI or 
Chapter VII. Any lingering doubts about overall United Nations' 
supremacy are seemingly removed by Article 103 which states, 
"In the event of a conflict between the 
obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their 
obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present 
Charter shall prevail. " 
However, the compromise between regionalism and globalism attained 
in Chapter VIII (and Article 103) is itself compromised by Article 
51. The insertion of this provision into the Charter at San 
Francisco arose from 
"The fear that a possible stalemate of the 
Security Council, caused by the veto power of 
a permanent member, might cripple the 
functioning of regional arrangements finally 
led to a provision safeguarding the right to 
individual and collective self-defence. Thus 
the unified concept of a regional arrangement 
was split and there ultimately resulted 
regional organizations based on collective 
self-defence under Article 51. "(154) 
Article 51 destroys, to some extent the supremacy of the 
Security Council in relation to security matters, for it provides 
that "individual or collective self-defence" may be taken by 
Members "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary 
to maintain international peace.. ". This should be contrasted 
with Article 53(1) which seems to allow the Council to veto any 
enforcement action by a regional organization. Article 51 
effectively removes action taken in collective self-defence from 
being vetoed. 
Writers have tended to concentrate on the difference between 
regional organizations in the nature of collective self-defence 
pacts under Article 51 and regional organizations in the nature of 
"arrangements" and "agencies" under Chapter VIII, rather than 
looking to specific actions to see if they are of a defensive or 
enforcement nature. This analysis probably takes account of the 
fact that many of the actions taken by regional organizations may 
be viewed subjectively as either, although objectively speaking 
such actions can only be one or the other (155). 
Akehurst states that a regional arrangement is covered by 
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter if the Parties declare 
it to be so and if the United Nations has accepted this claim by 
its practice (156). Kelsen adds that such an arrangement must be 
restricted to a certain geographical area by the agreement, and 
any action taken under the agreement must have the character of a 
regional action (157). Berberg suggests that an additional 
qualification for a regional organization to be within Chapter 
VIII, is that it "must provide for an adequate mechanism for 
settling local disputes" (158). Whether these requirements would 
exclude NATO and the Warsaw Pact from being subject to the 
restrictions of Chapter VIII has been debated (159). One must not 
forget that they were designed to circumvent a potential veto 
under Chapter VIII by being specifically based on Article 51 
(160). Putting these debates to one side, this writer takes the 
view that organizations such as NATO are not, objectively 
speaking, regional arrangements under Chapter VIII. Such 
arrangements are probably confined to those which have similar 
functions and powers to the United Nations as regards 
international peace (161), except these powers are operated on a 
regional not a global basis. Organizations designed primarily to 
enhance the defence and military capabilities of power blocs do 
not fit this concept. This does not mean that such "collective 
self-defence" pacts (162) do not undertake enforcement action, but 
if they do, it should be authorised by the Security Council under 
Article 53(1). On the other hand, if a regional organization, 
which primarily appears to come within Chapter VIII operates, on 
occasions, solely in collective self-defence, it should not 
require such authorization for it is acting under Article 51. 
Designating that a regional organization comes within Article 51 
or Chapter VIII is only a prima facie presumption that its actions 
will be based on those provisions, it does not prevent that 
organization from taking collective self-defence action under 
Article 51 even if it is a regional arrangement under Chapter 
VIII; nor does it prevent a prima facie collective self-defence 
pact from taking enforcement action under Article 53(1) as long as 
it is authorised by the Security Council (163). 
An alternative view is taken by Franck, 
"..... since 1945 
... 
these three Articles 
[51,52,53] have melded to produce an 
increasingly asserted right of regional 
organizations (in which he includes 
self-defence pacts] to take the law into their 
own hands, to act militarily without Security 
Council approval even in the absence of an 
armed attack, and to exclude the United 
Nations from jurisdiction over disputes in 
which one member of a regional organization is 
being forcibly purged of ideological 
non-conformity by the rest. "(164) 
Certainly in relation to superpower dominated organizations - the 
OAS and the Warsaw Pact 
- 
Franck is probably correct. Even if the 
superpowers make references to Article 51 or Chapter VIII, they 
are usually only using the Charter as a fig leaf to cover the 
naked abuse of power. However, whether Franck's cynical view can 
be applied to regional organizations in the intermediate areas of 
the world 
- 
such as the OAU is doubtful. Nevertheless, there is 
one factor common to the OAS, the Warsaw Pact and the OAU 
- 
that 
disputes in the areas of the world they cover are not, usually, 
the subject of Security Council action. In the case of the OAS 
and the Warsaw Pact this is because of the superpower veto, 
whereas, in the case of the OAU, it appears to be due to tha fact 
that both superpowers are vying for influence that a "hands-off" 
approach is taken. 
The OAS appears to be a regional organization for the 
purposes of Chapter VIII, not simply because its Charter 
specifically states that it is (165), but also because it is 
designed to perform similar functions to the United Nations on a 
hemispheric level (166). Nevertheless, it could act solely within 
Article 51 as a self-defence pact, a fact envisaged by its Charter 
(167). Be that as it may, unfortunately the OAS has sometimes 
been used by its dominant member - the United States - in an 
attempt to legalise interventions aimed at purging "ideological 
non-conformity" by one of the American states (168). 
In the case of Guatemala in 1954, the Soviet Union vetoed a 
draft resolution proposing to refer the matter to the OAS, citing, 
quite correctly Articles 52(4), 53(1) and 103 in support (169). 
The United States, comfortable in a Western dominated Council, was 
able to maintain the position that the situation should be dealt 
with by the OAS (170). 
Another dispute in which the de jure supremacy of the Council 
gave way to the de facto supremacy of the OAS was the United 
States' intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. 
Originally, solely a United States' operation, the OAS authorised 
the use of its own force (171), which remained mainly composed of 
United States' troops. Predictably the Soviet Union took the view 
that, 
"In order to cover up its armed intervention 
in the Dominican Republic, the United States 
is once more trying to retreat behind the 
screen of the Organization of American States, 
which it long ago placed in the service of its 
imperialist aims. "(172) 
The United States stated that the OAS action did not constitute 
"enforcement" action within the meaning of Article 53(1) which 
required prior Council authorization, arguing instead that the 
organization was undertaking a "peacekeeping operation" (173). 
Even if this was so, the Security Council, theoretically, was 
supreme and could only be disregarded initially if the action was 
in self-defence. 
Nevertheless, considerable effort is put into arguments 
trying to circumvent Article 53(1). Chayes admits that since the 
quarantine imposed by the United States and rubber stamped by the 
OAS during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 was not in response to 
an "armed attack" it could not be considered as self-defence. It 
was therefore enforcement action which was not prevented by 
Article 53(1), according to Chayes, because that provision should 
be interpreted to allow regional enforcement action when the 
Council has failed to disapprove 
-a situation usually caused by 
the veto (174). 
Why does the United States manipulate the OAS and the 
provisions of the United Nations Charter in attempts to legally 
justify its actions? It could, as the Soviet Union does, merely 
rely on spurious arguments of self-defence. Akehurst suggests 
that the reason for using the OAS is to give the action some 
degree of reasonableness, not necessarily legality (175). United 
States' politicians seem to go further than this, evidenced by 
Robert Kennedy, then United States' Attorney General, commenting 
on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
"It was the vote of the Organization of 
American States that gave the legal basis of 
the quarantine. It 
... 
changed our position 
from that of an outlaw acting in violation of 
international law into a country acting in 
accordance with twenty allies legally 
protecting their position. "(176) 
Comments such as this suggest that in American matters the OAS is 
paramount over the Security Council despite the provisions of the 
United Nations' Charter. 
The United States in its foreign policy "characteristically 
overvalues legal considerations" (177). It puts a considerable 
amount of emphasis on legal justifications as evidenced by its 
manipulation of Chapter VIII. The Soviet Union has a much simpler 
approach. It uses its regional organization - the Warsaw Pact - 
which, prima facie, is a self-defence pact, combined with a wide 
interpretation of Article 51, to maintain its hold on the Eastern 
bloc. This method circumvents the requirement of prior Security 
Council "authorization", for under Article 51, Council 
consideration and attempted measures follow any action taken in 
"collective self-defence" and, of course, the Soviets are able to 
prevent any criticism by using the power of veto (178). An 
example of the Soviet Union relying on Article 51 was during the 
Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968, 
".... the Charter itself, in Article 51 
specifically, permits states to take 
collective and individual measures for 
self-defence, and the actions undertaken by 
the Socialist countries are just such measures 
in conformity with the Charter. " (179) 
In the absence of an "armed attack", the Soviets reliance on 
Article 51 is transparent. In reality it represents a mechanism 
whereby intra-bloc disputes are kept from being the subject of 
Security Council measures. 
So far the examination of regional organizations fits in with 
the previous analysis of intra-bloc interventions by the 
superpowers. One would have thought that in the intermediate 
areas of the world the Security Council would not be restricted by 
arguments in favour of regionalism. Africa and its regional body 
- 
the OAU 
- 
are the most striking examples (180). After the 
United Nations' involvement in the Congo ended in 1964 there has 
been little Security Council interference in independent black 
Africa (181). 
There are remarkable similarities between the civil war in 
the Congo and the three-year-long Nigerian civil war (1967-1970) 
(182). Both involved problems of secession arising out of the 
artificial boundaries left by colonial powers, and both involved 
extensive suffering and loss of life. Yet the Congo produced a 
United Nations' involvement second only to Korea, whereas the 
Biafran tragedy was virtually ignored by the world organization 
(183). On no occasion was it discussed in the Security Council. 
The Secretary General of the United Nations had initially explored 
the possibility of exercising his good offices (184), but when he 
spoke before the 5th session of the OAU Assembly he stated that 
"the OAU should be the most appropriate instrument for the 
promotion of peace in Nigeria" (185). Again in his speech before 
the 6th session, he emphasised that in the long run only 
acceptance of OAU recommendations could put an end to the crisis 
(186). 
Since the establishment of the OAU (187) in May 1963, the 
Security Council has avoided even discussing many significant 
conflicts within the continent. This cannot be due entirely to a 
"hands off" attitude from the permanent members because there is 
often a significant permanent member involvement in many of the 
conflicts. A cynical view might be that the permanent members, 
particularly the superpowers, are playing the regionalism card 
knowing that the OAU is powerless to stop them intervening in 
Africa. 
In 1977-78, the Congo (renamed Zaire) again became an area of 
conflict with international repercussions. In March 1977 a force 
from Angola invaded the southern province of Shaba (formerly 
Katanga). President Mobutu of Zaire alleged that the insurgents 
were Soviet/Cuban backed with a core composed of remnants of the 
Katangese secessionists of the early 1960's (188). When a larger 
force invaded Shaba in May 1978, French and Belgian paratroops 
became involved ostensibly to rescue Europeans trapped in the 
mining town of Kolwesi, although in so doing they helped to repel 
the invaders (189). The matter was not discussed before the 
Council (190), nor the OAU probably in silent recognition of the 
fact that the conflict was a product of the uneasy and unstable 
spheres of influence in the area, with Soviet involvement in 
Angola and Western support for Zaire. Before the area became a 
power frontier between East and West, in other words, when Angola 
was still a Portuguese colony, the Security Council expressly 
preferred that the OAU should seek a peaceful solution after the 
United States and Belgium had intervened in the Congo to rescue 
white nationals held hostage in Stanleyville in December 1964 
(191). 
The sometimes ephemeral nature of the superpowers' influence 
in the continent is illustrated by the conflict in the Horn of 
Africa in 1977-1978. Prior to 1977 Ethiopia had received aid from 
the United States whereas Somalia was heavily supported by Moscow 
persuant to a Soviet/Somali Treaty of Friendship signed in 1974. 
However, when American aid to Ethiopia was withdrawn because of 
human rights abuses the Soviets started supporting Ethiopia as 
well as Somalia. Such was the situation when war broke out in 
June 1977 between the two countries in the disputed Ogaden desert. 
The conflict lasted until March 1978 when Somali troops withdrew 
from the Ogaden after a joint Cuban and Ethiopian offensive (192). 
The conflict appeared to be a breach of the peace and should have 
involved the Security Council. It did not meet probably because 
of anticipation of a Soviet veto combined with an apparent general 
policy of leaving such matters to the OAU. The OAU produced 
little by way of positive measures. Its eight nation mediation 
committee merely reaffirmed the inviolability of frontiers 
inherited from the colonial era (193). 
Vestiges of colonialism are probably significant factors in 
determining why the Security Council has little involvement in 
black Africa. Significant Council intervention could upset 
African Members who may see it as a form of neo-colonialism, and 
yet as we have seen, the superpowers are quite heavily involved in 
Africa. Even former colonial powers, particularly France, still 
play a role in African affairs. It is a paradoxical situation in 
which seemingly fiercely independent African states are only 
prepared to conciliate through the OAU and yet they are subject to 
superpower intervention. The fundamental reason for this is 
probably the economic dependence of many African states on Western 
and Soviet aid. 
The nine year long conflict between Chad and Libya is 
illustrative of the complicated nature of African disputes. It is 
unusual in inter-African disputes because Chad insists on 
referring it to the Security Council. In 1978, Chad complained of 
Libyan "aggression" and intervention in its internal affairs 
(194). The Council met, allowed the two disputants to vent their 
anger verbally and left the matter (195). Similar complaints were 
made by Chad in 1983 (196) and 1985 (197) with similar 
conclusions. The Security Council has shown a deference to the 
OAU by merely rubber stamping a resolution calling for financial 
support for an OAU peacekeeping operation (198), and by a 
statement made on behalf of the Council by its President which 
asked the parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means 
through the OAU in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter of 
the United Nations (199). Instead, the Chadians, faced with 
Libyan intransigence and OAU ineffectiveness, have chosen the 
military option, which combined with French help and the defection 
of previously Libyan backed rebels, has resulted in the Libyans 
being pushed back to their own frontier (200). 
Most of the conflicts examined so far have involved permanent 
members so making Council action unlikely. The major exception is 
the Biafran tragedy which indicates that even if there is no Great 
Power involvement the Security Council is still unwilling to 
intervene in black Africa. It may be argued that Biafra was 
essentially an internal dispute and so excluded from Council 
purview by Article 2(7). It will be seen later that situations 
such as Biafra and Sri Lanka today in which there are major 
atrocities and serious loss of life are of "international concern" 
and as such escape the limitation in Article 2(7) (201). 
Nevertheless, to dispel any doubts about the Council's policy 
towards Africa, we will briefly mention a dispute between two 
independent African states in which there was no overt superpower 
intervention. When Tanzanian troops and Ugandan rebels invaded 
Uganda in November 1978, President Amin of Uganda appealed to the 
United Nations' Secretary General to inform the Council of a 
"serious breach of the peace". Despite this appeal the Security 
Council did not meet. The OAU met but was divided between 
upholding the principle on the non-use of force in international 
relations and the desire to see the Amin regime overthrown (202). 
5 Conclusions 
The following is a brief summary of the geopolitical 
limitations on the competence of the Security Council: 
Generally, in conflicts within the superpowers respective 
blocs the Security Council will be prevented from taking action by 
the use of the veto. Similarly, in conflicts or disputes that are 
inter-bloc, in other words, which are cases of East-West 
confrontation, the Security Council will be paralysed. 
Nevertheless, the Council may perform a peripheral role in the 
settlement of inter-bloc disputes in that it sometimes is a 
prelude to a settlement by diplomacy. However, whether such open 
debates are a necessary prerequisite to successful settlement 
remains doubtful. 
In the intermediate areas of the world beyond the power 
blocs, the Security Council may operate without geopolitical 
restriction, unless the superpowers are trying to establish a 
sphere of influence in that particular area; or even, in some 
cases, are merely protecting a state in which one of them has an 
indirect involvement or limited interest. 
Intra-bloc disputes are often accompanied by arguments in 
favour of regionalism being paramount over universalism. De jure, 
the Charter of the United Nations maintains that the Security 
Council remains paramount; de facto, the superpower have ensured 
that their regional organizations are supreme. 
Even in the intermediate areas, the Security Council may show 
undue deference to a regional body. This may either be due to the 
fact that the superpowers are vying for control in these areas and 
are prepared to let a weak regional body provide the necessary 
veneer of pacific settlement while not getting to the substance of 
the problem, or it may be due to pure disinterest which amounts to 
a policy of leaving disputes in a particularly unimportant area to 
the relevant regional organization. Thus lack of Security Council 
concern could be due to the fact that the area is too 
strategically important or, conversely, too strategically 
unimportant. 
The question remains; how could more areas of the world be 
opened up to the positive and objective scrutiny of the Security 
Council ? 
It would be unrealistic to expect the permanent members of 
the Security Council to cast their votes in favour of the 
abolition of the veto power as required by Article 109 (203). The 
most that could be expected would be a gentlemen's agreement 
between the permanent members to veto only when their vital 
interests are affected, instead of vetoing in situations where 
they only have a limited concern (204). However, this scenario is 
also unlikely. 
A realistic reform would be to alter the rules of procedure 
to ensure that the Security Council is forced to scrutinize all 
international conflicts (205). At the moment the methods of 
seizing the Security Council of a dispute (206) rely on the 
initiative of states which allows for the non-discussion of 
certain disputes for geopolitical reasons. Procedural reform, of 
course, would not prevent the operation of the veto but it might 
lead the Council not to think in terms of resolutions and of 
potential vetoes but in terms of providing accommodation and 
conciliation (207). 
Sohn has suggested a method whereby the Council would have to 
consider all disputes or conflicts endangering international 
peace, by taking the initiative of complaining to the Security 
Council out of the hands of states under Article 35, and putting 
it into the hands of the Secretary General and people appointed by 
him. These people or "regional monitoring groups" would be placed 
strategically so as to be able to report on international 
violence. They would coordinate with regional organizations so 
that the Council and these regional organizations could act 
together, instead of at odds, in the settlement of disputes. The 
reports of these groups would be submitted by the Secretary 
General under Article 99 and so would, in all probability, have to 
be discussed by the Council. Further benefits of this method are 
pointed out by Sohn, 
"Such a monitoring procedure would enable the 
Security Council to deal with issues of 
international peace and security as routine 
matters 
.... 
although better procedure is no 
substitute for the willingness of UN Member 
states to fulfil their obligations 
...... 
very often a routinization of procedure 
enables states to comply with their 
obligations more easily 
... 
The most 
important gain would be that the Council would 
be functioning continuously 
.. 
rather than 
only at times of crisis. Maintenance of the 
peace would become for it a daily enterprise, 
increasing the cooperative spirit among its 
members and their understanding of the 
inter-dependence of various components of 
world peace. "(208) 
Such benefits may also help to lessen the geopolitical limitations 
on the Council, if only, to a slight extent. 
Notes 
(1) The increase in the number of members on the Security 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE COMPETENCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS PROVIDED BY THE CHARTER 
Chapter 1 contained an examination of the geopolitical 
limitations on the competence of the Security Council. However, 
it would be wrong to say that these limitations were extra-legal 
at least in their origins. The two principal geopolitical 
limitations, the power of the veto and the power of regional 
organizations, are both recognised in the Charter 
- 
in Article 27 
and Chapter VIII respectively. They therefore remain legal 
limitations. It is the use of these powers in the Security 
Council that has created limitations which are strongly 
influenced, if not solely determined, by political and strategic 
considerations - considerations which often go beyond the powers 
provided by the Charter for the operation of the veto and of 
regional organizations. This chapter will contain an examination 
of the Charter provisions as to jurisdiction which provide the 
detail within the framework of the larger scale, global 
limitations elucidated in chapter 1. The difference is 
essentially one of scale for it will be seen that many 
jurisdictional questions examined by the Security Council, for 
example the determination of a "threat to the peace" within 
Article 39, are, in essence, political decisions. That is not to 
say that legal considerations do not play an important role, on 
occasions, but such considerations only provide a counter-weight 
to the permanent members' interests which, if sufficiently strong, 
will predominate. 
This chapter will consider the relative openness of the 
Charter system regarding the maintenance of international peace 
and security through the Security Council, in other words whether 
there is any equivalence between the norms of jus cogens contained 
in Article 2(4) and the situations contained in Article 39 which 
give the Security Council jurisdiction under Chapter VII. Perhaps 
this may help us to distinguish between the type of situation, 
dispute or conflict which gives the Council competence under 
Chapter VI, and the type which gives it jurisdiction under Chapter 
VII. We may discover that there is no essential difference and 
that what determines competence under each Chapter are political 
factors. To elucidate whether there is a distinct type of 
situation which is dealt with under Chapter VII an attempt will be 
made to find a consistent practice of the usage of, and perhaps 
even arrive at definitions of, the terms used in Article 39 
- 
"threat to the peace", "breach of the peace" and "act of 
aggression". The analysis will then be concerned with whether the 
domestic jurisdiction limitation contained in Article 2(7) has any 
effect on the Council's competence. Once we have distinguished 
between the elements which spark off jurisdiction under Chapter VI 
and Chapter VII, the question of whether there is an essential 
difference in the nature of resolutions adopted under each Chapter 
will be examined. In essence, this will involve an examination of 
the mandatory/ recommendatory dichotomy. 
The essence of this chapter is to define the factors which 
give, and the limitations upon, the Council's jurisdiction as 
contained in the Charter. It is not concerned with the powers 
that are at the Council's disposal once it has jurisdiction. An 
examination of the powers and effectiveness of the Council is left 
to chapter 3. 
1 Whether the Security Council's jurisdiction is limited hy 
Article 2(4)? 
Article 2(4) is a peremptory norm of international law and a 
fundamental provision of the Charter (1). It states that all 
"Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force" (2). Since Article 2(4) purports to 
control the use of force by stating a norm of international law to 
which states must conform, and the Security Council is concerned 
with maintaining international peace by taking action against 
states using force, one might think that there would be a 
correlation between Article 2(4) and the competence of the 
Security Council. In other words, one might argue that the 
Security Council can only deal with actual or potential breaches 
of Article 2(4). Chapter VI may be seen to deal with potential 
breaches (3), whereas Chapter VII deals with actual breaches of 
Article 2(4). To agree with this hypothesis would be to accept a 
direct relationship between "threat or use of force" under Article 
2(4) and a "threat to the peace", "breach of the peace" and "act 
of aggression" under Article 39. In other words "threat of force" 
corresponds with "threat to the peace" and "use of force" is 
equivalent to a "breach of the peace" and "act of aggression". 
This necessarily would entail limiting the Security Council to 
situations which are or potentially could be breaches of Article 
2(4). Such a thesis envisages that the Charter established a 
"closed" rather than an "open" system to use the terminology of a 
systems analyst. The Security Council's competence would be 
defined, at its limits, by Article 2(4); to go beyond that and, 
say, determine that a situation was a "threat to the peace" when 
it was not a "threat of force" would be ultra vires the Charter. 
The above analysis illustrates an essential weakness in the 
arguments for a "closed" system, in that equating Article 2(4) 
with Article 39, it pushes to one side potential breaches of 
Article 2(4) which may be caught under Chapter VI or under Article 
39. The introduction of a wide, discretionary concept such as a 
potential breach of Article 2(4), weakens the argument beyond 
repair, because it would allow the Council to deal with a wide 
range of disputes that may theoretically breach Article 2(4) in 
time, but in reality, are unlikely to do so. 
The main advocate of a closed Charter system by which the 
Security Council's ultimate competence is defined by international 
law in the form of Article 2(4) is Joachim Arntz (4). Kelsen, on 
the other hand, advocates an open, discretionary system, 
"Of utmost importance is the difference 
between the meaning of 'threat of force' used 
in Article 2, paragraph 4, and that of 'threat 
to the peace' used in Article 39. It is 
completely within the discretion of the 
Security Council as to what constitutes a 
'threat to the peace'. " (5) 
Kelsen (6) and Higgins (7) state that because the Council is not 
fettered in its powers of determination under Article 39, such a 
determination, in a case where no obligation stipulated by 
customary international law or Charter law is breached, can create 
new law as to what constitutes a threat to or breach of the peace. 
In other words the Security Council is not limited in determining 
jurisdiction by international law. McDougal and Reisman agree, 
"...... the Charter does not require a 
violation of international law in any sense 
other than the constitution of a threat to the 
peace. "(8) 
As is to be expected from a politically orientated body, the 
Security Council has, in practice, manifested a preference for the 
open system. In particular it has applied the concept of a 
"threat to the peace" to essentially internal situations. Arntz 
argues that internal situations are not within the ambit of 
Article 39 because they do not constitute a "threat of force" 
against another state within the meaning of Article 2(4). He 
argues that the text of the Charter, particularly the preamble and 
Article 1, indicate that "peace" is the antithesis of war, and so 
the Charter only deals with threats to or breaches of inter-state 
or international peace, and not to intra-state or internal peace 
(9). Jonathan disagrees, 
"L'introduction de la formule 'menace 
contre la paix' avait justement pour but 
d'elargir le champ d'action du Conseil de 
securite. I1 s' agit, en effet, d'un terme 
tres general qui peut couvrir des hypotheses 
tres diverses: un conflit entre Etats aussi 
bien qu'une situation interne tres grave qui 
menace la paix parce que l'on peut s'attendre 
ä ce qu'elle ait des repercussions 
internationales. "(10) 
The evidence is that if an internal situation or civil war is 
serious enough the Security Council will become involved. This is 
sufficient, in itself, to destroy the "closed" Charter theory. 
In 1966 the Council determined that the "situation in 
Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security" (11). It cannot really be denied that the only "threat 
or use of force" arose from the activities of the guerrillas 
infiltrating Rhodesia from the frontline African states. 
Nevertheless, the Council decided that the situation in Southern 
Rhodesia itself constituted a "threat to the peace" evidenced by 
its policy of imposing sanctions against Rhodesia (12). 
In 1977, the Security Council determined "having regard to 
the policies and acts of the South African Government, that the 
acquisition by South Africa of arms and related materiel 
constitutes a threat to the maintenance of international peace and 
security" (13). It could be argued that the "acts" referred to 
are the frequent punitive attacks against the frontline countries 
of Botswana, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Lesotho, and 
so the "threat to the peace" has the international character that 
Arntz's formulation requires (14). Indeed, the resolution makes 
reference to South Africa's "persistent acts of aggression against 
neighbouring states". However, the resolution also refers to the 
"policies" of the South African government and calls for the 
elimination of apartheid and racial discrimination within the 
country. Given that the resolution was adopted against a 
background of riots and killing in the black townships, it is 
submitted that it is the internal system of apartheid that 
constitutes the "threat to the peace" with the border conflicts 
being manifestations of that threat (15). A parallel can be drawn 
with the arrival of oil tankers at Beira carrying oil for Rhodesia 
- 
an event which the Security Council seemed to view, in 
resolution 221 (16), as being, in itself, a "threat to the peace". 
However, the real threat was the situation in Southern Rhodesia 
itself, a fact later recognised by the Council in resolution 232. 
The Council initially made a limited finding of a threat because 
of political factors (17). The same can be said of South Africa, 
where the Western members refuse to allow a general finding of a 
threat (18). 
It is often forgotten that the Council determined that there 
was a "threat to the peace" arising from the crisis in the Congo 
(19) after the situation had deteriorated so badly as to 
constitute a civil war. It is arguable whether this was an 
internal situation as such with Belgian support for Tshombe and 
Soviet aid to Lumumba. However, there was certainly no direct 
"threat or use of force" by one state against another. At the 
time the Council found a "threat to the peace" in resolution 161 
the main foreign element of force consisted of the few hundred 
mercenaries employed by Tshombe to maintain Katanga's secession 
(20). The crisis had international repercussions in that the 
civil war could suck in outside forces including the superpowers 
and that was why the internal civil war in the Congo was a threat 
to international peace. The linkage of the civil war in the Congo 
and the threat to international peace was emphasised in resolution 
161 (21). 
The Security Council's measures against the Smith regime in 
Southern Rhodesia is the main thorn in the side of the advocates 
of a "closed" Charter system, although the situations in South 
Africa and the Congo are sufficient, in themselves, to cast doubt 
on this view. All three situations involved international 
repercussions of varying degrees but it must be remembered that 
these repercussions derive from the internal situation itself. To 
be sure, the Council often refuses to find a "threat to the peace" 
in situations that seem to fit the Rhodesian model. Portugal's 
failure to implement the General Assembly's "Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" (22) 
is one example. The Council went as far as to adopt a resolution 
in Addis Ababa which found that the "situation resulting from the 
policies of Portugal both in its colonies and in its constant 
provocations against neighbouring states seriously disturbs 
international peace and security" (23). Although this falls short 
of a finding under Article 39 there is evidence to suggest that a 
finding of a "threat to the peace" might eventually have been made 
as a result of international pressure against Western members 
(24). 
The above analysis suggests that a finding of a "threat to 
the peace" is, to a large degree, a political decision on the part 
of the Council, and so such a finding as regards a wholly internal 
situation is not precluded. Generally, however, the permanent 
members are not going to exercise this discretion unless the 
situation has potential international repercussions which could 
affect their interests, or even involve them in an escalating 
conflict. An alternative and no less plausible viewpoint would be 
to say that changing political views shape and change the legal 
meaning of concepts such as "threat to the peace". 
2 The difference between a "danger to international peace and 
security" and a "threat to the peace" 
The provisions of Chapter VI refer, in several instances, to 
a "dispute" or "situation" which is "likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security" (25). To save 
repeating this ungainly formula, the phrase "danger to 
international peace" will be used to signify the set of 
circumstances to be dealt with using the pacific settlement powers 
of the Council contained in Chapter VI of the Charter. The title 
of Chapter VII reads "action with respect to threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression". These terms are 
repeated in Article 39 which make it clear that the set of 
circumstances to be dealt with under Chapter VII are threats to or 
breaches of international peace (26). 
This section will be concerned with determining whether there 
is any objective difference between situations or conflicts dealt 
with under Chapter VI or those dealt with under Chapter VII, or 
whether the Security Council treats the powers contained in the 
two Chapters as one continuum, using them selectively and 
interchangeably as political factors, including the need for 
consensus, dictate. The main area of this analysis will concern 
the distinction, if any, between a "danger to international peace" 
and a "threat to the peace". Goodrich, Hambro and Simons make the 
point that it is the use of "threat to the peace" in Article 39 
that draws together the jurisdictional requirements of the two 
Chapters, 
"The distinction between the three terms [in 
Article 39] have not, however, been as much a 
source of controversy as the distinction 
between a 'threat to the peace' under Article 
39 and a dispute or situation the continuance 
of which is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and 
security', the language used in Article 
34. "(27) 
So close is the relationship that it will become clear from the 
following analysis that there is often no substantive factual 
distinction between the two; they are, in effect, often merely 
"labels" put into the resolutions to indicate the political 
climate in the Council. Conceptually, however, there is a legal 
distinction between a "danger" and a "threat". The latter, for 
example, is often used as a legal tool to facilitate the 
imposition of mandatory measures under Chapter VII (28), a 
function which the label "danger" is not legally qualified to 
perform. 
To say that there is little practical difference between a 
"danger to international peace" and a "threat to the peace" is not 
so radical as it may first appear. At San Francisco, the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals had provided for a link between Chapters 
VI and VII. The proposals had a provision at the beginning of 
what emerged to be Chapter VII of the Charter which empowered the 
Council to find a "threat to the maintenance of international 
peace and security" if the procedures in what is now Article 33(1) 
or recommendations in Article 36(1) had failed or had been ignored 
(29). In other words, the scale and the nature of the conflict 
may not have altered significantly since the Council had purported 
to deal with it under Chapter VI. The factor which converted a 
danger to international peace under Chapter VI to a threat to the 
peace under Chapter VII was not necessarily a change in the nature 
of the conflict (except its prolongation) but a failure by the 
Council to end it under Chapter VI. The provision was dropped at 
San Francisco not because it brought the concepts of danger and 
threat too close together, but because it fettered the Council's 
operation of its powers (30), that is it might have prevented the 
complete unfettered discretion of the Council in determining 
whether a situation was a "threat to the peace" or not. This was 
despite the fact that the proposed provision would have been of 
relative insignificance in practice for it was, itself, 
discretionary. 
Nevertheless, in its formative years the Council did seem to 
develop a jurisprudence purporting to differentiate between a 
danger and a threat to international peace, revealed most clearly 
by the Spanish question, 1946. The Council adopted a resolution 
(31) establishing a sub-committee of five members (32) to 
determine whether the "existence and activities of the Franco 
regime in Spain" (33) "does endanger international peace and 
security" (34). The sub-committee reported that the situation was 
of "international concern" (35) but not yet a "threat to the 
peace" within Article 39. There was a "potential menace to 
international peace" and therefore "a situation likely to endanger 
international peace" within Article 34 (36). 
The sub-committee thus created a distinction between a 
potential threat to the peace which corresponds to a danger within 
Chapter VI and an actual or real threat within Article 39. There 
is no further development of the distinction in the report except 
the factual findings that Spain had no imminent warlike intentions 
which suggests that the test is the relative immediacy of the war 
or conflict. However, the probable reason for distinguishing 
between a potential and an actual threat was that the 
sub-committee was labouring under an understandable view that 
Chapter VII was a "very sharp instrument" (37) which enabled the 
United Nations to wage war if necessary. This belief meant that 
it was reluctant to find a threat unless there was a very real and 
immediate danger to international peace which there was not in 
Spain. 
However, the powers of Chapter VII have been revealed to be 
not as formidible as believed in 1946 (38). This has resulted in 
the relaxation of the distinctions between a danger and a threat. 
Nevertheless, the motivating factor behind the Council's finding 
or not finding a "threat to the peace" remains, in most cases, the 
reluctance by some members to impose economic sanctions under 
Chapter VII. 
The development of the Security Council's arms embargo 
against South Africa is interesting for it reveals that often the 
difference between a potential threat and an actual threat or a 
danger and a threat is not an increase in the level of violence of 
a dispute or conflict, but the ephemeral motives and interests of 
the members of the Council. The Western members see the 
protection of their economic interests in South Africa as vital, 
and therefore their general aim is to stop a mandatory set of 
sanctions being imposed against the Pretoria government. 
Nevertheless, the international pressure on South Africa and 
consequently on Western governments has forced them to grant some 
concessions. Thus changing political factors affect the Council's 
jurisdictional finding often to a greater extent than any legal 
criteria. 
In 1963 the Council called upon all states to cease the 
shipment of arms and military material to South Africa after 
expressing its conviction "that the situation in South Africa is 
seriously disturbing international peace and security" (39). The 
call was only voluntary with the phrase "seriously disturbing" 
seemingly equivalent to "likely to endanger". As we have seen 
(40) this was eventually made mandatory in 1977 with a 
determination that the supply of arms to South Africa constituted 
a "threat to the peace". Ozgur summarizes the reason for this 
change, 
"Until November 1977, the Western permanent 
members of the Council had resisted the 
adoption of mandatory measures against South 
Africa. Once South Africa was adequately 
armed, however, Western members went along 
with the partial embargo, but resisted total 
sanctions including economic sanctions. The 
increased reaction by the black people and 
some guerrilla action in South Africa, world 
public opinion, the human rights policies of 
some Western leaders, and the reconsideration 
by Western states of their interest in Africa 
all led to the adoption of a mandatory arms 
embargo. it would have been quite 
hypocritical of those governments to be 
lecturing to the world on human rights while 
closing their eyes to apartheid and increasing 
repression in South Africa. "(41) 
He suggests that there may have been a change in the nature of the 
situation due to an increased level of violence within South 
Africa which may have influenced the Council in its determination 
of a threat, though the most significant factors were the 
political interests of the Western states (42). 
The gradual change in the Council's collective will can be 
traced in the language of its resolutions on South Africa. By 
1970, the determination was that, 
"..... the situation resulting from the 
continued policies of apartheid and the 
constant build up of the South African 
military and police forces 
..... 
constitutes 
a potential threat to international peace and 
security. "(43) 
The original draft resolution sponsored by the Non Aligned members 
of the Council (44) contained the phrase "serious threat", but 
with Western opposition the second and final draft amended this to 
"potential threat" (45). The representative of the United Kingdom 
expressed the West's opposition to the earlier drafts, 
"(they] gave us concern because the language 
employed appeared to be taken from Chapter VII 
of the Charter. However, the amendment 
...... 
makes it clear that this is not so. We are 
certainly not opposed to the mention of a 
'potential threat' 
..... 
"(46) 
With the prevention of Chapter VII achieved, the resolution's call 
for an arms embargo was generally accepted to be only 
recommendatory, even though it also referred to a "real threat to 
the security" of surrounding African states due to the arms build 
up in South Africa. 
"Seriously disturbing international peace", "likely to 
endanger international peace", "threats to the security" of 
neighbouring states, "potential threat to international peace" and 
a "threat to international peace" are terms used by the Council. 
They could be said to be arranged here in a scale of ascendancy 
(47) with the last being the most serious and the only one which 
is recognised as representing an implied finding under Article 39 
(48). The factors which produce a move up or down the scale are a 
combination of factual and determinable change in the level and 
nature of the conflict and also political and strategic 
adjustments by the members of the Security Council, particularly 
the permanent members. The political factors being the stronger, 
the phraseology used should be seen as an indicator of a change in 
political will rather than providing any significant criteria by 
which one can legally define the difference between a danger to 
international peace (49) and a threat to international peace. 
Nevertheless, political factors primarily influence the timing of 
a finding of a "threat to the peace". Once a finding is made it 
is possible to determine why a situation is a "threat to the 
peace" and to construct a legal definition (50). In doing this 
one should try to ignore the political factors which influenced 
the designation of the situation as a threat to the peace at a 
particular time, for it may well be that, legally speaking, such a 
threat had existed for many years prior to the finding. 
The influence of political factors in finding a "threat to 
the peace" in the Rhodesian situation illustrates the influence a 
solitary permanent member can have. Resolution 216 adopted on 
November 12 1965 condemned UDI and called upon states not to 
recognise the "illegal regime" or render any assistance to it. 
The resolution contained no determination of a danger to 
international peace nor of a threat to the peace because it arose 
from the desire to find a compromise between a British draft 
resolution (51), which determined that the "continuance of the 
resulting situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security" and a draft resolution proposed 
by the Ivory Coast (52) which stated that the declaration of 
independence constituted a "threat to international peace and 
security". The difference in terminology arose principally 
because of the British and Western view that Rhodesia should not 
be subjected to punitive sanctions but to a policy of gradually 
escalating sanctions to urge peaceful change, whereas the 
Afro-Asian and Communist view was that Rhodesia should be the 
subject of immediate and punitive mandatory sanctions and possibly 
the use of military force (53). The difference was not primarily 
one of a different perception of the nature of the situation in 
Rhodesia. According to the General Assembly a "threat to the 
peace" had existed in 1963 (54), and since the Assembly's 
resolutions are also politically motivated, to a great extent, it 
may well be that a "threat to the peace" had existed for some 
years prior to the Assembly so deciding. 
Due to the United Kingdom's hold over the other members of 
the Council in the form of its veto, the Council's resolutions 
reflected the British policy rather than that of the Afro-Asian 
states (55). The Council gradually moved towards a finding of a 
threat to the peace with a corresponding move from voluntary to 
mandatory measures which were eventually made comprehensive. 
Resolution 217 adopted on November 20 1965 determined that the 
"continuance in time [of the Rhodesian situation) constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security" (56). This phrase 
appears to be akin to a "potential threat" and so it was no 
surprise when the Council found a "threat to the peace" 
specifically in relation to the oil tankers arriving at Beira 
(57), then a general finding of a "threat to the peace" as regards 
the Southern Rhodesian situation as a whole (58), accompanied by 
the imposition of mandatory sanctions which were later made 
comprehensive (59). An intermediate finding of a potential threat 
is generally indicative of the Council members first consensual 
step towards an implied finding under Article 39. Ambassador 
Goldberg of the United States summarized the state of the 
Council's deliberations when voting on resolution 217, 
"[the resolution] does not mention whether 
Chapter VI or Chapter VII is brought to bear. 
My Government agrees with this interpretation 
of the text. "(60) 
This bizarre comment merely reflects the mid-point between the 
polarized views of the other Council members. For example, the 
Ivory Coast believed that resolution 217 imposed mandatory 
sanctions, whereas the British viewed it as "not falling under 
Chapter VII" (61). 
The phrase "potential threat", which conceptually appears to 
be no different to a danger to the peace, is a product of the 
requirement of the need for consensus in a body dominated by the 
veto power. Bailey writes, 
"In a world of conflicting principles and 
interests the Security Council can act on 
behalf of all the Members only by an 
unremitting search for compromise between 
conflicting principles and pressures; it is 
out of these national compromises that 
international compromises must be sought. "(62) 
If some members want a finding of a threat accompanied by Chapter 
VII action, whilst others, for equally political reasons, desire 
only a finding of a danger and a recommendation of peaceful 
settlement under Chapter VI, in order to produce some sort of 
resolution a compromise is often achieved by the use of "potential 
threat" accompanied perhaps by voluntary measures. If a 
compromise is not achieved the veto will inevitably be used. 
The need for consensus may produce a jurisdictional finding 
of a potential threat or it may result in no finding being made at 
all (63), or it may manifest itself in the appearance of two 
different types of finding. After considering a complaint by 
Senegal of armed attacks by Portugal from its colony in 
Guinea-Bissau (64), the Council adopted resolution 294 on July 15 
1971 in which it was, on the one hand "conscious of its duty to 
remove threats to international peace and security" and, on the 
other, it was "gravely concern[ed] that (such] incidents 
...... 
might endanger international peace and security". The resolution 
created a Special Mission to investigate the complaint. The 
resolution was a compromise between Western members who desired to 
protect their NATO ally from more than just formal censure and the 
Non Aligned and Socialist states desiring Chapter VII action (65). 
Such resolutions give rise to charges of inconsistency being 
levelled against the Council, even that it has not developed any 
coherent policy or norms to guide states' behaviour (66). One 
must remember that the Council is a political body in which the 
national interests of states are going to be paramount over any 
consideration of creating any international policies. 
Probably the most hurtful action the Council can take against 
a state is of a mandatory kind under Article 41. Such mandatory 
action usually follows a finding of a "threat to the peace" which 
means that such a finding will only be made exceptionally because 
of the possible serious consequences. The result is that an 
implied finding 
- whether a threat to or breach of the peace or 
act of aggression - under Article 39 is unlikely to be made 
particularly if accompanied by mandatory measures (67). Given the 
unlikelihood of the Council utilising mandatory measures, it has 
developed the range of its "lower order" recommendatory powers to 
include areas designated in the Charter as coming under Chapter 
VII. These include the power to recommend a cease-fire and a 
power to ask for voluntary measures. The conceptual home for 
these powers is Chapter VII 
-Articles 40 and 41 respectively, but 
because the Council has developed them as recommendatory it is 
common for them to be attributed to Chapter VI 
- 
namely Article 36 
(68). Whether one designates them as coming within Article 36 or 
Article 40 or 41 is relatively unimportant. the significant 
factor is whether they are mandatory or recommendatory. As we 
shall see below, the powers of the Security Council contained in 
Chapter VI and VII have become, in practice, one continuum, which 
creates a situation in which most, but not all, of the powers can 
either be mandatory or recommendatory (69). 
3 Distinctions between and usage of "threat to the peace", "breach 
of the peace", and "act of aggression" 
"Threat to the Peace" 
We have seen in the above section that because of a delay 
caused by political factors in a finding of a "threat to the 
peace" there appears to be little factual difference between a 
situation "likely to endanger international peace" and a"threat to 
international peace". Undoubtedly a "threat to the peace" is a 
very flexible concept covering anything from intrastate 
situations to inter-state disputes. Nevertheless, if we ignore 
for a moment the confusion caused by political delay, it can be 
seen that, on the limited occasions of its use, the term "threat 
to the peace" is taking on a conceptual form. 
The potentially wide ranging, discretionary and flexible use 
of Article 39 via a finding of a "threat to the peace" has been 
pointed out by McDougal and Reisman, 
as the legislative history of 
Article 39 anticipates and subsequent practice 
confirms, the Security Council is authorized 
to find a 'threat to the peace' in a specific 
situation without an allocation of blame or 
fault to any of the parties. The finding of a 
threat to the peace is a factual determination 
only, though an indispensable procedure for 
establishing the authoritative base for 
sanctioning measures. " 
However, they point out that arbitrary or spurious determinations 
are unlikely because of the safeguards in the voting procedure of 
the Security Council (70). One may add that such safeguards not 
only add to the delay in findings of a "threat to the peace", they 
also prevent such findings in large areas of the globe where the 
permanent members have an interest. The veto power effectively 
restricts determinations of a threat to or breach of the peace or 
act of aggression to those "intermediate areas" of the world which 
are relatively free from the hands of the superpowers. 
The most extensive use of the term, undoubtedly, was during 
the meetings of the Security Council between 1965 and 1968, 
although very few of the speakers explained why the situation in 
Southern Rhodesia was a "threat to the peace". Perhaps the 
decision was a political one requiring no rational or conceptual 
deliberations by the members of the Council. However, the meeting 
of December 16 1966, at which the first mandatory resolution of a 
more general nature was adopted, reveals that at least some of the 
representatives had applied their minds as to why an essentially 
internal situation was a threat to the peace. The representative 
of Jordan stated, 
"(The rebellion] amounts to an invasion of the 
rights of the majority. It is an act of 
aggression that cannot be condoned. The 
answer to such invasion and aggression is 
Chapter VII. "(71) 
Prima facie he appears to be referring to an inter-state conflict 
rather than an internal situation; however, the "invasion of the 
rights of the majority" clearly shows the primary reason for the 
situation being a threat to the peace - the gross deprivation of 
human rights by the Smith regime, although, as the following 
analysis shows, another element in a "threat to the peace" is the 
potential "spillover" effect 
- 
the likelihood of internal violence 
spreading to become international violence (72). This justified 
the Security Council undertaking collective humanitarian 
intervention using the weapon of mandatory sanctions (73). Nkala 
discusses why, factually, the Rhodesian situation was a "threat to 
the peace", and why political factors delayed that determination, 
"As far as the factual considerations were 
concerned, it could be argued that the 
systematic denial of basic human rights that 
the Rhodesian Africans suffered prior to and 
after UDI, constituted a threat to the peace 
as there was always a danger of a mass 
uprising of the oppressed people with the 
consequent likelihood of external intervention 
that could involve most of the states in the 
region, and even beyond in violence 
...... 
When UDI was proclaimed, therefore, all 
African Members of the United Nations took the 
view that it constituted a threat to the 
peace. The major Western powers were not 
initially convinced that there was a need to 
invoke Chapter VII, consequently they argued 
that the situation in Rhodesia did not 
constitute a threat to the peace. The only 
concession they were prepared to make at the 
time was that the situation constituted a 
potential threat to the peace. Since the 
major Western powers had the veto no 
determination that a threat to the peace 
existed was possible. "(74) 
The violations of human rights by Smith's black successors in 
Zimbabwe's Matabeleland (75), and the indifference shown by the 
United Nations to the Biafran rebellion in 1967, indicate that 
although the factual considerations may be present, political 
factors will often predominate to prevent such a finding, indeed, 
to prevent any finding whatsoever. These factors may limit a 
finding of a "threat" to colonialist, neo-colonialist or "white 
racist" regimes. 
It could be argued that in Matabeleland and Biafra the denial 
of human rights threatened only internal and not external peace, 
and that for a threat to the peace to be found an internal 
conflict must have the potential to ignite a wider conflict. This 
would possibly exclude Biafra and Matabeleland, but it would not 
exclude a factual finding of a "threat to the peace" as regards 
South Africa (76). The Council has not made such a finding in 
general terms (77) as regards South Africa, although resolutions 
passed in condemnation of the system of apartheid have said as 
much without using the term (78). Resolution 473 of June 13 1978 
reaffirmed that, 
"..... the policy of apartheid is a crime 
against the conscience and dignity of mankind 
and is incompatible with the rights and 
dignity of man, the Charter of the United 
Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and seriously disturbs international 
peace. " 
The last phrase appears to be added to keep the resolution within 
the bounds of Chapter VI. Nevertheless designating apartheid as a 
"crime against mankind" indicates that there is sufficient 
"international concern" to rebut any arguments of domestic 
jurisdiction even when the Council is acting within Chapter VI. 
However, only a finding of a "threat to the peace" will be 
sufficient if the Council is going to operate within Chapter VII 
(79). Such a finding would entail a political decision on the 
part of Western members of the Council for the legal requirements 
have existed for many years, not only in the form of gross 
deprivations of human rights, but also by its illegal presence in, 
and practice of apartheid in, Namibia 
-a situation which the 
Council has labelled a "mounting threat" (80). The evidence is 
that Western Members are willing to allow findings of "aggression" 
and "threats to the peace" (81) as regards South African attacks 
on neighbouring states, but not to allow any mandatory measures to 
be directed against the perpetrator (82). The Western political 
lines are apparently being re-drawn to allow findings of 
individual incidents being categorized as "threats", but not 
permitting a general finding nor any concrete Chapter VII 
measures. 
It appears that a "threat to the peace" is the term the 
Council has shaped to use in situations of non-traditional 
international violence (83) in which the main danger to 
international peace is not a conflict between two or more states, 
instead it arises primarily from the internal events in one state, 
which may, as in the case of South Africa, manifest itself in the 
form of attacks upon other states. Whereas South Africa and 
Rhodesia are cases of human rights abuses caused by racist 
regimes, the crisis in the Congo was more akin to a civil war 
situation. Franck supports the view that the Congo involved an 
intra rather than an inter-state conflict, 
the enemies against which the [UN] 
action was directed were hunger, chaos, 
tribalism and freebootery, not a transgressing 
state. "(84) 
The problems of civil strife and human suffering were, in 
themselves, sufficient to warrant a finding of a "threat to the 
peace" (85), although the Council tended to combine this with the 
menace caused by Belgian and mercenary military intervention. 
In other conflicts the question of civil strife is often 
overshadowed by foreign intervention. In 1974 a Greek backed coup 
against Archbishop Makarios followed by the Turkish invasion of 
the northern part of Cyprus led the Council to adopt resolution 
353 (86), which stated that there was a "serious threat to 
international peace and security" and demanded "an end to foreign 
military intervention". The threat to international peace was 
inherent in the civil strife between the Greek and the Turkish 
Cypriots, a fact recognised by resolution 186, adopted in 1964, 
which classified the violent eruptions on the island as "likely to 
threaten international peace". The Turkish invasion in 1974 was a 
manifestation and realisation of the threat. 
Earlier practice of the Council does not reveal the same 
usage of "threat to the peace" as does later practice, which is 
probably a reflection of the increasingly organized influence of 
the Non Aligned group of members sitting on the Council. A 
finding of a "threat to the peace" was viewed as a preliminary to 
a finding of a "breach of the peace". The invasion of Palestine 
by the surrounding Arab countries after the proclamation of the 
state of Israel on May 14 1948 (87), eventually led the Council to 
classify the situation as a "threat to the peace within the 
meaning of Article 39", and to order that "persuant to Article 
40", there should be a cessation of hostilities which should take 
place "not later than three days from the date" of the resolution. 
Any failure to comply "would demonstrate the existence of a breach 
of the peace within Article 39" (88). The Council was not saying 
that the Arab countries were threatening to breach the peace for 
hostilities had already begun 
- 
it was the continuance in time of 
the conflict which would convert a threat into a breach of the 
peace. 
Through its later practice the Council had developed a more 
complex and wide ranging concept of threat. In 1969, Ireland 
requested a meeting of the Security Council (89) to consider the 
situation in Northern Ireland with a view to sending a United 
Nations peacekeeping force to the province because of the serious 
disturbances caused by the alleged denial of civil rights to the 
Catholic community. Although the question was not even adopted on 
the agenda, it is interesting to note that Lord Caradon was 
sufficiently perturbed by Irish references to southern Africa that 
he not only relied on Article 2(7) as would be expected, but also 
stated, 
there is no question of [the situation 
in Northern Ireland] being in any way a threat 
to international peace and security. "(90) 
This illustrates that members do have in mind the wide concept of 
a threat to the peace. It must be noted, however, that whereas 
South Africa and Southern Rhodesia involved, inter alia, the 
suppression of the fundamental rights of the majority justifying 
collective humanitarian intervention by the United Nations, in 
Northern Ireland it is only the minority that allege this 
suppression. Thus Northern Ireland cannot be a "threat to the 
peace" even if the Irish view that Northern Ireland is a part of 
the Republic is subscribed to, because it still only involves the 
suppression of the rights of a minority - those Catholics in the 
six provinces (91). 
As we have seen, in the earlier practice, threat to and 
breach of the peace were not always distinguishable, even though 
Kelsen's early commentary had contained a strikingly prescient 
differentiation, 
"The Charter distinguishes between 'threat to 
the peace' and 'breach of the peace', an 'act 
of aggression' being, as is correctly 
formulated in Article 1, paragraph 1. only a 
special case of a breach of the peace. This 
distinction is of great importance. Peace or, 
as the Charter says, 'international peace' is 
a relation between states. Hence a 'breach of 
the peace' can only be committed by a state in 
relation to another state. "(92) 
He cites the case of Korea, saying that if the North Korean forces 
had not been the forces of a state, "but a revolutionary group or 
insurgents" making the Korean war a "civil war" then there could 
only be a "threat to the peace" not a "breach of the peace". 
Unlike the Council in the case of Palestine, Kelsen distinguishes 
between the "peace between states" and the "peace between one and 
the same state". A threat to the peace only applies to the 
latter, whereas a breach only applies to the former. Subsequent 
practice shows that Reisen was essentially correct with the 
proviso that a threat is not only applied to civil wars but to a 
much wider range of situations involving considerations of human 
rights and the principle of self-determination. 
(ii) "Breach of the peace" 
In practice, "breach of the peace" has rarely been found, the 
recent preference being for findings of "aggression". This is 
surprising for as Kelsen points out, "aggression" is merely a 
special case of breach, Article 1(1) speaking of "acts of 
aggression or other breaches of the peace". Although a finding of 
"aggression" is much more condemnatory, often, as shall be seen, 
it produces little by way of sanctioning measures. "Breach of the 
peace", although a much more neutral expression when applied to 
traditional international violence (93) has, on two of the three 
occasions on which it has been found, been accompanied by positive 
Council action. 
The Australian representative attempted a reasonable 
definition of a "breach of the peace" during discussion of the 
Indonesian question, 
"We assume that this means a breach of 
international peace and applies to cases where 
hostilities are occurring, but where it is not 
alleged that one particular party is the 
aggressor or has committed an act of 
aggression. "(94) 
He advocated such a finding in relation to the conflict occurring 
in Indonesia. The Dutch representative objected on the grounds 
that, 
"What happened in Indonesia was not a breach 
of international peace but rather a breach of 
internal peace. Breaches of internal peace 
.... 
are and remain the exclusive 
responsibility of the Members of the United 
Nations on the territory of which those 
unfortunate occurrences take place. "(95) 
A finding of a "threat to the peace" may have been more applicable 
if the situation was indeed a breach of internal peace. As will 
be seen later a finding under Article 39 generally renders 
nugatory the application of Article 2(7). However, the Council 
did not make such a finding, neither at the beginning of the 
conflict nor at any stage throughout it, in order to gain Dutch 
consent to its resolutions. Council practice in the late 1940's 
had not evolved the wider concept of a "threat to the peace", 
which in retrospect could have been applied to the Indonesian 
question. 
There have been three findings of a "breach of the peace" in 
cases before the Council. The first concerned the conflict in 
Korea in 1950. On June 25, the Council was rapidly convened at 
the request of the United States (96), after massive North Korean 
forces had crossed the 38th parallel which had divided the country 
since the Japanese surrender to Soviet forces north of that line 
and to American forces south of it (97). The Soviet Union had 
been absent from the Council since January 30 1950 in protest of 
the failure to install the Chinese Communists in the permanent 
seat instead of the Nationalists. If the Soviets had been present 
any Council moves would probably have been vetoed, possibly on the 
grounds that the armed conflict in Korea was a civil war or war of 
national liberation involving only that country. However, the 
rest of the Council viewed the North Korean attack as a "breach of 
the peace" (98). The resolution referred to the General Assembly 
resolution 293 (99) which recognised the government of the 
Republic of Korea based in South Korea, and so the Council was 
able to view the attack as akin to an armed attack by one state 
against another. 
The Secretary General had viewed the attack as a "threat to 
international peace" (100) whereas the United States had labelled 
it as a "breach of the peace and an act of aggression" (101). 
Secretary General Lie's use of "threat" is possibly because he was 
thinking of a civil war situation which was serious enough to 
warrant a finding under Article 39. He may have viewed Korea as a 
single state temporarily divided at the 38th parallel with the 
result that the conflict was, if anything, a "threat to the 
peace", or he may have been influenced by the fact that the 
Council would have been entering upon a new era with a finding of 
a "breach" or indeed "aggression" (102). The Council viewed the 
situation differently, although a finding of "aggression" would 
have been more suitable as the Secretary General had received a 
report from United Nations observers that the attacks had been 
launched in strength by North Korean forces (103). The finding of 
"breach of the peace" was sufficient, however, to allow the 
Council to adopt some of the most strident resolutions in its 
history (104). Suffice to say, for the moment, that the operation 
in Korea was, arguably, the only military enforcement action 
undertaken by the United Nations. 
The second occasion on which a "breach of the peace" has been 
found in a resolution was during the Falklands conflict in 1982. 
On April 3, after Argentina had invaded the Falklands, the British 
introduced resolution 502 which determined that there was a 
"breach of the peace in the region of the Falkland Islands". The 
resolution did not condemn Argentinian "aggression" to ensure that 
it did not incur the veto of an otherwise indifferent Soviet 
Union. It then introduced certain provisional measures which 
although not complied with were, in the circumstances, probably 
the best that could be expected. 
The third occasion upon which the Security Council determined 
that a "breach of the peace" existed was on June 20 1987 when it 
unanimously adopted resolution 598. The breach was found in 
relation to the Gulf War between Iran and Iraq which had been 
continuing for seven years before the Council found that a clear 
case of inter-state conflict came within Article 39. This 
illustrates the political nature of such a finding because during 
those years the Council was unwilling to step into Chapter VII. 
As it is the Council has not yet adopted any measures under 
Chapter VII beyond demanding a cease fire under Article 40 after 
resolution 598 had determined that a "breach of the peace" under 
Article 39 existed. 
Goodrich, Hambro and Simons introduce a section on "breaches 
of the peace" as follows, 
"Various kinds of acts could be considered as 
constituting breaches of the peace. At the 
least, it would seem logical that any resort 
to armed force would come within the meaning 
of the phrase. "(105) 
Even if "breach of the peace" is defined more narrowly as 
referring to "international" and not "internal" peace, it appears, 
at the very least, incongruous, that a body established with 
"primary responsibility for international peace and security" 
(106) has found a breach of the peace on only three occasions. It 
has been calculated that in the period 1946 to 1981 there were 73 
instances of conflict between or among states (107). In the study 
only inter-state conflict was examined so findings of threats to 
the peace in relation to intra-state conflicts would not be 
encompassed in the 73 instances. In other words, "breach of the 
peace" and "act of aggression" together should, objectively 
speaking, have been employed by the Council in over 70 cases. 
Although "aggression" has been applied by the Council in relation 
to South African attacks against neighbouring states and as 
regards several Israeli reprisals, a fairly accurate estimate of 
its overall use would not exceed a dozen. As shall be illustrated 
a finding of "aggression" is more condemnatory than constructive, 
whereas, in the rare instances of its use, a finding of a "breach 
of the peace" has entailed positive Security Council action, and 
may, in the case of the Gulf War, eventually lead to further 
measures. 
(iii) "Act of Aggression" 
As has been suggested above an "act of aggression" is a 
special form of a "breach of the peace", in particular it labels 
or condemns one of the states involved in a conflict as the 
"guilty" party. It is therefore not surprising that the term 
"aggression" is used quite frequently in Council discussions. 
However, 
"..... while the members may be willing to 
use the words "aggression" and "aggressive" 
quite freely in their statements, they are 
cautious about including them in their formal 
findings. "(108) 
Indeed, before the adoption of a definition of aggression in 1974 
(109), there had been no formal findings of "aggression"; since, 
there have been several against South Africa (110) and Israel 
(111). However, the above statement is still true to the extent 
that Westerm members are still cautious about allowing a finding 
of "aggression" against two friendly states, only allowing such 
determinations as long as they are not accompanied by positive 
measures. They can ease their consciences as well as deflecting 
international pressure to introduce sanctions against these 
countries by allowing the occasional condemnatory but paper 
resolution to be adopted. 
However, when an attempt is made to link a finding of 
"aggression" with a mandatory measure under Chapter VII, the 
alleged aggressor is protected by its superpower backer. The 
Middle Eastern theatre of conflict tends to produce these 
predictable reactions. In 1967, during the Six Day War (112), the 
Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution condemning Israeli 
"aggression" and demanding the immediate withdrawal of Israeli 
troops from the Arab territories occupied by the Israelis (113). 
This attempt to introduce a binding resolution under Chapter VII 
after an implied finding under Article 39 was too much for the 
pro-Israeli members of the Council. After much negotiation a 
consensus was reached on a recommendatory resolution, with no 
condemnatory overtones (114). 
Although it appears that the 1974 Definition of Aggression 
has produced an increase in the number of formal findings of 
"aggression", the question remains whether it has resulted in 
objective findings or whether they are predominantly caused by 
political factors. 
During the drafting of the Charter at San Francisco, both 
Bolivia (115) and the Philippines (116) proposed to include 
definitions of "aggression". The Bolivian definition was similar 
to the Soviet proposal submitted to the Disarmament Conference in 
1933 (117), in that it combined the enumeration of acts of 
aggression with a recognition of the Council's power to determine 
that other acts also constitute aggression. 
At San Francisco, the committee concerned rejected the idea 
of a definition, stating, 
" 
....... 
that a preliminary definition of 
aggression went beyond the possibilities of 
this Conference and the purposes of the 
Charter. The progress of the technique of 
modern warfare renders very difficult the 
definition of all cases of aggression 
....... 
the list of such cases being necessarily 
incomplete, the Council would have a tendency 
to consider of less importance the acts not 
mentioned therein; these omissions would 
encourage the aggressor to distort the 
definition or might delay action by the 
Council. Furthermore, in the other cases 
listed, automatic action by the Council might 
bring about a premature application of 
enforcement measures. "(118) 
Despite these objections the United Nations struggled for years to 
find an acceptable definition of aggression. When this finally 
happened on December 14 1974 (119) the formulation was similar to 
the Bolivian proposal. 
The definition is a compromise between those states who 
favoured a generic definition and those who favoured an 
"enumerative approach". The problem was resolved by the adoption 
of a "mixed" definition. Article 1 contains the generic 
definition, 
"Aggression is the use of armed force against 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter 
of the United Nations, as set out in this 
definition. " 
This is similar to Article 2(4) of the Charter. Unlike Article 
2(4), the definition makes it clear that for the purposes of a 
determination under Article 39 of "aggression" the Council is 
considering the use of "armed force" only (120). 
Article 3 enumerates the acts that may qualify as 
"aggression". Invasion, attack, bombardment, blockade and 
occupation are cases of direct aggression, whereas allowing 
territory to be used by another state to perpetrate aggression 
against a third state, and the sending of armed bands to carry out 
acts of force against another state are really cases of indirect 
aggression. The latter are additions to the already well settled 
cases of direct aggression. 
However, although the definition introduces indirect 
aggression, it has never been found in a Security Council 
resolution, for as Broms points out, 
"........ the case of aggression must be 
exceptionally clear and reprehensive before 
the term 'aggression' has a chance of being 
adopted by consensus. "(121) 
Cases of indirect aggression are more likely to be unclear. In 
addition, such cases often involve elements of national 
liberation. The introduction of such elements often negates the 
possibility of a finding of aggression. As has been pointed out, 
South Africa has been condemned frequently for its incursions into 
Angola and other neighbouring African states. The South Africans 
argue that these are punitive raids aimed at preventing the 
incursions of SWAPO and the ANC into Namibia and South Africa 
(122), but the Council only condemns South African "aggression" 
not Angolan or Botswanan. 
Even where Socialist or Non Aligned support for a particular 
war of national liberation does not exist it is still difficult to 
reach a finding of indirect aggression. The United States' backed 
Contra guerrillas fighting to overthrow the Sandinista government 
in Nicaragua is a case of indirect aggression which does not enjoy 
the support of the national liberation lobby at the United 
Nations. Nevertheless, when Nicaragua introduced a draft 
resolution (123) which obliquley referred to indirect aggression 
by the United States by using such language as "covert" and 
"destabalizing" action, the United States used its veto power, 
although it was not directly named. If indirect aggression does 
not involve the support of the national liberation lobby, it more 
often than not involves one of the superpowers, so paralysing any 
attempt in the Council to label the actions as "aggression". 
Articles 2 and 4 of the Definition preserve the discretionary 
powers of the Council. Article 2 states that the "first use of 
armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall 
constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression" although 
the Council, in the light of all the evidence, may decide 
otherwise. Article 4 further states that acts enumerated in 
Article 3 "are not exhaustive and the Security Council may 
determine that other acts constitute aggression under the 
provisions of the Charter". 
The Definition has produced varying responses from 
international lawyers. Garvey criticises it thus, 
"The UN definition frames 'aggression' as a 
delictual and juridical term to be used to 
identify a wrongdoer in international 
law. "(124) 
He alleges that this type of definition is "misconceived" and is 
"incompatible with the effective operation of" the Council, in 
particular its pacification function; 
"Identifying a State as an 'aggressor' is 
obviously not compatible with an invitation to 
negotiate. As a statement of condemnation, 
the label of 'aggressor' establishes a moral, 
emotional and institutional basis for uniting 
opposition to the accused State. It does not 
signal the opening of the 'good offices' of 
the United Nations, but rather indicates the 
assertion of a condemnatory and punitive 
posture by the Security Council. "(125) 
Garvey believes that the original rejection of a definition at San 
Francisco was premised on not preempting the Council's 
pacification powers by the "premature application of enforcement 
measures" (126). He refutes the argument that the preservation, 
in the Definition, of the Council's discretionary powers acts as a 
"safety valve" by saying that if the Council is faced with a clear 
case of aggression within the terms of the Definition, it would be 
afraid of being inconsistent and hypocritical if it opted for 
pacification under Chapter VI. 
The above analysis has shown that since 1974, although the 
use of the term "aggression" in Council resolutions has increased, 
the definition has not resulted in a consistent and objective use 
of the term. The findings are mainly motivated by selective, 
discretionary and political factors and so the fears expressed by 
Garvey above have not been realised. The loopholes provided in 
the Definition by retaining a discretionary balance in favour of 
the discretion of the Council and by the tacit encouragement of 
wars of national liberation (127), have proved sufficient to save 
the Council the embarrassment of making an objective finding of 
"aggression". 
Although the Council may appear to be acting within the 
Definition when it condemns South Africa and Israel, it is being 
somewhat selective because, irrespective of their treatment of 
Blacks and Arabs within their countries or territories under their 
occupation, they too are being subjected to aggression of an 
indirect nature. There has been no attempt to define the Lebanese 
acquiescence of the PLO in its country as a case of indirect 
aggression against Israel. The United Nations is so hostile to 
Israel that it has managed to equate Zionism with racism (128), so 
allowing the PLO to be designated as fighting a racist regime in 
an attempt to exercise the Palestinian right of 
self-determination, and making it as "legitimate" as the ANC and 
SWAPO guerrillas in southern Africa. 
4 The extent of the domestic jurisdiction limitation on the 
competence of the Security Council 
Article 2(7) of the Charter reads, 
"Nothing contained in the present Charter 
shall authorise the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State 
........; but this principle shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII. " 
The meaning of Article 2(7) is unclear. In relation to the 
travaux preparatoires, Gilmour argues that the San Francisco 
records show that there is, 
"...... no other reasonable conclusion than 
it was the intention of those present at San 
Francisco to prevent any organ of the United 
Nations discussing or making recommendations 
concerning matters which were essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of 
states. "(129) 
In other words "intervene" is to be construed as "interference 
pure and simple", not solely "dictatorial interference". Gilmour 
sees the intention behind Article 2(7) as excluding all Security 
Council review either under Chapter VI or by its recommendatory 
powers under Chapter VII when the situation it is faced with is 
essentially internal (130). 
An examination of the process whereby the exception to 
Article 2(7) was arrived at (131), will show that the delegates 
intended that the exception should be wider than that advocated by 
Gilmour. The French had proposed to limit Article 2(7) further by 
proposing that the domestic jurisdiction principle (132) would 
apply "unless the clear violation of essential liberties and human 
rights constitutes itself a threat capable of compromising peace" 
(133). The problem was finding the correct words to express the 
view that "it would be proper in the interests of peace and 
justice, and in the preservation of human rights to interfere in 
the internal affairs of Member States" (134). The Australian 
amendment that the domestic jurisdiction principle "shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 
VII" was rather clumsy. It did not fully express the views of the 
delegates and gave rise to technical difficulties. 
In practice, the Security Council has developed its own 
interpretation as to what constitutes intervention and domestic 
jurisdiction (135), to such an extent that, 
"........ domestic jurisdiction means little 
more than a general community concession of 
primary, but not exclusive, competence over 
matters arising and intimately concerned with 
aspects of internal public order of states. 
Where such acts precipitate major inclusive 
deprivations, jurisdiction is 
internationalised and inclusive concern and 
measures become permissible 
....... 
even in 
the absence of a finding of a threat to the 
peace, the United Nations could have acquired 
a considerable competence with respect to 
Rhodesia because of the systematic deprivation 
of human rights practiced there. "(136) 
As early as 1946, the Council interpreted Article 2(7) as allowing 
it to establish a Commission of Investigation under Article 34 in 
order to report on aspects of the Greek civil war (137). In the 
Spanish question, the Security Council set up a sub-committee to 
investigate the situation in Spain (138), highlighting the facts 
that an investigation to ascertain the facts and in the latter 
case to make substantive recommendations, do not constitute 
"intervention". The sub-committee found the situation in Spain to 
be of "international concern" and a "potential menace to 
international peace". It recommended action under Chapter VI in 
the form of a voluntary termination of diplomatic relations (139). 
Although no such resolution was adopted, the view that Article 
2(7) was inapplicable in cases of "international concern" 
prevailed, the proposed resolution being vetoed by the Soviet 
Union on other grounds (140). 
The problem is to define what is of "international concern". 
Higgins expresses the view, 
"........ there can be varying degrees of 
'threats to the peace', less dramatic than 
those necessitating enforcement measures 
.... 
yet which, in spite of Article 2(7), allow 
action under Chapter VI 
.... 
"(141) 
A finding under Article 39 of a "threat to the peace" accompanied 
by the application of enforcement measures under Article 41 or 
Article 42 is exempt by the terms of Article 2(7) itself. The 
Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia argued that the situation there 
was essentially a domestic matter (142). However, the denial of 
human rights internationalised the situation, the Security Council 
making this crystal clear by a finding of a "threat to the peace" 
accompanied by mandatory sanctions under Article 41. The 
Uruguayan representative emphasisised that there was no question 
of applying Article 2(7), 
"We must not forget that the very nature of 
these events has removed the Rhodesian 
situation from the United Kingdom's 
jurisdiction and made it a matter of 
international concern. "(143) 
Once a "threat to the peace" is found there is no question of any 
Security Council action being excluded by the terms of Article 
2(7). 
It has been argued that if it is accepted that the ONUC 
operation was taken persuant to Article 40 (which is the 
non-enforcement provision of Chapter VII) it should have been 
subject to the domestic jurisdiction limitation (144). It must be 
remembered that the Council eventually made a finding of a "threat 
to the peace" in relation to the situation within the Congo (145). 
Resolution 169 (146) referred to resolution 161 which contained 
the finding of a threat while authorizing the Secretary General to 
take vigorous action including the requisite measure of force in 
order to "apprehend all foreign troops and mercenaries". The 
resolution also declared that "all secessionist activities against 
the Republic of the Congo are contrary to the Loi Fondementale and 
Security Council decisions" and specifically demanded "that such 
activities which are now taking place in Katanga shall cease 
forthwith". This certainly appears to be interference in the 
internal affairs of the Congo which is the sort of activity prima 
facie prohibited by Article 2(7). Certain members expressed 
reservations about setting a dangerous precedent for the future, 
by putting the United Nations "at the beck and call of any state 
faced with a problem of a dissident minority within its own 
borders" (147). The International Court has advised that ONUC was 
not an enforcement measure under Article 42 (148), which leaves 
open the question whether it came instead within the terms of 
Article 40 (149). If Article 40 is the correct Charter base for 
ONUC, according to a literal reading of Article 2(7), the 
exception to the domestic jurisdiction limitation for enforcement 
measures is inapplicable. However, this ignores the fact that 
when a situation is designated a threat to the peace it is 
inevitably out of the domestic realm into the international 
sphere, effectively rendering redundant the exception contained in 
Article 2(7) itself. Any action within Chapter VII, whether 
enforcement or not is not limited by Article 2(7) (150). 
McDougal, Reisman and Higgins, in the extracts quoted above, 
suggest that the limitation contained in Article 2(7) is 
circumvented not only by a finding of a threat to the peace, but 
also by the finding that the situation is one of "international 
concern". Higgins writes further, 
"..... It is claimed that while it may not be 
clear that a matter does in fact constitute a 
threat to or breach of the peace which 
warrants enforcement action under Chapter VII, 
the existence of international repercussions 
may none the less serve as a basis for 
jurisdiction. This doctrine of 'international 
concern' has seen service in the guise of a 
'potential threat to the peace'. "(151) 
Thus a finding of a "potential menace" can be seen not only as a 
link between Chapter VI and VII, but also as a means by which the 
Council can utilise the provisions of Chapter VI and the power to 
ask for voluntary measures in the face of the provisions of 
Article 2(7). 
The clearest example of the Council using its recommendatory 
powers in an essentially domestic situation is as regards South 
Africa. The Council has not found a general threat to the peace 
in relation to the system of apartheid in South Africa. However, 
it has adopted many resolutions of a recommendatory nature 
including a recent call for selective voluntary measures (152) 
after 1985 witnessed killings at Crossroads, further political 
detentions, suppression of freedom and the declaration of a state 
of emergency. South African objections based on Article 2(7) have 
proved fruitless, because by characterising apartheid as a "crime 
against humanity" (153), the Council has recognised the situation 
as one of sufficient international concern to warrant collective 
humanitarian intervention using recommendatory measures (154). 
Article 2(7) was a rather clumsy attempt to reconcile the 
doctrine of state sovereignty with the need to intervene in cases 
of international concern, which historically connotes the gross 
deprivation of human rights. However, it has been pointed out 
that, 
"... By its very nature the concept of 
domestic jurisdiction (and international 
concern] is incapable of capture and 
crystallisation for all time. What is truly 
domestic today will not necessarily be so in 
five years time. "(155) 
For the moment we can conclude that the deprivation of the human 
rights of the majority of the population of a state is not within 
the domestic jurisdiction of the state despite first appearances. 
Maybe, in the future, the deprivation of the human rights of the 
minority will be of sufficient international concern to be outside 
the limitation of Article 2(7) (156). 
Recently the Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has 
reaffirmed the above conclusions by stating that, 
"The Charter provides that the United Nations 
may not intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of the state. But in defining the promotion 
and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as one of the purposes of the United 
Nations, the Charter renders them universally 
applicable 
........... 
of common 
concern. "(157) 
However, one must not forget the political limitations on the 
competence of the Security Council, in that international 
intervention via the United Nations only occurs in the areas 
"outside the direct zones of influence of the two superpowers". 
If there is internal strife in countries within the superpowers' 
"areas of security interest or in states closely allied to them", 
then council "intervention" is likely to be non-existent (158). 
To disguise their own political intentions the superpowers will 
often rely on ex post facto legal justifications based on Article 
2(7) (159). 
5 Whether the Security Council's ability to adopt mandatory 
decisions is limited to Chapter VII 
The topic of this chapter are the limitations placed upon the 
Security Council's competence and powers by the provisions of the 
Charter itself and the Council's interpretation by its subsequent 
practice of those provisions (160). The different types of power 
will be examined in the next chapter. A problem which spans both 
chapters is the mandatory/recommendatory dichotomy. Here is an 
examination of whether the Council's use of mandatory decisions is 
limited to Chapter VII. The question of the different types of 
mandatory powers the Council has will be analysed in the next 
chapter. 
Article 25 of the Charter states, 
"The Members agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council in 
accordance with the present Charter. " 
Article 25 is contained in Chapter V of the Charter and 
immediately follows the lex generalis of the Council contained in 
Article 24(1), which confers on that body "primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security". A 
laymen reading the Charter may believe that any decision of the 
Security Council relating to a matter within Article 24(1) would 
be binding on Member states, whether it was taken under Chapter VI 
or Chapter VII - which contain the lex specialis of the Council. 
If the Council desired to make a recommendation in accordance with 
its powers, this would be clear from the resolution and so would 
not constitute a mandatory "decision" of the Council within the 
meaning of Article 25. A binding decision under Chapter VI may be 
rare because it is mainly concerned with recommendatory powers 
(161), although it is not impossible. Article 39 allows the 
Council to make non-binding recommendations as well as mandatory 
decisions within the framework of Chapter VII. 
Different factions of the Security Council have interpreted 
Article 25 in varying ways. The situation in Namibia has 
highlighted the controversy over Article 25. During a Council 
debate on the situation, the British representative, Sir Colin 
Crowe stated, 
"As a matter of law, my Government considers 
the Security Council can only take decisions 
generally binding on Member States only when 
the Security Council has made a determination 
under Article 39 
...... 
Only in these 
circumstances are decisions binding under 
Article 25. "(162) 
In this statement he was disagreeing with the opinion of the 
International Court of Justice on Namibia which was delivered 
after being so requested by the Council (163). The Court opined 
that Article 25 was not restricted in its application to Chapter 
VII (164). The Council resolution to which the British objected 
was resolution 269 of August 12 1969 which "decided" that "the 
continued occupation of the Territory of Namibia by the South 
African authorities constitutes an aggressive encroachment on the 
authority of the United Nations" after reminding Members of the 
content of Article 25. The resolution did not contain an express 
or implied determination under Article 39 in spite of the 
suggestion that the United Nations was in some way the object of 
some sort of aggression (165). Nevertheless the resolution 
invoked Article 25. All the Western powers on the Council 
abstained on this resolution indicating that the collective view 
of the West is to equate Article 25 with Chapter VII. 
The views of the United States were also enunciated in the 
initial Council dealings with Namibia (166) after the termination 
of South Africa's mandate by the General Assembly (167). 
Initially, the Council concerned itself with the essentially 
peripheral matter of the trials by the Pretorian government of 
members of SWAPO. Although resolutions 245 (168) and 246 (169) 
originally contained references to Article 25, these were deleted 
on the insistence of the United States, whose representative 
explained, 
"Among these changes is the omission of the 
reference to Article 25 of the Charter...... 
which we would have regarded as inappropriate 
for a resolution which was to be adopted under 
Chapter VI. "(170) 
The Western view has been taken for granted in several books 
written on the Security Council's dealings with international 
conflicts. Both Murphy (171) and Pogany expound a simple view, 
summarised by the latter, who writes, "resolutions under Chapter 
VI do not constitute 'decisions' within the meaning of Article 25" 
(172). 
The Western view is probably based on the desire to provide a 
rough and ready, convenient and simple guide to the drafting of 
resolutions, which through constant reiteration by its adherents 
has taken on, for them, the status of international law (173). 
However, it is probably true to say that only the British have 
taken a rigid view as to the application of Article 25, the United 
States has recently shown itself a little more flexible when it is 
in its interests to do so. 
After the Israelis had invaded southern Lebanon in March 
1978, the Council adopted resolution 425 which established UNIFIL, 
while remaining, like most resolutions on peacekeeping, ambiguous 
as to the Charter base of the force. When Israel and other 
factions in southern Lebanon prevented the implementation of the 
second part of UNIFIL's mandate (174), the American ambassador 
stated, 
"My Government calls upon all concerned, in 
the spirit of Article 25, to take urgent steps 
required to enable UNIFIL to fulfil its 
mandate by full deployment to Lebanon's 
internationally recognised borders in southern 
Lebanon. "(175) 
There is a strong argument that peacekeeping is neither consonant 
with Chapter VI or VII, instead it is an implied power deriving 
from Article 24 (176). The International Court viewed Council 
resolutions on Namibia as also coming within this power (177), so 
it may be said that the Council can make binding decisions outside 
of Chapter VII if it is using the general principles of Article 
24. The United Nations operation in the Congo accords with this 
view. Before the Council had determined that there was a "threat 
to the peace" it had invoked Article 25 in a resolution (178), 
when it called on Belgium to withdraw its troops from the province 
of Katanga. The operation of ONUC and the activities of the 
Council in relation to the Congo can be viewed as an extension of 
the powers contained in Article 24, although the later finding of 
a threat to the peace complicates the matter (179). 
The Soviet Union, while not always citing Article 25, have 
made suggestions that "decisions" of the Council may be made 
outside of the framework of Chapter VII (180). A good example of 
this can be seen during the debates of the Council on the Yom 
Kippur War in 1973. The East-West deadlock which had prevented 
the Council acting at the beginning of the war was overcome by the 
invitation of Secretary of State Kissinger to Moscow (181). The 
result was a resolution virtually forced through the Council by 
the superpowers (182) which simply called on the parties to the 
conflict to "terminate all military activity" no later than 12 
hours after the adoption of the resolution, followed by the 
implementation of resolution 242. Non-compliance with the 
cease-fire resulted in another joint superpower sponsored 
resolution (183) which confirmed the Council's "decision" in the 
previous resolution and urged the combatants to "return to the 
positions they occupied at the moment the cease-fire became 
effective". Although both resolutions had the appearance of being 
provisional measures under Article 40, an application of the 
Western view, supported by Pogany (184), would mean that without a 
finding under Article 39, there can be no "decision" within the 
meaning of Article 25 and consequently the resolution can only be 
a recommendation adopted within the parameters of Chapter VI 
(185). 
The Soviets, while not actually citing Article 25, seemed to 
view both the resolutions as binding decisions. On one occasion 
ambassador Malik quoted President Brezhnev, 
"'It is difficult to understand what the 
rulers of Israel are hoping for when they 
persue this adventurist course, flouting the 
decisions of the Security Council, and defying 
world public opinion. '"(186) 
On another occasion the Soviet representative stated, in his own 
words, 
"How long will this flagrant perfidy and 
flouting of the decisions of the Council 
continue? "(187) 
Higgins has pointed out that the British view of Article 25 would 
effectively retitle Chapters VI and VII as "Recommendations for 
the settlement of disputes" and "Decisions with respect to the 
breakdown of peace" respectively (188). She suggests that 
although this may provide a good working basis an equally good 
working basis would be, 
"....... achieved by looking to see whether a 
resolution was intended as a recommendation or 
a decision, and avoiding the somewhat 
artificial designation of resolutions which 
recommend Article 41 type measures as Chapter 
VI resolutions. "(189) 
This more flexible approach seems to be adopted by the majority of 
the Council. If a resolution is what Franck would call a "mouse 
of a resolution" (190), it is probably a recommendation, whereas 
in the Middle East crisis in 1973, the Council, particularly the 
sponsors, intended resolutions 338 and 339 to be binding without 
aggravating the situation by making a determination of a threat to 
or breach of the peace (191). Often political compromise will not 
allow a finding to be made under Article 39. However, this 
absence, does not, on occasions, prevent the production of a 
resolution which is a binding decision. Similarly a 
recommendation can be made under Article 39. This is expressly 
provided for in that provision. The United Nations' 
recommendation of enforcement action against North Korea in 1950 
provides a somewhat unusual example (192). 
Halderman points out that "recommendations" in Article 39 
signifies that the Council is able to perform its peaceful 
settlement function within Chapter VII as well as Chapter VI 
(193). Indeed, the placing of a recommendatory power in Article 
39 indicates that the drafters of the Charter had this in mind 
rather than the use made of it in the Korean case. Halderman 
argues against the view that a finding within the meaning of 
Article 39 necessarily accompanies the application of mandatory 
enforcement measures. He cites the example of Council resolution 
221 in which there was a finding of a "threat to the peace" in 
relation to the arrival of oil tankers at the port of Beira 
carrying oil for Rhodesia. He points out that despite the finding 
under Article 39, the direction to the United Kingdom to stop the 
tankers from discharging their cargo cannot be viewed as a 
mandatory decision because it was directed against actions not 
against states (194). He uses this to develop a wider concept of 
collective measures which could also encompass "a police function 
in the ordinary, non-political sense of the term" (195), in other 
words, peacekeeping. He argues that due to "political 
connotations of collective measures" the Council has developed a 
narrow view leading to the seperate creation of peacekeeping 
powers. 
On occasions, the Council has operated on the basis of a wide 
concept of collective measures. Halderman cites actions as 
regards Rhodesia and the Congo as examples. It could be argued 
that although as regards both situations the Council commenced its 
involvement by using non-mandatory measures against actions not 
states (in Rhodesia the action was against oil tankers, in the 
Congo it was against mercenaries), the Council then began to deal 
with the whole internal political situation in each country after 
a finding of a "threat to the peace" followed by the application 
of mandatory enforcement measures. In other words the Council 
involvement soon became directed towards states. 
Generally, until the Western states drop their equation of 
Article 25 with Chapter VII, the observer must take this into 
account when analysing resolutions. Nevertheless, there is a 
growing tendency to ignore the West's working rule in some 
critical situations where a binding resolution is essential but an 
express or implied finding under Article 39 is not feasible, 
possibly due to the fear that a cease-fire resolution, for 
example, accompanied by a finding of a threat to or breach of the 
peace may lead to the later application of collective measures. A 
finding under Article 39 is essential for the application of 
enforcement measures, it is not a prerequisite for the resolution 
to be binding under Article 25. This leads to the conclusion that 
a cease-fire resolution may be binding in the absence of a 
determination under Article 39, but a resolution calling for 
sanctions could never be mandatory in the absence of such a 
finding. 
There is support from the travaux preparatoires that 
the application of Article 25 is not limited to Chapter VII, when 
a Belgian proposal to limit the application of Article 25 to 
Chapters VI, VII and VIII was defeated (196). The drafters 
appeared to have intended Article 25 to be unrestricted. 
The World Court has also supported the view that Article 25 
is not restricted to Chapter VII, when it delivered its advisory 
opinion in the Namibia case; 
"It has been contended that Article 25 of the 
Charter applies only to enforcement measures 
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. It 
is not possible to find in the Charter any 
support for this view. Article 25 is not 
confined to decisions in regard to enforcement 
action but applies to 'decisions of the 
Security Council' adopted in accordance with 
the Charter. Moreover, that Article is 
placed, not in Chapter VII, but immediately 
after Article 24 in that part of the Charter 
which deals with the functions and powers of 
the Security Council. "(197) 
The evidence is that the Security Council's competence to make 
mandatory decisions is not restricted to Chapter VII. The power 
to take collective measures, however, is inextricably linked to 
Chapter VII. Such powers can only be made to be binding within 
the terms of Chapter VII which means the necessity of a 
determination under Article 39. 
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CHAPTER 3 
POWERS, PRACTICE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
Having examined the limitations on the competence of the 
Security Council 
- 
both in terms of politics and law, we will now 
examine the development and use of the Council's powers, within 
those limitations. As has been suggested in chapter 2, there has 
been some blurring of the distinction between Chapters VI and VII 
and this will be reflected in the analysis below. Nevertheless, 
the basic structure of the Charter in terms of the Council's 
powers remains intact after forty years of that body's practice. 
The array of powers available to the Security Council has been 
described in terms of "une gradation d'intensite des pouvoirs" 
(1) culminating in the provisions of Chapter VII. 
The development of the Charter provisions concerning 
collective measures was the main preoccupation of the sponsoring 
powers at San Francisco in their quest for collective security. 
As we have seen the contents of Chapter VII were not greatly 
questioned by the smaller powers. The only significant amendments 
to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were the removal of the provision 
linking Chapter VI to Chapter VII; and to readily accept a Chinese 
proposal for the insertion of a provision enabling the Council to 
Adopt "provisional measures" (2). The proposals regarding pacific 
settlement were to prove more novel and problematic both to the 
sponsoring powers and to the other delegates at San Francisco. 
Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter arose out of Chapter 
VIII A of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The latter had "the 
doubtful distinction of being regarded as one of the most poorly 
drafted sections". Russell and Muther relate that as a result, 
"There were 
....... 
many amendments 
......, 
but except for one important matter - that of 
extending the authority of the Security 
Council to recommend terms of settlement in 
certain disputes 
- 
the final provisions of the 
Charter 
.... 
incorporated only secondary 
changes from the four power proposals. At the 
end, therefore, more than one delegation felt 
that the Chapter contained 'continuing 
obscurities' and the 'wording was not as 
explicit as necessary'. "(3) 
In fact the amendments probably created more confusion than the 
untouched proposals. The proposals were firmly based on the 
concept of the Security Council as a policeman. This was 
emphasised in the proposals by placing the Council's powers of 
investigation at the head of the section containing powers of 
pacific settlement. Russell and Muther explain why the four 
powers preferred this arrangement, 
"...... it was decided to begin by 
emphasising 
....... 
the authority of the 
Council to keep watch over the whole world 
situation and to investigate any matter it 
wished, in order to see if any action was 
needed. "(4) 
The main "action" the Council could take under the proposals for 
pacific settlement was primarily to call on the parties to the 
dispute to settle it by the peaceful means enumerated in the third 
paragraph of Chapter VIII A (5). If the dispute continued the 
Council could then utilise its powers in paragraph 5 to "recommend 
appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment" or move into the 
enforcement powers contained in section B (6) by means of 
paragraph 1 of section B. 
The original proposals did recognise a "situation" as well as 
a "dispute" (7) but the possible measures outlined above only 
applied to "disputes". The amendments to the proposals extended 
to the Council powers to give it a somewhat quasi-judicial role 
(8). One of the amendments to this effect was to empower it to 
"recommend appropriate procedures and methods of adjustment" to 
"situations" as well as "disputes" (9). Theoretically it is the 
Council only which can recognise a "situation likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security" (10), for the 
obligation placed on Members to settle their disputes by peaceful 
means contained in Article 33 only applies to "disputes". This 
extends the Council's powers of determining the nature of events 
that endanger peace and hence is an enhancement of its "judicial" 
powers. Practically, however, states will often refer 
"situations" as well as "disputes" to the Council under Article 
35, and although the Council could, by itself, determine 
jurisdiction under Article 34, it rarely does so, nor has it 
attempted to distinguish between a "dispute" and a "situation" 
(11). 
Goodrich, Hambro and Simons summarise the three major changes 
in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals for pacific settlement made at San 
Francisco. The proposals were rearranged so as to "give pride of 
place to the obligation of the parties to seek a solution to their 
disputes by peaceful means". The primary emphasis of the Members' 
obligation to settle in Article 33(1) not only recognises that 
without some cooperation by the parties to the dispute settlement 
will be hard to obtain; it also illustrates the greater emphasis 
on the envisaged judicial role of the Council. If the parties 
fail to settle out of the Council, they may be subject to 
settlement not necessarily by the Council but with the (perhaps 
unwelcome) help of the Council; a process broadened by the second 
major amendment of enabling the Council to recommend "terms" as 
well as "procedures" for settlement (12). In fact, the addition 
of Articles 37 and 38 to the proposals were intended to invest the 
Council with quasi-judicial powers. The confusion is created 
because the change of emphasis from policeman to judge did not 
involve a wholesale revision of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, 
instead the judicial provisions were tacked on so that the 
fundamental role the Council should play in relation to 
international disputes is unclear. Only an examination of the 
Council's practice will help us to understand the role it has 
actually played (13). 
Another problem created by the transition from proposals to 
the final Charter at San Francisco was the introduction of the 
concept of "justice" into the final provisions. The Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals did not contain any mention of the concept. At San 
Francisco, the smaller states insisted on its inclusion in 
Articles 1(1) and 2(3) to attempt to prevent appeasement at their 
expense, despite the objections of the sponsoring governments that 
it added an "imprecise element" (14). Kelsen discusses the 
introduction of this nebulous concept, 
"Since the principles of justice are not 
identical with, and sometimes in opposition 
to, the rules of positive international law, 
in may be impossible to comply with the 
postulate to conform with both 
........... 
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the Security Council in making recommendations 
for the settlement of disputes, if justice is 
in conflict with international law, can only 
apply the one or the other, not both at the 
same time. Hence, they have the choice 
between the two principles. "(15) 
The provisions of Chapter VI contain no mention of "justice", so 
perhaps this undefined concept which would give the Council a 
potentially wide discretionary power, only operates when the 
principles of international law would create a wholly unjust 
settlement. However, Chapter VI is also devoid of any reference 
to international law so it could be argued that the Council could 
opt for a wholly political settlement with only the occasional 
cursory reference to only law or justice. An examination of the 
Council's practice will reveal its interpretation of the Charter 
provisions on pacific settlement. 
1 The Council's supervision of the Members' obligation to settle 
their disputes by peaceful means 
Article 33(1) of the Charter imposes upon Members an 
obligation to settle disputes "the continuance of which" are 
"likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security" by peaceful means. It lists some examples of methods 
whereby this obligation could be fulfilled such as negotiation, 
mediation, arbitration and resort to regional arrangements. 
Article 33(2) states that, 
"The Security Council shall, when it deems 
necessary, call upon the parties to settle 
their disputes by such means (as contained in 
paragraph (1)1. " 
Despite the inclusion of the word "shall" instead of "may", this 
provision does not purport to impose a mandatory obligation on the 
Council to enforce in some way the provisions of Article 33(1), 
for it only operates when the Council deems it necessary, which in 
theory should be when it has found the basic requirement of a 
danger to international peace and security. The Council's role 
under Article 33 is one of supervision of the obligation to settle 
placed on Members (16). 
The most effective use of this power would be not only as a 
reminder to states of their duties under the Charter, but also as 
a warning of future Council action under the other provisions of 
Chapter VI or, if the states concerned continue to be in breach of 
their obligation, of the possibility of Council action under 
Chapter VII. A Presidential statement, made with the unanimous 
support of all the Council, is often preferable, for it can be 
made quickly and is illustrative of the mood of the Council 
towards a continuance of the conflict, or if the Council is 
purporting to take preventative measures, towards future breaches. 
In 1982, with an Argentinian invasion of the Falklands imminent, 
the President of the Council made a statement on the same day that 
the Council was convened at the request of the United Kingdom 
(17). It read, 
".......... the Security Council 
.... 
calls 
on the Governments of Argentina and the United 
Kingdom to exercise the utmost restraint at 
this time and in particular to refrain from 
the use or threat of force in the region and 
to continue to search for a diplomatic 
solution. "(18) 
Although a balanced reminder, the statement was a warning to 
Argentina not to invade. The Argentinians needed a fair degree of 
international support if they were to maintain their hold on the 
islands, but the statement reflected unanimous Council opposition 
to invasion. The Argentinians misread the signs and carried out 
their threat to the almost unanimous condemnation of the Council. 
The Irish ambassador summarised the body's feelings, 
"If we here ignore this flouting by one of the 
parties to the dispute of a unanimous call by 
the Council to avoid the use of force in 
settling it, then we have seriously weakened 
the whole effort to establish law rather than 
force as the guide in international 
relations. "(19) 
The Council then found a "breach of the peace" and demanded 
withdrawal (20) which although not complied with, effectively put 
Argentina in the wrong, helped to isolate it internationally, and 
contributed to Argentina's defeat in that it tacitly supported the 
British stance in support of principles of international law, 
though not necessarily the use of force in defence of those 
principles. 
The Falklands conflict was in an area free from superpower or 
regional interests. In other cases, where such influences 
predominate, the Council's use of the power contained in Article 
33(2) is limited to a statement of concern, with no immediate 
prospects of further Council action. The Presidential statement 
calling on Chad and Libya to utilise the pacification machinery of 
the OAU in 1983 has already been discussed (21). It represented a 
token gesture by the Council to placate the Chadians, whose 
complaints have been heard on various occasions over the past nine 
years. There remains little possibility of more constructive 
Council action despite the Chadians' insistence that they have 
exhausted all possible diplomatic, regional and other peaceful 
means of settlement under Article 33(1) (22). 
The use of Article 33(2) is sometimes the only measure 
available when the Council is faced with superpower intervention. 
In the Central American region, the United States has generally 
shown an unwillingness to participate in United Nations' action, 
evidenced by its veto in 1982 of a draft resolution which merely 
called for non-interference, self-determination, non use or threat 
of force and negotiation in the troubled area (23). The draft 
resolution did not name any party and so was the mildest of 
recommendatory resolutions within terms of Article 33(2). The 
representative of Guyana stated as such, 
"The draft resolution does not seek to 
incriminate or to blame any party for the 
present crisis 
... 
It merely seeks 
.... 
to 
bring all the parties to the negotiating table 
with a view to the peaceful settlement of the 
problems. "(24) 
However, in 1983, the Americans relaxed slightly with the 
introduction of the OAS supported Contadora group's peace efforts. 
This proved to be sufficient regionalisation to enable the United 
States to support resolution 530 (25) which expressed the 
Council's concern at "the danger of military confrontation between 
Honduras and Nicaragua". Although the resolution was similar to 
the previously vetoed draft resolution, it put more emphasis on 
the efforts of the Contadora group and so represents a particular 
application of the Council supervising the obligation imposed by 
Article 33(1) 
- 
of "resort to regional agencies or arrangements". 
It represents a minimum measures resolution aimed at securing the 
support of the United States. There appears to be little 
possibility of the Council taking any further measures, even the 
adoption of a paper resolution critical of the United States, 
although it has adopted another minimum measures resolution which 
is similar in content to resolution 530 (26). 
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The fact that Article 33 is likely to be the only possible 
measure utilised in the face of superpower involvement is to be 
expected, although not condoned. However, it must be pointed out 
that in the Falklands conflict the United Kingdom, a permanent 
member, encouraged the adoption of a more forceful resolution 
(502) after initial use of Article 33(2) because it had 
international law on its side. Maybe the United States lacks the 
support of law and so is wary of any further Council action beyond 
Article 33, a view which is emphasised by the International 
Court's judgement against the United States in a case brought 
before it by Nicaragua (27). 
Sometimes each superpower is concerned not to let the other 
gain a foothold in an intermediate area, particularly one which 
would alter the strategic balance of power such as the Persian 
Gulf. Hence the relative Council inaction towards the Gulf War. 
The aim is not to protect their interests but to prevent each 
other from taking advantage from a change in the situation which 
may result from more positive Council action. Although the 
initial Council call to Iran and Iraq within the meaning of 
Article 33(2) (28) has been supplemented by other recommendatory 
Chapter VI resolutions (29), it took seven years of bloody 
conflict before the necessary consensus could be achieved to 
enable the Council to unanimously adopt resolution 598 on July 20 
1987 which contained a mandatory demand for a cease-fire within 
the terms of Chapter VII. 
Goodrich, Hambro and Simons state that Article 33(1) is 
intended to operate only at the pre-conflict stage (30). It has 
been pointed out be Arend (31) that the obligation contained in 
Article 33(1) has been extended beyond the pre-conflict stage 
- 
the period of tension preceding the outbreak of armed conflict 
- 
to operate during the whole period of hostilities. He suggests 
that the obligation to settle before and during hostilities is 
becoming a norm of contemporary international law (32). He points 
to the Council activities during the Gulf War and the Falklands 
conflict as recent evidence of this trend. Both cases involved 
acts of aggression by Iraq and Argentina respectively 
- 
though the 
Council diplomatically avoided such factual determinations 
- 
for 
the purpose of "value extension" (33), but they provoked no 
collective enforcement measures by the Security Council, instead 
they produced calls to the parties to settle their disputes 
peacefully (34). Arend argues that this development has occurred 
to successfully fill the void created by the lack of enforcement 
muscle in the Council. The evidence does suggest that he is 
right, but a failure to arrive at a settlement other than by the 
use of force in the Falklands, and to the present day, in the 
Gulf, suggests that this development will not increase the 
effectiveness of the Council, instead it will provide it with the 
excuse of not having to consider the application of enforcement 
measures at all which in turn may result in further breaches of 
the peace. 
2 Investigation 
Investigatory bodies established by the Security Council to 
ascertain the facts of a dispute are relatively rare. The Charter 
basis for such bodies is to be located in a combination of 
Articles 34 and 29 (35), although they are rarely cited in the 
enabling resolutions. Often the body's function will go beyond 
mere fact finding and enter the realm of good offices and 
peacekeeping (36). In this section an attempt will be made to 
keep the discussion centred on investigatory bodies the true basis 
of which is Article 34. Good offices committees and peacekeeping 
bodies have different constitutional bases (37). Article 34 
provides, 
"The Security Council may investigate any 
dispute or any situation 
.... 
in order to 
determine whether the continuance of the 
dispute or situation is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and 
security. " 
During the early years of Council practice, some confusion arose 
from the fact that this provision did not confer a general power 
of investigation on the Council; the power appears to be refined 
to ascertaining whether the dispute or situation came within the 
parameters of Chapter VI (38). Indeed, the sub-committee on the 
Spanish question established in 1946 was directed to ascertain 
whether the activities of the Franco regime constituted a 
situation within the meaning of Article 34 or Article 39 (39). 
However, very soon after, the Council showed its willingness 
to go beyond a strict interpretation of Article 34 when, in 1946, 
it established a Commission of Investigation to examine certain 
frontier incidents on the Greek borders (40). The Commission not 
only ascertained the facts but made several wide ranging 
recommendations (41) which, unfortunately, were not adopted by the 
Council because of Soviet opposition 
Of course geopolitical factors have limited the ability of 
the Council to establish investigatory bodies. In the Greek case 
above the Commission of Investigation was prevented from examining 
the situation further because of the Soviet Union's dislike of the 
Commission's findings which tended to blame Yugoslavia, Bulgaria 
and Albania. Similarly as regards disputes in the American 
hemisphere, proposals for investigation of the conflict will not 
be adopted because of the opposition of the United States. 
Guatemala's complaint, in 1954, of aggression by neighbouring 
Honduras and Nicaragua (43) allegedly inspired by a United States' 
concern - the United Fruit Company - cried out for an impartial 
investigation. Indeed, the Guatemalan representative asked for 
one (44), but none was forthcoming. 
A method of circumventing the superpower veto is by applying 
a procedural vote to the establishment of such a body. This was 
done in 1959 to establish a sub-committee to investigate a 
complaint by Laos despite the negative Soviet vote (45). The 
legality of this method is doubtful (46) and it has not become an 
established feature in the practice of the Security Council (47). 
An alternative method would be to provide for continuous 
investigation independent of the whims of the voting of the 
members of the Council, perhaps under the control of the Secretary 
General (48). Reports would be sent to the Council from the 
various UN centres around the world, a scenario which would not 
only force the Council to consider all conflict but would also 
make any permanent member involved in the conflict answerable to 
the other members when faced with independently obtained facts. 
It may be argued that criticism of a superpower will not alter its 
foreign policy. This may be true but one may point to the great 
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lengths to which the superpowers go to prevent criticism of their 
actions by the Council or by potential subsidiary bodies. An 
automatic investigation of all conflicts or potential conflicts 
might be one small factor in deterring the actions of actual or 
potential aggressors. 
Such reforms would also enhance the investigatory potential 
of the United Nations as regards potential conflicts which would 
enable the Security Council to adopt preventative measures. At 
present, even in the "intermediate areas" where Council 
investigation is possible, the body established to undertake the 
task is often faced with a fait accompli. After alleged attacks 
by Portuguese forces on the independent African states of Guinea 
in 1970 and Senegal in 1971, the Council established Special 
Missions to ascertain whether such attacks occurred (49). The 
Mission's report on Guinea led to the Council finding a "threat to 
the peace" (50). However, since the attacks were over, the 
Council could only condemn them, warn Portugal against further 
attacks, and demand that Portugal pay compensation to Guinea. 
Often in these cases where the aggression is short-lived and the 
status quo has been re-established, the investigation's only 
purpose is to find the guilty party which proves virtually 
impossible in the case of mercenary aggression and difficult in 
the case of guerrilla activities. After a mercenary attack in 
1977 aimed at overthrowing the government of Benin, a Special 
Mission could only report that the attackers worked for "pecuniary 
motives" and that the financiers could not be found (51). This 
resulted in a general Council condemnation of mercenary aggression 
(52). 
It is doubtful whether, strictly speaking, the Council's 
powers under Article 34 go beyond investigating and reporting on a 
factual basis (53). Sometimes the Council uses Article 34 in 
other senses, which often, are better covered by other provisions 
of Chapter VI. For example in resolution 377 adopted on October 
22 1975, the Council, purportedly "acting in accordance with 
Article 34" requested the Secretary General "to enter into 
immediate consultations with the parties concerned" in the dispute 
over Western Sahara, with the intention of providing the Security 
Council with the basis upon which it could recommend a settlement. 
However, the Secretary General's report (54) did not produce any 
positive Council recommendation (55). 
Nevertheless, "good offices" resolutions do sometimes produce 
a framework for settlement and as such should be classified within 
the powers provided by Article 36. Indeed, in the Kashmir case, 
the Council established a Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) 
in 1948 to investigate the facts persuant to Article 34 (56). 
UNCIP became more than a fact finding body when the Council set 
out the modalities for conducting a referendum under UNCIP 
auspices after "considering that the continuance of the dispute is 
likely to endanger international peace and security (57). This 
recommendatory resolution (58), which was probably adopted with 
Article 36 rather than Article 34 in mind, was not complied with 
and UNCIP concentrated on demarcating the cease-fire line and 
placing observers along it (59). 
Kashmir illustrates the flaw in the Council's powers of 
pacific settlement. Even if a successful investigation is carried 
out a settlement based on the impartial findings is often not 
possible, which on occasions, results in the Council accepting the 
"lesser custodial role" of peacekeeping to maintain the status quo 
(60). 
3 The settlement of disputes 
Article 36(1) of the Charter provides, 
"The Security Council may, at any stage of a 
dispute of a nature referred to in Article 33 
or of a situation of a like nature, recommend 
appropriate procedures or methods of 
adjustment. " 
Paragraph 2 of the Article directs the Council to "take into 
consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute 
which have already been adopted by the parties". This is a 
reversal of the procedure envisaged by Article 33 but it is also a 
recognition that the Security Council can recommend "appropriate 
procedures or methods of adjustment" to "situations" as well as 
"disputes". The terms of Article 36 can be applied to a variety 
of situations in the absence of any statement in the resolution of 
its Charter base. Cease-fire and withdrawal resolutions can be 
seen as "appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment" as can 
recommendations of settlement. This latter power can also be 
derived from Artilcle 37(2) which empowers the Council to 
recommend "such terms of settlement as it may consider 
appropriate". When the Council makes a recommendation for 
settlement it does not state which provision in the Charter it is 
using and so one must assume that, in practice, the Council's 
powers as regards settlement have been amalgamated (61). However, 
it could be said that Article 36 empowers the Security Council to 
establish the modalities for settlement or the framework within 
which a settlement process may be undertaken, whereas Article 37 
enables it to directly recommend the terms of settlement (62). 
Before examining the Council's use of these powers, it is 
worth mentioning the little utilised but potentially wide power 
conferred on the Council by Article 38, which provide that the 
Council "may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make 
recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement 
of the dispute". The dispute does not have to cross the threshold 
of being a danger to international peace and security. However, 
despite the fact that by means of this provision the Council could 
involve itself in any kind of dispute, it has never been used in 
this way. During the Indonesian question, the Council appeared to 
have Article 38 in mind when it adopted resolution 31 on August 21 
1947, which resolved to tender the Council's "good offices" in the 
form of a Committee of Three if the parties so requested. There 
can be little doubt, however, that the Indonesian situation was, 
at the very least, a danger to international peace and security, 
although the Council did not make such a determination, nor did it 
make one under Article 39 (63). 
jfl "Good offices" resolutions 
The phase of the Indonesian question which ended with the 
Renville Agreement (64) in 1948 represented a relative success for 
the Council in its role as a peacemaker. Resolution 27 (65) 
called for a cease-fire and called on the parties "to settle their 
disputes by arbitration or by other peaceful means". The Council 
then began to build on the fragile cease-fire that ensued. 
Resolution 30 (66) noted with satisfaction the steps taken by the 
parties to implement resolution 27, steps which included a Dutch 
statement that it intended to implement the Linggadjati Agreement. 
It also noted the request by Indonesia for the creation of a 
commission of observers. On this last point the Council acted 
quickly by requesting, in the same resolution, that governments 
with consuls in Batavia jointly prepare reports on the state of 
the cease-fire for the Council (67). Then came the creation of 
the Committee of Three by resolution 31. The Council was creating 
the machinery to facilitate the reaching of an agreement; it did 
not, at this stage, recommend one itself, although its resolutions 
implicitly favoured the implementation of the Linggadjati 
Agreement (68). After clarifying the meaning of the earlier 
resolutions, the Council urged the Committee of Three 
(alternatively called the Committee of Good Offices) to help the 
parties reach an agreement (69). 
On December 24 1947, the Committee of Good Offices addressed 
an informal message to the parties containing suggested terms for 
a truce agreement. The Renville Agreement between the Netherlands 
and Indonesia provided for an immediate cease-fire, the 
establishment of demilitarised zones, and the supervision of 
arrangements by the military assistants of the Committee of Good 
Offices. It also contained principles governing negotiations 
towards a political settlement. The effectiveness of the Council 
depended, to a great extent, on the participation and cooperation 
in good faith of both parties to the dispute. The Dutch, although 
still denying the Council's jurisdiction, viewed use of the 
Council as the only viable means of achieving a peaceful solution 
(70). Good offices resolutions do not work when the parties 
refuse to cooperate or give only token cooperation. This may be a 
truism, but it illustrates the inherent and unavoidable weakness 
of the Council in its pacification role as a whole. 
Sometimes the parties to a dispute may appear willing to 
reach an agreement with the help of the United Nations. In the 
Cyprus question the two main disputants, Greece and Turkey, have 
consented, as has the Cypriot government, to the good offices of 
the Secretary General. However, even since Perez de Cuellar 
commenced his task, the Turkish government has gone about 
consolidating its grip on the northern part of the island. "Good 
offices" implies that the Secretary General should help the 
parties to reach an agreement. In the Cyprus case, it is the 
Secretary General who has, so far, made proposals for settlement. 
Two plans have failed (71). His third plan, which deals with the 
withdrawal of Turkish troops from the northern third of the 
island, guarantees for a settlement, and freedom to move, settle 
and own property throughout the island, appears doomed to failure 
(72). The disputants display token, not genuine, consent to the 
settlement process. They feign consent because of international 
pressure, which in the case of Greece and Turkey, is heightened by 
their membership of NATO (73). 
Higgins has argued in favour"of the "third party" role of the 
Security Council in helping to settle disputes by using the 
principles of international law in accordance with Article 1(1), 
,, it is 
.... 
argued that reference to 
international law is a hindrance in this 
process because it is static and lacks the 
necessary flexibility, and that attempts at 
imposition of these rules by a third party are 
doomed to failure, and cannot properly be 
deemed either conflict resolution or the 
settlement of disputes. My own belief is that 
the legal process is considerably more 
flexible and dynamic than these argumants 
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would lead us to believe. " 
She argues that in the long term, settlement by reference to legal 
principles is preferable to short term settlement by other 
methods, including the use of force (74). Undoubtedly, the 
Council's actions in Indonesia and Cyprus have their background in 
international law; its desire for the parties to implement the 
Linggadjati Agreement as regards Indonesia and its premise that 
the resolution of the Cyprus problem should be on the basis that 
the Turks are in illegal occupation of the northern part of the 
island, are basic legal justifications for settlement. Can it be 
said, however, that the Council's primary consideration is 
settlement according to law, or is its main concern to adduce 
sufficient compromise within the Council as well as between the 
parties to produce what is, in reality, a political settlement? 
(ii) The quasi-judicial role of the Security Council in the 
settlement of disputes 
Although it may be argued that some of the provisions of 
Chapter VI and the general principles contained in Article 1(1) 
create a quasi-judicial role for the Council (75), an examination 
of most Council debates leading to the adoption of a 
recommendation towards the pacific settlement of a dispute will 
illustrate that it is arrived at by political consensus, and that 
law is often merely a "tactical device" and a "weapon in the 
armoury of rhetoric" (76). The law of nations could be said to 
play a residual role in the work of a political body such as the 
Security Council. Higgins (77) and Schacter (78) admit that the 
Council is not an adjudicative body, but argues that it still 
applies international law in its role as a peacemaker. Higgins 
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explains this distinction, 
"The International Court is enjoined to settle 
disputes by discovering the better legal 
positions of the parties before it, drawing 
upon the accepted sources of international 
law. The Security Council is to settle 
disputes by encouraging the parties to agree 
between themselves, or by recommending 
solutions itself. It has a wide political 
discretion, and all that is required is that 
its solutions should be 'in conformity with 
the principles of 
....... 
international law'. 
It can even recommend adjustments, if these 
are compatible with international law. This 
political operation within the law, rather 
than a decision according to the law, which is 
the Council's function, allows the Council to 
address itself to problems with a very 
considerable number of facets, which it is 
better equipped to do rather than a purely 
judicial body. "(79) 
This argument entails the acceptance of the Council operating 
within a "broad framework of legally acceptable solutions". On 
the face of Council recommendations there is no indication of the 
legal principles applied so the real test is that the Council can 
recommend any solution which is not illegal. The law thus need 
play a very minimal role; even less if one accepts Kelsen's 
concept of "justice" as allowing illegal recommendations (80). 
Higgins, in order to maintain the importance of law, states that 
there is little difference between the concepts of "international 
law" and "justice", so that the latter does not introduce a new 
discretionary consideration (81). 
These legal debates are only important, as far as this 
section is concerned, if they can point to the failures and 
weaknesses of the Council in the performance of its pacification 
function. As we have seen in the case of Kashmir, the Council is 
able to freeze the situation but is unable to settle the dispute. 
The failure of the Council was not due to its lack of regard for 
legal principles; indeed its recommendations were based firmly on 
the principle that no state should gain territory by the use of 
force, as exemplified by its withdrawal calls, and on the nascent 
principle of self-determination evidenced by its attempts to 
establish a framework within which a plebiscite in Kashmir could 
take place. 
The Council's failure to establish a solution is mainly due 
to it often being faced with the situation of an aggressor country 
gaining, with little possibility of it handing back its gains when 
faced with a Council recommendation. This is an inevitable flaw 
in any system based on recommendation and voluntary acceptance 
(82). Nevertheless, in order to ensure that the recommendation 
has a chance of success, it should be clear and unambiguous. 
Unfortunately, the necessities of consensus dictate that clarity 
is often unattainable. Resolution 242, adopted on November 6, 
1967, is an example of an ambiguous recommendation. The 
resolution stated, inter alia, that the Council, 
"Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter 
principles requires the establishment of a 
just and lasting peace in the Middle East 
which should include the application of both 
the following principles: 
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from 
territories occupied in the recent conflict; 
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of 
belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political 
independence of every state in the area and 
their right to live in peace within secure and 
recognised boundaries free from threats or 
acts of force. "(83) 
This appears to be a reasonable framework for the settlement of 
the Middle East problem, although the two principles outlined in 
the resolution miss the root of the problem 
- 
the homeless 
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Palestinians. Nevertheless, the resolution is based on principles 
which appear "just" as well as "legal"; the implication that 
Israel has the right to exist, the non-use of force, and the 
return of territories occupied by Israel in the Six Day War. 
However, the fact that the resolution does not state whether this 
means "all" or "some" of the territories detracts from its value. 
Law and justice point to the former interpretation, otherwise the 
Israelis would be gaining by the use of force, although it could 
be argued that they only used force for "value conservation" not 
"value extension" (84) and that the occupied territories, or at 
least some of them, are essential for the security and 
self-defence of Israel. Although Perry argues (85) that if an 
advisory opinion of the International Court were sought, there 
would be no doubt that resolution 242 would be interpreted to mean 
"all" the territories, the doubt and confusion created by the 
British proposed text has not helped to end the conflict. 
When attempting to settle a dispute the Security Council 
tends to adopt recommendations which are aimed at not causing 
offence to either party in order to induce them to come to an 
agreement. Determinations of legal guilt may come later if the 
parties remain recalcitrant. Usually, these determinations will 
contain a finding under Article 39 without the accompaniment of 
enforcement action. The initial recommendations are usually based 
on broad principles of international law and justice centred 
around the jus cogens contained in Article 2(4) and the principle 
that state should not gain from its breach. It may be argued that 
more concrete legal determinations should be made even under 
purely recommendatory Chapter VI resolutions. There are both 
pitfalls and advantages in this approach; a "once and for all" 
legal determination may make a state more intransigent and so work 
against the settlement process, and at the same time it may 
mobilise international opinion which will work in its favour (86). 
Discussions of this nature miss the point somewhat, for it is the 
regular flouting of the principles of international law and those 
contained in the Charter, particularly the principle on the 
non-use of force, which undermines the effectiveness of the 
Council. All Council resolutions, whether recommendations or 
decisions of a substantive nature are based primarily on this 
fundamental principle. Yet most nations only pay lip-service to 
Article 2(4); force is used illegally by states on a regular 
basis. In the cases of Goa, East Timor, Western Sahara, the 
Middle East, Kampuchea and West Irian, states have gained 
territory by the use of force. In many of the cases mentioned, 
which by no means constitutes an exhaustive list, other principles 
of international law have been flouted, for example the principle 
of self-determination (87). The relative ineffectiveness of the 
Council is due to a combination of the failure of some Members to 
respect basic principles of law and a failure by the members of 
the Council to operate its powers in accordance with the 
objectives of the Charter rather than an inherent flaw in the 
Council's powers. In a world where international law was 
honoured, the Security Council would be successful, even 
unnecessary, for as Franck puts it, 
"Principles that are regularly implemented 
over a long period tend to make certain 
conduct 'unthinkable'. The idea the something 
'just isn't done' is both descriptive and 
proscriptive. However, once a principle is 
violated with impunity 
....... 
it loses part 
of its credibility and thus its capacity to 
deter. It is no longer unthinkable. 
Restoring its unthinkability is rather like 
putting toothpaste back in a tube. "(88) 
The Council, to continue the simile, is faced with the hopeless 
task of "forcing" the toothpaste back, or more correctly 
"recommending" that it be put back in the tube. 
(iii) No power to impose a binding settlement 
Despite isolated suggestions to the contrary (89), neither 
the Charter nor the practice of the Security Council can be used 
to evince the possibility of a power to impose a mandatory or 
binding settlement by a combination of Article 25 and Chapter VI 
(Articles 36 and 37) (90). Nevertheless, on occasions, the 
Council's recommendations for settlement based on a combination of 
Article 24 and Chapter VI, are more comprehensive and detailed 
that they suggest a more intense and concerted effort by the 
Council to achieve a settlement than do the recommendations which 
outline a framework for settlement discussed above. However, they 
are not binding on non-complying parties. 
The conclusion of the Renville Agreement between the 
Netherlands and Indonesia represented a success for the Security 
Council and its Committee of Good Offices. However, although the 
truce arrangements were put into effect, the political discussions 
broke down despite the efforts of the above mentioned Committee. 
In December 1948 a Dutch surprise attack enabled it to capture 
most of the principle cities in the territory of the Republic, 
which combined with a more intransigent approach by the Dutch (91) 
signified that the Council could no longer persevere with its good 
offices approach. Nor did it venture into Chapter VII. Instead 
it adopted resolution 67 on January 28 1949 which represented a 
much more comprehensive approach by the Council aimed at 
a political solution. 
The resolution uses, in its preamble, the language of Article 
24, and then goes on to outline a more detailed recommendation for 
settlement presumably with Article 36 or Article 37 in mind. The 
use of Article 24 is possibly to impress upon the intransigent 
parties the desire of the Council to fulfil its primary 
responsibility; a desire which may, in time lead to the use of 
Chapter VII (92). By the resolution the Council established the 
United Nations Commission for Indonesia in the place of the Good 
Offices Committee, a move which indicated the Council's increased 
commitment to a more comprehensive settlement. In operative 
paragraph 3 the Council recommended the establishment of an 
Interim Federal government which was to have internal powers until 
the transfer of sovereignty by the Netherlands which was to be 
achieved by July 1 1950. Elections for the Indonesian Constituent 
Assembly were to be completed by October 1 1949. The Commission 
was established to help the parties to implement the resolution. 
The resolution was recommendatory only but it had the value 
of being so comprehensive that it was almost "decision like" in 
its content. Nevertheless, the Belgian representative made it 
clear that the resolution remained under Chapter VI, 
"With regard to the settlement of the 
substance of a question, the Council can only 
make recommendations, and it could not be 
otherwise. To acknowledge the Council's right 
to decide on the liberation of the peoples of 
Indonesia, or of any other people, would be 
the equivalent of granting it the authority to 
settle the fate of a territory, to determine 
likewise its allegiance, in a word, to settle 
categorically the question whether a state 
should or should not be created. "(93) 
Nevertheless, the combination of Article 24 and the obvious 
commitment of the Council to the independence of Indonesia led to 
the Dutch government notifying its general acceptance of the 
resolution with a few exceptions (94). On December 27 1949 the 
Netherlands transferred sovereignty to the Republic of Indonesia. 
In the Namibian case, the Council "decided" that the 
"continued occupation of the Territory of Namibia by the South 
African authorities" was illegal and that its mandate over the 
territory was terminated (95). However, this was only a decision 
on legality, it was not a political solution, although it provided 
a base for the United Nations' plan for Namibia. Subsequent 
resolutions on Namibia, dealing with settlement, can be viewed as 
coming under Chapter VI (96). 
The current basis for the settlement of the Namibian problem 
is resolution 435 adopted on September 29 1978, which endorsed the 
proposals in the Secretary General's report (97) providing for 
internationally supervised elections leading to the independence 
of the disputed territory. South Africa has, so far, frustrated 
any attempt to implement resolution 435, by holding unilateral 
election which the Council condemned (98), and by linking South 
African withdrawal from Namibia with Cuban withdrawal from Angola 
which has also been condemend by the Council (99). 
In a revision and extension of its attitude to the Namibian 
problem the Security Council has called for voluntary measures of 
a limited nature (100) against South Africa. The original text 
supported the implementation of mandatory sanctions against 
Pretoria if the Namibian Independence Plan had not been put into 
operation by a certain date, but the United Kingdom and the United 
States could not support this and they later vetoed a Non Aligned 
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draft (101) which would have determined that the "continued 
illegal occupation of Namibia by, South Africa constitutes a breach 
of international peace and an act of aggression", and would have 
imposed mandatory sanctions against South Africa under Article 41, 
Chapter VII. 
The use of Chapter VII action to enforce the provisions of a 
settlement proposal ostensibly made under Chapter VI and Article 
24 would represent the most effective method of operation for the 
Council short of the use of force. Unfortunately, the two Western 
powers cannot commit themselves to this, when, paradoxically, they 
were two of the original drafters of the Namibian Plan for 
Independence (102). The lack of complete support for the 
Council's resolutions makes them ineffective. The same effect has 
been felt as regards the South African situation as a whole. The 
most effective method of bringing about change in the form of a 
comprehensive recommendation to end apartheid combined with the 
modalities necessary to replace it by majority rule under Chapter 
VI and Article 24, which if not complied with, to be backed up by 
mandatory economic sanctions, has been prevented by Western 
states. Nevetheless, the tone of the Council's resolutions is 
beginning to reach this point as the Western powers begin to 
buckle as a result of the international outrage shown towards the 
continuing violence and repression in South Africa. In 1984 the 
Pretoria government introduced a new constitution giving 
"coloureds" and those people of Asian origin some political 
franchise. The Security Council merely condemend the new 
constitution and declared it invalid while expressing support for 
the continued struggle for self-determination (103). By 1986, the 
Council was able to suggest a "threat to the peace" in South 
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Africa and, 
"Demand[ed] the immediate eradication of 
apartheid as a necessary step towards the 
establishment of a non racial democratic 
society based on self-determination and 
majority rule through the full and free 
exercise of adult suffrage in a united and 
non-fragmented South Africa. "(104) 
And to this end it demanded, inter alia, the dismantling of 
bantustans, the release of political prisoners and the lifting of 
the state of emergency. The Security Council cannot impose a 
binding settlement under Chapter VII for two reasons; first, such 
a power is not envisaged in the Charter and secondly the 
settlement process is only conducive to recommendations. However, 
the Council could pass a forceful recommendation under Chapter VI 
or under the non-mandatory powers contained in Article 39, Chapter 
VII. The above resolution approaches this position but failed 
because it lacks the support of the United Kingdom and the United 
States who abstained and who would prevent any pressure being 
brought to bear on South Africa by the use of the powers of 
Chapter VII (105). 
iv The dysfunctional effect of the Council's attempts at 
conflict resolution 
Jeanne Kirkpatrick, former United States' ambassador to the 
United Nations, has expressed some interesting points on the 
problems of conflict resolution. Her conclusion is that ".. the 
UN has on occasion made conflict resolution more difficult than it 
would otherwise be" (106). She cites the Camp David Accords as an 
example of a successful settlement which would not have occurred 
through the United Nations. The negotiations between Israel and 
Egypt with mediation by the United States were, she states, 
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"pragmatic and non-ideological". She argues that because the 
parties to the dispute were involved with assistance from the 
mediator, the settlement process was made much easier. On the 
other hand, 
"At the United Nations, none of these factors 
is present. First, the debates are intensely 
ideological, as are the resolutions that are 
ultimately adopted. The objective instead is 
to isolate and denigrate Israel and ultimately 
to undermine its political legitimacy. A 
related objective is to isolate the countries 
friendly to Israel, above all the United 
States. "(107) 
She states that bringing the conflict before the United Nations, 
by which she presumably means the Security Council or the General 
Assembly, actually has the effect of spreading the conflict by 
extending the number of parties to it. Certainly, in the case of 
the Security Council, the number of invited speakers has 
proliferated over the last two decades (108) which inhibits the 
settlement process, but it remains doubtful that by involving the 
United Nations, the conflict is in danger of escalating. Speaking 
against Israel is not akin to a declaration of war against Israel 
although Kirkpatrick says that it amounts to a "war by other 
means". She explains that as well as extending the conflict, the 
United Nations exacerbates and polarizes the conflict by 
discouraging neutral stances which would give rise to negotiation 
attempts (109). 
Several of these points are valid, but one must remember that 
the Camp David Accords only dealt with a small fraction of the 
Middle Eastern problem 
- 
the conflict between Israel and Egypt, 
and then it did not deal successfully with the problem of the Gaza 
Strip. The Security Council had attempted to establish a 
framework for the solution of the whole (110), when perhaps it 
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might have been better to take it piece by piece. However, the 
polarization talked about by Kirkpatrick is not solely caused by 
the Socialist and Non Aligned blocs, but equally by the United 
States. Continual American blocking of any effective Council 
moves to stop the Israeli advancement into Lebanon in 1982 meant 
that when the Israelis left Beirut, the Americans had only 
themselves to blame when in December 1985 the Syrians stepped in 
and backed a peace plan encompassing all the various factions in 
Beirut (111). Sometimes it is the attitude of the United States 
which forces the settlement of a conflict outside the United 
Nations, in particular, the Security Council. 
4 Reference to the International Court 
Article 36(3) of the Charter states, 
"In making recommendations under this Article 
the Security Council should also take into 
consideration that legal disputes should as a 
general rule be referred by the parties to the 
International Court 
.... 
" 
Many factors militate against increased reference by the Council 
to the International Court. Many countries are not willing to 
gamble losing a dispute in an all or nothing legal ruling; they 
prefer, if anything, political compromises. In addition a strict 
delineation between the Council and the International Court on the 
basis of whether the dispute is political or legal fails to take 
account of the fine and often blurred distinction between law and 
politics (112) and the fact that the Council has, by other 
provisions in Chapter VI, a quasi-judicial role anyway (113). 
In fact the Council has made little use of Article 36(3). In 
the dispute between Albania and the United Kingdom over aspects of 
passage through the Corfu Channel in 1947, the Security Council 
recommended that the parties "immediately refer the dispute" to 
the International Court (114). That the Council, under Article 
36(3), can do no more than make a recommendation which the parties 
are free to accept or reject was made clear by the World Court. 
The United Kingdom argued that the Council's resolution had 
established the Court's jurisdiction. Although the Court found it 
unnecessary to rule on this point, a majority pointed out that 
Article 36(3) did not introduce a new case of compulsory 
jurisdiction (115). 
The only other use of Article 36(3) by the Council occurred 
in 1976 when Greece complained of "flagrant violations by Turkey 
of the sovereign rights of Greece on its continental shelf in the 
Aegean" which has created a dangerous situation threatening 
international peace and security" (116). Resolution 395 was 
adopted on August 25 1976 by consensus; it called for negotiations 
and invited the parties to refer the question to the International 
Court (117). 
Article 36(3) is really an example of settlement by pacific 
means and so should be associated with Article 33(1). It is not 
generally used by the Security Council because it only entails a 
recommendation. If the parties are willing to refer their dispute 
to the International Court they do not generally need the Council 
to remind them to do so. The infrequent use of Article 36(3) is a 
consequence of the limited use of the World Court in resolving 
conflicts (118). 
5 Provisional measures 
Article 40 provides, 
"In order to prevent the aggravation of the 
situation, the Security Council may, before 
making the recommendations or deciding upon 
the measures provided for in Article 39, call 
upon the parties concerned to comply with such 
provisional measures as it deems necessary or 
desirable. Such provisional measures shall be 
without prejudice to the rights, claims or 
positions of the parties concerned. The 
Security Council shall duly take account of a 
failure to comply with such provisional 
measures. " 
By placing this provision in Chapter VII which deals mainly with 
mandatory measures, there has been a tendency to view 
recommendations of provisional measures (usually a call for a 
cease-fire and withdrawal) as coming within Chapter VI, usually 
Article 36, with Article 40 measures being exclusively mandatory 
following a finding under Article 39 or by the invocation of 
Article 25 (119). However, as we have seen (120), provisional 
measures can be binding without references to Article 39 or 
Article 25 if the language of the resolution is peremptory and the 
discussions in the Council so indicate (121). Once one accepts 
some degree of flexibility in the nature of provisional measures 
as developed in the practice of the Security Council, one can see 
that Article 40 is the natural basis for them whether their 
invocation is recommendatory or in the form of a decision under 
Article 25 (122), just as Article 41 is the basis for sanctions 
whether voluntary or mandatory. The question to be discussed here 
is whether overtly mandatory provisional measures are more 
effective than recommendatory ones (123). First of all we will 
examine certain situations in which the call for a cease fire and 
withdrawal was viewed as recommendatory. 
In Palestine in 1948, the fighting between the Jewish Haganah 
and the Palestinian Liberation Army caused the Council to adopt 
several resolutions calling for a cessation of hostilities and a 
truce (124). These are generally viewed as recommendatory because 
there was a refusal in the meetings of the Security Council to 
make a finding under Article 39 (125). These calls continued with 
little success even after the surrounding Arab countries invaded 
the newly proclaimed state of Israel (126), until the conflict was 
brought clearly within Chapter VII. The question whether the 
later resolutions adopted under Chapter VII were more effective 
will be examined later. 
The reason why the Council so often has to resort to 
cease-fire calls is obviously due to the fact that it is badly 
prepared. Often the cease-fire resolution is the first Council 
action in a conflict whereas if it had heeded the warnings it 
could have attempted to defuse the situation at an earlier stage. 
The Middle East is again illustrative of the Council's poor crisis 
management. In the build up to the outbreak of the Six Day War on 
May 5 1967, the Council showed an unwillingness to prevent what 
appeared to be at least "a very serious potential threat to the 
peace" (127). The withdrawal of UNEF and the military build up of 
Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian forces appeared to be a threat to 
the peace but pro-Arab members of the Council blocked any 
attempted move to prevent war (128). Yet when the war broke out 
the Council managed to adopt a unanimous resolution which called 
upon "the Governments concerned as a first step to take forthwith 
all measures for an immediate cease-fire" (129). This was 
disregarded so on June 7, the Soviets, concerned about Arab 
losses, proposed a more forceful draft which was adopted as 
resolution 234. In it the Council demanded a cessation of 
hostilities. A similar resolution was adopted when fighting 
intensified on the Syrian front (130). By June 10 all the 
disputants had accepted the cease-fire. 
These latter resolutions appear to have been more effective, 
perhaps because of their more peremptory language. However, this 
is deceiving for the Israelis only accepted the cease-fire when 
they had gained the Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights, 
whereas the Arabs were in no position to refuse when their armies 
started losing severely. Cease-fire resolutions are often 
combined with or are followed by a call for the withdrawal of 
occupying troops. In the case of the Six Day War it was some 
months before the Council adopted resolution 242 (131), which, 
inter alia, called for Israeli withdrawal. Although a cease-fire 
may be complied with, a call for withdrawal is less likely to be 
obeyed for it is often an intrinsic part of the settlement 
process. The Security Council quickly adopted both a cease-fire 
resolution (132) and a resolution calling for the withdrawal of 
Israeli troops (133) soon after the Israelis had launched their 
invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Neither call was complied with until 
the Israelis had achieved their aims of eradicating the PLO from 
Lebanon and establishing a security zone in the southern part of 
the country. 
The Middle East (134) illustrates how the Council is often 
unable to step beyond the establishment of a cease-fire. Even 
compliance with such a call is illusory of Council effectiveness, 
in that it will only be accepted when both sides are 
simultaneously ready because of their relative military positions. 
Withdrawal calls are not generally complied with because the party 
in the strongest position will lose most. Settlement in terms of 
international law or justice is unlikely while countries are able 
to benefit territorially by the use of force. 
Potentially, the Security Council's role in a conflict, if 
one excludes mandatory enforcement measures, can be summarized as 
calling for or demanding a cease-fire, then a withdrawal to prior 
positions and then an outline of settlement (135). On several 
occasions the Council has been unable to go beyond a cease-fire 
call; for example, the sole Council resolution on the dispute 
between France and Tunisia was a call "for an immediate cease-fire 
and a return of all armed forces to their original positions" 
(136). Similarly, the Council has called on the participants in 
the Gulf War to establish a cease-fire (137). These calls have 
been repeated for many years, yet until a cease-fire is 
established, in the absence of enforcement measures, the Council 
is able to do little else. 
On July 20 1987 the Council finally adopted a mandatory 
demand for a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq in resolution 598 
after expressly referring to Articles 39 and 40 of Chapter VII as 
well as determining that there "exists a breach of the peace as 
regards the conflict between Iran and Iraq". The evidence to 
suggest that a mandatory call for provisional measures is more 
effective is somewhat ambiguous and indeed resolution 598 seems to 
have little effect so far on the belligerents in the Gulf War. 
The problem being that designating a provisional measure as 
"binding" rather than recommendatory is going to be little more 
than a token gesture, unless the Council is prepared to enforce 
those provisional measures or use enforcement measures under 
Article 41 or Article 42. The Council has only enforced 
provisional measures on one or possibly two occasions (138). 
Often the effectiveness of any mandatory call under Article 
40 is reduced because the Council dithers between Chapter VI and 
VII. The delay and political in fighting which occur in the 
Council as various factions argue whether to make a determination 
under Article 39 or not, encourages the parties to a conflict to 
ignore the calls, whether mandatory or recommendatory because it 
obviously lacks the necessary solidarity, having been arrived at 
only when the various groups on the Council have simultaneously 
arrived at the conclusion that the party they favour would benefit 
from a cease-fire. 
The Bangladesh crisis in 1971 took this process to the 
extreme. The Council met one day after the outbreak of 
hostilities. A plethora of draft resolutions did not result in a 
consensus, in fact it was five days after the hostilities had 
ceased that the Council managed to adopt a resolution which 
appeared to be a mandatory call for provisional measures. 
Resolution 307 (139) made an indirect finding under Article 39 by 
stating that the situation on the sub-continent "remains a threat 
to international peace" and then demanded that "a durable 
cease-fire and cessation of hostilities 
.... 
be strictly 
observed". The resolution noted that a cease-fire had already 
taken place; in fact the political solution envisaged by the 
Polish proposal (140) had taken place through India's victory in 
the war, and by the creation of the independent state of 
Bangladesh. The Council was guilty of shutting the gate afer the 
horse had bolted. 
In other cases, the Council has acted less ineptly but still 
too slowly in its usage of a mandatory call under Article 40. The 
Gulf War is one modern example. The first Arab-Israeli conflict 
in 1948 is another. From March 5 1948 (141) to July 7 1949 (142) 
the Security Council could only produce mere cease-fire calls as 
hostilities intensified in Palestine. The Soviet Union and the 
United States favoured the newly born state of Israel and so 
pressed for a finding of a "threat to the peace" under Article 39 
combined with provisional measures under Article 40 to try and 
stem the Arab advance, but with the British and Chinese being 
sympathetic to the Arab nations any such move was blocked (143). 
Eventually with the Arab countries losing, the United Kingdom and 
China felt unable to continue to prevent a determination under 
Article 39. Resolution 54 (144) at last classified the situation 
as a "threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39" and 
ordered that "persuant to Article 40" a cessation of hostilities 
should take place "not later than three days from the date" of the 
resolution. A truce was established within the specified time. 
However, with the Israelis strengthening militarily in the 
breathing space created by the truce, the Soviet Union and the 
United States blocked any attempt to make a further resolution 
(resolution 61) binding (145) by refusing to allow a finding of a 
threat to or breach of the peace. Resolution 61 called for the 
withdrawal of forces to position held on October 14 and for the 
establishment of permanent truce lines. The Soviet Union and the 
United States realised that only Israel would lose by such an 
action. The Israelis ignored the resolution. The Council then 
entered into Chapter VII again with the adoption of resolution 62 
(146) which cited Article 39 and decided that to eliminate the 
"threat to the peace" an armistice "shall be established". It 
called upon the parties, "as a provisional measure under Article 
40" to negotiate with a "view to establishing an armistice". An 
armistice was eventually established. 
From this brief account it appears that when the Council does 
place itself squarely under Articles 39 and 40, the cease-fire is 
established, whereas a mere recommendatory call is, all too often, 
readily ignored by the parties. However, this is too simplistic a 
view. Although the Israelis certainly viewed the mandatory calls 
of the Council with great concern (147), the major factor in their 
acceptance of the cease-fire calls was the state of hostilities in 
each case. Resolution 54 produced a cease-fire because the Arabs 
were losing and the Israelis, unknown to the Arabs, desperately 
needed time to re-group and re-equip. Resolution 62 calling for 
armistice negotiations was initially ignored by the Egyptians who 
resumed an offensive in the Negev in December. It was Israel's 
counter offensive which forced the eventual negotiations of an 
armistice while the Council ineptly returned to the use of a 
recommendatory resolution calling for a cease-fire (148). 
Mandatory resolutions may be marginally more successful than 
their recommendatory counterparts, but they still have the same 
inherent flaw when they are successful; they tend to freeze the 
dispute and usually to one of the parties advantage. Even fairly 
rapidly arrived at resolutions, although sometimes effective, work 
to the advantage of one of the parties. When violence erupted 
between the two Cypriot communities in 1974, the Council was 
rapidly convened on July 16 (149). With a Turkish invasion 
occurring the Council adopted resolution 353 (150) which found a 
"serious threat to international peace and security" and demanded 
an "end to foreign military intervention". The resolution called 
for both a cease-fire and for the cooperation of the parties with 
the peacekeeping force present since 1964. The cease-fire was 
eventually complied with after the call had been reiterated (151). 
Further provisional measures created a security zone between 
Turkish forces in the north of the island and Greek Cypriot forces 
to the south (152). The effect of this was to cement the solution 
sought by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots by the partition of the 
island. 
The drafters of the Charter inserted the provisional measures 
provision as an optional stop-gap before the application of 
enforcement measures under Articles 41 and 42. The Security 
Council has used Article 40 more in the way of a holding measure 
while pacific settlement is sought. The Secretary General's 
attempts at mediation in the Cyprus situation have been mentioned. 
In the Falklands War, the Council speedily adopted a call for 
provisional measures after a finding of a "breach of the peace" 
(153) and then encouraged the Secretary General in his good 
offices mission (154). 
The call for provisional measures was speedily adopted in the 
Falklands War, but was ignored by Argentina. Similarly, after the 
North Korean forces had invaded the South, the Council quickly 
found a "breach of the peace" and called for a cessation of 
hostilities and a withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th 
parallel (155); a call which was also ignored. 
This suggests that even when quickly adopted, mandatory 
provisional measures are not much more effective than those 
adopted without a finding under Article 39. This is probably 
because the Council has very rarely adopted effective enforcement 
of the provisional measures it has called for. 
6 Voluntary sanctions 
The powers contained in Article 41 were intended to be 
mandatory enforcement measures following a finding of a threat to 
or breach of the peace under Article 39. However, on occasions, 
the Council is unwilling to take mandatory action with the 
consequence that it settles for a call for voluntary measures or 
sanctions. Such action can be viewed as a reinterpretation of 
Article 41 to allow recommendations, or as merely a recommendation 
under Chapter VI, or a recommendation of enforcement action under 
Article 39. Although the Charter base for such powers is 
inconclusive there is no doubt that the Council has developed such 
a power, the evolution of which lies in political compromise. In 
almost every case in which voluntary measures have been called 
for, the Western powers have objected to a finding under Article 
39 combined with mandatory sanctions. Voluntary sanctions, as the 
term implies, are breached with impunity and so are relatively 
ineffective except for a certain symbolic role plus being a 
reflection of international opinion. 
In the Rhodesian situation the Council initially called for 
an arms, oil and petroleum embargo to be imposed against the Smith 
regime (156). The Western powers viewed this as a voluntary call 
(157), although others thought that it was "only under Chapter VII 
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that economic sanctions are mentioned" (158). With at least two 
of the permanent members regarding the call as voluntary, the 
resolution must be regarded as recommendatory. 
International pressure sometimes has the effect of turning 
voluntary measures into mandatory ones. In the case of Rhodesia 
this happened relatively quickly when the Council first imposed 
selective mandatory sanctions (159) and then more comprehensive 
sanctions (160). Nevertheless, over two years elapsed between the 
call for voluntary measures and the call for comprehensive 
mandatory measures, a fact that decreased the effectiveness of the 
sanctions for it allowed the Rhodesian economy time to prepare. 
It was almost as if certain members were dragging their feet to 
allow this to happen. The same can be said as regards the arms 
embargo placed on South Africa. This was originally a voluntary 
call made in 1963 (161); fourteen years later it was made 
mandatory (162), giving the Pretoria regime ample time to 
stockpile and to work out alternative supply routes. The 
arguments against sanctions, which are prevalent in the West, will 
be examined below, although it can be said at this stage that 
sanctions are not going to be effective unless they are imposed 
immediately. 
In the South African situation, the United Kingdom and the 
United States have prevented the application of mandatory 
sanctions (163). The most these countries accept is a voluntary 
call for limited economic sanctions (164). Britain's reticence to 
impose even these limited measures was evidenced by Prime Minister 
Thatcher's original opposition to sanctions at the Commonwealth 
leaders meeting in Nassau in October 1985. She eventually 
compromised under intense pressure from the other leaders and 
agreed to some of the voluntary measures called for by the 
Security Council (165). 
7 Mandatory economic sanctions 
Article 41 of the United Nations Charter reads, 
"The Security Council may decide what measures 
not involving the use of armed force are to be 
employed to give effect to its decisions and 
it may call upon the Members of the United 
Nations to apply such measures. These may 
include the complete or partial interruption 
of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, 
postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of 
communication or the severance of diplomatic 
relations. " 
Given that the military measures envisaged by Articles 42 and 43 
are defunct (166), the application of economic sanctions under 
Article 41 probably represents the greatest extent of the 
Council's armoury. Voluntary sanctions have been mentioned and 
generally dismissed as purely notional and ineffective. Mandatory 
measures under Article 41 following an express or implied finding 
under Article 39 (167) have been used only twice by the Council. 
They were imposed against the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia in 
1966 (168), and were finally terminated in 1980 (169) with the 
emergence of Zimbabwe. The only other mandatory use of Article 41 
was a limited one - to impose an arms embargo against South Africa 
in 1977 (170), which is still in force (171). Thus in the 
following examination we only have the Rhodesian experience to 
illustrate the effectiveness of a full economic embargo under 
Article 41. The attempts to introduce mandatory sanctions against 
South Africa provide a chance of comparing the effectiveness of 
sanctions in the Rhodesian case with the effectiveness of 
sanctions if applied with the purpose of ending the system of 
- 
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- 
apartheid in South Africa, and its occupation of Namibia. 
If Article 41 sanctions prove to be ineffective then the 
Security Council's ability to fulfil its primary role is similarly 
reduced. Potential aggressors and international law breakers are 
not going to be deterred by a toothless Security Council whose 
ultimate power is the application of ineffective enforcement 
measures in the form of economic sanctions. Indeed, the fact that 
the Council has only used its power under Article 41 in two 
situations (172) suggests that it might be reluctant for fear of 
revealing its inadequacies. However, the main reason for its 
limited use is the perceived economic interests of the members, 
particularly the permanent members. 
There have been varying assessments of the effectiveness of 
the mandatory economic measures imposed aginst Rhodesia (173). 
The figures suggest that after initially struggling, after 1968 
the Rhodesian economy improved (174). These figures have been 
used to deny the effectiveness of economic measures (175). 
Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that after 1974 with 
the combined effects of Mozambique's independence (176), the 
guerrilla war and the sanctions, the Rhodesian domestic situation 
as a whole began to decline (177). Thus although the application 
of sanctions did not immediately achieve the primary goals of the 
Security Council of either ending UDI by forcing Smith to 
negotiate, or to ruin the Rhodesian economy and thus force 
internal change (178), it did achieve certain subsidiary goals 
which must be viewed as a success. These were namely the 
prevention of an all out civil war in Rhodesia after the 
proclamation of UDI, the prevention of foreign military 
intervention to end WI and possibly escalation, and the 
inducement, as opposed to the coercion, of the white regime to 
negotiate (179). 
Nevertheless, the use of economic statistics to point to the 
alleged failure of sanctions against Rhodesia has led to arguments 
against applying sanctions against South Africa (180), 
particularly by the West. Unless the West is willing to enforce 
sanctions they will be ineffective, but that is not an inherent 
fault in the nature of sanctions but the fault of the Western 
states (181). Indeed, it has been suggested, by the former South 
African ambassador to London that the mandatory, global 
application of those sanctions mentioned by the Eminent Persons 
Group (182) would have a "very major effect" on South Africa 
(183). 
Nevertheless, in the Rhodesian case, sanctions were mandatory 
and so binding on Member countries including Western states and so 
the question remains as to why the Rhodesian economy was not 
affected more rapidly. One major reason for this is the poor 
timing of the imposition. Pokalas summarises the effect of this 
in the case of Rhodesia, 
"Such anticipatory actions as stockpiling 
materials, developing alternative supply 
sources to obviate over-dependence on any one 
source, diversifying domestic production, 
planting crops that were readily exportable, 
conserving key commodities and establishing 
new trade routes were utilised by Southern 
Rhodesia even prior to Security Council 
action. "(184) 
Comprehensive economic sanctions were imposed one and a half years 
after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (185), which in 
terms of the United Nations was relatively quickly. However, it 
was six years since the United Nations had taken cognizance of the 
situation and so the country had ample time to prepare (186). For 
sanctions to be effective they must be immediate, mandatory and 
comprehensive. In other words a resolution should have been 
adopted by the Council on the day of UDI or even before containing 
a determination of a threat to the peace and the imposition of 
mandatory, comprehensive measures. In the Rhodesian case 
sanctions were applied in a "gradual crescendo of severity" (187) 
creating many loopholes which the Security Council gradually 
filled in a piecemeal fashion. Above all, for sanctions to be 
effective, they must have the full support of the Members of the 
United Nations in particular the permanent members of the Security 
Council. 
On the basis outlined above, sanctions against South Africa 
would not be effective in bringing about an internal change 
because the Pretoria regime has been given over twenty years 
warning of their possible implementation and so have had more than 
adequate time to prepare. In addition, it is doubtful whether the 
United States and Britain would commit themselves to sanctions 
even if they decided not to veto their mandatory application. In 
1980, the United States was South Africa's number one trading 
partner, with an increase in two way trade of 24% from 1979 (188), 
while British interest in South Africa comprises 45% of all 
foreign investment there (189). Thus these two Western powers 
have the most to lose after South Africa if sanctions were 
imposed, not only by losing investments and valuable minerals in 
South Africa but also by affecting their own economies (190). 
Nevertheless, pragmatic arguments aside, and despite the fact 
that South Africa has been given warning, sanctions applied fully 
by all the United Nations' Members would deal a severe blow to the 
morale of South Africa and shorten its life though not bringing it 
to its knees. Thus sanctions would not cripple South Africa and 
so possibly cause a civil war in the ensuing vacuum, instead the 
increased pressure would force the minority regime to negotiate 
radical political reforms rather than the piecemeal ones it has 
adopted so far to placate its Western trading partners (191). As 
with the Smith regime in Rhodesia, the object of a full array of 
economic sanctions against South Africa must be to cause peaceful 
internal change not bloody revolution, economic collapse and 
possible escalation. 
Given the scenario that the Council decided unanimously to 
adopt mandatory sanctions against a certain state and the Members 
acted diligently to observe the binding obligation placed on them, 
there can be little doubt that even the strongest well-prepared 
economy, such as South Africa's, would be damaged. Such damage 
would lead to negotiations whereas destruction of the economy 
would probably lead to conflict. As regards observance, the 
permanent members, in particular, could apply their sophisticated 
intelligence and surveillance networks to ensure that no country 
was breaking the sanctions (192). 
In the Rhodesian situation sanction breakers went unpunished 
in many instances which led the Council to adopt resolution 333 
(193); this called for the "enactment and enforcement of 
legislation providing for the imposition of severe penalties on 
persons natural or juridical that evade or commit breach of 
sanctions". Admittedly, in the case of Rhodesia the two countries 
which openly defied sanctions - South Africa and Portugal 
- 
were 
states over which the rest of the international community had 
little hold. It is doubtful whether a parallel can be drawn 
between their support for Rhodesia and Britain's and the United 
States' continuing economic involvement in South Africa. The two 
Western states would not want to appear as international law 
breakers if sanctions ever became mandatory. The Catch 22 is that 
these two countries prevent the mandatory application of Article 
41. 
In addition to South Africa and Portugal, other prominent 
sanction breakers during the Rhodesian crisis were the 
multinational corporations. These proved to be the most difficult 
to prevent because of their diverse locations and their economic 
and political power. Multinationals are mainly based in the West 
and so it is natural that they should be the responsibility of 
those members which have a share in them. In particular, 
supervision should be coordinated by the three Western permanent 
members of the Council (194). 
Another main sanction breaker during the Rhodesian situation 
was the United States which in 1970 defied the Security Council by 
passing the Byrd Amendment (195) enabling it to trade with 
Southern Rhodesia in strategic materials. The Council, with the 
United States merely abstaining, censored the United States in 
resolution 320 (196) in which it was "deeply concerned by the 
report of the United States of America that it has authorized the 
importation of chrome ore and other minerals from Southern 
Rhodesia". The Rhodesian economy could not but benefit from such 
illegal activities evidenced by its economic growth in conjunction 
with the reported number of sanction violations. By 1968 there 
had been 13 violations; this had increased to 73 by 1970 and 346 
by 1976. The United States had committed 46 violations by 1978 
(197). The United States had ignored a mandatory decision of the 
Security Council and had therefore abrogated its treaty 
obligations and breached Charter law. The lead given by the 
United States led to the initial vigilance of other states being 
relaxed with the result that the mandatory measures were then 
treated like voluntary measures 
- 
as a token gesture to be ignored 
with impunity. 
It is possible that the United Kingdom and the United States 
would also be lax as regards any mandatory sanctions against South 
Africa although it remains to be seen whether they would 
positively encourage their breach. However, it would be wrong to 
assert that economic sanctions are inherently ineffective; it 
would be correct to say that it is the attitude of certain Members 
which causes them to be ineffective (198). 
It is also argued that because a possible target nation is 
industrially and militarily strong, sanctions would serve no 
useful purpose and so should not be imposed. This argument is 
applied to South Africa (199). The import of this pragmatic 
argument is that sanctions should only be applied selectively 
against states which the Council has decided are a threat to the 
peace or have breached the peace and are weak economically. The 
extreme of this would be the industrialised nations combining to 
sanction a poor Third World country. Surely, sanctions should be 
applied irrespective of the strength of the target state if the 
situation so warrants. However, arguments in favour of the 
Council adopting an objective and normative approach are subject 
to the geopolitical factors which govern the work of that body. 
Rhodesia was internally strong. It was self-sufficient in 
agriculture, had abundant minerals including gold and a strong 
industrial base, but it still needed trade and investment. This 
is why the Council should have implemented a total embargo against 
the country, for as Pokalas points out, 
"Had the embargo been properly implemented by 
States legislation, strictly enforced by 
States administration and judicial sectors, 
and diligently coordinated by the Committee, 
the Rhodesian economy would have floundered 
and ultimately collapsed. " (200) 
The only effective method of ensuring that the weaknesses of the 
target state's economy are exposed is to impose a comprehensive 
embargo. Limited embargos are insufficient because even if they 
are aimed at those areas of weakness the other unsanctioned areas 
of the economy will develop to compensate. An arms embargo, such 
as that imposed against South Africa, is a folly because South 
Africa's strong economy and natural resources supply have enabled 
it to produce its own weapons (201). 
8 Other non-violent means 
Article 41 lists other non-violent measures other than 
economic sanctions which might be utilised in a situation of a 
threat to or breach of the peace. These constitute mainly token 
gestures of international concern and censure. In 1946, the 
Security Council failed to adopt mandatory diplomatic sanctions in 
the form of a severance of diplomatic relations with the Franco 
regime in Spain after a committee failed to find a threat to the 
peace (202). The thwarted aim was to pressure the Spanish 
government into a less dictatorial rule. 
Similarly, in relation to South Africa, a voluntary boycott 
"in the field of sporting and cultural relations" has been 
requested by the Security Council (203). The United Kingdom does 
not strictly implement these calls, relying instead on sporting 
and pressure groups to ensure the boycott (204). This is 
indicative of the seriousness with which voluntary measures are 
taken. Such measures, even if they are mandatory, add little to 
the Security Council's armoury and do not appear to induce the 
target states to make any radical reforms. 
9 Military measures 
The organization's role in the maintenance of international 
peace was premised, in 1945, on the ability of its primary organ, 
the Security Council, ultimately to use military measures to 
enforce the peace. The Council's ultimate weapon and deterrent 
was contained in Article 42, 
"Should the Security Council consider that 
measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it 
may take such action by air, sea, or land 
forces as may be necessary to maintain or 
restore international peace and security. " 
It is generally agreed that the use of such military measures 
would require a "decision" of the Council, which would be binding 
on Members by means of the military agreements envisaged in 
Article 43 (205). Since the agreements in Article 43 were not 
arrived at because of an East-West rift (206) it is argued that 
Article 42 is defunct. The only method by which a military 
enforcement action could be taken by the Council is by 
recommendation under Article 39, which, itself, expressly states 
that actions taken under Articles 41 and 42 are only authorized by 
decisions. 
However, we have seen that the development of a power to 
recommend measures under Article 41 could be attributed to a 
reinterpretation of that Article to allow recommendations as well 
as decisions. It has been suggested that Article 39 is the true 
base for such recommendatory measures (207) but this appears 
incorrect without a finding of a threat to or breach of the peace. 
Wherever one places its power to recommend sanctions, it is clear 
that the Council has such a power. Similarly, it has the power to 
recommend military measures, as evidenced by its actions in Korea 
and by its authorization of the Beira patrol. 
On April 9 1966, the Council adopted resolution 221 which, 
inter alia, authorised Britain "to prevent, by the use of force if 
necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to 
be carrying oil for Southern Rhodesia.. " (208), after determining 
that the arrival of oil at Beira destined for Rhodesia was a 
threat to the peace. In the absence of any Article 42 agreement 
between Britain and the United Nations, this resolution can only 
be regarded as a recommendation to Britain, presumably under 
Article 39, to take enforcement action (209). 
The Beira patrol was maintained successfully by Britain until 
1975 (210). Resolution 221 was itself a result of a threatened 
breach of the voluntary oil embargo imposed against Rhodesia by 
two Greek registered tankers (211). The "Joanna V" was already in 
Beira, but as a result of resolution 221, which also empowered the 
United Kingdom to arrest the ship upon her departure if she 
discharged her oil, it left with a full load. The "Manuela" was 
stopped by a British warship before entering the port with the 
result that the captain changed the tanker's course away from 
Beira (212). 
The case of Korea was a "historical aberration" which will 
probably never be repeated again (213). United Nations' 
enforcement action was only made possible by the absence of the 
Soviet Union which enabled the United States to use the Security 
Council to confer legitimacy on its policy of containing communism 
wherever it threatened to expand. Although other countries 
contributed to the United Nations force and although the force 
used the United Nations flag, the action was essentially dictated 
by United States' foreign policy, under the command of a United 
States' general 
- 
MacArthur 
- 
who took his orders from Washington, 
not the United Nations (214). 
In the Soviets' absence, the Council adopted resolution 82 
(215) which found a "breach of the peace", called for a cessation 
of hostilities and a withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th 
parallel. Non compliance with resolution 82 caused the Council to 
adopt resolution 83 on June 27 1950, which recommended that 
Members furnish armed assistance to South Korea; this in turn was 
followed by resolution 84 (216) which recommended that Member 
states providing forces make them "available to a unified command 
under the United States of America". 
Although the call in resolution 82 was probably an example of 
a mandatory provisional measure called for with Article 40 in mind 
after an implied finding under Article 39 (217), the call for 
military assistance was only recommendatory and therefore was 
probably adopted with Article 39 in mind rather than Article 42 
(218). The resolution did not purport to bind Members to supply 
military assistance, a move which in the absence of agreements 
under Article 43 is practically impossible. 
The action in Korea represented the only use by the United 
Nations (219) of military measures so as to amount to an 
engagement in a conflict (220). It was also relatively successful 
in that it did prevent the North Koreans from gaining 
territorially by the use of force by eventually pushing them back 
to the 38th parallel. However, it involved the manipulation of 
the Council and the Assembly by the West, particularly the United 
States, who would have been quite happy to "liberate" North Korea 
if it had not been for the intervention of Communist China after 
the UN force had pushed over the 38th parallel. Although the 
General Assembly had tacitly authorised this, such actions went 
beyond the requirements of enforcing the peace between North and 
South Korea, to amount to an attempted United Nations' conquest of 
a country and the enforcment of a settlement upon it. These 
objectives were those of the United States, using its superiority 
in the United Nations at the time to continue the Cold War. As it 
happens the United States had to settle for a continuing division 
of Korea at the 38th parallel which has been made permanent by the 
failure of any process of settlement to unify the country. It 
could be said that the result of the Korean war, whether it was a 
United Nations' action or not, was to freeze the conflict and 
maintain the status quo, which is a normal "half" successful 
result of a United Nations' action. However, the division of 
Korea is a product of ideology, a result of a conflict of power. 
In such a case it is defensible to have a limited objective of 
freezing the dispute than to attempt to settle it because any such 
attempt may lead to escalation as evidenced by Chinese 
intervention after the United Nations' force had crossed the 38th 
parallel in an attempt to settle the problem once and for all. 
10. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined the powers of the Security 
Council in an order which could loosely be described as 
representing a gradual scale of severity. Unfortunatley, the top 
of the scale - military measures and economic sanctions (Articles 
41 and 42) 
- 
are severely limited in effectiveness by geopolitical 
considerations, although it is arguable whether economic measures 
could be successful if freed from these limitations. The lower 
one goes down the scale - the lowest point possibly being a call 
on the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means - the 
fewer geopolitical limitations there are. This is exemplified by 
the Council's willingness in Central America and, until recently, 
the Gulf War to call for settlement but to venture very little 
further up the scale. 
Nevertheless, at each point on the scale geopolitical 
limitations play a part - consensus dictates that generally the 
Council resolution produced is indicating to the parties the 
furthest point on the scale that the Council is willing to reach. 
it is very unlikely that the Council will go beyond that point 
- 
witness the refusal of Western members to allow the imposition of 
mandatory sanctions against South Africa; and even if it does 
(possibly because of a change in the governments of those 
members), and goes to the furthest practical point along its scale 
- 
the imposition of economic sanctions 
- 
the sanctioned state has 
had ample time to prepare. 
There is little possibility of improving the substantive 
content of Security Council resolutions and action, until the 
national interests of the members, particularly the permanent 
members, is less important than the collective responsibility of 
the United Nations. This is unlikely except if the permanent 
members can arrive at a gentlemen's agreement whereby they define 
their national interests more narrowly, and by this method more 
areas of the world might be open to collective action by the 
Security Council. 
One possible procedural method which could help to limit 
perceived national interests is the reform already mentioned (221) 
whereby an independent investigation process would force the 
Council to examine every conflict or potential conflict, whatever 
area of the world it occurred in. Such a method might induce the 
permanent members to explain, in the many cases in which they are 
involved, why the Council should not be allowed to act. In their 
own spheres of influence, at the moment, the superpowers not only 
prevent constructive Council action, but any kind of criticism. 
Independent investigation could embarrass them into redefining 
their national interests more narrowly. 
Another procedural reform would be aimed at making the 
Security Council more able to take preventative action, in 
preference to its present method of crisis management which makes 
it ineffective in many cases because it is faced with faits 
accomplis. Recently, the Security Council has become, in effect, 
"an off-season General Assembly" (222), by the vast increase in 
the number of invited speakers (223), who are not representing the 
members of the Council nor, in many cases, the parties to the 
dispute or conflict. This tendency was the subject of a valid 
criticism of the French Minister for External Relations in a 
special meeting of the Council (224) in September 1985, 
"One sees a growing tendency to transform the 
debates of the Council which should be action 
orientated and should concern, above all, the 
members of the Council and the main parties to 
the dispute or conflict, into a substitute 
General Assembly debate, providing all the 
Members of the Organization with an 
opportunity to make known their views on a 
given situation. "(225) 
A look at the first appendix to this chapter will illustrate that 
the above is not just a cry from a frustrated diplomat. The 
average number of speakers per meeting reached 8 in 1985 when 
previously (in the years sampled) it was no higher than 6, and the 
proportion of invited speakers representing states not parties to 
the dispute or involved in a situation has (in the years sampled) 
risen from 0% in 1955 to 15% in 1965, to 25% in 1975 and to a 
staggering 50% in 1985. These facts combined with the increasing 
representation of various organizations and groupings at Council 
meeting must mean that the Council's ability to act to a given 
dangerous situation or threat to or breach of the peace is 
severely hindered. 
A French writer, Smouts, has reached a similar conclusion 
(226). He perceives an increasing "banalisation" of the Council 
as it is being transformed into a "petite Assemblee generale, 
avec les meines methods, les meines travers et 
.... 
progressivement 
.... 
la meine irresponsabilite en matiere de paix et de securite 
internationales", 
One can understand the smaller, non permanent members 
affiliating themselves to a particular group, 
"..... ils ont tendance ä subordonner leur 
comportement individuel ä des imperatifs de 
groupe pour justifier leur presence au Conseil 
et maximiser leur pouvoir de negociation 
via-e-vis des Grands. "(227) 
However, this results in the impossibility of obtaining the quick 
communication and negotiation necessary for the Council to be 
effective, because these affiliated states "donnent ä leurs 
partenaires au Conseil le sentiment d'avoir ä negocier avec 
d'autres interlocuteurs que ceux qui siegent avec eux, avec des 
partenaires absents et inconnus. Quelle possibilite reelle de 
negociation peut encore appartenir au Conseil dans un tel 
climat? ". 
A procedural reform would bring practice back into line with 
the Charter which states in Article 31, that the Council may 
invite non members whenever it "considers that the interests of 
that member are specially affected". At the moment any state and 
most non state organizations can express their views because the 
invited speakers are allowed into the forum unless there is an 
objection (228). 
However, our two procedural reforms are not going to 
radically increase the effectiveness of the Council. Only a 
change of perspective from national to collective security will 
facilitate a significant increase in success rate. 
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PART 2: THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S ROLE IN THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE 
Introduction 
Whereas the Security Council's position as the primary body 
responsible for the maintenance of international peace and 
security is reasonably well established (1) and defined (2), the 
General Assembly's role is nebulous and ill-defined (3). The 
drafting of the provisions relating to the General Assembly's 
functions and powers was a source of contention between the 
smaller states represented at San Francisco and the sponsoring 
powers. The four power Dumbarton Oaks proposals gave the Assembly 
no real power. At San Francisco, the smaller states insisted that 
all the power should not be in the hands of the Council, or more 
specifically in the hands of the veto-wielding powers. As a 
result Chapter IV, which indicates the powers of the General 
Assembly, became a compromise between the provisions granting 
generous powers to the Assembly to placate the smaller nations, 
namely Articles 10 and 14, and provisions attempting to restrict 
the powers and competence of the Assembly - Articles 11 and 12 
(4). 
The result is an example of political compromise 
-a 
confusing set of provisions which have been interpreted 
advantageously by and for the benefit of whichever group or groups 
of states is dominating the Assembly at a particular time. In the 
early years of the Organization the body was Western dominated 
(5). With the advent of rapid decolonization in the late 1950's 
and during the 1960's the whole complexion of the Organization 
changed with the Non Aligned movement seizing virtual control of 
the Assembly. 
During the early years the Soviets protected their interests 
by the use of the veto in the Security Council and were fiercely 
critical of any attempt to give the Western dominated Assembly 
more than subsidiary powers in the field of international peace, 
basing their objections on a narrow interpretation of the relevant 
Charter provisions. Nevertheless the West used its dominant 
position to introduce procedures (6) and bodies (7) to circumvent 
the paralysis in the Council brought on by the Soviet veto, using 
a liberal interpretation of the Charter. 
In 1945 the membership of the United Nations numbered 51 
whereas this has now increased to 159. The bulk of this increase 
consists of the 100 or so members of the Non Aligned, dramatically 
altering the balance of power in the Assembly. The Socialist 
states have cleverly adopted similar stances to the Non Aligned on 
such issues as colonialism and self-determination, which 
understandably are of considerable concern to the Non Aligned. 
Paradoxically, the West, who one would expect to dominate 
questions of freedom and self-determination (though not in 
colonial situations), has not been able to align itself on these 
issues with the newly, independent states. Thus it is the 
erstwhile colonial powers and their allies (namely the "West") 
which are now, in the majority of discussions and votes, in the 
minority in the Assembly. Consequently, the West has withdrawn 
its liberal interpretation of the Charter which it used so 
successfully in the early years, and now argues on a narrow 
constitutional basis that the Security Council is the primary 
body, where, predictably, the number of Western vetoes in 
protection of Western interests has increased dramatically. 
Relatively, the number of Western and Socialist bloc 
countries has remained constant; the variable factor is the group 
of newly independent states which does not have a permanent 
member, from within its ranks, on the Security Council protecting 
its interests. Consequently, there is an increasing divergence on 
similar issues between the views of the Assembly where a majority 
of two thirds can adopt a resolution on "important questions" (8) 
such as those concerning international peace, and those of the 
Council where the overriding consideration is one of compromise in 
order to avoid the veto. In the early years the West dominated 
both bodies and so used the Assembly as a means of dealing with 
issues on which the Soviets were sensitive. Nevertheless, there 
was still a link between the Assembly and the Council during the 
Cold War period. The Cold War indeed continued during the 1950's 
and 1960's (9), but the introduction of a third factor -the newly 
independent states, meant that the link (10) between the Assembly 
and the Council became increasingly tenuous. The Assembly began 
to take initiatives and become antagonistic towards the Council. 
The new majority viewed the Council as a private club (11) 
protecting the interests of the superpowers and their allies (12). 
A view highlighted by the decreasing representation in the 
Security Council of the membership of the Organization. In 1945 
the ratio of members of the Security Council to Members of the 
Organization was 11: 51 (21.6%). In 1985 this percentage had 
decreased to 9.4 (15: 159). It would take a Security Council of 33 
members to reproduce the original ratio, and a non-permanent 
member could hope for election to the "club" once every 16 years 
(13). These figures emphasize the decreasing ties between the 
Council and the Assembly with the latter acting with increasing 
independence in the field of international peace and security 
(14). 
Evan Luard accurately summarizes the implications and 
importance to the Non Aligned of its power in the General Assembly 
in his work on the period of Western domination (1945-1955), 
"If the West had been tempted to use its votes 
to force through its own views with little 
thought of negotiations to impose the tyranny 
of the majority, how much more would the third 
world when it came to power, be tempted to do 
so? The West at least had possessed 
alternative means of securing the ends it 
cherished, overwhelming military power, 
widespread diplomatic opportunities, huge 
economic strength, unrivalled political 
leverage. The third world had none of these 
assets. It had no military power, little 
diplomatic experience, negligible economic 
strength, and insignificant political 
leverage. For these countries, it appeared, 
the one weapon at their disposal in the U. N., 
which not long after (the period of Western 
domination] they knew to be permanently at 
their disposal. It is scarcely surprising 
that, armed with this weapon, and inspired by 
the example presented by their predecessors, 
they proceeded, over the coming decades, to 
exploit, to the best of their ability, the one 
asset at their disposal. " (15) 
It will be illustrated that the Non Aligned and Socialist majority 
has used its voting power to adopt resolutions on virtually 
anything concerning international relations. This is not a 
revolutionary concept, for at San Francisco, the smaller states 
had made such proposals, to authorize the Assembly to consider, 
for example, "any matter within the sphere of international 
relations" or "affecting international relations" (16). However, 
at the time, such provisions were not included. 
Before analysing the provisions of the Charter, it must be 
noted that the division outlined above, where the Assembly 
consists of three blocs - Western, Non-Aligned and Socialist, is 
perhaps too simplistic a view. The General Assembly consists of 
many sub-divisions based loosely on regions such as the Group of 
Western States, League of Arab States, Group of African States, 
Group of Asian States, Group of Latin American States, and Group 
of Eastern European States. Sometimes these become more 
definitive and take the form of regional organizations from which 
one member is chosen from each to represent its views in the 
Assembly. The European Community, the Organization of African 
Unity, The Organization of American States, the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference, the Organization of South East Asian 
States are examples of regional bodies which are represented in 
the General Assembly, each with a different degree of 
cohesiveness. 
However, the Assembly is not like a political party system as 
found in a democratic society as Sydney Bailey recognizes, 
"In an organization of states based on the 
principle of sovereign equality, in which the 
interests of the members change and relations 
among them fluctuate, a party system in the 
conventional sense has not evolved. Indeed, 
the outstanding fact about the way states 
associate in the General Assembly is their 
tendency to affiliate differently for 
different purposes. " (17) 
Nevertheless, in the course of examining and voting upon problems 
involving the use of force in international relations, the 
Assembly very regularly divides into the three blocs discussed 
above. East-West relations have always been of great significance 
in the maintenance of peace through the United Nations, and the 
Non Aligned has united on this issue on so many occasions because 
its militarily weak members are so often the victims of the use of 
force in which a superpower is involved. Thus the Non Aligned is 
not only a significant coalition as regards self-determination but 
also has become a united advocate of the non use of force in 
international relations (18). 
Notes 
(1) See Article 24(1) of the Charter. 
(2) See Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. 
(3) See Articles 10-14 of the Charter. 
(4) See Russell and Muther, A History of the United Nations 
Charter (1958) pp. 750-763. 
(5) See generally Luard, E, A History of the United 
Nations: Volume 1: The Years of Western Domination 
1945-1955 (1982). 
(6) See Uniting for Peace Procedure discussed infra chapter 5 
section 4(11). 
(7) See the Interim Committee of the General Assembly 
discussed infra chapter 5 section 4(1). 
(8) See Article 18(2) of the Charter. 
(9) Indeed, it is apparent that the Cold War has continued 
through varying degrees of intensity to the present day; 
see generally Bown and Mooney, Cold War to Detente 
1945-1985 (1985). Detente, during the 1970's, 
represented a period of low Cold War intensity, which has 
been replaced by an increased level of intensity since 
1980; see Chomsky, Steele and Gittings, Superpowers in 
Collision: the new Cold War of the 1980's (1982). It may 
be that since Gorbachev became premier of the USSR, 
tensions have relaxed to some extent. 
(10) "Link" here indicates that earlier, in the period of 
Western domination, the majority of the Council and the 
Assembly shared pro-Western views. 
(11) See infra chapter 5, note (169) and accompanying text. 
(12) To defeat a draft resolution in the Security Council, the 
Non Aligned would have to muster 7 votes 
- 
see Article 27 
of the Charter. GA res 1991 (XVII), 17.12.1963, GAOR, 
18th seas, supp 15, p. 21, established the composition of 
the Council as follows: 5 permanent members, 5 from 
Afro-Asian states, 1 from Eastern Europe, 2 from Latin 
America, 2 from Western European and other states. Thus 
it is possible for the Non Aligned to have 7 votes at its 
disposal, at the maximum it could have 9-5 from 
Afro-Asia, 1 from East Europe (Yugoslavia) and 1 other 
plus 2 Latin American countries, but this is unlikely, as 
indeed it is of having 7 votes. 
(13) See Nicol, D, The United Nations Security Council: towards 
greater effectiveness (1982) p. 4. 
(14) However, another method by which the Members have 
attempted to bring the Council to the level of the 
Assembly is by a vast increase in invited members, 
particularly representatives of Non Aligned states, 
appearing at Council meetings; see supra chapter 3 
section 10. 
(15) See supra note (5) at p. 383. 
(16) New Zealand and Australian proposals, UNCIO vol 9 pp. 272, 
266. 
(17) Bailey, S. D, The General Assembly (1960) p. 23. He 
discusses the various coalitions and groups in the 
Assembly at pp. 21-40. 
(18) See generally Nicholas, H. G, The United Nations as a 
Political Institution (1975) ch 5, and Luard, E, The United 
Nations: How it works and what it does (1979) ch 2; see 
also Peterson, M. J, The General Assembly in World Politics 
(1986). 
CHAPTER 4 
THE POWERS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY UNDER THE CHARTER 
The notion that Articles 10,11,12, and 14 of the U. N. 
Charter can be subject to varying interpretations has already been 
raised in the introductory section to this Part when it was stated 
that the Western governments have changed from favouring a wide 
interpretation of these provisions giving the Assembly wide powers 
in the field of international peace, to a more narrow 
constitutional position in later years. 
1 The Powers contained in Articles 1,11 and 14 
Proponents of a wide view of the competence of the General 
Assembly would point to Article 10 of the Charter which provides, 
"The General Assembly may discuss any 
questions or any matters within the scope of 
the present Charter or relating to the powers 
or functions of any organs provided for in the 
present Charter, and, except as provided for 
in Article 12, may make recommendations to the 
Members of the United Nations or to the 
Security Council or to both on any such 
questions or matters. " 
Article 10 establishes a general competence for the Assembly to 
discuss any matter within the jurisdiction of the United Nations 
as determined by the Charter (1). This power indeed makes the 
Assembly the "town meeting place of the world", "the open 
conscience of humanity" as intended (2). However, its power to 
make recommendations on any such matter must also cover the same 
area as the more concrete recommendatory powers of the Security 
Council under Chapters VI and VII as regards the maintenance of 
international peace and security (3). Hence Article 10 is subject 
to Article 12 which attempts to delineate between the functions of 
the Assembly and those of the Security Council. 
Once it is established that Article 10 creates the widest 
possible sphere of competence for the Assembly subject to Article 
12, then the other provisions defining the powers of the Assembly 
are to some extent unnecessary unless they detract from the powers 
contained in Article 10. Article 11 deals more specifically and 
in a more limited fashion with the Assembly's role in the 
maintenance of international peace, but is subject to paragraph 
(4) which states that, 
"The powers of the General Assembly set forth 
in this Article shall not limit the general 
scope of Article 10. " 
As if Article 10 is not enough, Article 14 re-emphasizes the 
Assembly's potentially wide jurisdiction with specific reference 
to international security, 
"Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the 
General Assembly may recommend measures for 
the peaceful adjustment of any situation, 
regardless of origin, which it deems likely to 
impair the general welfare or friendly 
relations among nations including situations 
resulting from a violation of the present 
Charter setting forth the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations. " 
Article 14 with its jurisdictional threshold of a "situation" (4) 
deemed "likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations 
among nations" appears to give the Assembly access to a much wider 
range of situations (5) in the field of international peace and 
security than the Security Council which technically requires a 
danger to international peace, a threat to or breach of the peace 
or an act of aggression to act under Chapter VI or VII (6). The 
test under Article 14 covers the whole spectrum of situations 
which might impair peace, whereas the provisions contained in 
Articles 34 and 39 deal with the more important, global and 
potentially explosive situations. The Assembly can, under 
Articles 10 and 14, discuss situations contained in Articles 34 
and 39, but to prevent any clash between the work of the Security 
Council, which is primarily concerned with such situations, and 
the General Assembly, Article 14, as well as Article 10, is 
subject to the limitation contained in Article 12. 
According to Philippe Manin in Cot and Pellet's commentary on 
the Charter, 
".... l'article 14 a jou6 un role 
historique non n¬gligeable en faveur d'une 
interpr6tation large des comp6tences de 
1'Assembl6e dans is domaine du maintien de la 
paix. " (7) 
Despite the fact that Article 14 is rarely cited or quoted (8), in 
Assembly resolutions, he states that it is the foundation of most 
resolutions directed towards the maintenance of international 
peace and security, enabling the Assembly to suggest measures or 
sanctions against states (9) and to by-pass the domestic 
jurisdiction limitation contained in Article 2(7) (10). 
Goodrich, Hambro and Simons agree that Article 14 has formed 
the basis of Assembly resolutions dealing with fundamental human 
rights and self-determination "in the face of arguments that the 
questions being dealt with are matters of domestic jurisdiction" 
(11). The above authors cite the report of the Special Commission 
set up by the Assembly to study the apartheid policies of South 
Africa. The Commission interpreted the scope of the Article as 
follows, 
"It is clear that by the inclusion of Article 
14 in the Charter it was intended also to make 
provision for cases (regardless of origin) 
which, though not directly threatening peace 
and security, were likely to bring interests 
into conflict with one another, to impair 
friendly relations among nations, and to 
prejudice the 'general welfare' 
..... 
The 
Charter makes particular mention in this 
Article of the fact that the situations in 
question include those 'resulting from a 
violation of the provisions of the present 
Charter setting forth the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations'. " (12) 
This epitomises a rather more relaxed approach to Article 2(7) in 
the General Assembly compared to the Security Council, where the 
situation must usually be a "threat to the peace" or of 
"international concern" before intervention takes place (13). The 
approach of the General Assembly to internal conflicts will be 
examined in greater detail below (14). 
The reference in Article 14 to the purposes and principles of 
the United Nations indicates that perhaps one of the major roles 
of the General Assembly is to deal with the right to 
self-determination contained in Article 1(2). Also Articles 1(3) 
and 13(l)(b) contain references to "human rights and fundamental 
freedoms". These provisions combined with the Assembly's role as 
regards the maintenance of international peace and security 
contained in Articles 10,14 and indeed Article 11, suggest that 
the General Assembly has a major, if not primary role in 
situations concerning either human rights or the question of 
self-determination, or both, even when the situation also concerns 
the maintenance of international peace. 
Whether one could say that the proper division of functions 
between the Security Council and the General Assembly as regards 
the maintenance of international peace and security depends on 
whether the situation is predominantly one of human rights and 
self-determination (in which case the General Assembly is perhaps 
the organ jurisdictionally competent to deal with it) will be 
examined later. For the moment it is sufficient to say that this 
view is practice based. If one could quote a section of the 
Repertory of Practice, 
"Those who support the draft resolution 
[establishing a commission to examine denials 
of self-determination] maintained that its 
purpose was to establish machinery for putting 
Article 14 of the Charter into effect. It was 
impossible to argue that to set up machinery 
to put the Charter into effect was contrary to 
the Charter itself or that the establishment 
of a commission working under the General 
Assembly and reporting to it could violate the 
General Assembly's jurisdiction. It was 
equally difficult to see how there could be an 
infringement of the competence of the Security 
Council, which related to threats to the 
peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of 
aggression, when the proposed commission was 
supposed to examine any situation resulting 
from the alleged denial or inadequate 
realisation of the right of 
self-determination. The need for the 
commission arose from the fact that there was 
no United Nations organ competent to deal with 
the cases of the denial of the right to 
self-determination. " (15) 
An examination of the practice below will reveal that the Assembly 
has become that organ. However, it must be pointed out that the 
Security Council is empowered to examine situations "likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" 
(16); in other words situations which have not yet become threats 
to or breaches of the peace. Thus the distinction as to 
jurisdiction implied in the above paragraph is not as clear cut. 
Given that Articles 10 and 14 empower the General Assembly to 
discuss matters which may be a danger to international peace 
within Article 34, Chapter VI, or a threat to or breach of the 
peace within Article 39, Chapter VII, subject to Article 12, 
Article 11 in paragraphs 2 and 3 explains the relationship between 
the Assembly and the Security Council as regards "questions" which 
come within Chapter VII or "situations" under Chapter VI. 
Nevertheless, by paragraph 4 of Article 11, Article 10 is stated 
not to be subject to the restrictions contained in Article 11. 
This confusing situation may be explained by the compromise that 
brought these provisions about between the smaller states 
advocating wide powers and the sponsoring states attempting to 
limit these powers. Article 11(2) and (3) attempts to refine the 
wide area of overlap between the two organs created by Articles 10 
and 14. 
Article 11(3) deals specifically with a situation which comes 
within Chapter VI, as defined by Article 34. Article 11(3) reads, 
"The General Assembly may call the attention 
of the Security Council to situations which 
are likely to endanger international peace. " 
Article 11(3) seems to envisage the possibility of concurrent 
jurisdiction between the two organs in that it does not place an 
obligation on the Assembly to refer any such situation to the 
Council. However, if the Council is exercising its functions as 
regards the situation, Article 12 operates to prevent the Assembly 
recommending measures though not from deliberating on the 
situation. 
Article 24(2) refers to Chapter VI as containing "specific 
powers granted to the Security Council" for the discharge of its 
primary responsibility, and all the Articles, except Article 35, 
seem to envisage exclusivity of operation to the Security Council. 
Nevertheless, Articles 10 and 14 empower the Assembly to make 
recommendations for specific settlement similar to those contained 
in Chapter VI. Article 11(3) operates as a safety valve in that 
the Security Council is the body designed to deal with such 
situations. Article 11(3) does perform this function to a certain 
extent as evidenced by the fact that it is one of the rare Charter 
provisions actually cited in Assembly resolutions - for example on 
the situation in South Africa (17). 
Article 24(2) also states that Chapter VII contains the 
specific powers of the Security Council, and, indeed, its power 
conferring provisions (Articles 39-42) do not mention the Assembly 
nor seem to envisage the Assembly entering into Chapter VII. 
Article 11(2) provides an answer to the conundrum of whether the 
Assembly can utilize Chapter VII. It provides, 
"The General Assembly may discuss any 
questions relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security brought 
before it 
..... 
and, except as provided in 
Article 12, may make recommendations with 
regard to any such questions to the States 
concerned or to the Security Council, or to 
both. Any such question on which action is 
necessary shall be referred to the Security 
Council either before or after discussion. " 
Article 11(2) enables the General Assembly to find a "threat to 
the peace", a "breach of the peace" or an "act of aggression" and 
to make recommendations thereon to restore international peace 
-a 
power concurrent with that of the Security Council under Article 
39. It is a recommendatory power only, any coercive measures 
under Chapter VII requiring a mandatory decision can only be 
adopted by the Security Council (18). This interpretation of 
Article 11(3) is supported by the International Court in the 
Expenses case, 
"The Court considers that the kind of action 
referred to in Article 11, paragraph 2, is 
coercive or enforcement action 
......... 
The 
word 'action' must mean such action as is 
solely within the province of the Security 
Council. It cannot refer to recommendations 
which the Security Council might make, as for 
instance under Article 38 [or Article 39], 
because the General Assembly under Article 11 
has a comparable power 
........ 
If the word 
'action' in Article 11, paragraph 2, was 
interpreted to mean that the General Assembly 
could make recommedations only of a general 
character affecting peace and security in the 
abstract, and not in relation to specific 
cases, the paragraph would not have provided 
that the General Assembly may make 
recommendations on questions brought before it 
by States or by the Security Council. " (19) 
The tenor of this judgement suggests that the General Assembly can 
go so far as to recommend action by the Security Council, or by 
suggesting voluntary sanctions, or by recommending military 
measures under the Uniting for Peace procedure. Kelsen thought 
that the limitation in Article 11(2) precluded the recommendation 
of enforcement action, but considered that in any case Article 10 
could be used (20). Indeed on the assumption that Article 10 
contains the lex generalis (21) and Article 11 and to a certain 
extent Article 14 contain the lex specialis, the provisions of 
Article 11 are to a certain extent unnecessary under the principle 
that the extent of the Assembly's powers are defined by the 
general and in this case wider, rather than the specific, and in 
this case narrower, provisions. 
Effectively, therefore, the General Assembly is subject to 
two central limiting factors (apart from its lack of power to take 
coercive measures) - the limitations contained in Articles 12 and 
2(7). 
2 The limitation imposed by Article 12 
Articles 10,11(2) and 14 comprise the recommendatory powers 
of the General Assembly as far as the maintenance of international 
peace and security is concerned (22). All are subject to the 
limitation contained in Article 12(1) which states, 
"While the Security Council is exercising in 
respect of any dispute or situation the 
functions assigned to it in the present 
Charter, the General Assembly shall not make 
any recommendations with regard to that 
dispute or situation unless the Security 
Council so requests. " 
Article 12 is probably the most difficult provision, in 
constitutional terms, to reconcile with the practice of the 
General Assembly. As we have seen, the other provisions can be 
interpreted to enable the Assembly to pass resolutions on any 
matter concerning the maintenance of peace as long as they do not 
purport to be mandatory. However, as shall be illustrated (23), 
the Assembly often adopts resolutions on a matter at the same time 
at which the Security Council is considering the question. Two 
arguments to escape Article 12 could be employed in this situation 
- 
that the Security Council, although considering the question and 
perhaps even adopting resolutions on it, is not actually 
performing the "functions assigned to it in the Charter", or that 
the resolution adopted by the General Assembly is not actually a 
recommendation. 
It seems to have become established practice to equate items 
on the Security Council's agenda with that body exercising its 
functions in relation to the matter. The theory behind the list 
of matters which the Security Council submits to the General 
Assembly is that it tells the Assembly which issues it is not 
allowed to discuss because they are receiving attention in the 
Security Council (24). In effect, this amounts to defining 
"functions" in Article 12(1) with reference to Article 12(2) which 
provides, 
"The Secretary General with the consent of the 
Security Council, shall notify the General 
Assembly at each session of any matters 
relative to the maintenance of international 
peace and security which are being dealt with 
by the Security Council and shall similarly 
notify the General Assembly, or the Members of 
the United Nations if the General Assembly is 
not in session, immediately the Security 
Council ceases to deal with such matters. " 
Many writers subscribe to the view that Article 12(2) defines 
whether the Council is functioning or not (25). However, they 
recognize the artificiality of the process and concede that in 
practice the Assembly is not limited by the list nor would it be 
reasonable to expect it to be. Even when the Council adopts a 
resolution the Assembly will sometimes adopt its own on the same 
question, the justification being not of legal interpretation "but 
of necessity for the Assembly to promote the aims of the Charter 
when the Security Council cannot or will not do so " (26). 
A memorandum on the practice of the General Assembly 
concludes, inter alia, that 
"...... the most interesting feature of the 
practice is that the General Assembly, 
beginning in 1960, adopted several resolutions 
clearly containing recommendations in cases of 
which the Security Council was then seized and 
could reasonably be regarded as exercising its 
functions in regard to that question 
..... 
cases have been found in which the General 
Assembly appears to have departed from the 
actual text of Article 12. In none of these 
cases, however, did a Member object to a 
recommendation on the ground of Article 12. " 
(27) 
The question of whether a recommendation adopted in the face of 
Article 12 with the requisite two thirds majority with or without 
minority objections is ultra vires will be examined later (28). 
Suffice to say for the moment that the procedure in which the list 
of matters seized by the Security Council is also those matters in 
relation to which it is exercising the functions assigned to it 
may still be formally accepted, but in practice it has all but 
been disregarded. 
Nevertheless, in the early years, this procedural rule was 
applied with some regularity. One of these cases was the Greek 
question (1947-8) which is worth examining in some detail because 
it is illustrative of how Western domination of the organization 
enabled it to manipulate the procedure to its own advantage. 
The United States had committed itself by the Truman doctrine 
(29) to the economic and military support of Greece and Turkey. 
It was therefore interested in the prevention of a Communist 
takeover in Greece. In the Security Council it managed to 
establish a Commission to examine the situation (30). In May 1947 
the majority of the Commission reported that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria 
and Albania had supported guerrilla warfare in Greece (31). The 
United States proposed that the Council endorse the Commission's 
recommendation to send a permanent body to Greece to observe her 
borders (32). This was seen as a Cold War move by the Communist 
countries by a Council and a Commission dominated by Western 
countries. The proposal was vetoed by the Soviet Union (33). 
The United States simply waited for the regular session of 
the General Assembly in the autumn of 1947 to propose a similar 
resolution (34) condemning Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and 
establishing a permanent Committee to help observe the borders 
(35). Thus the United States had successfully used its 
overwhelming support in the United Nations to pass resolutions to 
reinforce its sphere of influence in the Balkans and to prevent 
the encroachment of communism (36). 
Technically, however, the United States and its supporters 
managed to keep within the provisions of the Charter, in that 
after the Soviets had vetoed its last draft resolution in the 
Council, it proposed that the item be removed from the agenda (37) 
to signify to the Assembly that it had ceased to deal with the 
matter allowing the Assembly to make recommendations thereon. It 
was simply because the West dominated both organs that it could 
switch from Council to Assembly within the accepted constitutional 
procedure. It could easily win a procedural vote in the Council. 
The Non Aligned group, nowadays, is not guaranteed even with 
Socialist support, to win a procedural vote in the Council and so 
in practice it tends to ignore the legal technicalities. In view 
of the importance of the United Nations to the Non Aligned, it is 
not surprising that they take the attitude that their disregard of 
a technical procedure adopted during a period of Western 
domination is no more reprehensible than the cynical manipulation 
by the West of the same procedure during the earlier period (38). 
Appendix 2 contains a list of some of the matters still seized or 
on the agenda of the Security Council. If a comparison is made 
between these and the examples of Assembly resolutions contained 
in the sections below, it is clear that the procedural 
construction of Article 12 has been breached on many occasions. 
An examination of the meaning of the term "recommendation" in 
Article 12 has important implications because the provisions 
granting powers to the General Assembly as regards international 
peace (Articles 10 11 and 14) only envisage Assembly resolutions 
in the form of recommendations. The question remains whether the 
Assembly can pass resolutions which are not technically 
recommendations and so escape the limitation contained in Article 
12. The International Court answered this question in the 
affirmative in the Expenses case, 
while it is the Security Council 
which, exclusively, may order coercive action, 
the functions and powers conferred on the 
General Assembly are not confined to 
discussion, consideration, the initiation of 
studies and the making of recommendations, 
they are not merely hortatory. Article 18 
deals with 'decisions' of the General Assembly 
on 'important questions'. These 'decisions' 
do indeed include certain recommendations, but 
others have dispositive force and effect. 
Among these latter decisions, Article 18 
includes suspension of rights and privileges 
of membership, expulsion of Members, 'and 
budgetary questions'. " (39) 
The Court's judgement confers recognition on non-recommendatory 
type resolutions, which on a literal interpretation would not be 
subject to the limitation contained in Article 12. The chapter 
- 
6- examining the concrete forms that General Assembly resolutions 
take (40) will illustrate that the Assembly often condemns, 
decides (41), demands, or declares, thus leading to an argument 
that these types of resolution are not included in Article 12. 
This view is supported by the memorandum on United Nations 
practice, 
" 
....... 
it is to be noted that Governments 
may argue that the phrase 'recommendation with 
regard to that dispute or situation', used in 
Article 12 
, 
is not applicable to certain 
types of resolution, such as confirmation by 
the General Assembly of a Security Council 
resolution, or a resolution reminding Member 
States to comply with certain Charter 
principles. There may, of course, be 
disagreements as to whether such resolutions 
contain implied recommendations and, if 
raised, this would be determined by the 
General Assembly, either by explicit decision 
or implicitly in its action on the proposed 
resolution. " (42) 
Nevertheless, it is very difficult to maintain that all but a few 
General Assembly resolutions are compatible with the above 
analysis. Often the resolution may demand or decide in one part 
and recommend in another, particularly with the increased length 
of resolutions passed regularly on subjects such as the Middle 
East, Palestine, South Africa and Namibia. Also those resolutions 
which appear to confirm Security Council resolutions do often go 
beyond them and implicitly or even explicitly make further 
recommendations than their Council counterparts (43). 
In effect, Article 12 has been ignored in many cases, 
sometimes in the face of objections that the provision applies. 
But if the General Assembly adopts the resolution is it invalid ? 
This question will be examined below (44). 
3 The limitation imposed Article 2(7) 
Article 2(7) prohibits the United Nations from intervening 
"essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State". It 
has already received examination when discussing the Security 
Council (45) when it was stated that Article 2(7) does not apply 
in not only those cases requiring "enforcement measures" under 
Chapter VII as catered for by Article 2(7) itself but also in 
cases of a "threat to the peace" without such measures, or, 
indeed, of "international concern" requiring only pacification 
under Chapter VI. 
The General Assembly, however, has not developed a similar 
jurisprudence, or, indeed , any discernable principles governing 
the applicability of Article 2(7). Guillaume, in Cot and Pellet's 
commentary on the Charter, discerns that the provision is of 
paramount importance in maintaining "1'equlibre necessaire entre 
les interets nationaux que les Etats membres considerent comme 
essentiels et les interets de la collectivite internationale dans 
son ensemble" but concludes that " la pratique suivie ne permet 
guere de degager une interpretation agree du texte" (46). It 
is submitted that an agreed interpretation is not possible because 
the equilibrium between national and international interests is 
not constant. This was recognized by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the case of Nationality decrees issued in 
Tunis and Morocco, 
"The question whether a certain matter is or 
is not solely within the domestic jurisdiction 
of a State is an essentially relative 
question, it depends upon the development of 
international relations. " (47) 
Thus, as will be shown below, the denial of the right to 
self-determination was originally within the domestic jurisdiction 
of a state and so outside the purview of the United Nations, but 
now it is of international concern and so subject to review. In 
the Security Council it only takes one permanent member to use 
Article 2(7) as a basis for its veto and so that body has a more 
substantial jurisprudence on the meaning of the domestic 
jurisdiction limitation. Nevertheless, it is possible to chart 
the involvement of the General Assembly in what might 
superficially appear to be internal matters as developed in forty 
years of practice (48). 
The first "striking interference in domestic internal 
affairs" (49) involved the Assembly examining the regime of a 
state. In December 1946, the Assembly passed a resolution which 
recommended the banning of Spain from the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies and requested that all member states should 
recall their ambassadors from Spain. It also stated that if a 
democratic Spanish government was not established within a 
reasonable time, the Security Council should consider adequate 
measures to remedy the situation (50). 
Rajan uses the example of the Hungarian crisis in 1956 to 
illustrate further the questioning by the Assembly of the nature 
of a government (51). However, this is not altogether a good 
example for it involved armed intervention by an outside power - 
the U. S. S. R. - in contravention of Article 2(4) which effectively 
internationalized the situation (52). Nevertheless, the Assembly 
resolutions adopted at the Second Emergency Special Session did 
pass comment on the regime in Hungary despite Soviet objections 
based on Article 2(7) (53). For example, the Assembly "affirmed 
the right of the Hungarian people to a government responsive to 
its national aspirations and dedicated to its independence and 
well-being" as well as calling on the Soviet union to withdraw 
(54). 
The next area developed by General Assembly practice which 
effectively puts it outside the limitation contained in Article 
2(7) concerns Non Self-Governing Territories. Rajan cites many 
cases which will be discussed elsewhere - Tunisia, Algeria, the 
Portuguese Territories, Namibia and Southern Rhodesia 
- 
to 
conclude that "after all these actions [by the United Nations], 
there is no shred of evidence to sustain the view that non 
self-governing territories fall under the domestic jurisdiction of 
their respective metropolitan powers" (55), despite objections by 
the colonial powers (56). These objections are apt to be 
ephemeral, for example the United Kingdom initially relied on 
Article 2(7) to deny vehemently the United Nations' jurisdiction 
as regards Southern Rhodesia (57), but after U. D. I. it was 
Britain which requested the Organization's involvement (58). 
The Assembly's disregard of Article 2(7) on issues of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms can be traced back to the era of 
Western domination when that body was used to criticize the 
Eastern bloc. At its third annual session in 1949 the Assembly 
adopted a resolution expressing concern at the "grave accusations 
made against the Governments of Bulgaria and Hungary regarding the 
suppression of human right and fundamental freedoms (59). At the 
same session the Assembly criticized the Soviet Union declaring 
that the measures preventing the wives of foreign nationals from 
leaving their own country to join their husbands were "not in 
conformity with the Charter, and that if the wives were persons 
belonging to foreign diplomatic missions, such measures were 
contrary to diplomatic practice and likely to impair friendly 
relations between states". The resolution therefore called on the 
Soviet Union to withdraw the measures (60). 
The use of Article 14 language in the latter case is 
illustrative of how that provision is used to empower the Assembly 
to discuss relatively trivial matters for the practice criticized 
was hardly likely to even remotely endanger peace. It is not 
surprising therefore, that with such a relatively minor matter 
escaping the provisions of Article 2(7), the Non Aligned/Socialist 
majority established since the 1950's has not paid much heed to 
its limitations. The United Nations' involvement in the South 
African problem cannot be classified as a trivial concern, but it 
is a good illustration of how the Assembly has now elevated the 
denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms to one of 
international concern. Only the South African government has 
persistently based its objections on Article 2(7) (61). Although 
it was initially supported by some Western states (62), it now 
stands alone. Rajan relies on this body of practice to assert 
that 
"........ if a Member persistently and 
obstinately violated the provisions of the 
Charter, the declarations and Conventions on 
human rights and the resolutions/ 
recommendations of U. N. organs, they are not 
inhibited by the provision of Article 2(7) 
from exceptionally dealing with what are 
normally and essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of Member states, if they become 
matters of international concern, have 
international repercussions, have the effect 
of posing an actual or potential threat to the 
maintenance of peace, or affecting friendly 
relations among nations. "(63) 
It is interesting to note that although Rajan uses phrases in the 
above quoted passage which appear to imply that the situation must 
be potentially explosive, he also uses a phrase at the end from 
Article 14, which we have seen (64), has been utilized in 
situations of an internal nature which could not be regarded as so 
dangerous to international peace. 
An extension from Rajan's categories of non self-governing 
territories and cases concerning human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, is that of cases concerning the denial of the right to 
self-determination. It will be a constant theme throughout this 
part that one of the Assembly's major purposes is the furtherance 
of the right to self-determination. It has virtually established 
that the denial of that right is a matter of international concern 
and so no longer within the sovereign domain of a state (65). 
The above categories all involve primary consideration of 
matters such as human rights and self-determination which result 
in considerations of international peace. It must be noted, 
however, that in cases primarily concerned with international 
peace and security, arguments based on domestic jurisdiction are 
used. Cases such as the Lebanon and Jordan (1958), Bangladesh 
(1971), Afghanistan (1980), and Kampuchea (1979), all involved 
arguments that the situation was internal and so covered by 
Article 2(7), but only usually by one party or power bloc involved 
in the dispute. According to Rajan in these cases the extension 
of Assembly or United Nations' jurisdiction is "unavoidable" 
because if the majority bloc consider it to their advantage it 
will ignore Article 2(7) and intervene by adopting resolutions, 
of 
....... 
therefore, it seems, the real 
question is not whether it was proper for the 
United Nations to have extended its 
jurisdiction 
- 
by discussion, recommendation 
etc 
- 
into the domestic jurisdiction of 
states, but whether at all it could have been 
avoided or prevented, even if members other 
than the parties concerned decided to do so. " 
(66) 
4 Arguments of ultra vires 
States objecting to the General Assembly adopting resolutions 
often argue that the resolution is ultra vires. For example, the 
argument is usually based on Article 12 or Article 2(7). The 
Assembly's continued consideration of the apartheid policies of 
the South African government has produced many objections based on 
Article 2(7). The South African ambassador has consistently 
asserted that his government must regard 
".... any resolution emanating from a 
discussion on or the consideration of the 
present item as ultra vires and, therefore, 
null and void. "(67) 
One can find many examples of objections based on Article 2(7) 
(68). However, if they are in the minority they do not appear to 
have any affect on the jurisdiction of the Assembly. It appears, 
to the observer, that the Assembly's jurisdiction is determined by 
that body and not necessarily by the Charter. 
An example of a resolution being introduced despite 
objections based on Article 12 is the Uniting for Peace resolution 
(69). Briefly, the resolution proposed to give competence to the 
Assembly, including the power to recommend enforcement measures, 
when the Security Council was paralysed by the veto. The Soviet 
Union and other Socialist states, being in the minority bloc at 
the time, objected to the resolution on the grounds that it was 
unconstitutional in that the "functions" of the Security Council 
in Article 12 included cases where the veto was used, since the 
veto was an integral part of the constitution of the Security 
Council. The Soviet representative thus asserted that the 
proposed procedure would amend the Charter without going through 
the amendment procedure envisaged in the Charter (70). He went on 
to conclude that, 
"We therefore consider that it is our duty, in 
conscience, and as Members of the United 
Nations, to insist that such a draft be 
rejected, or at least those parts of the draft 
which are incompatible with the law by which 
we must be guided - that is the Charter - 
should be amended in the way we have proposed 
[by Article 109], guided solely by the true 
interests of our Organization by respect for 
the law of our Organization and for its 
constitution - the Charter. " (71) 
Nevertheless, the majority proceeded and adopted the resolution, 
the procedure of which the Soviets have boycotted ever since even 
though they now often form part of the majority. 
From a legal point of view the Charter of the United Nations 
"is the primary source of its jurisdiction"(72). Admittedly, as 
far as the provisions conferring powers on the General Assembly 
are concerned, there is considerable confusion as to the limits of 
its jurisdiction. Nevertheless, Articles 12 and 2(7) represent 
relatively clear limitations on its competence. Could clear 
breaches of these provisions be justified on the basis of the 
Assembly having implied powers to enable it to do so ?A negative 
answer is furnished by the International Court in the Reparations 
Case, 
"Under international law, the Organization 
must be deemed to have those powers which 
though not expressly provided in the Charter 
are conferred upon it by necessary implication 
as being essential to the performance of its 
duties. "(73). 
The Court does not allow the Organization to imply powers which go 
against its Charter. Indeed, Ciobanu ties implied powers very 
securely to express provisions, 
01....... powers not expressed cannot freely 
be implied; implied powers flow from the grant 
of expressed powers, and are limited to those 
that are 'necessary' to the exercise of powers 
expressly granted. " (74) 
Even if one takes a much more liberal approach to implied or 
inherent powers than Ciobanu there is no possibility of 
accommodating a clear breach of an express provision within their 
framework. Prandler defines inherent powers as follows; 
"...... inter-governmental organizations seem 
to be, unlike States, bound by the special 
provisions in their constitutions - with 
regard to the purposes for the attainment of 
which they must work - yet these may, very 
much like States, perform in principle every 
sovereign activity or take every action under 
international law, if they are really in a 
position to accomplish such purposes, provide 
their constitutions do not preclude such an 
activity. " (75) 
Prandler's definition of implied powers seems to go beyond the 
dictum of the International Court in the Expenses Case in that it 
gives the Assembly virtual carte blanche to determine its own 
competence as long as it does not do so in contradiction to the 
express terms. 
However, there are many factors militating against even what 
appears to be a clear breach of the Charter from being null and 
void. Firstly there is a World Court judgement which as part of a 
teleological interpretation favoured a presumption against ultra 
vires; 
"These purposes are broad indeed, but neither 
they nor the powers conferred to effectuate 
them are unlimited 
.... 
But when the 
Organization takes action which warrants the 
assertion that it was appropriate for the 
fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of 
the United Nations, the presumption is that 
such action is not ultra vires the 
Organization. " (76) 
The presumption against ultra vires is a practical approach to the 
problem recognizing that a resolution adopted according to the 
voting provisions of the Charter has to be presumed to be valid 
otherwise the Assembly's resolutions would remain in a state of 
limbo until the unlikely event of their challenge before the 
International Court. It is the lack of procedure for the 
challenge of resolutions that leads to this presumption. Judge 
Morelli made this clear in a separate judgement, 
"..... the failure of an organ to conform to 
the rules concerning competence has no 
influence on the validity of the act, which 
amounts to saying that each organ of the 
United Nations is the judge of its own 
competence. " (77) 
The same arguments apply to decisions of the Security Council 
except that the Council is less likely than the Assembly to pass 
resolutions which are apparently in contravention of the Charter. 
One of the permanent members would probably prevent this by using 
its veto to protect its or its blocs interests. To this extent, 
the veto operates as a safeguard against the adoption of ultra 
vires resolutions. Also, the Council has a much greater 
competence in the field of international peace than the Assembly 
which is much more likely to contravene the provisions such as 
Article 12 which attempt to limit its competence and keep it the 
subsidiary body. 
The approach that recognizes the theory of "la competence 
de la competence" 
- 
that the Council and Assembly act as judges 
of their own competence (78) was not without recognition at San 
Francisco where the relevant Committee stated, 
"In the course of the operations from day to 
day of the various organs of the organization, 
it is inevitable that each organ will 
interpret such parts of the Charter as are 
applicable to its particular functions. This 
process is inherent in the functioning of any 
body which operates under an instrument 
defining its functions and powers. " (79) 
In addition to legal recognition of the Assembly's (and Council's) 
ability to act as its own judge, one must not forget the inherent 
difficulty in making an ultra vires objection count 
-a difficulty 
made worse by the practice of the Assembly of not citing the 
source of its authority in its resolutions. If there is no clear 
basis as to the resolution it is indeed difficult to challenge it 
for the challenge itself must be based on an interpretation of the 
provision (80). 
5 The principle of subsequent practice 
A related question to that discussed in the above section is 
whether the Assembly has re-interpreted the Charter by its 
subsequent practice. 
The principle of subsequent practice as regards treaty 
interpretation is reasonably clear and accepted as affording 
legitimate evidence as to its correct interpretation. A common, 
consistent practice by the vast majority of parties to a 
multilateral treaty such as the Charter of the United Nations 
"must come near to being conclusive on how the treaty should be 
interpreted" (81). Indeed, this amounts to "not so much the 
meaning of an existing text, as a revision of it, but a revision 
brought about by practice or conduct, rather than affected by and 
recorded in writing" (82). Further, 
"Conduct usually forms a more reliable guide 
to intention or purpose than anything to be 
found for instance in the preparatory work of 
the treaty simply because it has taken 
concrete and active, and not merely paper or 
verbal, form. " (83) 
So if the Assembly has consistently adopted resolutions on matters 
subject to Article 2(7) and Article 12 by a sufficiently large 
majority throughout its forty years of practice it might be 
possible to state that this amounts to a revision of those 
provisions. On the presumption that a consistent two-thirds 
majority, present and voting, (which is required for important 
questions) is sufficient, it is submitted that such a revision has 
taken place. The revision amounts to a severe restriction on the 
domestic jurisdiction limitation contained in Article 2(7); a 
virtual disregard of the division of competence between the 
Assembly and the Council contained in Article 12; and, in effect, 
an interpretation of the vague powers contained in Articles 10,11 
and 14 to give the Assembly competence and powers with regard to 
any matter in international relations with the exception of the 
ability to take mandatory measures. 
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice examined the principle of subsequent 
practice in the Expenses Case in a separate judgement; 
"Nevertheless, while the existence of these 
considerations renders it impossible to regard 
the practice of the United Nations as 
conclusive in the matter [the question of 
whether there existed a legal obligation to 
pay expenses] - it cannot be less than very 
material, and even if a majority vote cannot 
in the formal sense bind the minority, it can, 
if consistently exercised in a particular way, 
suffice to establish a settled practice which 
a tribunal can usefully and properly take 
account of. "(84) 
Even the most conservative of judges could not deny that there is 
a sufficient body of practice by the Assembly as regards its 
powers and competence not only to be taken account of in 
evaluating the Assembly's actions, but, combined with the 
presumption against ultra vires, to amount to a revision of the 
Charter by practice. 
The following two chapters will attempt to rationalise and 
categorise the practice of the Assembly first in the matter of 
competence, particularly as regards the Security Council, and, 
secondly, as regards the concrete forms the powers of the 
Assembly, derived from its competence, take. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE DIVISION OF COMPETENCE BETWEEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE. 
Given that it has been established in chapter 4 that Article 
11(2) only operated to prohibit the Assembly from taking mandatory 
or coercive action (1) and that Article 12 had been revised by 
Assembly practice (2), it remains to be seen as to what form this 
revision has taken - in other words to examine the evolution by 
practice of the division of competence between the Council and the 
Assembly in the field of international peace. Because the 
Assembly is only technically a subsidiary body in this field its 
competence and powers are determined by the division of the total 
U. N. powers and competence in the field of international peace 
between the two organs. Thus by examining the Assembly's 
perception of its competence it will be possible to determine the 
extent of its powers in the field of international peace and 
security (3). 
Five areas will be examined in which the Assembly has: 
(i) Acted in a parallel manner to the Security Council. This 
basically means repeating the work of the Council without 
pre-empting it or complementing it; 
(ii) Pre-empted, pre-judged or usurped the role or work of the 
Security Council. In other words, the Assembly has entered the 
Council's sphere of operation; for example by making a finding 
under Article 39. Strictu sensu, we have already seen that there 
is nothing in the Charter, except for Article 12, to prevent the 
Assembly from adopting recommendatory measures under Chapter VII 
following a finding under Article 39 (4). Nevertheless, the whole 
tenor of the Charter and the wording of Chapter VII suggests that 
the functions and powers contained in that Chapter are the sole 
reserve of the Security Council; 
(iii) Supplemented or complemented the role or work of the 
Council. This area involves the Assembly dealing with the same 
dispute as the Security Council but in a different manner 
- 
by 
concentrating on other areas of the dispute from the Security 
Council. It is neither repeating the work of the Council as in 
(i), or prejudicing it as in (ii); 
(iv) Performed the functions of the Security Council. In other 
words it has taken over the role of the Council which has failed 
to fulfil its primary responsibilty for the maintenance of 
international peace and security under Article 24. The main 
example of this is the Uniting for Peace procedure. There is no 
question of the Assembly pre-empting the Council since the Council 
has usually already considered the question but is unable to act; 
(v) Acted within its own sphere of competence in which there is 
also a question of international peace. For example, if a 
conflict (usually internal) is dominated by questions of 
fundamental human rights or the problem of self-determination 
then, arguably, the General Assembly has the primary role as the 
body responsible for the protection of those rights, even though 
the situation also involves the maintenance of international 
peace. This category can be viewed as representing an alternative 
way of analysing the question of division of competence as a whole 
and thus can be contrasted with the four areas of analysis above. 
Inevitably there are some grey areas where it might be argued 
that one cannot categorize the Assembly's competence as such. For 
example, it might successfully be argued that it cannot be said 
that the General Assembly has added nothing to the work of the 
Security Council in a situation even though its resolutions are 
basically the same (i. e. (i) above), since a repetition adds to 
the weight of international opinion and therefore supplements the 
work of the Council (i. e. (iii) above). This must be kept in 
mind when considering the areas below. 
1 Cases where the General Assembly has acted in a manner parallel 
to that of the Security Council 
(ii, ) Central America (5) 
Considering that the resolutions passed by the security 
Council are inevitably weak because of the involvement of one of 
the permanent members, one might have expected the Assembly to 
fill the void. On the surface the Assembly's first resolution on 
the subject (6) appears much firmer, more comprehensive and 
jurisdictionally more explicit than the corresponding Council 
resolution (7). The Council resolution puts emphasis on the 
efforts of the Contadora group and appears to be adopted under 
Article 33(2). The Assembly resolution, on the other hand, uses 
more explicit Charter language when it expresses deep concern "at 
the worsening of tensions and conflicts in Central America and the 
increase in outside interference and acts of aggression against 
the countries of the region, which endanger international peace 
and security". Although the resolution may be said to act as a 
jurisdictional complement to the Council resolution by indicating 
that the overall situation is of a type to be dealt with by the 
powers contained in Chapter VI with the occasional act coming 
within Article 39, it merely makes more explicit what is the 
implicit basis of the Council resolution without adding 
significantly to the recommendations for specific settlement (8). 
During its 42nd session the Assembly adopted a resolution 
without vote expressing its "firmest support" for the Guatamala 
Agreement (9). This resolution is based on previous General 
Assembly resolutions and so to some extent still parallels the 
Council's resolution (10). However, by expressing support for a 
specific peace plan rather than just the Contadora process, it 
could be argued that the Assembly has gone beyond the Council's 
basic position, although it is doubtful whether the Western 
states, particularly the United States, would have given their 
support if the majority of Members had put this interpretation on 
the resolution. 
(ii) Iraqi Nuclear Reactor 
The commentator in Cot and Pellet has designated the 
Assembly's resolutions on this subject as "parallel" to that of 
the Council (11). Prima facie, the Assembly does appear to have 
merely repeated the Council's resolution. However, on further 
examination the Assembly has gone further than the Council by 
attempting to bring this single act into the continuing problems 
of the middle East. 
The Assembly passed a resolution which recalled the Security 
Council resolution (12) and noted Israel's refusal to comply with 
it. The resolution virtually amounted to an attack on Israel and 
the United States. Like the Council resolution, the Assembly 
condemned Israel for its "act of aggression" but went further by 
saying that it also "constitutes a new and dangerous escalation in 
the threat to international peace and security". The Assembly, by 
finding a continuing threat as well as a single act of aggression 
is attempting to pave the way for the adoption of enforcement 
action by the Council. Indeed, the resolution contained a request 
to the Council, 
".... to institute effective enforcement 
action to prevent Israel from further 
endangering international peace and security 
through its acts of aggression and continued 
policies of expansion, occupation and 
annexation. " 
The Assembly's attempt at pre-empting the work of the Council was 
continued in 1982 (13). Although only Israel and the United 
States voted against the resolution, some Members expressed the 
hope that the item would not become a permanent fixture on the 
Assembly's agenda (14), which according to the British 
representative would "ritualize" and "trivialize" the subject 
(15). 
The Dutch representative advanced the argument that by its 
resolution (16) the Security Council was seized of the issue and 
an annual debate on the subject would not be respecting the 
Council's primary responsibilty (17). Obviously over two-thirds 
of the Assembly are not influenced in their voting by such a 
strict interpretation of competence under Article 12 for the 
Assembly has adopted further resolutions on the topic (18), the 
most recent of which reiterated its call to the Security Council 
to take "urgent and effective measures to ensure that Israel 
complies without further delay with the provisions of resolution 
487 (1981)" (19). 
iii The Gulf War 
On this topic the General Assembly does nothing more than to 
parallel the Security Council. The Assembly has passed one 
resolution on the conflict (20) which was to all intents and 
purposes a reaffirmation of previous Council resolutions (21). 
The only value of the resolution is that of repetition for it even 
recognized, when calling for a cease-fire, that "the Security 
Council has already called for an immediate cease fire and end to 
all military operations". It reflected the Council's 
jurisdictional findings when it deemed that the conflict 
endangered international peace and security. One would have 
thought that the provisions of Article 12 would have played some 
role in the discussions. However, the Members apparently did not 
see the resolution as treading on the toes of the Council (22). 
The representative of Jamaica made it plain that nothing in the 
resolution "proposes the removal of the issue from the purview" of 
the council and was not "an attempt to circumvent the fundamental 
role of the Security Council" (23). 
Some of the Members thought that the Assembly should have 
gone further and found a "breach of the peace" (24). Such a 
finding might have forced the Security Council to consider action 
under Chapter VII which in the case of the Gulf War, which has 
lasted eight years, might have been a good idea, for the Council's 
attempts at pacification have been an unmitigated failure. 
Pre-emption of the Council's competence in the face of Articles 12 
and 11(2) is a fact of life at the United Nations (25). As it is, 
the Council found a "breach of the peace" under Article 39 and 
demanded a cease-fire under Article 40 in July 1987 (26). 
iv Cyprus 1974-present 
Sometimes, in the case of disputes which are never off the 
Security Council's agenda (27), it appears as if the General 
Assembly, in its annual session of 3-4 months, is taking part of 
the burden off the Council by passing what are almost obligatory 
(28) resolutions on the conflict. In some cases (29) the Assembly 
seizes this opportunity either to complement the Council's 
resolutions or to pre-empt them. In the case of Cyprus, however, 
the Assembly has added little to the work of the Council except 
perhaps an increased weight of international opinion. 
After the Greek backed coup against Makarios and the Turkish 
invasion of the northern part of Cyprus in 1974, the General 
Assembly virtually repeated earlier Council resolutions (30) in 
its resolution passed at its 29th session which expressed grave 
concern "about the continuation of the Cyprus crisis, which 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security", urged 
the withdrawal of foreign forces and the cessation of all "foreign 
interference in its affairs" (31). 
By the time the Assembly passed this resolution the Turkish 
intervention had become a fait accompli. This partly explains why 
the Assembly and the Council share the responsibilty of dealing 
with the Cyprus situation, for once the Council had acted promptly 
in accordance with Article 28(1) during the initial crisis in 1974 
and the situation had become on-going, there was no practical 
reason why both organs should not share the burden even though the 
situation is primarily one of international peace and in theory 
Article 12 should apply. 
The Assembly has passed a long line of resolutions on the 
Cyprus situation (32). In its 1983 resolution (33) the Assembly 
made it clear that it was acting together with the Security 
Council when it demanded the implementation of the relevant 
resolutions adopted by both organs on the subject. During the 
discussions in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly there 
was very little about any conflict between the two organs; indeed 
most suggestions were about a harnessed effort or more correctly a 
channel of support for the Secretary General's efforts (34). 
Nevertheless, the resolution induced five negative votes and 
twenty abstentions mainly from Western nations who objected to a 
paragraph in the resolution which recommended that "the Security 
Council should examine the question of implementation, within a 
specific time frame, of its relevant resolutions and consider and 
adopt thereafter, if necessary, all appropriate and practical 
measures under the Charter 
..... 
for ensuring the speedy and 
effective implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations 
on Cyprus....... ". 
Those abstaining and those casting negative votes explained 
that they thought the recommendation to the Security Council was 
"inappropriate" (35). The representative of France summed up 
Western sentiment, 
".... while my country is aware of the 
necessity for ensuring the application of 
Security Council decisions; it feels that it 
is up to that body itself to decide the 
measures to be adopted, in conformity with the 
Charter, to ensure such application. " (36) 
Throughout this chapter it will become apparent that, since the 
end of their period of dominance in the mid 1950's, the Western 
states rely on legal objections based on Charter provisions in 
order to attempt to prevent the Assembly encroaching on the work 
of the Council, whereas the Socialist and Non Aligned countries 
skip over such objections. This more constitutional approach 
covers the self-interest of the Western states who would like to 
see the Security Council remain the primary body in which they 
have a triple veto to protect their vital interests rather than 
allow the Assembly to have greater power with its overwhelming Non 
Aligned and Socialist majority (37). The Socialist and Non 
Aligned countries are apt to interpret Articles 10,11 and 14 very 
widely, and ignore Article 12 assuming, of course, that they have 
them in mind since they very rarely refer to them (38). 
The Congo 
As well as acting under the Uniting for Peace procedure at 
its fourth emergency special session (39) at the request of the 
Security Council, the General Assembly also passed resolutions 
paralleling those of the Security Council at its fifteenth annual 
session (40). Like the Council resolution the Assembly saw the 
presence of Belgian troops as the "central factor" in the "grave 
situation" and called for their withdrawal. Like its Council 
counterpart it found a "threat to the peace" but was more 
conciliatory in trying to obtain the Congolese authorities' 
cooperation with the United Nations. In this respect the Assembly 
supplemented the Council's resolution for as the representative of 
the Ivory Coast pointed out, the decision taken by the Council 
created an "atmosphere of tension" which the Assembly was 
attempting to diffuse (41). 
Certain Members had attempted to introduce a proposal that 
the Assembly should "decide" that Belgium should withdraw all 
personnel within 21 days. This was not adopted because of 
objections by moderate states. The representative of Ireland 
explained these objections clearly, 
"..... [the General Assembly] has the useful 
functions of making recommendations...... and 
of registering world opinion on various issues 
....... 
in the exercise of these functions it 
has proved able, in certain circumstances, to 
save the United Nations from the consequences 
of a paralysis brought on by Security Council 
deadlocks; but from that to making the General 
Assembly a primary decision making body seems 
to us a long step of doubtful legality and of 
even more doubtful use. "(42) 
Indeed the Charter provisions examined above contain only the 
power of recommendation with binding decisions remaining within 
the exclusive power of the Security Council. Perhaps the division 
of duties between the two bodies is based on this - the General 
Assembly having a recommendatory register of world opinion 
function whereas the Council makes the "primary decisions". If 
this is the case then Article 12 has no application 
- 
both bodies 
could consider the same problem at the same time for they are 
exercising different functions. This is too simplistic a 
dichotomy for the Security Council often adopts purely 
recommendatory resolutions under Chapter VI. Philippe Manin in 
his commentary on Article 14 points out that in recent practice, 
the Assembly's resolutions purport to go beyond mere 
recommendations, 
"L'examen de la practique r6cente de 
1'Assembl6e d6montre 
- 
si besoin en 6tait 
- 
que 1'Assembl6e gen6rale ne donne aucune 
limite au contenu de ses r6solutions. Elle 
'condamne', indique aux Etats membres des 
sanctions ä prendre et va meme quelquefois 
jusqu'ä utiliser le terme 'exiger'. "(43) 
Nevertheless, it is extremely doubtful if the Assembly can 
interpret the Charter so widely (in fact to act totally against 
its provisions) to give itself mandatory decision making powers. 
Some of the resolutions take the form of forceful recommendations 
as recognized by Mohamed Bennani in his commentary on Article 10, 
"Si le caractere obligatoire des 
recommendations demeure controverse, malgre le 
fait que pour certains leur adoption, par voie 
de consensus ou a une majorite ecrasante, tend 
ä leur conferer la force contraignante d'une 
decision...... "(44) 
Nevertheless the above comment shows a tendency by third world 
lawyers to extend the scope of the Charter to allow the Assembly 
to adopt decision-like recommendations (45). 
2 Cases where the General Assembly has pre-empted or prejudged the 
role of the Security Council 
Portuguese Territories 
With a vast increase in newly independent states joining the 
United Nations there arose a significant gap between the 
resolutions of the General Assembly and those of the Security 
Council as regards colonial or neo-colonial situations (South 
Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Namibia) which involved 
considerations of international peace. As early as 1962 the 
General Assembly found "that the policy and acts of the Portuguese 
Government with regard to the territories under its administration 
have constituted a serious threat to international peace and 
security". This finding under Article 39 suggests that the 
situation required "action" by the Security Council which should 
have had the question referred to it under Article 11(2). The 
resolution appeared to recognize this in that it requested the 
Security Council to take steps to "secure the compliance of 
Portugal with its obligations as a Member State" (46). 
The Assembly expanded its finding under Article 39 not only 
to include "the attitude of Portugal towards the African 
populations of its colonies" but also towards "neighbouring 
States" which also constituted a "threat to international peace 
and security". On this occasion it suggested voluntary measures 
of its own while requesting that the Council take action (47). 
The resolutions in this case illustrate how the Non Aligned 
become increasingly exasperated with the Security Council. As we 
have seen a finding of a "threat to the peace" by the Assembly is 
not prohibited by the Charter but it often represents the 
beginning of a course of action leading to the Assembly taking the 
primary role in international peace, evidenced in this case by the 
recommendation of measures. Admittedly, neither is the adoption 
voluntary measures against the letter of the Charter, but is 
against the basic division of responsibilities in the Charter 
which designates the Council as the primary body. Besides on a 
strict interpretation of Article 12 the Assembly, in adopting the 
second of the resolutions referred to above, was acting in an 
unconstitutional way since the question of the Portuguese 
Territories had been on the Security Council agenda since 1963 
(48) and has never been removed. 
The majority saw it as their duty, despite what the Charter 
might suggest, to cajole the council, in particular the Western 
states, into adopting more forceful measures. In this they failed 
for whereas the Assembly found the situation a threat to the peace 
in 1962, the Council only found a danger to international peace in 
1972 (49). 
(ii) Southern Rhodesia 
The Charter provisions are so vague that it could be argued 
that the practice of the General Assembly is a valid 
interpretation. Herve Cassan makes this point in his commentary 
on Article 11(2), 
"I1 ne s'agit pas d'en deduire 
- 
ce serait 
inexact 
- 
que 1'Assemblee generale a cherche a 
empieter sur les competences du Conseil de 
securite, mais seulement de constater que les 
pouvoirs qu'elle detient au titre de l'article 
11, paragraphe 2, Pont logiquement amenee e 
intervenir dans une sphere de competences 
reservee par la Charte au Conseil de securite. 
Des lors, c'est moins la pratique extensive de 
1'Assemblee que les maladresses de la Charte 
qui expliquent ce glissement. " (50) 
He argues that Article 11 is meant to cover all the Charter 
situations - paragraph 3 covers an Article 34/Chapter VI 
situation, and paragraph 2 allows the Assembly to make a finding 
under Article 39. What paragraph 2 does not allow is "action" by 
the Assembly which is to be interpreted to mean coercive, Chapter 
VII action, so not precluding recommendatory measures by the 
Assembly (51). He cites the Assembly practice as regards the 
Portuguese colonies and Southern Rhodesia in support. 
In the case of Southern Rhodesia the Assembly found the 
situation a "threat to the peace" several years before the 
Security Council (52). A finding of a "threat to the peace" is 
mainly a political decision and so one might expect a difference 
in the timing of such a finding in two organs with different 
voting procedures. Nevertheless, once the situation came to a 
head with UDI one might have expected the Security Council to take 
the lead. Not so, for the General Assembly was first to condemn 
UDI and referred the matter to the Security Council (53). It even 
urged the Security Council to adopt enforcement measures under 
Chapter VII (54) before the Council had even agreed to condemn. 
The Assembly, throughout the problems in Southern Rhodesia, 
seemed to be pushing the Council, reaching decisions which the 
Council often reluctantly followed, and above all acting as the 
conscience of the Security Council. There were objections. The 
Dutch representative pointed out that the Security Council had 
been seized of the problem since 1963 and so by virtue of Article 
12 the Assembly could not make recommendations unless the Council 
so requested (55). 
The Dutch ambassador also stated that the situation was not a 
"threat to the peace" with the consequence that no enforcement 
measures could be taken. His and other objections were ignored as 
the Council adopted mandatory economic measures against the 
minority Smith regime (56). Nevertheless, the Assembly did not 
stop pushing to have the embargo made more effective. It called 
on the Council to take the next logical and legal step (57) of 
taking mandatory sanctions against the sanction breakers 
principally South Africa and Portugal (58). 
This call was repeated (but never carried out) in 1973 in a 
resolution which contained, in the following paragraph, an appeal 
"....... to those permanent members of the 
Security Council whose negative votes on 
various proposals to the question [of imposing 
sanctions against South Africa and Portugal] 
have continued to obstruct the effective and 
faithful discharge by the Council of its 
responsibilities under the relevant provisions 
of the Charter 
..... 
to reconsider their 
negative attitude with a view to the 
elimination forthwith of the threat to 
international peace and security resulting 
from the critical situation in Southern 
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). " (59) 
It may be stepping on the toes of the Council, but the Assembly 
has taken it upon itself to act as the conscience of the Council, 
particularly the permanent members - an approach which was 
emphasized when the Assembly adopted a resolution reminding 
Members of their obligations under Article 25 (60). 
iii South Africa 
From the beginning of Assembly consideration of the internal 
situation in South Africa, the Pretoria regime has relied on 
Article 2(7) (61) to attempt to deny the General Assembly 
jurisdiction. Goodrich, Hambro and Simons concede that Article 
2(7) has little relevance as regards "colonial" situations due to 
the fact that U. N. practice, particularly by the General Assembly 
has had the effect of rendering Article 2(7) a meaningless 
provision (62). In the Security Council where only one permanent 
member has to decide that Article 2(7) would be a sufficient legal 
justification to operate the veto, the provision has taken on more 
legal and political significance giving rise to the view that the 
situation must be of "international concern" or a "threat to the 
peace" for the Council to act (63). In the Assembly such legal 
arguments are in the minority even if the situation is not 
strictly "colonial" but involves minority, "racist" domination 
(64). 
A finding of a "threat to the peace" by the General Assembly 
is a political decision by at least two-thirds of its Members but 
it can have indirect legal consequences, for if the Council feels 
the pressure sufficiently to adopt a similar finding, it can 
enforce its decisions under Chapter VII (65). A finding in the 
General Assembly has no such legal consequence for it is empowered 
to adopt recommendations only. 
During the early years of its consideration of the South 
African problem the Assembly was contented with finding that the 
continuance of the policies of the South African government 
"seriously endangers international peace and security" while 
calling on the Security Council to consider the question under 
Article 11(3) (66). Ignoring for the moment objections based on 
Article 2(7) this appears to be a reasonable, Charter based 
approach. 
However, four years later in 1965 the Socialist/Non Aligned 
majority's patience ran out when it adopted a resolution drawing 
" 
.... 
the attention of the Security Council 
to the fact that the situation in South Africa 
constitutes a threat to international peace 
and security; that action under Chapter VII of 
the Charter is essential to solve the problem 
of apartheid and that universally applied 
economic sanctions are the only means of 
achieving a peaceful solution. " (67) 
De facto, the General Assembly had pre-empted the Security 
Council's prerogative of making a finding under Article 39. The 
majority ignored the problem of division of powers. The 
representative of Norway, however, expressed the minority view, 
"It is the Security Council and the Security 
Council alone, which has the authority to 
stipulate if a situation or crisis is of such 
a nature that sanctions should be imposed. We 
may regret it....... " 
He stated that although the "General Assembly can and should exert 
its influence on the Security Council", in his opinion, the 
resolution went too far in finding a "threat to the peace" (68). 
A riposte to this argument would be to say that such a finding is 
necessary for the organization as a whole to get involved in a 
domestic situation and if the Security Council is unable to make 
such a finding (despite overwhelming international opinion) it is 
for the General Assembly to make one (69). 
A majority of Members see the Assembly's role as that of 
removing the block put up by Western states in the Council to the 
adoption of mandatory economic sanctions by repeating its finding 
of a threat, urging mandatory sanctions (and strongly recommending 
voluntary ones of its own) and by persistently criticizing those 
states deemed "guilty" of "colluding" with the "illegitimate" 
"racist" regime. 
In 1976 the Assembly adopted a resolution calling on the 
governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States 
"to desist from misusing their veto power in the Security Council 
to protect the racist regime of South Africa"; "to enable the 
Security Council to determine the existence of a threat to the 
peace"; and "to facilitate the adoption" of mandatory measures 
(70) under Chapter VII. 
Such an approach does seem to encroach on the powers of the 
Council by criticizing permanent members but the Assembly does 
have support for its finding of a "threat to the peace" from 
various bodies it has set up to investigate the situation (71). 
The overwhelming weight of world opinion appears to be behind such 
a finding and the imposition of mandatory sanctions, and so the 
Assembly sees it as its duty to goad the recalcitrant permanent 
members into supporting such action (72). Such an approach seems 
to be a liberal interpretation of the proviso in Article 11(2) 
which requires the Assembly to refer any question on which 
"action" is necessary to the Security Council in that it attempts 
to virtually direct the Council into taking mandatory action after 
attempting to force the Council's hand by making a finding under 
Article 39. The majority of Members seem to view the Council's 
acts so far as not constituting a performance of its "functions" 
so that Article 12 does not preclude the General Assembly from 
discussing a matter which has remained on the Council's agenda for 
many years (73). 
The annual resolutions on South Africa have become 
increasingly reflective of the ideological dominance of the Non 
Aligned and Socialist blocs in the Assembly as that majority 
continues with its policy of condemnation rather than negotiation 
with the apartheid regime. This attitude is understandable to a 
certain extent in that the Pretoria government has consistently 
refuted attempts at what it sees as interference in its internal 
affairs -a policy which is not conducive to settlement. The only 
viable alternative left to the U. N. is to try to bring an end to 
apartheid by external pressure, hence the call by the Assembly for 
mandatory action, and the increasingly anti-Western content of its 
resolutions (74), as the Western permanent members, in particular 
Britain and the United States continue to block any such move in 
the Council. 
In order to fulfil its aims the Assembly has to use the term 
"threat to the peace" to cover not only the "policies and actions 
of the apartheid regime", but also the "escalating acts of 
aggression and subversion of that regime against independent 
African States" (75) and "collaboration with the racist regime and 
apartheid institutions" by countries such as the United Kingdom, 
the United States, West Germany, Japan and Belgium (76). However, 
an overuse of the term "threat to the peace" not only devalues its 
impact but is also unlikely to facilitate the achievement of the 
Assembly's goals, for the Council has yet to make such a finding 
as regards the situation in South Africa and if it is to do so it 
must have the agreement of the Western members who are unlikely to 
do so as long as they are included in that threat (77). 
Convinced that the method of ending apartheid should be 
coercive and not pacific, the Assembly adopts annual resolutions 
calling for the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions by the 
Council under Chapter VII while recommending a wide range of 
voluntary measures itself (78). Indeed, the latest resolution 
lumps together the whole range of findings under Article 39 while 
calling on Western states to abandon "constructive engagement" and 
support the Council in imposing mandatory economic sanctions (79). 
(iv) South West Africa/Namibia 
During the early stages of the South West Africa dispute, it 
was not considered that there was a problem concerning the 
maintenance of international peace and security and so the General 
Assembly dealt with it as a problem involving trusteeship (80). 
Although it passed its first resolution on the subject in 1946 
(81) it did not reach a jurisdictional finding until 1960 (82) 
when it considered "with grave concern that the present situation 
in South West Africa constitutes a serious threat to international 
peace and security" (83). Nevertheless, it did not request, under 
Article 11(2) or (3), that the Security Council meet even though 
by making a finding of a "threat to the peace" it brought the 
situation within the ambit of the Council's primary 
responsibility. Instead it invited the Committee on South West 
Africa to propose "conditions for restoring a climate of peace and 
security". This culminated in an appeal to Members close to the 
government of South Africa to bring pressure to bear (84). 
Neither the report of the Fourth Committee which led to the 
1960 resolution (85) nor the report of the Committee on South West 
Africa (86) nor the meetings of the Assembly (87) discussed in any 
great detail why the situation was a threat to the peace. It 
seems to be a politically expedient move by the Members to 
galvanize world opinion and prepare the Security Council to take 
action to help in ending South African occupation. The Western 
countries opposed such a finding but had to admit that the 
situation concerned international peace and security when Liberia 
proposed that a simple majority be required to adopt resolutions 
on the question of Namibia. The Western states argued that under 
Article 18 a two-third's majority was required for recommendations 
regarding international peace and security, and since the 
resolution in question (88) found a "threat to the peace" a 
two-third's majority was required (89). 
The General Assembly's recommendations as regards Namibia 
parallel its resolutions on South Africa, in that in the early 
years, although it pre-empted the Council by making a finding 
under Article 39, it was content to make a request to the Security 
Council "to keep watch over the critical situation in South West 
Africa". It then widened its use of Article 39 language in order 
to present the Council with all the opportunities it could for 
imposing sanctions against South Africa. In 1976, it found, in 
addition to a "threat to the peace" that the illegal occupation 
constituted an "act of aggression against the Namibian people" 
(90). In 1977 it expressed deep concern at "the increasing 
militarization of Namibia and the continuing acts of aggression 
against neighbouring African countries including the most recent 
acts of aggression against Angola and Zambia" (91). However, 
since then the resolutions have become ritual and repetitive with 
an increase in anti-Western bias. 
In 1981, the Assembly named France, the United States and the 
United Kingdom as being "in collusion with the South African 
racists as manifested in their triple vetoes in the Security 
Council where the majority of the world body demonstrated its 
determination to adopt concrete political and economic measures 
aimed at isolating terrorist South Africa in order to compel it to 
vacate Namibia" (92). The recent ritual condemnation of South 
Africa and Western states occurred at the Assembly's fortieth 
session in which it expressed "its dismay at the failure to date 
of the Security Council to discharge effectively its 
responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security in 
southern Africa, owing to the opposition of its Western permanent 
members" and called for mandatory economic sanctions (93). 
One would expect Western states to object, and to use 
Articles 11(2) and 12 as a legal basis (94). In fact, the 
relevant parts of neither of the above resolutions were voted 
against (95), with Western nations being content to abstain. The 
representative of Canada explained the West's position, 
"The authority of the General Assembly is 
recommendatory in character; moreover, the 
General Assembly cannot arrogate to itself 
powers it does not have by using language 
appropriate only to the Security Council. 
Nothing in this text, therefore, gives rise to 
a legal obligation. "(96) 
The Western states realize that they cannot stop the resolutions 
from being adopted because they are heavily outnumbered. Since 
the resolutions are validly adopted (97), arguments based on 
Articles 11 and 12 would be futile, so the thrust of the West's 
arguments (when it bothers to state one) is that the resolutions 
of the Assembly are of paper value only, mere recommendations - 
the real power of decision making lies in the Security Council 
(98). The Western states attempt to confine the Assembly to a 
forum where the majority of Members let off steam (99). 
The Middle East 
it will be shown below (100) that initially after the failure 
of the Assembly's partition plan for Palestine, that body went 
about complementing the decisions of the Security Council until 
the 1970's when it started to encroach on the Security Council's 
primary role when passing its annual resolutions on the Middle 
East conflict and the problem of Palestine. 
In its resolutions on the Middle East question the Assembly 
has shown the same propensity for entering the Council's area of 
competence while isolating the generally pro-Israeli Western 
countries even though it may appear as if the Assembly is 
supporting the relevant Council resolution (101). For example, in 
1971 the Assembly adopted a resolution which appeared to accord 
without the Council's actions in that it stated "that the Security 
Council resolution 242 (1967) 
... 
should be implemented in all 
its parts in order to achieve a just and lasting peace in the 
Middle East". However, the resolution went further and found a 
"threat to the peace" which the Council had not and suggested the 
Council take steps for the implementation of 242. The West's main 
objections, however, were with the alterations of the balance of 
the Council's resolution such as the Assembly's expression of 
grave concern at Israel's "continued occupation" rather than with 
the introduction of the term "threat to the peace" which in 
Assembly terms, unlike those of the Council, cannot make the 
resolution mandatory (102). The Dutch representative voiced the 
most comprehensive objection, 
"It is hard to see how the Assembly can make 
any constructive contribution of its own. 
Matters of international peace and security 
are the primary responsibility of the Security 
Council. The Council's resolution 242 (1967) 
is the only basis for further activity, and 
the General Assembly cannot and should not try 
to detract from the resolution as a whole, or 
to attempt its own formulation of that 
carefully balanced text. In addition, the 
Netherlands feels, as a conscientious Member 
of the United Nations, that Article 12 of the 
Charter 
......... 
should be 
..... 
scrupulously observed 
...... 
Perhaps a simple 
appeal to the parties to resume the Jarring 
talks on the basis of Security Council 
resolution 242 (1967) would be the 
answer. "(103) 
Nevertheless, more than two-thirds of the Assembly are not so 
"conscientious" and in 1975 it adopted a resolution which in 
addition to a finding of a "threat to the peace" provided an 
example of a comprehensive, pre-emptive request to the Council, 
"....... in the exercise of its 
responsibilities under the Charter to take all 
necessary measures for the speedy 
implementation, according to an appropriate 
timetable, of all relevant resolutions of the 
General Assembly and Security Council aimed at 
the establishment of a just and lasting peace 
in the region through a comprehensive 
settlement, worked out with the participation 
of all the parties concerned, including the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, and within 
the framework of the United Nations, which 
ensures complete Israeli withdrawal from ALL 
the occupied Arab territories as well as a 
full recognition of the inalienable national 
rights of the Palestinian people and the 
attainment of those rights. "(104) 
The resolutions have become increasingly antagonistic; naming the 
United States as aiding Israeli "aggression" against the 
Palestinian people (105); calling for voluntary measures against 
Israel (106) and demanding that it comply with Article 25 as 
regards Council resolutions (107); condemning Israel's links with 
South Africa (108); and criticizing the United States for vetoing 
a draft resolution in the Security Council which prevented that 
body from taking Chapter VII action against Israel for its 
invasion of the Lebanon (109). In effect, the Assembly has 
arrogated to itself a virtually limitless competence as far as 
recommendatory resolutions are concerned. 
The United States representative was forced to respond to a 
recent resolution; 
"We reject pernicious charges of this nature, 
which are grossly improper and purport to 
engage the Assembly in matters which, under 
the United Nations Charter, are expressly and 
necessarily reserved to the Security 
Council. "(110) 
One might argue as to what provisions of the Charter does he base 
this assertion. Indeed, the relevant Articles tend to suggest a 
sacrosanct sphere of competence for the primary body, but it is 
possible to point to other provisions which confer on the Assembly 
a generous sphere of operation. Perhaps a better approach was 
taken by the representative of New Zealand who stated, 
"We are always ready to support 
.... 
resolutions which reflect both the balance of 
principles embodied in the Security Council 
resolutions and the measured approach that is 
essential if the co-operation of all parties 
to the dispute is to be secured. "(111) 
This approach would not unduly restrict the competence of the 
Assembly as long as it acted in accord with the Council's 
resolutions and did not attempt any new initiative. The fact that 
the New Zealand representative was unable to support the 
resolution because it was too "antagonistic" indicates that the 
approach he advocates has not been adopted in this case. 
1vi Cyprus 1964 
Whereas in 1974 the Assembly appeared to act in a parallel 
fashion to the Security Council (112), in 1964 there were 
objections that it was attempting to go beyond the relevant 
resolutions of the Security Council when it merely called upon 
"all States 
.... 
to refrain from any intervention directed 
against" the Republic of Cyprus (113). This seems a minor 
transgression as compared to those above, but it was deemed by 
those voting against it or abstaining to be anti-Turkish. 
According to the representative of the United States, 
"...... this Assembly should not adopt a 
resolution which addresses itself to the 
substance of the problem, which goes beyond 
the basic resolution of the Security Council 
and which represents views in regard to the 
eventual settlement which are favoured by one 
party to the dispute and objected to by 
another. "(114) 
Perhaps this was an early example of the new majority of recently 
independent states along with Socialist countries flexing their 
collective muscle (very slightly) to the consternation of the 
West. Twenty years on that resolution and its encroachment on the 
competence of the Security Council would probably pass by without 
comment. 
In fact by 1969 Goodrich, Hambro and Simons were able to 
state that the "Assembly has been generally unmoved by arguments 
tending to restrict the area of its competence" (115), and by 1985 
Mohamed Bennani is able to write the following, 
"Limitaes par certaines dispositions de la 
Charte, du fait que les fondateurs de 
1'Organisation ont voulu consacrer dans ce 
domaine la pr66minence du Conseil de s6curit6, 
les competences de 1'Assembl6e dans ce domaine 
n'en existent pas moins et celle-ci a 
constamment cherche a les atendre. "(116) 
Both these comments (117) reflect the conclusion that the Assembly 
can indeed consider and adopt resolutions on any matter within the 
sphere of international relations. They also reflect the fact 
that the Assembly has re-interpreted Article 12. As we have seen 
the only sustainable legal objection (118) to the Assembly 
examining the above areas is that the Council has them on its list 
of matters under Article 12(2) and so is functioning in regard to 
them for the purpose of Article 12(1). The Assembly appears to 
have revised this artificial interpretation of "functions" not 
only to the extent of the Council actually deliberating upon and 
passing resolutions on a subject (as opposed to it merely being on 
its agenda), but also to the extent of the Assembly determining 
whether the Council is functioning even if it is deliberating and 
resolving. The Assembly not only appears to have the competence 
to determine its own competence but in so doing it has arrogated 
to itself the competence to determine whether the Council is 
functioning. It has thus gone beyond the theory of "la 
competence de Is competence" for it has most probably entered into 
the jurisdiction of the Security Council. It is doubtful 
whether such a revision would survive a challenge of ultra vires 
before the International Court (119). 
3 Cases in which the General Assembly has supplemented or 
complemented the work of the Security Council 
LJA East Timor 
Although the General Assembly produced a resolution (120) 
which was remarkably similar to its Council counterpart (121) it 
could not be accused of merely repeating or paralleling the 
Council for it seized the issue and adopted its resolution before 
the Council. Indonesia had moved its troops into East Timor on 
the 7 December, the General Assembly adopted its resolution on the 
12th, whereas the Council could only virtually repeat the 
Assembly's call on the 22nd. 
The Assembly did not really pre-empt the Council for the 
resolution contained no findings under Article 39 but did contain 
a request to the Council "in conformity with" Article 11(3) to 
consider the situation. The Assembly was not performing the 
Council's role, for the Council did act eventually except more 
slowly. It was a case of the Assembly aiding the Council, the 
machinery of which, on this occasion, lacked the necessary 
alacrity. 
Subsequently the Assembly has dealt with the situation on an 
annual basis (122). Although it repeated its own and later the 
Council's call for Indonesian withdrawal, in later years it 
concentrated more on humanitarian issues (123), possibly in the 
folorn hope that the Security Council would take up the issue 
again. Nevertheless, the Assembly restricted itself to a call 
under Article 11(3) rather than crying out for Chapter VII 
measures (124). Unlike in the cases in section (ii) above the Non 
Aligned were unwilling to suggest enforcement action against one 
of their own. This was reflected in the relatively measured but 
weak Assembly resolutions (125). 
(ii) Tunisia 
After the Security Council had failed to adopt a resolution 
which dealt more than temporarily with the Tunisian conflict 
(126), the General Assembly held its Third Special Session under 
Article 20 (127). 
The representative of Tunisia stated that the General 
Assembly should act because of 
".... the inability of the Security Council 
to make an appropriate decision which would 
put an end to the aggression of 19 July 1961 
and enable Tunisia to secure the withdrawal of 
all the French armed forces that are in 
Tunisia against the will of the people. "(128) 
Nevertheless, the Assembly did not adopt a resolution condemning 
French "aggression"; instead it adopted one calling for 
negotiations and French withdrawal. The resolution classified the 
situation as a "source of international friction" and a danger to 
international peace and security (129). 
Although the resolution did not favour the French, it built 
upon rather than detracted from the work of the Council. The 
Council was able to act with some immediacy and call for a 
cease-fire but as on so many occasions was unable to go that step 
further and recommend a basis for settlement. Instead, the 
Assembly performed this task making explicit what was implicit in 
the Council resolution (130) - that the situation was of a kind 
that should be subject to pacific settlement. The Assembly did 
not upset the work of the Council by finding a "breach" or "act of 
aggression" which would not induce any settlement. On this 
occasion the Assembly did constitute a "compelling summons to the 
conscience of the world" (131). 
iii Namibia 
In 1966 the General Assembly terminated South Africa's 
mandate over Namibia (132) and called "the attention of the 
Security Council to the present resolution... ". This represented 
quite a good example of the dovetailing of the Assembly and the 
Council; a fact recognized by the International Court, 
"By resolution 2145 (XXI) the General Assembly 
terminated the Mandate. However, lacking the 
necessary powers to ensure the withdrawal of 
South Africa from the Territory, it enlisted 
the help of the Security Council by calling 
the latter's attention to the resolution, thus 
acting in accordance with Article 11, 
paragraph 2 of the Charter. "(133) 
The Council went on to adopt resolutions for this purpose (134). 
However, the Assembly then became increasingly exasperated with 
the Council's inability to end South Africa's presence and started 
to prejudge issues that should be considered by the Council (135). 
Further resolutions found the situation a "threat to the 
peace" and an "act of aggression" against the Namibian people 
(136) reflecting the majority's exasperation at the Council's 
ineffectiveness and unwillingness to act (137). The Dutch 
representative had to remind the Assembly that it was veering away 
from co-operation with the Council to being antagonistic towards 
it by making such findings, 
"This terminology, derived from Chapter VII, 
implies the existence of a situation calling 
for action by the Security Council, and 
prejudges a definite opinion which only the 
Security council is entitled to express. In 
the view of my delegation a statement to this 
effect is constitutionally impermissible, 
factually incorrect and politically 
inappropriate. By forcing the matter into 
channels which unavoidably lead to aggravation 
rather than remedy, the Assembly moves away 
from a solution by peaceful means. " (138) 
However, the Assembly has by its practice established that usually 
it sees its role as prejudicial and antagonistic rather than 
complementary towards the Council. 
(iv) Palestine 
The Assembly's actions over Palestine also reflect upon the 
fact that in the early years, when there was a Western majority in 
both organs, the Assembly acted as a complement to the Council, 
whereas after the mid-1950's, with the increase in newly 
independent, Non Aligned countries, the Assembly's resolutions 
became increasingly extreme and divorced from those of the 
Council. 
After the failure of its partition plan for Palestine, the 
Assembly set about complementing the Council in its efforts to 
restore peace and stability to the region. For example it passed 
a resolution in 1948 (139) which strongly affirmed the General 
Assembly's "support for the efforts of the Security Council to 
secure a truce in Palestine". To further the Council's efforts, 
the Assembly appointed a mediator to "promote a peaceful 
adjustment of the future situation in Palestine" and to 
"co-operate with the Truce Commission for Palestine appointed by 
the Security Council on 23 April 1948". 
From this relatively harmonious position the Assembly and 
Council have become increasingly divorced in their dealings with 
the Palestinian problem. Annual resolutions on the Palestine 
situation have been adopted since the mid 1970's, based on the 
reports of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights 
of the Palestinian people -a heavily biased Committee on which 
the West refuses to serve (140). 
These annual resolutions go beyond, criticize and undermine 
those of the Council. A good example of this is the resolution 
adopted in 1980 which expressed the Assembly's 
11 
..... 
grave concern that no just solution 
to the problem of Palestine has been achieved 
and that this problem therefore continues to 
aggravate the Middle East conflict of which it 
is the core, and to endanger international 
peace and security, and that Security Council 
resolution 242 (1967) 
.... 
does not provide 
for the future or for the inalienable rights 
of the Palestinian people, the attainment of 
which is a conditio sine quo non for a just 
solution of the question of Palestine. "(141) 
It reflects badly on the U. N. 's ability to settle disputes when 
the supposedly subsidiary body is constantly undermining and 
questioning the decisions of the primary organ (142). 
4 Cases where the General Assembly has performed the functions of 
the Security Council 
There are three methods by which the General Assembly has 
become the primary organ as regards a situation concerning 
international peace - by means of the Interim Committee or Little 
Assembly, by the Uniting for Peace procedure in Emergency Special 
Session or by Special Session under Article 20. Only the last of 
these is specifically authorized by the Charter. The former two 
methods were both created in the period of Western domination in 
an attempt to give the Assembly power when the Security Council 
was paralysed by the Soviet veto. 
The Interim Committee of the General Assembly 
The first method the pro-Western majority employed in an 
attempt to give more primacy in affairs of peace and security to 
the Assembly when the Council was blocked concentrated on 
increasing the effective length of the Assembly's session beyond 
its four monthly regular session. The Assembly adopted a proposal 
by the United States (143) creating a little Assembly consisting 
of all the Members which could be convened all year round. What 
was intended was to give the Assembly competence in the area of 
international peace when not in regular session - an "all year" 
Assembly (144). 
Its responsibilities included the study of problems relating 
to international peace and to report to the Assembly at its 
regular session. Thus the power of recommendation still remained 
with the Assembly proper and so the little Assembly did not 
represent a serious revision of the Charter to extend the 
Assembly's period of competence. In practice it represented even 
less of a threat to the Council's primacy for although it did 
submit reports to the General Assembly during the United Nations' 
first decade, it was severely paralysed by the Soviet boycott and 
was eclipsed by another Western sponsored idea - the Uniting for 
Peace Resolution (145). 
The creators of the Interim Committee saw it as a subsidiary 
organ of the General Assembly under Article 22. Prandler argues 
that it was created unconstitutionally, for theoretically its 
powers in the field of international peace undermined those of the 
Security Council and it is doubtful whether subsidiary bodies can 
have an independent scope of duties (146). One would have thought 
that the Little Assembly's powers came under the Assembly's 
umbrella of powers - either Articles 10,11 or 14 and so it had no 
duties independent of the Assembly, and only undermined the 
Security Council's competence in that it attempted to extend the 
Assembly's period of session. 
, 
(ii) The Uniting for Peace Procedure 
The immediate reason for the adoption of the Uniting for 
Peace resolution (147) was the return, in August 1950, of the 
Soviet Union to the Security Council leading to the 
discontinuation of the Council as the body dealing with the United 
Nations' involvement in Korea (148). However, the Western 
influenced majority in the General Assembly was also of the view 
that the frequent use of the Soviet veto during the period 
1946-1950 was an abuse of that right and that the ideal of Great 
Power unanimity at San Francisco was no longer attainable (149). 
The method proposed by the United States, Canada, France, the 
Philippines, the United Kingdom, Turkey and Uruguay by which 
paralysis of the Security Council would be circumvented was the 
Uniting for Peace resolution, the salient part of which stated, 
" 
...... 
that if the Security Council because 
of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, 
fails to exercise its primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and 
security in any case where there appears to be 
a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression, the General Assembly shall 
consider the matter immediately with a view to 
making the appropriate recommendations to 
Members for collective measures, including in 
cases of a breach of the peace or act of 
aggression the use of armed force when 
necessary, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. If not in 
session at the time, the General Assembly may 
meet in emergency special session within 24 
hours of the request therefor. Such emergency 
special session shall be called if requested 
by the Security Council on a vote of any seven 
(nine) members, or by a majority of the 
Members of the United Nations. "(150) 
The resolution was introduced at the height of the Cold War and 
predictably led to an East-West 
dichotomy in the discussions 
leading up to it. 
Since it was the time of Western domination, the Socialist 
countries argued against its adoption on the basis that Articles 
10 to 14 of the Charter indicate that the Security Council and the 
General Assembly "cannot be substituted for one another, they 
merely complement each other" (151). Such arguments are not used 
by Socialist states today. The pro-Western states argued, inter 
alia, that the resolution was valid on a wide interpretation of 
Article 12 
- 
for when the Council was paralysed by the veto it was 
not "functioning" in the sense of that provision (152). Western 
states would not subscribe to this view today (153). 
Prandler supports the view that the Uniting for Peace 
resolution is unconstitutional, 
"..... nothing in the Charter confers power 
on the General Assembly to act for the 
Security Council 
.... 
if the latter does not 
discharge its responsibilities for whatever 
reason. The U. N. is built not only on the 
separation of powers of the two organs, but it 
is emphasized in the Charter that the General 
Assembly cannot take action. Neither Article 
10, nor Articles 11 and 14 can serve as a 
basis for substituting the General Assembly 
for the Security Council. "(154) 
The unconstitutionality of the resolution is not as unequivocal as 
the above statement makes out. The World Court has made it clear 
that "action" in Article 11(2) refers to mandatory coercive action 
but the Court did not express the view that the Assembly was 
barred by the Charter from recommending enforcement. The Court 
also recognized the primary but not exclusive responsibility of 
the Security Council so not precluding the Assembly from having 
some responsibility (155). 
The real problem with the procedure, as with all attempts at 
extending the competence of the Assembly, is the construction of 
Article 12 and the meaning of "functions". The argument that the 
constitution of the Security Council includes the veto and so when 
the Security Council fails to adopt the resolution because of the 
veto it is still functioning seems perfectly sound. On this basis 
the Uniting for Peace resolution is unconstitutional, but as we 
have seen there is a presumption against this (156) and there is 
evidence of a revision of the ambit of Article 12 by subsequent 
practice (157) -a process which could well have been started by 
the resolution. 
In over forty years years of practice there have been only 
nine emergency special sessions called using the Uniting for Peace 
procedure (158) - this cannot be regarded as making the procedure 
a significant factor in the extension of the competence of the 
General Assembly. As has been pointed out at the time of the 
resolution's adoption there was a significant link between both 
organs - they were dominated by a Western majority. The West 
tried to strengthen the link in terms of the transfer of problems 
from one organ to the other by means of the Uniting for Peace 
resolution. With the new majority in the Assembly the Uniting for 
Peace procedure has no such use, for the Security Council is not 
controlled by that majority but by the permanent members, in 
particular the superpowers. Thus in later years, the procedure 
has become a vehicle either for condemnation of fait accompli in 
which one of the superpowers is involved or for the reinforcement 
of the Assembly's previous recommendations on the topic in 
question (159). To emphasize the change in significance of the 
Uniting for Peace procedure the examination below is divided into 
the early period and the later period. 
THE EARLY YEARS : Before the adoption of the Uniting for 
Peace resolution, President Truman spoke before the General 
Assembly and indicated that he envisaged the procedure being used 
in situations such as Korea (160). In fact the Assembly had made 
a substantial contribution to U. N. action in Korea by passing a 
resolution which allowed the U. N. force to continue its 
operations to establish "a unified, independent and democratic 
Government of Korea" after the Security Council had been 
deadlocked by the return of the Soviet representative (161). This 
resolution impliedly authorized General MacArthur to cross the 
38th parallel and so could be classified as authorizing 
enforcement action. President Truman probably had this in mind 
when he and Secretary of State Acheson introduced the Uniting for 
Peace resolution (162). 
The early successes of the procedure lay in the peacekeeping 
function 
- 
the establishment of UNEF (163), and the facility to 
take over the running of ONUC when the Security Council was 
paralysed by the Soviet veto (164). However, the peacekeeping 
function has gradually gravitated towards the Security Council 
- 
evidenced by the failure of the General Assembly to produce any 
constructive resolution on the Middle East in its Fifth Emergency 
Special Session after the Six Day War in 1967. The resolution 
adopted merely passed the records of the session to the Security 
Council (165) because after four weeks of discussion the Assembly 
itself could not agree on a compromise (166). 
Without a role in the peacekeeping function and with 
situations like Korea being unlikely to arise again it was 
becoming clear that the Uniting for Peace resolution was not going 
to result in the primacy of the General Assembly in matters of 
international peace. Gradually its function was to evolve into 
one where the Assembly is to be used to condemn cases of direct 
superpower intervention which will obviously result in a paralysed 
Security Council. The signs were there as early as the Second 
Emergency Special Session on Hungary in which the Assembly adopted 
a resolution which virtually paralleled the draft resolution 
vetoed in the Security Council in that it condemned the Soviet 
attack without classifying it as a breach of the peace or act of 
aggression as would seem to be required by the Uniting for Peace 
resolution (167). Again in 1958 when American and British troops 
were invited into Lebanon and Jordan respectively the Assembly 
could merely adopt a non-descript resolution which called for 
mutual respect for and non-interference between Arab countries 
(168). 
However, on one occasion the General Assembly managed to act 
in a manner which suggested that it could take on the role of the 
Council. During the Bangladesh crisis in 1971 the Security 
Council was hopelessly deadlocked and so sought the help of the 
Assembly which was in its 26th session at the time. The Council 
resolution cited the Uniting for Peace procedure although the 
Assembly did not meet in emergency special session (169). 
Assembly responded with commendable alacrity by adopting 
The 
a 
resolution which found that the "hostilities 
...... 
between India 
and Pakistan constitute an immediate threat to 
international peace and security" and called for a cease-fire and 
withdrawal (170). Admittedly there was no recommendation of 
enforcement action (which was highly unlikely anyway); 
nevertheless, the Assembly made a finding of a threat and made the 
recommendations which the Council, at the minimum, should have 
made much earlier in the conflict. The Assembly was in fact 
performing the role of the Council. The representative of Ecuador 
spoke in terms that reflected upon the poor impression created by 
the Council's inablity to act, 
"If power politics makes the Security Council 
what a few minutes ago was called a private 
club, with five permanent members and 11 
occasional guests, then the General Assembly 
is under an urgent duty of enforcing 
compliance with the provisions of the Charter, 
enshrining the last hope of mankind, which had 
hoped that a final end had been put to the 
scourge of war and to the threat or use of 
force. "(171) 
Unfortunately the Assembly's actions as regards Bangladesh were 
its last significant ones as regards the Uniting for Peace 
procedure. 
THE LATER YEARS : Since Bangladesh the Uniting for Peace 
procedure has become indistinguishable in its impact from Assembly 
actions taken in ordinary or special sessions. The Sixth 
Emergency Special Session on Afghanistan adopted a resolution 
which was a mirror image of the draft resolution defeated in the 
Security Council by the Soviet veto. It deplored the "recent 
armed intervention" after expressing grave concern "at the recent 
developments in Afghanistan and their implications for 
international peace and security" (172). Its call for withdrawal 
has subsequently been repeated annually (173). The only argument 
that has been repeatedly put forward in favour of these 
resolutions was expressed recently by the Egyptian representative, 
"It is an open secret that the adoption of the 
resolutions of the General Assembly on 
Afghanistan by such an overwhelming majority 
is the clearest evidence of the unswerving 
resolve of the international community to 
reject the policy of fait accompli that was 
imposed on the Afghan people. " (174) 
Perhaps this is the best that could be hoped for. However, one 
would have thought that the Assembly could have made a finding 
under Article 39 as envisaged by the Uniting for Peace procedure 
for by merely repeating the "armed intervention" resolution that 
was first drafted (with an eye on consensus) in the Security 
Council, the Assembly is guilty of merely going through the 
motions. The Assembly should not adopt failed Council resolutions 
but should do more 
- 
by acting as the Council ought to have done 
- 
that is what was envisaged by the Uniting for Peace procedure. 
The problem is that when dealing with superpower 
interventions 
- 
no matter how quickly the General Assembly is 
convened, it is still generally dealing with a fait accompli. In 
these cases the Uniting for Peace procedure is superfluous, and 
often the Assembly waits until its annual session (175). After 
the United States intervened in Grenada the Assembly was already 
in its regular session so that it produced a resolution relatively 
quickly, which again mirrored the draft vetoed by the United 
States in the Council, deploring the "armed intervention" and 
calling for withdrawal (176). However, in the case of the 
Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea, the Assembly waited many 
months before expressing deep regret at the "armed intervention by 
outside forces" and calling for withdrawal (177). Again after the 
air raids by the United States against Libya on April 15 1986, the 
Assembly waited until its 41st annual session to condemn the 
attacks as a violation of international law and as a serious 
threat to peace and security in the Mediterranean region (178). 
In these situations of superpower intervention the Uniting 
for Peace procedure is not necessary. The speed of condemnation 
is not too important. What is required is for the Assembly to 
have regard to the purpose of the Uniting for Peace resolution 
- 
that it should act in the manner in which the Council was designed 
to act. In this respect, the latest Kampuchean resolutions have 
taken a step forward by finding a "threat to the peace" (179). 
The Council was unable to make such a jurisdictional finding 
because of the Soviet veto, but there is no such reason why the 
Assembly should not make a finding of a "threat to the peace" 
which could lead to the possible recommendation of measures by 
that body, whereas the mere condemnation of armed intervention has 
no such potential. Futher action by the Assembly may be unlikely 
but there is no reason why it should not leave itself the 
possibility. 
In other situations the Uniting for Peace resolution has 
become an additional tool in the hands of the majority of the 
Members, who, for example, in 1981 called the Eighth Emergency 
Special Session of the Assembly to discuss the Namibian situation. 
The resolution produced added nothing to the plethora of Assembly 
resolutions passed at its annual sessions. It blamed the three 
Western permanent members for vetoing drafts aimed at introducing 
mandatory economic sanctions and called on the Council to respond 
to the "overwhelming demand of the international community" to 
impose mandatory sanctions in the "light of the serious threat to 
the peace" (180). 
In this respect they are little different from the special 
sessions which can be called by a majority of Members under 
Article 20 (181). 
(iii) Special Sessions 
Article 20 of the Charter provides that, 
"The General Assembly shall meet in regular 
annual sessions and in such special session as 
occasion may require. Special sessions shall 
be invoked by the Secretary General at the 
request of the Security Council or of a 
majority of the Members of the United 
Nations. " 
The procedure envisaged by the Charter for convoking a special 
session does not appear significantly different from that 
established under the Uniting for Peace resolution. The 
difference is that the resolution specifically grants the Assembly 
the power to recommend collective measures and establishes the 
machinery to enable it to carry out these measures. We have 
already seen that Article 10 in itself grants the power to the 
Assembly to recommend voluntary measures (182) so that whether in 
normal or special session it has the same powers as those 
purportedly granted by the Uniting for Peace resolution. 
Subsequent practice also has shown that the Assembly has the power 
to recommend voluntary measures (183), which means in effect that 
Article 20 and the Uniting for Peace resolution are conterminous 
- 
their only impact is to extend the Assembly's powers of 
consideration and recommendation beyond the annual regular session 
(isa). What seems to have confused the sponsors of the Uniting 
for Peace resolution is doubts over whether the Assembly could 
recommend enforcement measures. They failed to take account of 
the perfectly valid argument in favour of the Assembly having this 
power, a power it had already utilized in the Korean situation and 
to be recognized as legitimate by subsequent practice. The 
Uniting for Peace resolution thus remains an unnecessary monument 
to the era of Western domination. 
A comparison of Appendices 3 and 4 reveals that there is 
little difference (apart from the special sessions on disarmament) 
between the use of the emergency special session and the special 
session. The Eighth Emergency Special Session on Namibia 
discussed in the section above was a parallel of the Ninth Special 
Session which again produced nothing different from the annual 
Namibian debate (185). Both procedures are used by the majority 
in an attempt to assert the independence of the Assembly from the 
Security Council on matters relating to international peace. 
However, the resolutions produced reflect the Assembly's main 
jealousy 
- 
that neither under Article 20 nor under the Uniting for 
Peace resolution (as well as in its regular sessions) can it 
introduce mandatory, enforcement measures (186). 
5 Cases in which the General Assembly has acted within its own 
area of competence even though they also concern international 
peace and security 
It has been suggested above (187) that the expansive 
jurisdiction of the General Assembly can be explained partly by 
its desire to further and protect the right of self determination 
and the protection of human rights. These principles are 
enshrined in the Charter but no specific organ is entrusted with 
their protection. It is therefore natural that the Assembly 
- 
embodying the United Nations - should adopt itself as the defender 
of these principles. Often issues of self-determination and human 
rights involve questions of peace and security and thus we often 
have both the Security Council and the General Assembly involved 
(188). Strictly, on this analysis, the Assembly should 
concentrate on the self-determination aspect only, without 
considering the security situation, but, as shall be illustated 
below, this is often impossible in situations where the denial of 
self-determination is in itself seen as a "threat to the peace". 
Algeria 
The problem of the colonial situation in Algeria was never 
brought before the Security Council, although the Assembly passed 
a resolution (189) which found not only that the Algerian people 
had a "right to 
...... 
self determination and independence" but 
also that "the present situation in Algeria constitutes a threat 
to international peace and security". It can be argued that in 
internal situations a finding of a "threat to the peace" can only 
be based on a denial of self-determination or an abuse of human 
rights. Therefore in many cases both the Assembly and the Council 
have legitimate claims to competence, although as evidenced here, 
the Assembly is much more willing to find a threat to the peace in 
internal situations. 
(ii) Western Sahara 
A good illustation of the correct division of duties is found 
in the cases of the Falklands, the Comoros and Western Sahara. 
With regard to Western Sahara, before the conflict in 1975, the 
Assembly was solely concerned with the territory because it 
involved decolonization. In 1974 (190) it did consider "that the 
persistence of a colonial situation in Western Sahara jeopardizes 
stability and harmony in north-west Africa", but it was mainly 
concerned with obtaining an advisory opinion of the International 
Court as to the legal status of the territory so that it could 
make recommendations as to decolonization. 
When trouble erupted with the Green March, the Security 
Council became involved as the emphasis became one of restoring 
international peace (191), with the Assembly, at a later date, 
addressing the issue of self-determination (192). The General 
Assembly has since adopted annual resolutions on the subject 
(193). A recent resolution (194) reaffirmed that the "question of 
Western Sahara is a question of decolonization which remains to be 
completed on the basis of the exercise by the people of Western 
Sahara of their inalienable right to self-determination and 
independence". The question of self-determination is the 
Assembly's area, but to achieve this aim it must make 
recommendations in the area of securing international peace - in 
this case by calling for a cease-fire between Polisario and 
Morocco. Thus a confusion arises but if one concentrates on the 
main import of the resolution - the protection of the right to 
self-determination, it can be seen that we are in the Assembly's 
sphere of competence with the cease-fire being a necessary 
pre-condition to the establishment of self-determination. 
iii The Falklands 
The Assembly had adopted resolutions before the conflict in 
1982 relating to the decolonization of the islands (195). When 
the conflict arose the Security Council became solely concerned 
with the issue (196). Once the conflict was over the Assembly 
again returned to the question of decolonization while reminding 
the states involved of the principles of the non-use of force 
(197). 
(iv) The Comoros 
A rather less straightforward division of powers between the 
Council and the Assembly can be seen over the question of the 
continuing French colonization of the Comoran island of Mayotte. 
The problem was raised in the Council where France had to 
veto a draft resolution which would have criticized the holding of 
a referendum on the island by the French (198). The French 
ambassador scoffed at the idea that the situation was one which 
concerned international peace (199) and indeed it appeared to be a 
simple question of decolonization and self-determination better 
left to the General Assembly. Indeed, at its 31st session the 
Assembly adopted a resolution (200) which condemned the referendum 
and the French presence on the island. It urged France to enter 
into negotiations with the Comoran government. 
The problem has become one of ritual debate and resolution in 
the Assembly (201) and as with the situations below, once it 
becomes ritualized the Assembly seems to forget its jurisdictional 
competence and allows the resolution to stray into the realm of 
international peace. The 1985 resolution on the Comoros revealed 
this tendency, which arises out of frustration of its resolutions 
not being heeded, in that it was premised on the principle "that a 
speedy resolution of the problem is essential for the preservation 
of the peace and security of the region (202). 
Sy Southern Africa and the Middle East 
These situations have been grouped together for they are 
illustrative of how, in long running situations, the Assembly will 
stray from its true sphere of competence. This is usually due to 
a majority of Members equating a denial of self-determination with 
a threat to the peace. The General Assembly then sees it as its 
function as trying to bring the Security Council into line with 
this finding and urging it to take proper measures based thereon. 
These areas have been discussed above in the section on the 
pre-emption of the Council. This section is an alternative way of 
looking at the problem. The section on pre-judging can perhaps be 
seen as an example of how by ritualizing the topics the Assembly 
loses sight of its purpose - the protection of fundamental human 
rights and the right of self-determination - and concentrates on 
the question of peace based on its finding of a threat, which, 
generally speaking, should be dealt with by the Security Council. 
In the Southern Rhodesian situation the Assembly was 
primarily concerned with the implementation of the Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
(203) and not with problems of international peace and security as 
such (204). However, this culminated in the merging of the two 
areas in 1963 when the Assembly decided that the failure to accord 
"basic political rights" to the "vast majority of the African 
population" and the "entrenchment of the minority regime in power" 
created an "explosive situation" which constituted a "threat to 
international peace and security" (205). The equation of a denial 
of human rights and self-determination with a threat to the peace 
(206) shifted the emphasis towards the Council. One could argue 
that after the Council had made a similar finding (207) the 
Assembly should have left the situation to the Council. 
Nevertheless, the Assembly kept prejudging the work of the Council 
until the settlement of the situation in 1980. 
The situation on the Portuguese territories parallels that of 
Southern Rhodesia. For example in 1962, the Assembly found 
"........ that the continued refusal of 
Portugal to recognize the legitimate 
aspirations of the Angolan people to 
self-determination and independence 
constitutes a permanent source of 
international friction and threatens 
international peace and security. "(208) 
The Socialist and Non Aligned majority in the Assembly seem to 
favour the view that a denial of self-determination can constitute 
a threat to the peace. Thus the Assembly is often in disagreement 
with the Council where the Western vetoes deny such findings. The 
representative of Yugoslavia illustated the majority's beliefs, 
'........ that it is not the right of peoples 
to self-determination but the denial of that 
right by the colonial powers which is illegal 
and inconsistent with our Organization's 
principles. It should be remembered that it 
is not the aspiration of peoples to 
independence but the colonial powers' 
resistance to that aspiration which represents 
a serious threat to the peace. "(209) 
Thus with the Assembly and Council out of step the Assembly finds 
itself constantly urging the Council to align itself with the 
majority resulting in resolutions which pre-empt and pre-judge the 
work of the Council. 
Again in the case of South Africa, the Assembly began by 
concentrating on the denial of self-determination and of human 
rights. In 1952 the Assembly established a Commission of Three to 
examine the question of race conflict in South Africa (210). The 
Commission's report concluded that the racial policies of the 
government of South Africa were contrary to the Charter and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and that the continuance of 
these policies would endanger friendly relations among states 
(211). The Assembly established the basis of its examination of 
the South Africa problem in 1953 when it found that 
enduring peace will not be 
secured solely by collective arrangements 
against breaches of international peace, but 
that a genuine and lasting peace depends upon 
the observance of all the Purposes and 
Principles established in the Charter intended 
to achieve the maintenance of international 
peace and security, and especially upon 
respect for and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all.... "(212) 
This inevitably led the Assembly to find a threat to the peace 
(213) and then to urge the Council to step in line. The problem 
is that with Western states believing that there is no question of 
finding a threat to the peace based solely on a denial of human 
rights, there is bound to be antagonism between the Council and 
the Assembly. The Western states believe that findings of a 
threat to the peace must be made by the Council alone which 
suggests that there must be something more than a denial of human 
rights. The representative of the United Kingdom explained this 
view, 
"My delegation would like to confirm that we 
do not believe that the isolation of South 
Africa will bring about the fundamental change 
of view necessary for the peaceful solution of 
this problem; we do not consider that the 
General Assembly should attempt to determine 
the means by which the people of South Africa 
should determine their own future; and it 
clearly does not lie within the Assembly's 
responsibility to prescribe measures which 
fall within the sphere of competence of the 
Security Council. "(214) 
As long as the West takes this view the two organs will not be in 
accord. The Assembly will continue to attack the problem from the 
angle of a denial of human rights and self-determination, whereas 
a minority in the Council will continue to look for some sign of a 
danger to international peace arising from something more than the 
internal situation. What this decision blocking minority seem to 
forget is that the constant South African attacks against 
neighbouring states are sufficient manifestations of the threat to 
enable it to find a "threat to the peace", which would constitute 
a finding not based solely on the internal situation. 
As we have seen (215) the General Assembly's consideration of 
the Palestinian problem has been expanded into a consideration of 
the whole Middle Eastern problem which is essentially one of 
securing international peace. Nevertheless, the basis of the 
Assembly's involvement is centred around the self-determination of 
the Palestinian people. Its resolution of 1974 is a typical 
example containing an expression of deep concern 
"..... that no just solution to the problem 
of Palestine has yet been achieved and 
recognizing that the problem of Palestine 
continues to endanger international peace and 
security 
." 
Article 11(3) would tend to suggest that the Security Council 
should be called on to deal with the situation. However, the bulk 
of the resolution is concerned with a reaffirmation of the 
Palestinians' right to self-determination, independence and 
sovereignty and recognizes the "right of the Palestinian people to 
regain its rights by all means in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations" (216). 
The difficulty is that since the resolutions are 
pro-Palestinian and thus anti-Israeli, Israel's supporters on the 
Security Council are unlikely to take up the Assembly's 
resolutions. This leads the majority of the Assembly to adopt 
resolutions which increasingly impinge on the area of competence 
of the Security Council (217). 
6. Conclusion 
The above examination of the practice of the Assembly 
suggests that as a central basis for its involvement the Assembly 
focuses upon the question of self-determination and the abuse of 
human rights (area (v) above). It is from this base that it 
expands its competence into the realms of international security 
where it often antagonizes the Council and usurps its role (area 
(ii) and perhaps area (iv) above) rather than complementing it 
(area (iii) above) or paralleling it (area (i) above). The 
expansion of competence has led to Article 12 being reinterpreted 
so that in effect the Assembly purports to determine whether the 
Council is functioning or not, in the sense that it not only 
considers situations and conflicts with which the Council is 
dealing coterminously, but also in the sense that it is prepared 
to criticise the Council or to make determinations and to take 
measures (apart from mandatory ones) which the Council is not 
prepared to do. In other words, if the Council is not dealing 
with the situation to the Assembly's satisfaction, the Assembly 
believes that the Council is not "functioning" within the meaning 
of Article 12, so leaving the Assembly free to take steps. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE POWERS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN PRACTICE 
Due to the poor drafting of Articles 10 
- 
14 of the Charter 
it has been possible to argue (1) that the provisions can be 
interpreted to give the Assembly a wide range of recommendatory 
powers, equivalent to the Security Council's powers of 
recommendation under Chapters VI and VII. This chapter will 
contain an examination of how the practice of the Assembly has 
followed this path to such an extent that in certain areas of 
recommendation, for example on disarmament and on general 
principles of international peace, the General Assembly is 
undoubtedly the primary organ. Theoretically the Assembly's 
resolutions are non-mandatory (2), and in practice this remains so 
although in certain instances the language of the resolutions 
reflect the present day majority's desire that they should be 
binding. 
1. Disarmament 
Article 11(1) of the Charter states, 
"The General Assembly may consider the general 
principles of cooperation in the maintenance 
of international peace and security, including 
the principles governing disarmament and the 
regulation of armaments, and may make 
recommendations with regard to such principles 
to the Members or to the Security Council or 
both. " 
It is generally recognized that this is the basis of disarmament 
resolutions adopted by the General Assembly while resolutions 
concerning general principles come under Article 13(l)(a) (3). In 
fact the General Assembly has taken on the responsibilities of the 
United Nations as regards disarmament for the Security Council has 
abstained from exercising its competence as regards disarmament 
given it under Article 26. 
In practice the Assembly has elevated disarmament from the 
relatively low-key treatment given to it under the Charter, to it 
being one of the most important areas of U. N. work, 
"I1 a souvent ete dit que le desarmement 
revet moms d'importance dans la Charte que 
dans le pacte de la S. D. N. La redaction de 
l'article 11, paragraphe 1, oü le desarmement 
n'est envisage que comme 1'un des aspects du 
maintien de la paix et de la securite 
internationales en temoigne. Mais la pratique 
des Nations Unies a ete toute autre. Le 
desarmement est devenu une preoccupation 
majeure de l'Organisation autant que le 
developpement et davantage que le protection 
des droits de l'homme. " (4) 
The work on disarmament is not only done in the regular and 
special sessions of the Assembly (5), but also by bodies set up or 
brought under the auspices of the United Nations - for example the 
Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament (6). 
The Assembly has interpreted its powers under Article 11(1) 
widely to go beyond the recommendation of mere principles to 
resolutions establishing bodies to study the problem and to 
provide the machinery for the negotiation of disarmament (7). 
Indeed, it is remarkable that during forty years of superpower 
arms build-up the discussions and agreements on disarmament, 
either inside or outside the United Nations, have continued. To 
this extent the General Assembly has proved an effective organ, 
not for achieving disarmament but for maintaining a dialogue over 
levels and the regulation of armament. To this end, a major 
success was achieved during the period of detente in the 
1970's, resulting in the adoption in 1978 of a resolution at 
the Tenth Special Session by consensus. The resolution embodied 
the goals, principles, objectives and priorities for disarmament 
and new machinery for putting them into effect (8). 
The Committee on Disarmament which has been meeting in Geneva 
since 1962, having a membership of 31 states under the 
co-chairmanship of the Soviet Union and the United States, was 
brought under U. N. auspices by the 1978 resolution. The 
resolution opened the Committee up to all nuclear weapon states 
and 32-35 others to be chosen in consultation with the President 
of the General Assembly, with a personal representative of the 
Secretary General serving as Secretary to the Committee. It was 
also agreed to establish a Disarmament Commission made up of the 
entire U. N. membership to follow up the work of the special 
session, make recommendations on various disarmament problems, and 
consider the elements of a comprehensive disarmament programme. 
The resolution begins with a statement that "States for a 
long time (had) sought to maintain their security through 
possession of arms 
...... 
yet the accumulation of weapons today 
constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of 
mankind". "The time has come", it says, "to abandon the use of 
force in international relations and to seek security in 
disarmament 
..... 
through a gradual but effective process 
beginning with a reduction in the present level of armaments". 
The document expands on these principles by emphasizing the 
importance of refraining from threats against the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of any state or against peoples under a 
colonial or foreign domination (9). Non-intervention in internal 
affairs, the inviolability of frontiers, and the peaceful 
settlement of disputes are also stressed. From these premises, 
the resolution states that all nations have the right to 
participate in disarmament negotiations, that disarmament measures 
should be equitable and balanced to ensure security to each state, 
and that they should be accompanied by adequate verification. 
From general principles the resolution moves on to a more 
practical approach by establishing a programme of action which 
sets forth objectives and priorities, immediate and short-term 
measures to halt and reverse the arms race. Special importance is 
given to efforts to curb nuclear and other mass destruction 
weapons (10). Negotiations for the reduction of conventional arms 
and armed forces are also called 
for. Emphasizing the need to 
work towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, 
the 
programme favours such measures as an agreement on a comprehensive 
nuclear test ban, further Soviet-United 
States negotiations on 
strategic arms limitations and reductions, nuclear 
weapon free 
zones, and expanded non-proliferation agreements. Suggested as 
especially desirable measures are steps by the security Council to 
"prevent the frustration" of the objective of a denuclearized 
Africa, and consideration of steps to give effect to the proposal 
for a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East. Other 
provisions call for an expert study of the relationship between 
disarmament and development, and continuation of a study of the 
inter-relationship between disarmament and international security. 
The 1978 Special Session resolution has been analysed in some 
detail because it represents possibly the most important 
achievement of the United Nations as regards disarmament. Its 
adoption by consensus represented the crossing of ideological and 
political frontiers (11). It may appear, in some respects, naive 
- 
for example expressing the hope that the Security Council would 
become involved in disarmament. However, it must be remembered 
that the period of detente had raised hopes of a Council less 
divided by East-West ideology. Undoubtedly, the resolution put 
the U. N. at the centre of the disarmament stage. 
However, since 1978, the period of detente has ended and a 
new Cold War era has been entered upon (12), and "la diplomatie du 
disarmement est dominee par l'esprit de confrontation" (13). 
Hubert Thierry states that the Twelfth Special Session of the 
Assembly on disarmament in 1982 reported no progress since 1978 
(14) and no resolution was passed (15), the reason being "la 
divergence fondamentale quant au disarmement oppose 
1'URSS et les 
pays de lest rejoints le plus souvent par les pays non-alignes, 
aux puissances occidentales" (16). Again we see 
the schism in the 
Assembly which so often puts the Western states in the 
minority. However, away from the United Nations, the recent thaw 
in the Cold War has evidenced itself strongly in the form of a 
treaty to eliminate all intermediate range nuclear weapons (17). 
Nevertheless, from a promising base in 1978, the Assembly 
sponsored disarmament programme has faltered, and its Conference 
on Disarmament has become a place 'for rigid positions and 
oratorical exchanges (18). The Assembly adopts numerous 
disarmament resolutions at its annual sessions (19), but these are 
only adopted by a majority (usually non-nuclear states), are 
repetitive, and create no new initiatives (20). 
2. General Principles 
Article 13(l)(a) of the Charter allows the Assembly to 
initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of ".... 
promoting international cooperation in the political field and 
encouraging the progressive development of international law and 
its codification", while sub-paragraph (b) gives the same power, 
inter alia, "in the realisation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. " 
It is out of sub-paragraph (a) that the power to pass 
resolutions enunciating general principles has developed. 
Nevertheless, sub-paragraph (b) is significant in that the general 
principles generally represent a compromise between the human 
rights lobby (and more recently the national liberation or 
self-determination lobby) and those states who want to emphasize 
the (greater) importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
This aspect will be concentrated on for it is illustrative of the 
influence of the various factions of the General Assembly, an 
influence which tends to result in an unsatisfactory compromise. 
in 1949, a majority of states were still committed to the 
principle of the inviolability of the sovereignty of states which 
in 1945 was embodied in Article 2(4) of the Charter. The Draft 
Declaration on Rights and Duties of States was adopted unanimously 
in 1949 (21). It represented an affirmation and clarification of 
the sovereignty principle. It stated that every state has 
complete jurisdiction in its own territory; the right of 
independence including freedom to choose its own government; the 
duty not to intervene in another state or to forment civil strife 
therein; and the duty to treat all persons under its jurisdiction 
with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (22). 
Although the balance of the resolution is clearly in favour 
of affirming the doctrine of absolute sovereignty, there are 
suggestions that perhaps this concept is subject to the principle 
of self-determination (right to choose a government) and respect 
for human rights. In 1949, it was the United States and its 
allies who supported these nascent principles, even advocating 
that all the contents of the draft resolution embodied 
international law (23), reflecting the Western majority's 
criticism of the form of government and abuse of rights in Eastern 
Europe (24). The Eastern bloc doubted that the principles 
contained in the declaration embodied international law (25). 
However, by 1960 the tables had turned and it was the Soviet 
Union (26) and the newly independent countries (27) advocating 
firm anti-colonial and hence pro self-determination resolutions. 
The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples (28) recognized the "increasingly powerful 
trend towards freedom" in dependent territories and emphasized 
that colonialism was not only a denial of self-determination but 
also of fundamental human rights and therefore was contrary to the 
Charter. This represents a move away from the sovereignty 
principle at least in so far as metropolitan powers and their 
dominions were concerned. 
The resolution was adopted by 89 votes to nil. However, 9 
pro-Western states abstained (29), the United States abandoning 
their previous principled approach for more practical reasoning. 
The all or nothing approach (no stage between a colony and an 
independent state) of the resolution was criticized by the 
representative of the United States, 
"We must question the wisdom of espousing 
principles which would result in some cases in 
unnecessary political fragmentation and which 
would also fly in the face of political and 
economic realities in many areas of the 
world. " (30) 
The United States' preference for an approach based on economic 
realities has increasingly alienated it from the majority of 
Assembly Members who prefer a more abstact, principled approach. 
The impact of the decolonized majority became increasingly 
apparent in 1965 with the unanimous adoption of the Declaration on 
the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of 
States (31). Although compromise was necessary to achieve 
unanimity, the influence of the national liberation lobby eroded 
even further the by then mainly Western support for 
non-intervention and sovereignty, and to this extent correlates 
with the demise of Article 2(7). 
The resolution declares that no state has the right to 
intervene in the affairs of another. This includes indirect 
intervention which is defined as helping or financing subversive 
activities against a state. So far the Declaration entirely 
supports the Western view. However, the resolution then 
contradicts itself. After reaffirming the principles of 
self-determination and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, it states that "all States shall contribute to the 
complete elimination of racial discrimination and colonialism". 
This suggests that indirect intervention is permissible if it aids 
self-determination in colonial or racial situations. The Western 
states voted for the resolution on the understanding that the word 
"contribute" did not allow intervention in favour of 
self-determination (32). Inevitably, the Soviets favoured the 
view that it did and increased the Cold War rhetoric against the 
United States by accusing it of denying self-determination in 
Vietnam and the Dominican Republic (33), whereas the United States 
accused the Soviet Union of intervention in violation of the 
sovereignty of Vietnam (34). 
Similarly in 1970, the Declaration on Principles Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with 
the United Nations' Charter (35) represented a compromise. 
Indirect intervention was declared illegal but, at the same time, 
the declaration expressed the right of people to take "forcible 
action in pursuit of their right to self-determination" and that 
they were "entitled to seek and receive support in accordance with 
the purposes and principles of the Charter". "Support" for 
"forcible action" suggests that the "support" could be forcible as 
well. However, the reference to the Charter tends to suggest that 
it is support short of the use or threat of force, which after all 
would be contrary to Article 2(4), and as the representative of 
Australia pointed out a mere recommendatory Assembly resolution 
cannot amend the Charter (36). Most Western states explicitly 
granted their vote on the understanding that the Declaration did 
not diminish the principle of the non-use of force (37). The 
Socialist and Non Aligned nations did not express a view, probably 
in order not to invoke any negative Western votes, but it is 
interesting that they saw the Declaration as a crystallization of 
international law (38). 
In the Nicaragua Case, the International Court relied on the 
Declaration as evidence of opinio juris on the illegality of the 
United States' indirect armed intervention in Nicaragua (39). It 
also said that if clear evidence could be adduced to show that 
Nicaragua was supplying arms to the rebels in El Salvador this 
would be a breach of the principle of non-intervention, despite 
any claims that the rebels were fighting to achieve 
self-determination. The Court did not find sufficient evidence of 
this, but stated that even if there was adequate proof the supply 
of arms did not constitute an intervention amounting to an "armed 
attack" which would justify the United States' sponsored operation 
as self-defence. The United States' creation, training, and 
arming of the Contra rebels in Nicaragua, on the other hand, 
constituted a greater degree of intervention so as to amount to an 
indirect use of force (40). The Court was not convinced by 
ideological arguments of self-determination and so its judgement 
can be said to constitute a pro-Western interpretation of the 1970 
Declaration, despite the fact that on the substantive issues the 
Court found against the major Western power involved. 
The unhappy compromise between Western powers and the 
national liberation lobby was continued when the Assembly finally 
adopted by consensus the Definition of Aggression (41) which has 
been discussed elsewhere (42). The Definition purportedly 
outlawed indirect as well as direct aggression, but made this 
subject to the right of peoples struggling to achieve 
self-determination "to struggle to that end and to seek and 
receive support..... ". 
The power of the General Assembly to adopt resolutions on 
general principles has not led to "the progressive development of 
international law" in the area of the non-use of force. Instead, 
th principle contained in Article 2(4) has been seriously weakened 
by these recommendations which suggest that the principle is 
subject to the use of allowable force in the pursuit of the right 
to self-determination or national liberation. This represents a 
serious undermining of the fundamental provision of the Charter 
(43). The compromise necessary for the adoption of these 
resolutions has resulted in a confusing set of principles with 
which one superpower could argue that it is supporting national 
liberation while the other could justifiably accuse it of 
intervention. The modern war inevitably involves indirect force 
usually with the "substantial involvement" (44) of a superpower. 
Instead of adapting the principle on the non-use of force to cover 
this development, the Assembly has sown serious seeds of doubt on 
its applicability in certain situations involving indirect force 
(45). 
3. Cease-Fire and Withdrawal 
Whereas Assembly recommendations on disarmament and those 
enunciating general principles on the use of force are directly 
adopted under Articles 11(1) and 13(1) respectively; resolutions 
which call for a cease-fire, withdrawal, or for voluntary measures 
or recommend a settlement cannot be attributed to any particular 
Charter provision, but, instead, are concrete manifestations of 
the general powers of Articles 10,11(2) and 14. As has already 
been stated (46), Article 10 can be interpreted to give the 
Assembly similar recommendatory powers to those granted to the 
Council in Chapters VI and VII, subject to the limitation in 
Article 12. To a large extent the powers examined below are 
similar to those recommendatory powers employed by the Security 
Council. 
The Assembly makes relatively few cease-fire and withdrawal 
calls. The Security Council usually responds first and makes the 
necessary call. However, if the General Assembly is in its 
regular session it may be able to make the call more quickly than 
the Council 
- 
with speedier calls likely to have more impact the 
quicker the call the more effective it is likely to be. The 
Assembly has made such calls in the case of the Indonesian 
invasion of East Timor in 1975 (47) and in the case of the Turkish 
invasion of Cyprus in 1974 (48). 
If the Council is deadlocked by a conflict of interests of 
the permanent members, the General Assembly sometimes takes up the 
role of the organ making the preliminary call for a cease-fire and 
withdrawal. This is done either immediately, under the Uniting 
for Peace procedure, or the Assembly waits until its regular 
session. If done in emergency special session the call has 
greater immediacy than if the regular session is waited for. 
However, the Council is likely to be paralysed because of 
superpower involvement and so any cease-fire call is seen as a 
token gesture. In this respect it does not matter if the regular 
session is waited for. 
In the case of the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 
(49), the Assembly met in emergency special session and called for 
a cease-fire and a withdrawal of Soviet troops (50). The call was 
seen as a gesture by some Members (51) or more optimistically as a 
warning or holding measure to prevent further Soviet interventions 
(52) by others. In the case of the Vietnamese intervention in 
Kampuchea the Assembly waited 11 months before calling for a 
cease-fire (53). This wait could hardly justify some of the 
Members hailing the resolution as a valiant effort to save the 
"dying" Kampuchean people (54). Often the Assembly passes a 
resolution in order to save the Organization's face when the 
primary body is racked by arguments and vetoes. For example, the 
Assembly's resolution (55) calling for a cease-fire in the 
Bangladesh situation was seen as essential in rescuing the U. N. 
from its "darkest hour" (56). In terms of effectiveness, 
therefore, the Assembly call has not directly brought about an 
immediate cease-fire or withdrawal, instead it adds to the weight 
of opinion against belligerents which eventually may lead to a 
cease-fire and more importantly a withdrawal. 
In terms of withdrawal calls, the Assembly's most important 
ones were in the cases of Hungary, Bangladesh, Cyprus, East Timor, 
Kampuchea, Afghanistan and Grenada (57). In the cases of 
Bangladesh and Grenada, withdrawal was achieved only after the 
intervening forces had achieved their objectives. In the other 
cases occupation or domination by the intervening forces is still 
apparent today. 
4. Voluntary Measures 
The most radical interpretation of the Assembly's powers 
involves its use of voluntary measures. We have seen in the case 
of the Security Council that it can recommend military measures 
under Article 39, and has adopted the practice of suggesting 
economic measures under Article 41 (58). Both these 
recommendatory powers used by the Security Council were not 
envisaged by the drafters of the Charter and so represent an 
extension by subsequent practice. It has been argued that the 
General Assembly has similar recommendatory powers to the Council, 
and by extension, it has the power to recommend military action 
and to recommend voluntary sanctions. The former power has been 
expressly granted by the Uniting for Peace resolution, although it 
can be argued that the Assembly has had such powers from the time 
that the Security Council claimed similar powers (59). 
Nevertheless, the Assembly has very rarely used its power to 
recommend military action. The only clear instance, which 
occurred before the Uniting for Peace resolution was adopted, was 
in the case of Korea when the Assembly recommended a "unified, 
independent and democratic" Korea be established and that U. N. 
forces remain in Korea for that purpose (60). This impliedly 
authorized General MacArthur to cross the 38th parallel into North 
Korea. Paradoxically, although the Uniting for Peace resolution 
was adopted only a few days later there has been no further 
instance of the Assembly recommending coercive measures in the 
form of military action (61). 
Korea also involved one of the first instances of the 
Assembly recommending voluntary sanctions (62). These were not 
only directed against North Korea, but also Communist China which 
had entered the war when General MacArthur's forces threatened the 
Chinese border (63), and involved an embargo on military supplies 
and equipment (64). 
Since Korea the Assembly has, in practice, firmly established 
the power to recommend voluntary sanctions. However, in contrast 
with the Korean precedent such sanctions have mainly been adopted 
on the instigation and affirmative votes of the Non Aligned and 
Socialist majority. Voluntary sanctions have been called for in 
the cases of South Africa (65), the Portuguese territories (66), 
Southern Rhodesia (67), and Namibia (68). The Assembly's power to 
recommend voluntary measures has been confined, in practice, to 
colonial or racist situations (and then mainly in Africa), 
although by tying zionism to racism (69) it has been able to 
justify imposing or more correctly recommending voluntary measures 
against Israel (70). 
Calls for voluntary measures by the Assembly are unlikely to 
be effective. Blanket calls for economic measures against a 
country (71) rely solely on the Members to impose them for they 
are inherently difficult to supervise. Resolutions calling for 
more specific measures will not be observed by those Members 
voting against them, nor in many cases by those voting for them 
because of their non-mandatory nature. Thus as with withdrawal 
calls, voluntary measures are often gestures of support for or 
condemnation of a state. Also they are often used to try and 
force the Security Council to adopt similar, mandatory measures 
combined with effective enforcement machinery (72). 
Gestures of support or what could be termed positive measures 
sometimes take the form of encouragement for and calls of support 
for national liberation movements, for example, those in Southern 
Rhodesia before independence (73), those in South Africa (74), 
Namibia (75), and the Palestinian people (76). In effect, the 
Assembly has virtually legitimized the use of force by "freedom 
fighters" struggling for self-determination in colonial or 
neo-colonial situations. This is evident in some of the general 
principle resolutions examined above (77) as well as those adopted 
in specific situations. Although these fighters are regarded as 
criminals in the country in which they are fighting or rebelling, 
for the majority of the international community they are 
"legitimate" fighters (78). Roling has suggested that this 
development is partly due to the lack of collective enforcement 
machinery available to the U. N. to deal with such situations 
itself, resulting instead in moral support for those fighting for 
"justice". He states that the U. N. has developed the concept of 
"justice" to allow it to prevail, in certain situations involving 
the denial of human rights or self-determination, over the ban on 
force. 
5. Political settlement 
Political settlement of a dispute or problem requires some 
degree of consent or a (greater) degree of coercion of the parties 
to the dispute. Whereas the Council has the option of using 
mandatory coercion, the Assembly only has the powers of 
recommendation and therefore, in general (apart from the 
recommendation of measures), if it is to succeed it must try to 
attain some degree of cooperation from the parties. However, 
throughout its history the Assembly has shown a greater concern 
for votes than for concrete successes. The partition of Palestine 
is a good example of a case where the Assembly sought to impose a 
solution on the area and the parties through the inadequate means 
of a non-binding recommendation. Palestine was the subject of the 
First Special Session of the Assembly (79). The session was 
requested by the mandatory power - Britain, because it was 
dissatisfied with its position due to increasing antagonism 
between Jews and Arabs and the conflicting purposes of achieving a 
homeland for the Jews and independence for an Arab dominated 
Palestine. The session established a Special Committee on 
Palestine (80) which submitted a report to the 2nd Annual Session 
of the Assembly. The report of the majority recommended partition 
of Palestine as a means of reconciling the above conflicting 
principles, whereas the minority believed a federated state could 
achieve this (81). 
The Assembly established an ad hoc committee consisting of 
every Member to consider the report. The ad hoc committee did not 
use the report as a basis for negotiation between the parties, 
instead it supported the majority's proposals and recommended 
partition with economic union (82); a proposal which favoured the 
Jews and which was supported by both the Soviet Union and the 
United States (83). The solution recommended was an ideal one 
aimed at solving the problem of the mandate and the age old 
problem of a Jewish homeland all at one stroke (84). It was bound 
to fail because at no stage were the parties involved in the plan, 
a plan which was particularly unfavourable to one of the parties 
to the dispute 
- 
the Palestinians. 
Only the representative of Columbia questioned the 
recommendation for partition in any great detail. First he 
criticized the theory behind the majority report, 
"The legal competence of the General Assembly 
to set up two independent States in Palestine, 
without regard to the principle of 
self-determination has not been established to 
our satisfaction. " (85) 
He then proposed a resolution to improve the practical chances of 
the Assembly successfully helping to end the Palestinian problem 
(86), by authorizing the ad hoc committee to 
"..... take all steps necessary to try to bring 
about an agreement between the representatives 
of the Arab and Jewish populations of 
Palestine as to the future government and 
political constitution of that country. " (87) 
Instead the majority continued on its course which was bound to 
alienate one of the parties and its supporters - the Arabs 
represented by the Arab Higher Committee. The United States 
proposed that two sub-committees be set up - one to examine the 
majority report of the Special Committee and one to consider the 
minority report (88). States supporting the Jewish cause 
polarized around the first sub-committee while mainly Arab states 
were represented in the second sub-committee. The result was 
modified versions of both reports which were more extreme - for 
example, the minority report abandoned the federated state ideal 
and recommended independence for Palestine based on 
self-determination (89). The Assembly was, in effect, driving the 
two parties further apart. The ad hoc committee voted for the 
partition plan contained in the first sub-committee's report (90), 
and finally the Assembly adopted the partition plan (91). 
As Luard points out, 
"The U. N. Assembly, overruling the wishes of 
the majority of the people most concerned, had 
reached its decision on the future of 
Palestine. (92) 
The resolution took the form of a recommendation but was obviously 
based on the premise that the Council would enforce it if it was 
ignored. This too was unrealistic, but at the time, the relative 
impotence of the Council was not clear. 
Fighting between the two communities despite truce calls by 
the Council led to the Second Special Session of the Assembly one 
month before the end of the mandate. The idealistic approach of 
the First Session was replaced by disillusionment and the whole 
session was without effect. The Assembly failed to pass a 
resolution on the state of its rapidly disintegrating partition 
plan (93). The United States reversed its support for partition 
and suggested U. N. trusteeship (94). The Assembly did not take 
up this option. In effect, the Assembly abandoned Palestine to a 
military solution with the first Arab-Israeli war breaking out on 
the 14th May as the mandate ended. The Assembly was guilty of 
deciding the fate of Palestine by a majority of only vaguely 
interested states. It was concerned with voting victories rather 
than any practical attempt at reconciliation and negotiation 
between the parties mainly concerned (95). 
The modern Assembly is overwhelmingly pro-Palestinian in its 
approach to the Middle East crisis. Thus although the position as 
to the parties of the Assembly has altered, its basic approach has 
not changed. Its resolutions are pro-Arab and so are not 
conducive for encouraging Israel to negotiate. 
Security Council resolution 242 (96), designed to induce all 
the parties to negotiate, is a good example of how the 
requirements of compromise necessary in the Council produce a more 
balanced approach. The Assembly, however, imposes the will of the 
majority and in so doing has undermined the Council's work which 
necessarily has to accommodate the views of the minority 
pro-Israeli members. The Assembly has consistently adopted 
resolutions which while purportedly supporting Council resolution 
242, destroys its balance in a variety of ways (97). For example 
a recent Assembly resolution purports to lay down the guidelines 
for a proposed International Conference on the Middle East (98). 
The principles recommended as a basis for negotiation include the 
attainment of Palestinian self-determination, the participation of 
the P. L. O., the end of Israeli occupation of the Arab territories 
occupied in the 1967 war and finally a principle which echoes 
resolution 242 but adds a significant proviso, 
"The rights of all states in the region to 
existence within secure and internationally 
recognized boundaries with justice and 
security for all peoples the sine qua non of 
which is the recognition and attainment of the 
legitimate and inalienable rights of the 
Palestinian people. " 
This amounts to a virtual rewriting of resolution 242 in favour of 
the Arab cause and is certainly not likely to induce Israeli 
cooperation. The representative of Canada accurately summarized 
the West's objections to the resolution, 
"...... the nature of the Palestinian homeland 
and its relations with its neighbours should 
be decided through negotiations. We continue 
to oppose strongly attempts to prejudge the 
outcome of negotiations, whether by actions on 
the ground, such as Israeli settlements, or, 
on the other hand, by imbalanced resolutions 
in international forums..... " (99) 
To support this statement is not a pro-Western stance for it 
equally applies to earlier practice when the Western majority 
forced through unbalanced resolutions. One advantage of the 
constitution of the Security Council is that it does occasionally 
protect minority interests which are disregarded when the issue is 
raised before the General Assembly. 
Another example of the majority of the Assembly attempting to 
decide the fate of a country occurred at about the same time as 
the initial Assembly action on Palestine. Basically, the Assembly 
accepted the United States' proposal (100) for the settlement of 
the Korean problem in 1947. The Assembly recommended elections to 
be held by 31st March 1948 in the American and Soviet occupied 
zones under U. N. supervision to establish a single national 
assembly and a government (101). This was done despite Soviet 
objections that the basis of a solution to the Korean problem had 
been laid down in the Moscow Agreement (102). The Assembly had 
effectively ignored the Soviets, who, through the North Koreans, 
were hardly likely to agree to the Western inspired plan. The 
majority still seemed to believe in sweeping political change 
without negotiation or initial investigation (103). Without the 
consent of the Soviet Union and the North Korean authorities the 
plan was bound for failure. 
The case of South West Africa (Namibia) is slightly different 
in that South Africa had breached international law by continuing 
to administer the territory. Thus the U. N. was in a difficult 
position, for it would reflect badly on the Organization's 
prestige to negotiate with an illegal occupier of a trusteeship 
territory (104). In effect, the United Nations has become a party 
to a dispute with South Africa over Namibia. It will be 
illustrated below that the Assembly's attempts at achieving a 
solution in cases of colonial, neo-colonial or racist domination 
are often hampered by its vision of itself as the representative 
of colonial or repressed peoples, hence its one sided resolutions 
(105). 
In 1950 the International Court opined that South West Africa 
was still under a mandate which could only be modified by South 
Africa with the "consent" of the United Nations (106). The word 
"consent" is important here for it is not only required of the 
U. N. to achieve a solution but also by South Africa. Without 
South Africa's consent, and in the absence of effective mandatory 
measures by the Council, the problem of Namibia is unlikely to be 
resolved. However, as typical of a party to a dispute, the U. N. 
has ignored this fact, and has embarked on a unilateral approach 
to the problem by adopting resolutions on Namibia which although 
ideally and legally desirable are, nevertheless, unattainable. 
The Assembly has disavowed the mandate and has established the 
necessary machinery for U. N. administration with a view to the 
exercise of the right of self-determination by the Namibian people 
(107). Sympathies must lay with the United Nations for although 
it is acting in a partisan manner, it is after all a party with 
international law on its side. 
Other cases in which the Assembly adopts the position of the 
representative of peoples denied the right to self-determination 
include the Portuguese territories, Southern Rhodesia and South 
Africa itself. The denial of the right to self-determination is 
viewed by many writers to be contrary to international law (108) 
and has certainly been viewed as such by the majority of the 
Assembly for over two decades (109). However, although law is on 
its side, the majority of the Assembly, by acting as a protector 
of peoples without sufficient international personality to 
represent themselves, allows its vision to be clouded by its 
commitment to one side in the dispute - an attitude unlikely to 
result in settlement of the problem. It recommends that 
self-determination be achieved (110), or even demands that it be 
allowed (111), without establishing any reasonable basis for 
achieving this. The Assembly does not seem to realize that having 
justice on its side is insufficient to achieve a settlement. A 
judgemental approach is likely to succeed only in making the other 
party intransigent unless the Assembly can enlist the help of the 
Council to enforce the judgement of the international community. 
In other disputes, not involving colonial or racist 
domination, although still concerned with the denial of the right 
to self-determination, the Assembly adopts resolutions which have 
more objectivity about them and are more likely to result in the 
parties consenting to negotiation. Sometimes, however, this 
objectivity often results in weak resolutions simply because the 
majority of Members of the Assembly are not committed to finding a 
resolution to the dispute. A case in point is the Assembly's 
attempt at dealing with the dispute over Western Sahara. Although 
the Assembly had obtained an advisory opinion from the World Court 
favouring self-determination for the Western Saharans (112) (and 
so as in the cases of colonial and racist domination the Assembly 
had law on its side) the resultant Assembly resolution was 
reflective of the fact that the Non Aligned majority in the 
Assembly was unwilling to indict two of its Members as 
neo-colonialists (Morocco and Mauritania). It virtually granted 
recognition to the Tripartite Agreement concluded in Madrid on 14 
November 1975 between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania deciding the 
fate of the territory. The Assembly made a rather pathetic plea 
to the "interim administration" established by the Agreement, "to 
take all necessary steps to ensure that the Saharan populations 
originating in the Territory will be able to exercise their 
inalienable right of self-determination..... " (113). 
Nevertheless, the Assembly has shown greater signs of 
supporting the Polisario guerrillas against Morocco when in 1980 
it took account of the peace agreement between Polisario and 
Mauritania and urged Morocco to negotiate with Polisario. 
Morocco, however, had taken over the sector previously occupied by 
Mauritania (114). The resolution effectively recognized Polisario 
as a party to the dispute, in contrast to the above cases where 
the Assembly becomes the party representing the people. This 
belated approach to the problem is probably a good balance between 
too great a commitment to self-determination and too little. This 
is illustrated by the fact that the Assembly has legitimized the 
use of force in one neo-colonial situation to which it is over 
committed 
- 
Namibia, whereas in a case of lesser commitment 
(Western Sahara) no such extreme measures have been attempted. 
Ignoring for a moment the problem of self-determination, the 
Assembly does attempt to create a viable framework for the 
settlement of disputes in a few cases, and to this extent, often 
goes further than the Security Council. For example, in 1980, it 
passed a resolution on the Kampuchean problem (115) which called 
for an International Conference on Kampuchea and laid out the 
principles to be the basis of discussion - the negotiation of an 
agreement for Vietnamese withdrawal, observance of human rights, 
free elections and non-interference. It did not purport to 
isolate Vietnam; its purpose was to give it a way out (116). In 
the same vein, the Assembly expressed its unanimous support for 
the Central American Peace Plan agreed upon in Guatemala on August 
7,1987 (117). 
6. The Assembly's non-recommendatory powers 
One method of escaping the limitation upon the Assembly's 
powers embodied in Article 12 is to adopt a resolution which is 
not a recommendation (118). Articles 10-14 seem to create only 
recommendatory powers for the Assembly, but as we have seen (119), 
theoretically the Assembly can adopt non-recommendatory 
resolutions. However, there is no power to enable the Assembly to 
adopt mandatory resolutions, so, although the resolutions may 
"demand", "decide" or "declare", they are not mandatory decisions 
in the sense of Article 25 and Chapter VII. Besides, the 
resolutions are almost always mixed - in that they contain both 
recommendations and decisions, declarations, or condemnations. In 
this form they must come within the limitation contained in 
Article 12. 
The Assembly uses its declaratory or condemnatory power to 
strongly emphasize the United Nations' position as regards a 
particular dispute. In 1956, the Assembly declared "that by using 
its armed force against the Hungarian people, the Government of 
[the Soviet Union] is violating the political independence of 
Hungary" (120), as a follow up to the emergency special session on 
Hungary calling for withdrawal. The resolution also contained an 
"objective", "historical judgement" that the Soviet Union had 
breached Article 2(4) (121). In this respect the Assembly was 
acting like an international court in judging the Soviet Union 
guilty of a breach of the Charter. Although it has no power, like 
the International Court proper, to make a binding judgement, the 
verdict is important if the principle contained in Article 2(4) is 
not to be destroyed by constant breach. In 1986, the Assembly 
condemned the United States air raids on targets within Libya as 
"a violation of the Charter and of International Law" (122). Such 
resolutions offer evidence by way of state practice as to the 
status of Article 2(4) as a peremptory norm of international law. 
Although the Assembly's declaration is not binding under the 
Charter, the fact is that it is based on a jus cogens which is 
binding on all states without exception. In the case of South 
West Africa, the Assembly based its declaration that the 
"Government of South Africa cannot avoid its international 
obligations by unilateral action" (123) on the advisory opinion of 
the International Court (124). An advisory opinion is not 
binding; nevertheless, the Assembly's declaration has its basis in 
international law and so has considerable moral suasion (125). 
Similarly, its resolution declaring that South Africa's mandate 
over Namibia had been disavowed (126), although not technically 
binding (127), was given retroactive legal status by the World 
Court in 1971 (128). Although only an advisory opinion, the 1971 
judgement adds considerable weight to the Assembly's declaration. 
Although the Assembly's declarations are often based on legal 
concepts it could be argued that they are unlikely to aid a 
peaceful settlement of the dispute simply because they put one of 
the parties in the wrong and therefore make it unlikely that it 
will comply. The Assembly's declarations on South Africa are a 
case in point. In 1952 the Assembly declared, 
"...... that in a multi-racial society harmony 
and respect for human rights and freedoms and 
the peaceful development of a unified 
community are best assured when patterns of 
legislation and practice are directed towards 
ensuring equality before the law of all 
persons regardless of race, creed, or colour, 
and when economic, social and cultural and 
political participation of all racial groups 
is on the basis of equality. " (129) 
Even a pre-eminent Non Aligned state was compelled to abstain on 
the resolution because, 
"It expressed general sentiments which are 
fine and with which we are in complete 
agreement, but it does not adequately provide 
a solution for the problem with which the 
world is faced with today. " (130) 
Declaring that South Africa has breached the law of human rights 
is not going to gain that country's acquiescence in reform. Thus 
the Assembly is reduced to calling on the Council to adopt 
mandatory enforcement measures (131), for its resolutions are 
insufficient to induce settlement. Nevertheless, the Assembly has 
continued its course of declarations and condemnations of Pretoria 
(132). The aim is to reflect the feelings of the international 
community and to leave South Africa in "no doubt" as to these 
sentiments (133). However, without effective enforcement action 
to reinforce its calls, the Assembly can ill afford to antagonize 
the South Africans and to make them more intransigent. In the 
Southern Rhodesian situation the Assembly could afford to declare 
any attempt at independence based on minority rule (134) or any 
measures taken by the Smith regime (135) as illegal because the 
Council had adopted mandatory enforcement action. 
Often declaratory or condemnatory resolutions are reflective 
of the frustration of the Assembly at the U. N. 's inability to 
affect an outcome to a dispute or situation. In long running 
cases this is inevitable, with the declarations being increasingly 
directed against the minority (the West) who are believed by the 
majority to be blocking any successful move to resolve the 
dispute. In 1985, the Assembly declared "that all activities of 
foreign economic interests in Namibia are illegal under 
international law 
... 
" (136); also in 1985 it considered that 
strategic agreements between the United States and Israel, plus 
economic and military cooperation had encouraged Israel in its 
"aggression" and "expansion" (137). Such resolutions, although 
purportedly judgements of a legal nature, are no longer objective 
- 
they represent the majority laying down what it sees as the law 
to the minority (138). 
The use of the term "demands" often represents a hardening of 
the majority's attitude when a previous resolution has not been 
complied with. For example, after it had urged withdrawal of 
foreign troops from Cyprus in 1974 (139), the next year this 
became a "demand" (140) as the first call had not been complied 
with. This is representative of Assembly practice in general 
(141), and of its general frustration at not having true mandatory 
powers such as those possessed, but rarely used, by the Council. 
Assembly resolutions which "demand", "decide", "declare", or 
"condemn" may, if repeated, represent a considerable depth of 
international feeling, but they are not, nor do they purport to 
be, binding. 
7. Conclusion 
The various factions which, in loose coalitions, have formed 
the majority in the General Assembly over its period of existence 
have seized on the vague powers conferred by the Charter to create 
a substantial body of recommendatory powers. In doing so the 
Assembly has interpreted Articles 12 and 2(7), which represent the 
only clear theoretical limitations on the Assembly's power and 
competence, in such a way that they do not represent practical 
barriers to the Assembly making recommendations on matters which 
may be classified as either ones in respect of which the Council 
is functioning, or ones that may have been viewed as internal at 
some stage. 
However, the Assembly has not used these powers effectively, 
either to induce the interested parties to negotiate or to 
establish a framework which, at a later stage, might induce them 
to come to the negotiating table. The majority in control of the 
Assembly seems to fail to recognize the inherent weakness in 
recommendatory powers - that they cannot force a recalcitrant 
state to comply. It follows that the Assembly's calls for 
cease-fire, withdrawal or for voluntary measures are not concrete, 
but token attempts to resolve the situation (142). From this 
misperception of the import of Assembly resolutions there has 
arisen a desire on the part of some nations denied any degree of 
permanency on the Council that the Assembly should be able to make 
demands and decisions resulting in recent resolutions purporting 
to do this. These are merely paper, hortatory resolutions which 
cannot bind. Unlike the interpretation of Articles 2(7) and 12 
which has occurred consistently over forty years, a revision of 
the Charter to allow the Assembly to pass mandatory decisions 
would be of such a fundamental nature as to require either correct 
constitutional amendment, or more lengthy, consistent and 
overwhelming practice by the Members than has occurred to date. 
Its lack of mandatory powers and its failure to take account of 
minority views has meant that the Assembly has not become the 
"primary" organ in terms of international peace; its effectiveness 
would be improved if it ceased to act as if it were. This means 
adopting a more balanced approach to disputes. It should 
concentrate on the promotion of peaceful settlement rather than 
being concerned with voting victories. Nevertheless, one must not 
underestimate the value of the Assembly's fair and accurate 
condemnations of states in breach of international law as evidence 
of the majority of the world's support for the non-use of force 
and the promotion of peaceful settlement. 
The recent trend in the Assembly by the Non Aligned to use 
its majority to isolate states not conforming to its views is only 
partly to blame for the ineffectiveness of the Assembly in 
maintaining international peace and security. Throughout the 
forty years of its life the Assembly, or more correctly the 
majority, has been more concerned with voting victories for 
political purposes sometimes entirely divorced from the subject of 
the vote - mainly to embarrass, isolate or simply to criticize 
Members deemed to be in opposition blocs or groups - than with any 
concrete attempt at creating viable conditions in which a solution 
could be achieved (143). 
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PART 3: PEACEKEEPING. 
Introduction 
The development of a peacekeeping function is probably the 
most significant achievement of the United Nations in its attempt 
to maintain international' peace and security. To the layman 
peacekeeping is a concrete manifestation of the United Nations 
which offsets the common view that the Organization only produces 
rhetoric and ideologically motivated resolutions. To the 
political scientist peacekeeping probably represents the most 
concerted effort the international community makes in regulating 
conflict. Other peaceful mechanisms are generally unsuccessful as 
Weisman explains, 
"The tension and struggle between the forces 
for change and the forces for the maintenance 
of the status quo are constant and dynamic 
features of the international system. This 
struggle is manifested in the frequent 
occurrence of ferocious and intractable 
conflict. By contrast, but by no means as 
persistent and powerful as the systemmatic 
propensity to conflict, are the creation and 
utilization of international structures, 
instruments, and procedures for the 
containment and resolution of these conflicts 
by political means. The attempts to 
superimpose peaceful regulatory systems upon 
the disordered world are extremely hazardous 
and difficult. The national political 
propensities to make war are far more powerful 
than the international processes to make 
peace. Nonetheless, the will, determination 
and imagination of peoples and states persist 
in the quest to make order out of chaos and 
prescribe peaceful measures for progressive 
social change. " (1) 
Peacekeeping is such a "peaceful regulatory system". Its success 
lies in the fact that it usually only has limited objectives, for 
example, in separating two protagonists. Other "peaceful 
measures", such as resolving the conflict by negotiation, are not 
as successful for they involve far more ambitious objectives. The 
firm division between peacekeeping and peacemaking will be 
examined later. 
To the international lawyer peacekeeping represents an 
intriguing puzzle, raising in particular such questions as the 
constitutional basis for such operations; whether nations hosting 
peacekeeping operations are surrendering their sovereignty; 
whether such forces can use force beyond that required for 
self-defence; and which political organ of the United Nations can 
authorize such forces? Consistent answers to such questions have 
proved difficult to arrive at given the "ad hoc" creation of such 
forces resulting in various mandates and sizes of forces. In this 
respect peacekeeping reflects the crisis management nature of most 
of the organization's work concerning international peace and 
security. Despite the establishment, in 1965, by the General 
Assembly, of a Special Committee on Peacekeeping to try to 
formulate a more institutionalized basis for peacekeeping (2), 
forces are only envisaged, created and assembled after a conflict 
has started, and then only if there is sufficient political 
consensus in the Security Council or the General Assembly. 
Nevertheless, the United Nations has created fourteen 
peacekeeper or observer forces (3) so that it has now sufficient 
cumulative experience to gauge the requirements of a particular 
situation and create a force relatively quickly if so requested 
both by the parties and agreed upon by the relevant political 
organ of the United Nations. Despite the creation of peacekeeping 
forces outside the United Nations, the Organization's efforts 
still represent the most important in this field (4). 
Chronological list of United Nations Peacekeeping operations 
1. UN Observers in Indonesia 1947-1950. 
2. UN Sub Commission on the Balkans (UNSCOB) 1947-1954. 
3. UN Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) 
1949-present. 
4. UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) 
1949-present. 
5. UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) 1956-1967. 
6. UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) 1958. 
7. UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 1960-1964. 
8. UN Observers and Security Force in West Irian (UNSF) 1962-1963. 
9. UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) 1963-1964. 
10. UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 1964-present. 
11. UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) 1965-1966. 
12. UN Emergency Force (UNEF II) 1973-1979. 
13. UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) 1974-present. 
14. UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 1978-present. 
Franck gives a relatively narrow definition of peacekeeping, 
"........ the peaceful interpositioning of UN 
personnel, in response to an invitation of the 
disputants, to oversee an agreed 
cease-fire. "(5) 
Such a definition is applicable only to inter-state peacekeeping - 
where a force is placed between two formerly hostile states which 
have agreed a cease-fire; whereas the United Nations has also 
undertaken intra-state peacekeeping, for example in the Congo, 
where a force is placed within one factionalised state. Franck's 
definition also ignores the technique of observation from which 
inter and intra state peacekeeping evolved. Observation has the 
limited function of reporting on the state of hostilities whereas 
peacekeeping has the more intrusive function of separating the 
parties to the cease-fire without the force generally having the 
power to enforce the peace. However, the divisions between 
observation, peacekeeping and enforcement action 
are unclear, 
there are grey areas in which one function merges into another. 
Wiseman has analysed United Nations peacekeeping historically 
(6). He labels the period 1946-1956 as the "nascent period" of 
peacekeeping with the creation of four observation teams which are 
the "generic antecedents" of full peacekeeping forces which 
emerged in 1956 with the creation of UNEF I. This represented the 
beginning of what Wiseman calls the "assertive period" which ended 
in 1967 with the withdrawal of UNEF I. During this period eight 
peacekeeping (including observation) forces were created. The 
withdrawal of UNEF I in 1967 with the ensuing Six Day War called 
into the question the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping 
so that between 1967 and 1973 it went through a "dormant period" 
when no forces were created. Paradoxically, it took another 
conflict in the Middle East - the Yom Kippur War in 1973 
- 
to 
spark off a "resurgent period" in which three full peacekeeping 
forces were created, along with the machinery for the 
establishment of a force in Namibia for when (and if) the South 
Africans withdraw. Interestingly, UNTAG 
- 
the United Nations 
Transition Group for Namibia (7) 
- 
represents the only attempt by 
the united Nations to authorize and mandate a force before a 
crisis has occurred - in this case the crisis that will ensue when 
South Africa leaves Namibia, akin perhaps to the Belgian 
withdrawal from the Congo in 1960. As such it represents a 
limited move away from the traditional method of crisis management 
and perhaps augurs a future of more preventative measures. 
Nevertheless, UNTAG was still created on an "ad hoc" basis. 
The following analysis will be divided into three chapters 
which, in turn, are basically sub-divided into observation and 
peacekeeping. Chapter 7 will entail an analysis of the background 
to the creation of each force in order to put peacekeeping into a 
geopolitical context by looking at the question whether 
peacekeeping is limited to the "intermediate areas" of the world 
beyond the hemispheric or bloc influences of the superpowers. 
Chapter 8 will examine the constitutional basis of such forces. 
Unlike many works on peacekeeping such as Higgins' (8) and 
Bowett's (9), the present study will examine the constitutional 
basis not only by reference to the enabling resolutions, but also 
by taking into account the functions and mandate of each force. 
The above writers tend to keep the questions of constitutional 
base, functions, mandate, and the problem of host state consent, 
separate, whereas this writer considers that they are too 
inter-related for this type of treatment 
- 
the mandate of the 
force must correlate to the constitutional base, and the functions 
of the force must equate to the mandate. If there was no host 
state consent then the force might be arguably one of enforcement. 
Chapter 9 will consider the question of the effectiveness of 
peacekeeping which will not only involve an analysis of whether 
each force was successful in fulfilling its mandate, but also the 
wider question of whether peacekeeping performs a valuable role in 
the overall maintenance of international peace and security by the 
United Nations. 
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CHAPTER 7 
A GEOPOLITICAL EXAMINATION OF PEACEKEEPING BY THE UNITED NATIONS 
The main purpose of this chapter is to give a brief review of 
the creation of each force to try and analyse the historical and 
political circumstances under which they arose and to attempt to 
indicate in what circumstances peacekeeping forces are likely to 
be established. It may be that the circumstances are different 
for observation teams compared to peacekeeping forces. 
1. United Nations Observation Teams 
The observation teams created in the nascent period 
(1946-1956) all arose through the change that occurred in the 
international order following the Second World War. The first 
force to be created was the UN Observation team in Indonesia in 
1947 when a conflict arose involving the Dutch colonialists' 
attempt to maintain the old order against a rising tide of 
nationalism in Indonesia. The Security Council, with no direct 
permanent member involvement once the British withdrew their 
wartime forces, and with no member willing to stand in the way of 
decolonization in this case, was able to authorize UN observers. 
The need for such observers was apparent from the confused state 
of affairs in Indonesia with various cease-fire lines, sporadic 
fighting and changing areas under the control of each side (1). 
Observers were needed to report the various stages achieved, with 
the help of quite vigorous Security Council resolutions, towards 
Indonesian independence. 
Decolonization was also the main cause of the conflict 
between the newly independent states of India and Pakistan over 
the disputed Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir which led to the 
Security Council establishing uNmoGIP in 1949 (2). As with 
Indonesia, this again was a "soft area" of the world where none of 
the permanent members, particularly the superpowers, had 
sufficient interest in either side to protect them by the veto 
(3). As with all peacekeeping forces, UNMOGIP depended upon the 
cooperation of both parties. Thus such forces are not usually 
created and emplaced until the fighting has come to an end and the 
belligerents are willing to accept a cease-fire. However, 
observation teams are not meant as buffer forces - they only 
observe the cease-fire and they are not usually large enough nor 
are they mandated to make the cease-fire effective as are 
peacekeeping forces proper. Thus UNMOGIP observed throughout the 
outbreak of hostilities in 1965 and was present to observe the new 
cease-fire. In 1965, the fighting between India and Pakistan was 
on a wider front than in 1947 necessitating the emplacement of 
another team, for a limited period, beyond UNMOGIP's patrol. 
UNIPOM was in place from 1965-6 again under a Security Council 
mandate, illustrating that this area of the world was not 
considered part of a power bloc. UNIPOM was removed after a 
limited period but UNMOGIP remains because its area of patrol - 
Kashmir 
- 
continues to constitute a potential flashpoint where the 
United Nations needs a continuing presence (4). 
Along with UNMOGIP another observation team 
- 
UNTSO created 
under Security Council auspices in 1949 - has lasted for nearly 
forty years in an even more troubled area of the world. Unlike 
UNEF which was emplaced between Israel and Egypt for eleven years 
between 1956-1967 and for a further six years between 1973-1979, 
UNTSO has observed various cease-fires, truces and armistices 
between belligerents in the Middle East. The peculiar fact is 
that there is no Security Council resolution directly authorizing 
UNTSO, nor, as with UNMOGIP, is there any periodic renewal of its 
mandate. It has a loose mandate which is best described as 
observing and reporting to the United Nations on the situation in 
the Middle East (5). Its longevity is probably a testimony to the 
fact that the Security Council, particularly the superpowers, need 
to keep in constant touch with the situation in an area where both 
the United States and the Soviet Union have interests, but in 
which neither is paramount, and UNTSO provides them with valuable, 
neutral information. UNTSO thus acts to some extent as an 
effective brake on the possibility of escalation based on a hasty, 
one-sided account of a conflict. During the period of UNEF'S 
interpositioning, UNTSO observers worked alongside the 
peacekeeping force; however, unlike UNEF, UNTSO observers were 
used after the Six Day War, as it was a political necessity for 
the United Nations to maintain some presence (6). 
Observation is sufficiently flexible to be used equally 
successfully in intra-state conflicts such as Indonesia as well as 
in inter-state conflicts as found in the Middle-East and between 
India and Pakistan. It can also be of value where there is a 
combination of the two situations evidenced by UNOGIL in the 
Lebanon in 1958 and by UNYOM in the Yemen in 1963. In both cases 
there arose the problem of outside military interference in a 
civil war. The countries involved, either directly or indirectly, 
were again situated in the intermediate areas of the world beyond 
the direct hemispheric influences of the superpowers, and of any 
of the other permanent members, thus allowing the Security Council 
to mandate both forces. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
Middle-East was subject to superpower claims was evidenced by the 
United States' intervention in Lebanon despite UNOGIL's report 
that the country was not being undermined by the United Arab 
Republic (7). 
However, when the conflict in question is nearer both 
politically and geographically to the superpowers to amount to an 
East-West power struggle, there is less likelihood of an 
observation team being sent to the area by the Security Council. 
After the Second World War the world order changed dramatically to 
an East-West divide based on ideology and nowhere was this best 
evidenced than in the Balkans where the pro-Western Greek 
government alleged military support for the communist insurgents 
from the surrounding communist countries of Bulgaria, Albania and 
Yugoslavia. Although the Security Council was able to create a 
Commission of Investigation, it was left to the General Assembly, 
in 1947, to create a Sub-Committee which had observation 
functions. The Soviets objected to this. This situation is 
unlikely to happen again for it was then only possible in the 
initial period of Western domination in the decade following the 
establishment of the United Nations (8). During this period the 
Organization was used by the Western majority in the Cold War 
against the Soviet bloc. UNSCOB's effectiveness was limited 
because of its Cold War environment evidenced by the refusal of 
the Socialist states to allow it on their territory (9). 
Sometimes the United Nations has found it necessary to create 
a force which combines observation with other duties due to the 
circumstances of the situation. Although the main Indonesian 
question had been settled earlier, there were still disputes over 
several islands in the Indonesian archipelago. One such island 
was Irian where guerrilla warfare was being carried out by 
Indonesians parachuted into the jungle and Dutch armed forces in 
the western part of the island. The Netherlands and Indonesia 
came to an agreement on the 15 August 1962 (10) which provided for 
the administration of West Irian to be transferred by the 
Netherlands to a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority 
(UNTEA) pending a transfer of the territory to Indonesia. A 
United Nations Observer and Security Force (UNSF) was to observe 
the cease-fire which was to take place before authority was 
tranferred to UNTEA, and then to police the island until the 
transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia (11). 
Thus the force was really created by the parties although it 
required the approval of the General Assembly - as the body which 
deals with questions of self-determination - rather than the 
Security Council (12). Surprisingly, taking into account the 
large role given to the Secretary General in the control of UNTEA 
and UNSF, the Soviets voted for the creation of these bodies. At 
the time the continuing Congo question had brought Soviet 
objections as regards the amount of control the Secretary General 
had over ONUC and of the ability of the General Assembly to 
mandate such a force in the absence of Security Council consensus. 
Nevertheless, the Soviets were willing to vote in the Assembly for 
the creation of a force and an authority whose control amounted to 
virtual temporary sovereignty over the island. 
The reasons for the Soviets' support are twofold. Again the 
crisis was relatively minor and did not involve questions of 
superpower influence - except to the extent of the Soviets' uneasy 
courtship with the Non Aligned of which Indonesia was a member. 
Also, the Soviet assent was due to the agreement of the parties 
which virtually created the United Nations force. 
Indeed, all observer teams and peacekeeping forces depend on 
the cooperation of the parties; some arise directly from an 
agreement between the parties which the Security Council (or more 
rarely the Assembly - if the agreement calls for it) has the 
option of rubber-stamping (13). Under the Armistice Agreement of 
1949 between Israel on the one hand and Egypt, Syria, Jordan and 
Lebanon on the other (14), UNTSO was given specific duties; UNYOM 
directly arose out of an agreement between Yemen, Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Republic negotiated by Secretary General U Thant 
(15); UNMOGIP was a direct creation of the Karachi Agreement 
between India and Pakistan (16) with which the Security Council 
had very little involvement; the Agreement on Disengagement 
between Syria and Israel called for the establishment of UNDOF 
(17). Other forces are either requested by the states involved 
such as ONUC or UNFICYP, or are consented to by the parties on the 
initiative of the United Nations - for example UNEF. To say that 
only in the latter case does the initiative for the creation of a 
force come from the United Nations would be an exaggeration 
ignoring the often significant contribution of the Secretary 
General. Nevertheless, Franck's comments are essentially correct, 
"To say that the Security Council established 
most of these peacekeeping forces may be to 
give the Council more credit than the facts 
quite sustain. More accurately, the Council 
has taken the leading role in authorizing the 
establishment of peacekeeping forces. The 
forces function in accordance with agreements 
between the parties to the dispute usually 
worked out with the active help of one or both 
superpowers and, sometimes, of the Secretary 
General. " 
He states that only UNFICYP was wholly created both behind the 
scenes at the United Nations and in the Security Council (18). 
2. United Nations Peacekeeping Forces 
Observation, supervision, and enforcement are the three 
possible stages of United Nations' military involvement in a 
conflict. The first two are peacekeeping functions - observation 
has already been discussed, but it must be remembered that there 
is often a thin line between observation and full peacekeeping as 
evidenced by the mandate and functions of UNSF in West Irian. 
Similarly, there is a grey area between peacekeeping and 
enforcement action highlighted by the actions of ONUC in the 
Congo. The nuances between the mandates of the various forces 
will be discussed in chapter 8. 
For the purposes of this section peacekeeping involves not 
only observation of the cease-fire but also supervision which on 
most occasions of inter-state conflict entails the creation of a 
buffer zone. Thus a peacekeeping force acts as a buffer between 
the two belligerents -a function too large for, and requiring a 
different mandate than for, observation teams. Peacekeeping 
evolved from observation so as to give the United Nations a more 
active role after the cessation of hostilities. UNEF I was the 
first "dramatically innovative venture" (19) into peacekeeping 
proper. It was created in 1956 by the General Assembly after a 
joint Anglo/French/Israeli plan to prevent, inter alia, Egyptian 
nationalization of the Suez Canal. Permanent member involvement 
prevented the creation of such a force in the Security Council, so 
the question passed to the General Assembly where UNEF I was 
created with the substantial aid of the Secretary General. 
It might be argued that the above procedure could be 
successfully utilized in other cases of permanent member 
involvement so as to create peacekeeping forces in the Assembly 
when such efforts have been vetoed in the Security Council. There 
are two factors which prevent such a course being chosen more 
often. First, even though the United Kingdom and France vetoed 
any attempts to pacify the situation in the Council they only 
abstained (along with the Soviet bloc) on the Assembly resolution 
creating UNEF I, and, in fact, they eventually consented to the 
placement of the Force. Thus, the Assembly could, theoretically, 
create peacekeeping forces in cases of permanent member 
intervention, when the Council is blocked by the veto, but 
political reality prevents such a course without the consent of 
all the parties concerned. In the Suez case, the two permanent 
members involved had reached a stage where to continue would have 
brought them under unbearable international pressure, while to 
withdraw would have been too costly politically; the peacekeeping 
force was thus consented to for it maintained the status quo 
achieved so far. To this end it also met the requirements of the 
other two parties; Egypt because it was being heavily defeated and 
Israel because it had gained a considerable amount of territory. 
The circumstances were ripe for a United Nations peacekeeping 
force to fill the vacuum (20). 
A second factor which would probably prevent the creation of 
such a force by the Assembly instead of the Council is the 
increasing agreement among the permanent members, particularly the 
superpowers, that such forces should only be created by the 
Security Council. Originally, the French and Soviets took this 
line as regards UNEF I and ONUC leading to their challenge of 
being assessed for financial contribution in the Expenses Case 
(21). However, there is also evidence that the United States and 
the United Kingdom have adopted this line from 1960 onwards. Evan 
Luard has accurately summarized the reasons for this, 
"First, the outright opposition of the Soviet 
Union and France to the use previously made of 
the Assembly, their refusal to contribute to 
the costs of peacekeeping operations the 
Assembly had authorized, and the prolonged 
financial crisis which resulted from this 
constitutional difference in view, all served 
to induce some caution among other major 
powers in mobilizing the Assembly. Secondly, 
the increasing size of the Assembly, as well 
as the change in its composition (in which 
Afro-Asian Members came to hold more than 
two-thirds of the votes) meant that it came to 
be thought a less suitable instrument for use 
in such situations, by the US as much as by 
the Soviet Union. Thirdly, the far less use 
of the Soviet veto in the Council reduced the 
need for an alternative agency. Finally, the 
desire of the other permanent members to 
retain the special influence which they held 
in the Security Council also encouraged the 
restoration of the Council's supremacy in 
security questions. " (22) 
Communist China has sometimes objected to peacekeeping as a 
creation of the superpowers, at other times its supports the 
creation of a force by the Security Council depending on the 
circumstances of the case (23). 
The Middle East has been the area in which peacekeeping, 
whether by the United Nations or by other agencies, has been most 
utilized. UNEF I was withdrawn in 1967. UNEF II, authorized by 
the Security Council, was emplaced between Egypt and Israel 
following the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The danger of superpower 
intervention as well as the consent of the combatants were direct 
factors leading to its creation. UNEF II was not only a buffer 
between the two parties, it was also an indirect buffer between 
the superpowers backing Israel and Egypt. When Egypt changed its 
allegiance to become more pro-Western, the United States was able 
to sponsor negotiations between the Israelis and the Egyptians 
leading to the Camp David Accords. Although the Peace Agreement 
between Israel and Egypt provided for a continued United Nations 
peacekeeping presence, the Egyptian defection had practically 
destroyed the superpower accord behind UNEF II, and so the Force 
was discontinued in 1979 to be replaced by a United States' 
sponsored multinational force (24). However, superpower agreement 
still continued as regards UNDOF created in 1974 as a buffer on 
the Israeli-Syrian front, as each party remains fairly firmly 
placed in the Western and Eastern camps repectively (25). 
Middle Eastern peacekeeping forces have the regional function 
of separating two or more belligerents but they have wider 
functions than the maintenance of stable Arab-Israeli relations 
- 
they are placed so as to add an extra check on the possibility of 
escalation in an area where although both superpowers have clients 
neither has regional dominance, and neither, at this moment, feels 
capable of attaining supremacy. Similarly, UNIFIL was created in 
1978 not only to secure Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, but also 
to perform the unstated, global function of separating American 
backed Israel and Soviet supported Syria from engaging in conflict 
using Lebanon as a battleground, which might suck in one or both 
superpowers (26). When creating such a force the Security Council 
only lists the local functions of the force as regards the two 
belligerents, nevertheless, peacekeeping has played and continues 
to play a much more global function in the Middle East. 
Similarly, ONUC was created in an atmosphere of potential 
superpower intervention after the Belgians withdrew from the Congo 
in 1960 (27). Indeed, it was a Soviet charge of ONUC leaning 
towards the pro-Western factions in the Congo which led to the 
Soviet Union's veto of any continuing Security Council control 
over the force which in turn led to the General Assembly having 
control of the operation for a while. However, ONUC managed to 
tread the neutral tightrope sufficiently to preclude any overt 
superpower intervention. The members of the Security Council, 
particularly the superpowers, originally probably authorized the 
operation because the Congo represented an area in which both 
superpowers would have liked to have a base, but neither was 
willing to disturb the global status quo by intervening. Thus to 
concretize this mutual non-intervention, and to assuage each 
superpower's fear of the other intervening, the United Nations was 
called to fill the vacuum. 
ONUC's operation probably represented the only attempt by the 
United Nations to modify peacekeeping to suit a case of 
intra-state conflict. In later sections it will be argued that 
civil war situations require a different type of peacekeeping 
mandate than that required for peacekeeping forces in inter-state 
conflicts. Nevertheless, in global terms ONUC was fulfilling 
similar functions to inter-state forces 
- 
the prevention of 
escalation. 
One could argue that UNIFIL in Lebanon and UNFICYP in Cyprus 
are further examples of United Nations peacekeeping operations 
being authorized in intra-state conflicts. However, it is perhaps 
more realistic to view these two forces as a hybrid between antra 
and inter-state peacekeeping forces. UNIFIL was created after 
Israel intervened in 1978 and has acted to a certain extent as a 
buffer between two factions 
- 
pro-Israeli and anti-Israeli. 
Nevertheless each faction is in itself so fragmented that the 
situation has become one of civil war (28). Nevertheless, 
UNIFIL's main function still remains to supervise Israeli 
withdrawal, rather than to prevent a civil war which was one of 
ONUC's main tasks. 
UNFICYP was created in 1964 after fighting had broken out 
between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities on the island. 
It was thus a civil war situation akin to that in the Congo, 
except with fewer parties. Indeed, the fact that there were only 
two parties enabled UNFICYP to function similarly to an 
inter-state peacekeeping force, by separating the two communities. 
This function became particularly evident after the Turkish 
invasion and occupation of the northern third of Cyprus in 1974. 
UNFICYP evolved into a true buffer force between two belligerents 
after this date (29). 
UNFICYP probably constitutes one of the only peacekeeping 
forces in a situation were there is no real danger of superpower 
intervention, although the danger of escalation does exist on a 
regional level between Greece and Turkey. Although the Soviet 
Union originally abstained on the resolution establishing UNFICYP, 
it has recently voted in favour of the extension of its mandate. 
This indicates the Soviets' willingness to allow the Security 
Council to create forces in areas of low-level superpower 
interest. In addition, the fact that both Greece and Turkey are 
both NATO members, albeit relatively minor ones, possibly 
encouraged Soviet approval of UNFICYP because the maintenance of 
the status quo on Cyprus concentrates two members of NATO on a 
regional dispute rather than on the "common enemy". 
It will become apparent from the following two chapters that 
inter-state peacekeeping operations are easier to mandate and 
carry out than are the intra-state variety. This factor must be 
taken into account in assessing the areas of the world in which 
United Nations peacekeeping operations are likely to be 
authorized. 
3. Conclusions 
From the above brief historical and geopolitical survey of 
the peacekeeping and observation forces authorised by the United 
Nations, it is possible to glean some guidelines as to the 
circumstances in which the emplacement of a peacekeeping force is 
possible. 
Generally, the guidelines are the same for both peacekeeping 
forces and observation teams. Observation teams, however, with 
their more limited size and functions, are likelier to be used in 
areas where larger peacekeeping forces are not. This could mean 
areas peripheral to the power blocs. UNSCOB is a relatively poor 
example; but it only takes a little imagination to foresee United 
Nations observer teams reporting on Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan (30) or Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea (31). 
Generally, peacekeeping only occurs when all the parties 
directly involved in the hostilities would rather maintain the 
status quo than risk further conflict and possible losses. In 
addition, any permanent members of the Security Council either 
directly involved, such as France and the United Kingdom in the 
Suez Crisis, or indirectly involved, such as the United States 
before its intervention in the Lebanon in 1958, must also want to 
stop hostilities in order to maintain the status quo. 
Such limitations generally mean that where one superpower is 
dominant in an area it will not give its consent to a United 
Nations peacekeeping force. Thus in the power blocs or in the 
hemispheres dominated by the superpowers there has been no 
instance of a United Nations peacekeeping force. Where the 
conflict is intra-bloc or intra-hemispheric the result may be a 
superpower controlled "peacekeeping" operation, such as the OAS 
force, which supplanted the original intervention by the United 
States, in the Dominican Republic in 1965 (32). 
This means that peacekeeping by the United Nations usually is 
only going to occur in the "intermediate areas" of the world 
beyond overt superpower dominance. However, peacekeeping may be 
effective in terms of the maintenence of global peace where both 
superpowers are probing for control in a particular intermediate 
area. They may decide that the risk to global peace is too high 
for one of them to gain dominance and so they support a cessation 
of hostilities by their proxies in order to secure a relatively 
stable balance of power. Often the superpowers will support a 
United Nations peacekeeping force in such circumstances because it 
helps to maintain the stability required. Thus with superpower 
backing a United Nations peacekeeping force is likely in these 
areas, a good example of which is the Middle East. Due to the 
delicate balance of power in such volatile areas the superpowers 
will not generally countenance a peacekeeping force backed by 
either of them and so a neutral United Nations force is called 
for. 
In addition, where the conflict arises in an intermediate 
area which is of relatively little interest to any major power, a 
United Nations peacekeeping operation may be authorized such as in 
Cyprus, or if regional ties are stronger a regional peacekeeping 
force may be created such as the aborted OAU force created in 1980 
regarding the continuing conflict between Chad and Libya (33). 
Indeed, strong colonial ties may produce a peacekeeping presence 
inspired by the former colonial power as occurred under the 
Lancaster House Agreement on Rhodesia which authorized a 
Commonwealth presence (34). 
In these intermediate areas of the world where neither 
superpower is dominant, peacekeeping is more likely to be 
authorized in inter-state conflicts than in cases of intea-state 
strife. This is evidenced by the difficulties encountered in the 
mandating of ONUC and the precarious position of UNIFIL which is 
designed for inter-state peacekeeping when it needs to be more 
attuned to a civil war situation. UNIFIL's mandate is unlikely to 
be changed to one nearer to ONUC's because to do so would be to 
bring it nearer to enforcement. Intra-state conflicts have the 
potential to result in United Nations forces crossing the divide 
from peacekeeping to enforcement. 
Peacekeeping forces created outside the United Nations that 
are not regional or bloc orientated are rare (35). They generally 
occur in the "intermediate zones" and arise as a result of the 
failure of the United Nations to authorize a force. The 
Multinational Force in the Sinai created by a United 
States'/Israeli/Egyptian agreement was reasonably successful in a 
situation comprehensively covered by the accompanying peace treaty 
(36). The Multinational Force in Beirut established in 1982 (37) 
and situated, like ONUC and UNIFIL in a civil war situation, was 
unsuccessful. It was composed of French, British, Italian and 
United States' forces following a request by the Lebanese 
government after unsuccessful calls for a United Nations force. 
Franck summarizes its failure, 
"Its all Western composition also virtually 
guaranteed the accelerated intrusion of the 
Cold War. As U. S. representatives had gone 
to great lengths to point out during the 1973 
negotiations preceding the establishment of 
UNEF II, the posting of superpower forces in 
the region contributes to the very dangers and 
tensions the force is intended to alleviate. 
Arguably, a force of neutrals, established by 
the Security Council, and underwritten by all 
159 UN Members, might have fared better and 
could have scarcely done worse. " (38) 
The shift in the balance of power in the Middle East by the 
defection of Egypt from the Soviet camp to the Western camp 
enabled a Western backed peacekeeping force to be emplaced between 
Egypt and Israel. However, the Multinational Force in Beirut did 
not have the advantage of being between two relatively friendly 
and passive states; instead it was placed in a hostile civil war 
situation in a vain attempt to increase Western influence in the 
area. The Soviet Union and hence the Security Council did not 
view the sitation in Beirut as being susceptible to a peacekeeping 
force bearing in mind the difficulties UNIFIL was facing at the 
time (39). 
From the guidelines outlined above the following tentative 
suggestions can be made about possible future uses of United 
Nations' peacekeeping forces. Apart from Kampuchea, Afghanistan 
and Namibia which have already been mentioned, the most suitable 
candidate for the use of United Nations peacekeeping is the Gulf 
War. An interpositional peacekeeping force based on UNEF would be 
well suited to an inter-state conflict such as the Iran-Iraq war 
in which there are clear lines of demarcation between the opposing 
forces (the international frontier). 
The Gulf is of strategic importance to both superpowers but 
neither has any great preference for a victor. Indeed, neither 
the Soviet Union nor the United States desires a victory because 
such an event may disturb the global status quo. The conditions, 
apart from the question of both parties consenting, are therefore 
ripe for a peacekeeping force which would maintain the no-win, 
no-lose situation without significant loss of life until the 
status quo ante could be established by a peace treaty between 
Iran and Iraq. 
However, with all United Nations peacekeeping efforts, there 
would have to be an agreement by both parties to a cease-fire 
which must be effective before the emplacement of a force also 
with the consent of the parties. Iran, at least, has shown its 
unwillingness to accept even the first condition. The Security 
Council has passed a resolution deciding to despatch a United 
Nations team to observe the cease-fire called for. Iraq has 
consented to such a team but Iran has not (40), despite the fact 
that the Security Council recently has made a mandatory call for a 
cease-fire within the terms of Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter 
(41). Unfortunately, Iran has ignored this call (42) leading to 
the continuation of the fighting between the two sides (43). 
Without Iran's consent the United Nations cannot undertake any 
type of peacekeeping operation. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF PEACEKEEPING FORCES 
It has been demonstrated in chapter 7 that United Nations 
peacekeeping is limited to certain areas of the world; within 
those areas the nature of the operation differs depending on the 
type of conflict encountered. The purpose of the present chapter 
will be to undertake a more detailed analysis in terms of whether 
all peacekeeping operations can be reconciled with a single 
constitutional base or whether the variety of conflicts and forces 
have resulted in a different base for each force. Before a 
conclusion on this matter can be arrived at we must ascertain 
whether the Charter does in fact contain any provisions 
authorizing the creation of peacekeeping forces. There is no 
single Charter provision authorizing peacekeeping per se but there 
are several from which it could be inferred. Alternatively, it 
could be argued that peacekeeping is not attributable to 
individual provisions in the Charter but is an inherent power 
derived from the Organization's responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security (1). 
To determine the correct view each force will be examined 
after which a series of guidelines as to the constitutional basis 
of all peacekeeping forces will be attempted including the 
question of which organ is capable of authorizing such forces. As 
has already been explained (2), the Charter base will not only be 
derived from an examination of the enabling resolutions or 
agreements creating such forces, but also from a more practical 
analysis of the functions and overall mandate of each force. In 
turn the determination of the constitutional base will illustrate 
the nature or content of peacekeeping and will possibly provide a 
blueprint for future peacekeeping forces. 
As with the last, this chapter contains a basic division into 
observation and peacekeeping. 
1. The Constitutional Base of United Nations Observation Teams 
(i). UN Observers in Indonesia 1947-1950 
The creation of an observation team in Indonesia illustrates 
how early on in its life the United Nations realised the necessity 
of having accurate, neutral information about a conflict with 
which it was dealing. Initially, the Security Council, in 
resolution 27, called upon the Netherlands and Indonesia "to cease 
hostilities forthwith" and to settle their disputes by peaceful 
means (3). The resolution was based on an Australian draft but 
with references to Article 39 and 40 deleted. With varying 
cease-fires and demarcation lines being established on the islands 
the Security Council needed accurate information as to the state 
of hostilities before it could take more positive peacemaking 
steps. Dutch objections based on Article 2(7) meant that the 
establishment of an independent commission was not authorized (4), 
instead the Council requested, in resolution 30, that career 
consuls in Batavia report on the observance of the cease-fire 
called for in the earlier resolution (5). 
The same resolution also established a Consular Commission to 
attempt peacemaking. The Consular Commission itself interpreted 
the functions of the military observers, 
".... to observe any possible violations of 
the cease fire......; to investigate, where 
possible, allegations of violations of 
cease-fire orders; and to gather any other 
data that might be of value to the Commission 
and to the Security Council. " (6) 
These functions remained basically the same with the creation of 
the Good Offices Committee (7) which became the United Nations 
Commission on Indonesia (8), although instead of observation of 
temporary cease-fire lines, the team was given the task of 
observing the demilitarized zone created under the Renville 
Agreement (9). 
Although resolution 27 had references to Chapter VII deleted 
some members still believed that it contained a mandatory call 
under Article 40 of that Chapter (10). Resolution 30 was adopted 
to supplement resolution 27. Nevertheless, this does not mean 
that the observer force was in some way an enforcement measure. 
The Consular Commission's interpretation of its functions 
illustrates the essential limitation of the force to observation 
of a previously implemented cease-fire. The force is not 
authorized to prevent breaches of the cease-fire. Indeed, both 
parties consented to its presence (11), suggesting that the 
correct base for it is in Chapter VI. Higgins agrees with the 
conclusion that on an examination of the team's functions its 
Charter base is in Chapter VI (12), whereas Bowett concentrates on 
the enabling resolutions to conclude that the observers were 
instituted to report on compliance with provisional measures, and 
were created, therefore, under Article 40 (13). 
A correct view would be somewhere between Bowett and Higgins. 
Whether the provisional measures called for were mandatory or not 
they can still be derived from Article 40 (14). However, the 
provisional measure primarily consists of the call for a 
cease-fire, the creation of an observation team was ancillary to 
that. The observer team in Indonesia can be seen, therefore, as a 
non-enforcement (15) measure ancillary to the provisional measures 
called for under Article 40 which may or may not have been 
mandatory. Observation or peacekeeping often follow a call or 
demand for provisional measures, but they do not necessarily form 
part of them or take on an enforcement aspect if the call or 
demand is mandatory. 
(ii). UNSCOB 1947-1954 
Although UNSCOB was created by the General Assembly, it had 
its origins in the report of the Commission of Investigation 
established under Article 34 by the Security Council (16) to 
investigate Greek allegations of illegal border incursions from 
Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. When the question came before 
the General Assembly after having been removed from the Council's 
agenda, with the report of the Commission of Investigation before 
it (17), the Assembly decided to establish UNSOB to assist the 
governments concerned to comply with its recommendations which, 
inter alia, called on Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia not to 
furnish aid to the guerrillas and as regards observation called on 
UNSCOB to send a team to observe the frontiers (18). 
UNSCOB gave a general interpretation of its own mandate in 
relation to its observation function as the "continuous 
observation of the general circumstances prevailing in the 
frontier areas" (19); this was later refined by the Assembly to 
observation and reporting "on the response of Albania, Bulgaria 
and Yugoslavia to the call not to furnish aid to the Greek 
guerrillas" (20). 
The observation functions of UNSCOB were created by 
recommendations of the General Assembly. As we have seen, the 
Charter powers granted to the Assembly are very wide, and as long 
as they do not overtly conflict with Articles 12 or 2(7), they 
potentially encompass all the recommendatory powers of the 
Security Council (21). Bowett feels that the basis of UNSCOB is 
in Articles 11 and 22 whereas Higgins states a variety or 
combination of provisions - Articles 10,11(2), 14 and 22 (22). A 
combination of all its recommendatory powers is probably the 
Assembly's source in establishing UNSCOB; indeed, with the later 
refinement of the observation function by the Assembly to 
observation of its call on Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia not to 
furnish aid to the guerrillas, which is a provisional measure, we 
can see the similarity between UNSCOB and the consular observers 
in Indonesia 
- 
they were both requested to observe on the 
compliance of the parties with provisional measures. The Assembly 
has undoubted powers to recommend provisional measures (23). 
Nevertheless, the Eastern bloc countries, including Albania, 
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia argued that UNSCOB had been constituted 
illegally. They contended not that the Assembly was taking upon 
itself powers reserved to the Security Council, but rather that 
the very establishment of a Special Committee was an infringement 
of Albanian, Yugoslavian and Bulgarian sovereignty (24). Higgins 
answers these contentions, 
these nations appeared here to 
confuse the legal consequences flowing from 
the establishment of UNSCOB with those from 
the operation of UNSCOB. The General Assembly 
acknowledged that UNSCOB could not operate in 
the territory of any state without that 
state's consent; but its establishment was 
nonetheless clearly within the terms of 
Articles 10,11,14 and 22 of the Charter. " 
(25) 
For the Eastern bloc's arguments to be correct, would necessarily 
imply that the Assembly had created a force which could forcefully 
enter the territories of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to carry 
out its functions. The use of force by the Assembly would indeed 
raise constitutional problems (26), but the fact was that UNSCOB's 
presence was based on consent - as with all peacekeeping (27). 
(iii). UNTSO 1949-present 
As has already been explained in chapter 7, UNTSO's longevity 
arises out of the political necessity of the United Nations having 
a constant presence in the most volatile area of the world. Its 
duties have ranged from observation of the 1949 truce and 
subsequent Armistice Agreements, to general observation in the 
whole Middle Eastern theatre, with specific roles being granted to 
it after the 1956,1967 and 1973 conflicts. 
One would have thought that this would have required constant 
adjustment of UNTSO's mandate by the Security Council, but this 
does not appear to be the case. Even its original creation seems 
to have arisen indirectly from a Council decision. In 1948 the 
Security Council established a Truce Commission directed to 
negotiate and supervise a truce between Israel and the Arab states 
in resolution 48 (28). Resolution 54 (29) made the Council's call 
for a truce mandatory under Articles 39 and 40, and gave the Truce 
Commission wide powers to take any necessary steps to make the 
cease-fire effective. UNTSO arose from the team employed by the 
Truce Commission to observe and supervise the cease-fire and truce 
(30). UNTSO was then referred to in the Armistice Agreements (31) 
and given the specific function of observing the armistice lines. 
This function was recognised by the Council in 1949 (32). 
Although UNTSO has been given specific tasks since, either by 
the Secretary General (33) or by the Security Council (34), its 
constitutional origins lie in Council resolutions 48 and 54, and 
in the Armistice Agreements concluded by the parties after the 
first Arab-Israeli war. Although resolution 54 made the call for 
provisional measures under Article 40 as a mandatory decision, one 
must again distinguish between the mandatory cease-fire call and 
the procedures created by the Security Council - the Truce 
Commission from which UNTSO evolved - which were ancillary to the 
cease-fire. The mandate of observation, the requirement for 
states to consent to UNTSO's presence (35), and the small size of 
the force (36), illustrate that although tha call was mandatory, 
UNTSO in no way represented any kind of enforcement action 
- 
it 
was an observation team created as an ancillary requirement to a 
mandatory call for provisional measures under Article 40. The 
Armistice Agreements seemed to represent something more concrete 
than provisional measures and effectively gave UNTSO its more 
general observation function which it carries out to the present 
day. However, its relationship to provisional measures were still 
highlighted after the 1956,1967 and 1973 wars when it again 
observed the various cease-fires concluded (under varying degrees 
of pressure from the United Nations) after those conflicts (37). 
(iv). UNMOGIP 1949-present 
Following India's complaint of Pakistani aid to insurgents in 
the Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir (38), the Security Council 
adopted resolution 39 (39) establishing a United Nations 
Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) with the dual functions 
of investigating the facts under Article 34, and of exercising a 
mediatory influence. The creation of an observation team was 
essentially distinct - although Council resolution 47 of 21 April 
1948 allowed UNCIP to use observers; they were not emplaced until 
after a bilateral agreement on a cease-fire between India and 
Pakistan was reached on 27 July 1949 (40). Thus observation of 
the cease-fire in the period 1949-1965 was a direct result not of 
a Security Council resolution but of the functions granted to 
UNMOGIP by a bilateral accord. 
When new hostilities broke out in 1965 the Security Council 
in resolution 209 (41) ordered a new cease-fire and the withdrawal 
of both belligerents behind existing cease-fire lines. India and 
Pakistan were called on to co-operate with UNMOGIP in its task of 
observing the cease-fire. This was supported by Council 
resolution 211 of 20 September 1965 which demanded a cease-fire 
and withdrawal. UNMOGIP played a significant role in observing 
the cease-fire and withdrawal finally agreed upon at Tashkent by 
India and Pakistan (42). 
Although UNCIP was created within the provisions of Chapter 
VI by Council resolution 39, UNMOGIP's functions were defined by 
the Karachi accord which embodied an agreement on provisional 
measures (cease-fire and withdrawals) made between the parties. 
Higgins believes that UNMOGIP's constitutional base is to be found 
in resolution 47 which she states seems to be implicitly based on 
Article 40 (43). This supports the view that UNMOGIP was created 
to observe provisional measures, although this writer believes 
that the Karachi Agreement provides a stronger base since 
resolution 47 did not explicitly call for a cease-fire. The 1965 
conflict highlighted UNMOGIP's mandate as the observation of 
provisional steps taken by the states, although on that occasion 
the Security Council set UNMOGIP's functions which the parties 
agreed to at Tashkent. Bowett states that the constitutional base 
of UNMOGIP is Article 40 (44). To say that the Charter base of a 
force is Article 40 suggests Chapter VII action with its overtones 
of enforcement. As we have seen UNMOGIP's existence depended on 
the consent of the parties. This combined with its limited 
mandate and size (45) indicates that UNMOCIP was a pacific 
measure. It is best to view observer teams as non-enforcement 
measures taken to report on compliance with provisional measures, 
whether mandatory or recommendatory under Article 40, or agreed by 
the parties themselves. 
(v). UNOGIL 1958 
With the crisis in Lebanon, UNOGIL was established by Council 
resolution 128 of June 11 1958. It is illustrative to reproduce 
the whole of the resolution; 
"Having heard the charges of the 
representative of Lebanon concerning 
interference by the United Arab Republic in 
the internal affairs of Lebanon and the reply 
of the representative of the United Arab 
Republic, 
1. Decides to despatch urgently an 
observation group to proceed to Lebanon so as 
to ensure that there is no illegal 
infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or 
other materiel across the Lebanese borders; 
2. Authorizes the Secretary General to take 
the necessary steps to that end; 
3. Requests the observation group to keep the 
Security Council informed through the 
Secretary General. " 
The use of "ensure" in paragraph 1 of the enabling resolution 
suggests that UNOGIL was being directed to enforceably prevent 
infiltration. Practically, such a mandate would be impossible for 
an observation team, numbering 100, to perform (46). Indeed, the 
Secretary General's interpretation of UNOGIL's mandate, which was 
not contested in the Council, emphasised that its role was 
strictly limited to observing whether illegal infiltration 
occurred (47), 
"It was not the task of UNOGIL to mediate, 
arbitrate or to forcefully prohibit illegal 
infiltration, and it was reported on occasion 
that it was being asked by the Lebanese 
authorities to do such things, which were not 
properly within its mandate. " (48) 
Peacekeeping forces are essentially neutral, they do not form an 
arm of the government which has consented to their presence. To 
lose this neutrality would be to act as an enforcement body. It 
was the general view in the Security Council that it would be 
undesirable to create a UNEF I type peacekeeping force or a Korean 
type enforcement army (49), besides to do either would have been 
against UNOGIL's findings that there was no major infiltration 
occurring from the United Arab Republic (50). The fact that 
UNOGIL was a consensual, pacific observation group was emphasised 
by the Secretary General negotiating with Lebanon for its consent 
(51), whereas it proved impossible to extend a similar type of 
operation to Jordan in the face of that government's opposition 
(52). 
A little after UNOGIL reported, Council consensus broke down 
and the United States intervened in mid-July. The question passed 
to the Assembly, which did not even mention UNOGIL in its 
resolution (53). This would tend to indicate that UNOGIL's 
function remained the same; however, the Secretary General's 
report (54) suggests that in return for United States' withdrawal, 
UNOGIL would attempt to foster more peaceful relations between 
Lebanon and the surrounding Arab countries (55). 
Nevertheless, UNOGIL's functions probably remained as 
investigatory and observational as envisaged by Article 34. It 
was essentially different from most other types of peacekeeping 
forces which are usually created to perform some role in relation 
to provisional measures called for by the Assembly or the Council; 
whereas UNOGIL's mandate was to ascertain the facts before the 
United Nations could adopt any further measures (56). Although 
UNOGIL consisted of a team of military observers and therefore is 
included in this analysis, it could easily be classified with 
non-military investigatory teams established by the Council (57). 
(vi). UNSF 1962-1963 
Most peacekeeping forces heavily involve the Secretary 
General. It will be seen that earlier forces such as ONUC were 
really the creation of the Secretary General, whereas later forces 
such as UNIFIL reflected the Soviet Union's view that the 
Secretary General's task should not be the creation and direction 
of such forces, but the administration of them after the Security 
Council has mandated them - mandates which are regularly reviewed 
by the Council (58). UNSF along with ONUC are probably 
illustrative of the highpoint of the Secretary General's role in 
the Organization's peacekeeping function. 
Although the Agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia 
(59) required the approval of the General Assembly for the 
creation of UNTEA and UNSF in West Irian (60), it was the 
Agreement itself which detailed the functions of these bodies and 
granted the power of control over them to the Secretary General. 
The functions of UNSF contained in the Agreement relate to 
two different aspects of the planned transfer of sovereignty. 
First, an observation role as regards provisional measures agreed 
upon by the parties such as a cease-fire pending the transfer of 
sovereignty to UNTEA (61). Secondly, to act as an internal 
security force during the temporary administration by UNTEA 
pending transfer of authority to Indonesia (62). Loosely, UNSF 
could be described as facilitating provisional measures - on this 
occasion adopted by the parties - until the end result (transfer 
of sovereignty to Indonesia) could be achieved. 
The Charter base for the General Assembly's actions in rubber 
stamping the Agreement probably derives from one of its general 
powers 
- 
for example Article 14 
- 
at least in relation to UNSF 
(63). The Charter base for the Secretary General's role derives 
from a substantial evolution of his powers contained in Article 
98. Higgins writes, 
"From these fairly narrow provisions (Articles 
97 and 98] the Secretary General's power of 
diplomatic initiative has grown up, and it is 
arguable that the provision of observers falls 
within his general powers, so long as their 
duties are compatible with the general 
purposes of the Organization. But, at the 
same time, it must be admitted that these are 
implied powers and no express authority can be 
found for them. " (64) 
(vii). UNYOM 1963-1964 
UNYOM'S creation is another example of the Secretary 
General's "power of diplomatic initiative" 
- 
albeit a relatively 
minor one. 
With the Saudi Arabians supporting the Royalist faction and 
the United Arab Republic supporting the Republican faction in 
Yemen, it was politically necessary not only to obtain the consent 
of Yemen (65) to a United Nations' presence, but also the 
cooperation of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic (66). 
Secretary General U Thant negotiated with the Republican 
government of Yemen, and the governments of Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Republic. They agreed on disengagement and on a 
United Nations' presence (67); and they defined UNYOM's functions 
as observation only by about 100 personnel in the Saudi 
Arabian-Yemen area (68). 
The Council approved the Secretary General's reports in 
resolution adopted on June 11 1963 (69) and requested the 
Secretary General "to establish the observation operation as 
defined by him". The Secretary General further refined the 
functions of UNYOM in subsequent reports 
- 
these were limited to 
observing, reporting, and certifying the disengagement between 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen (70), and to observe on the departure of 
the United Arab Republic from Yemen (71) 
- 
this constituted a 
limited observation mandate not allowing UNYOM to take any steps 
to resolve the conflict (72). 
The Secretary General had taken substantial diplomatic 
initiatives before the matter was even placed on the Security 
Council's agenda. This ability again represents a substantial 
evolution from his Charter powers in which Article 99 limits his 
anticipatory powers to requesting that the Security Council place 
a matter on its agenda (73). The Security Council's approval 
could be viewed as similar to its creation of UNOGIL, based on 
Article 34, although UNYOM's function appears to be of observation 
rather than investigation. Its mandate is akin to the overseeing 
of provisional steps taken by Saudi Arabia and Yemen in their 
continuing conflict. Both Higgins and Bowett state a preference 
for Article 34 (74), although Bowett, in the alternative, ponders 
that UNYOM, in itself, could be a non-mandatory provisional 
measure (75). It is this writer's opinion that UNYOM is closer to 
UNMOGIP than UNOGIL. 
(viii). UNIPOM 1965-1966 
Large scale violations of the Karachi Agreement were reported 
by UNMOGIP on August 5 1965 (76). The necessity for another 
observer force lay in the fact that the conflict broke out on a 
much wider front than that covered by UNMOGIP. On 4 September the 
Security Council adopted resolution 209 which called for an 
immediate cease-fire and requested the cooperation of India and 
Pakistan with UNMOGIP. The fighting continued leading to a 
repeated cease-fire call on the 6 September in Council resolution 
210 
- 
which also contained a request to the Secretary General to 
strengthen UNMOGIP. Resolution 211 of September 20 gave a 
specific time for the cease-fire to become operative and asked the 
Secretary General "to provide the necessary assistance to ensure 
supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed 
personnel. " 
The Security Council probably envisaged an enlarged UNMOGIP 
when adopting resolution 211. Indeed, India insisted that only 
one operation was authorized (77). However, the Security Council 
neither censured the Secretary General for creating UNIPOM nor did 
it specifically grant him authority to do so. Only the Soviet 
Union made a somewhat oblique criticism, 
".......... only the Security Council is 
competent to adopt measures on concrete 
questions connected with observers of the 
United Nations, namely, with their functions, 
their numbers, the command, the method of 
financing their activities, and so on. " (78) 
To a large degree UNIPOM was the Secretary General's creation. He 
reconciled his action with the constitutional requirements by 
insisting that to extend UNMOGIP beyond Kashmir would have been a 
breach of its mandate and a usurption of the functions of the 
Security Council. Thus he argued that he needed to create UNIPOM 
in order to satisfy the requirements of Council resolution 211 
(79). The Secretary General also probably had the idea that 
UNIPOM would be the more transient requirement, whereas UNMOGIP 
would need to be kept in place for many years as it was Kashmir 
that was the flashpoint. 
UNIPOM's functions were derived from the mandate in 
resolution 211 - to provide, by observer duties, assistance as 
regards the cease-fire and withdrawal in the area outside 
UNMOGIP's control (80). Under the Agreement reached by India and 
Pakistan in January 1966, the functions of both forces were given 
greater definition as regards disengagement (81). Nevertheless, 
UNIPOM's creation was the reverse of UNMOGIP. The latter was 
created by agreement between the parties and sanctioned by the 
Security Council. UNIPOM was created by the Council 
- 
or more 
correctly a combination of the Council and the Secretary General 
- 
consented to by the parties (82), and later sanctioned by them. 
After looking at resolution 211, Higgins writes, 
"...... the cease-fire and withdrawal had 
been demanded by the Security Council in 
categorical terms. It is thus possible to 
regard the establishment of UNIPOM as falling 
under Article 40 of the Charter -a 
provisional measure for dealing with a breach 
of the peace - or as falling, like most purely 
observer functions under Chapter VI. " (83) 
This suggests too much rigidity in analysing the constitutional 
base. In a nutshell it means that if a cease-fire call is 
mandatory 
- 
by direct or indirect reference to Article 39 
- 
the 
observer team created to observe the cease-fire comes within 
Article 40. However, if the cease-fire is non-mandatory, as was 
the case with resolution 211 since Article 39 is not cited nor 
does it contain a reference to a breach of the peace 
- 
the 
observer team, according to Higgins, comes within Chapter VI. A 
more correct analysis would be to say that the resolution called 
for provisional measures -a cease-fire and withdrawal 
- 
whether 
these measures were mandatory or not has no real application to 
the observer group, whose main function was not to enforce the 
measures but only to observe whether or not they were complied 
with. There thus arises two alternatives; either observation does 
not depend upon which Chapter the provisional measures are adopted 
under, since there is no question of enforcement even if they are 
mandatory, or one can view a call for provisional measures under 
Article 40 
- 
despite its position within Chapter VII 
- 
as having 
the potential of either being mandatory or recommendatory (84), 
and so an observer team can be created persuant to either (85). 
2. The Constitutional Base of United Nations Peacekeeping Forces 
(i). UNEF 11956-1967 
Persuant to a joint Anglo/French/Israeli plan, Israel 
attacked Egypt in the Sinai on October 29 1956. The United States 
urged the Council to find a "breach of the peace" and to "demand" 
a cessation of the attack, combined with immediate Israeli 
withdrawal. The Soviet delegate agreed that the Israeli action 
came within Article 39, but preferred to use the more emotive 
classification of an "act of aggression" (86). No resolution was 
forthcoming although after the Anglo/French ultimatum had been 
delivered both the United States and the Soviet Union introduced 
draft resolutions calling on Israel to cease firing and to 
withdraw her troops (87). These drafts did not contain references 
to Chapter VII in a deliberate attempt to forestall the threatened 
Anglo/French intervention. No recommendatory measure could 
circumvent the vetoes of the United Kingdom and France. 
On October 31 1956, British and French forces intervened, an 
action which was classified by the Yugoslavian delegate as an "act 
of aggression" (88). He formally proposed that an emergency 
special session of the General Assembly should be convened under 
the Uniting for Peace procedure (89). A procedural vote was taken 
and the resolution was adopted despite the negative votes of the 
two permanent members involved (90). 
Despite the classification of the conflict by several members 
of the Council as coming within Chapter VII, and the use of the 
Uniting for Peace resolution, which, by its terms, necessarily 
implies that the situation comes within Article 39 (91), the 
General Assembly's first resolution on the conflict made no 
significant jurisdictional finding. Assembly resolution 997 (92), 
based on a United States' draft, urged the parties to cease-fire, 
to withdraw to their previous positions, and recommended that all 
Member states refrain from further acts. Canada abstained and New 
Zealand voted against the resolution because it lacked any method 
which would create conditions under which cease-fire and 
withdrawal would be acceptable to all the parties (93). 
Canada acted to rectify the failure of resolution 997, by 
proposing what was to become resolution 998 (94), which requested 
the Secretary General to submit a plan "for the setting up, with 
the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency 
international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the 
cessation of hostilities in accordance with the aforementioned 
resolution". On the same day a nineteen power draft was adopted 
as Assembly resolution 999 (95). This placed emphasis on the 
necessity of achieving an immediate cease-fire, and authorized the 
Secretary General to arrange immediately with the parties 
concerned a cease-fire and a withdrawal of forces behind armistice 
lines. The intention was to create the conditions under which 
UNEF I could fill the vacuum created by compliance with the 
cease-fire and withdrawal (96). The Secretary General's plan for 
UNEF I was approved by the Assembly (97) as was his report on the 
guiding principles for the functioning of UNEF (98). 
The Secretary General's principles illustrate the divisions 
between peacekeeping and enforcement action, 
"...... there is no intent in the 
establishment of the Force to influence the 
military balance in the present conflict and, 
thereby, the political balance affecting 
efforts to settle the conflict.... "; 
and between peacekeeping, enforcement and observation, 
"It would be more than an observers' corps, 
but in no way a military force controlling the 
territory in which it is stationed; nor, 
moreover, should the Force have military 
functions exceeding those necessary to secure 
peaceful conditions on the assumption that the 
parties to the conflict take all necessary 
steps for compliance with the recommendations 
of the General Assembly. " (99) 
UNEF I would therefore only be emplaced after all the parties had 
accepted, in principle, the cease-fire and withdrawal and had 
taken positive steps to comply. 
Despite proposals that UNEF I should guarantee passage 
through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aquaba (100), UNEF's 
mandate and functions were to derive from the General Assembly's 
resolutions which basically called for four things: a cease-fire, 
the cessation of hostilities, abstention from military raids and 
incursions, and scrupulous observance of the armistice agreements 
(101). 
The Secretary General's initial report summarized UNEF's 
functions, 
" 
...... 
the functions of [UNEF] would be, 
when a cease-fire is established, to enter 
Egyptian territory with the consent of the 
Egyptian government [Israel refused consent], 
in order to help maintain quiet during and 
after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops 
and to secure compliance with (resolution 
997]. " (102) 
Egypt's consent to UNEF I is illustrative of the basis of all 
observer and peacekeeping functions. It also demonstrates their 
weakness for Secretary General U Thant viewed President Nasser's 
request in 1967 that UNEF I be withdrawn as necessitating the 
removal of the force (103). 
There were objections to the Secretary General's view. 
Israel, New Zealand and Australia argued that the withdrawal of 
UNEF I should be a decision of the Assembly not of Egypt (104). 
Garvey argues against U Thant's decision on the basis of an 
aide-memoire written by the Secretary General at the time of 
the creation of UNEF I- Dag Hammarskjöld - but not 
published until 1967 (105). The former Secretary General stated 
that Egypt's acceptance of UNEF contained more than just 
unilaterally revokable consent in that the Egyptian government had 
consented to UNEF's presence on its territory until its mandate 
had been completed. To this extent argued Hammarskjöld, this 
so called Good Faith Accord had limited Egypt's sovereignty. 
Garvey states that this Accord should have at least forced Egypt 
to negotiate with the United Nations (106). 
These arguments seem to forget that without Egypt's consent 
UNEF's continued presence would have been hostile as regards 
Egypt, and if attacked, as it in fact was (107), UNEF could have 
used self-defence which was an integral part of its mandate; but 
if it was to carry out its functions in the face of Egyptian 
hostility it would have had to use force beyond that required for 
self-defence. Thus UNEF would have come dangerously close to 
constituting enforecement action. The Good Faith Accord could not 
derogate from the basic principle of peacekeeping 
- 
host state 
consent. The only condition attaching to Egypt's right to demand 
withdrawal was that of giving notice which in the face of such a 
demand and the increasing hostility towards UNEF proved to be 
unenforceable by the United Nations. The Secretary General 
recognised the stark reality of the situation when he withdrew 
UNEF without reference to the Assembly (108). The emplacement of 
a peacekeeping force does not limit the host state's sovereignty. 
The positioning of UNEF I was clearly predicated on Egyptian 
consent and on both parties' voluntary compliance with the 
Assembly's call for a cessation of hostilities. The argument that 
UNEF I was entitled to stay on Egyptian soil until its mandate was 
completed is unsound because this would appear to give UNEF an 
enforceable right to stay. Such enforceable rights are 
incompatible with a consensual peacekeeping force such as UNEF I. 
We have established so far that UNEF I was a peacekeeping by 
consent operation, to be emplaced after a cease-fire had been 
established, to supervise that cease-fire and subsequent 
withdrawal and to oversee the continuance of peaceful conditions. 
It was more than an observer force but less than enforcement 
action. France objected to it because it arose from the Uniting 
for Peace resolution, which, the French argued, contemplated 
enforcement, not peacekeeping measures (109). As has been argued 
(110), the Uniting for Peace resolution merely recognized the 
inherent powers of the Assembly, and in fact all it creates is a 
procedural device for the transfer of a matter from the Council to 
the Assembly (111), where the Assembly can operate any of its 
powers. The question remains whether the Assembly has the power 
to create peacekeeping forces. 
It has been stated that the Assembly's powers roughly 
comprise all of the recommendatory powers of the Security Council 
(112). Although the Security Council did not create a full 
peacekeeping force until after the Assembly, it had the potential 
to create such forces and following from this premise so did the 
Assembly. 
Alternatively, the Assembly's power to create peacekeeping 
forces can be said to arise from the doctrine of inherent powers - 
that anything appropriate to achieve the Organization's aims is 
permitted as long as the Charter does not expressly forbid it. 
Finally, peacekeeping forces could be reconciled with the general 
powers of the Assembly contained in Articles 10,11 and 14 - in 
other words they are express powers or at least powers implied 
directly from express powers (113). 
The Soviet Union, however, argues against all three of these 
justifications by saying that any form of military action is 
reserved, by Chapter VII, to the Security Council, and that the 
word "action" in Article 11(2) includes peacekeeping (114). The 
World Court in the Expenses Case contradicted this, 
"This paragraph (Article 11(2)) 
..... 
in its 
first sentence empowers the General Assembly, 
by means of recommendations to States or to 
the Security Council, or to both, to organize 
peacekeeping operations, at the request, or 
with the consent, of the States concerned. 
This power of the General Assembly is a 
special power which in no way derogates from 
its general powers under Articles 10 or 14 
except as limited by the last sentence of 
Article 11(2) 
..... 
The word "action" must 
mean action solely within the province of the 
Security Council. It cannot refer to 
recommendations which the Security Council 
might make 
..... 
because the General Assembly 
under Article 11 has a comparable power. " 
(115) 
The Court considered that "action" in Article 11(2) meant coercive 
or enforcement action, so that peacekeeping was not excluded from 
the Assembly's competence. It concluded that Article 11(2) or 
Article 14 contained sufficient powers to enable the Assembly to 
create UNEF 1 (116). 
What must be remembered is that UNEF was created to 
supplement the Assembly's recommendatory call for provisional 
measures -a cease-fire and withdrawal. Recommendatory or 
non-mandatory provisional measures and steps taken ancillary to 
them can be adopted either by the Assembly or the Council; only 
mandatory measures can be taken by the Council. This should be 
seen as the essence of the World Court's judgement. 
The Court's judgement can be interpreted as implying powers 
from express provisions. Article 10 gives the Assembly 
recommendatory powers similar to those of the Council. The 
Council has developed Article 40 so as to give itself the power to 
call for voluntary provisional measures. Thus the Assembly can 
call for provisional measures and following from that can provide 
the necessary machinery to facilitate the observance of the 
cease-fire. Peacekeeping thus arises from an express power - the 
power to call for provisional measures - and not from the more 
general proposition that the organs of the United Nations have the 
power to create a peacekeeping force because such a measure 
furthers the aims of the Organization and is not contrary to any 
express provision of the Charter. 
(ii). ONUC 1960-1964 
The Republic of the Congo achieved independence from Belgium 
on June 30 1960. As with many colonies, the Congo was something 
of an artificial construction consisting of many tribal areas. 
The Belgian authorities had done little to unify the colony before 
independence and so within a few days of its achievement 
disruptions between the various factions occurred resulting in 
Belgian intervention which was characterized as humanitarian by 
the Belgian government. 
President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba sent a cable to 
the Secretary General (117) requesting United Nations' military 
assistance to protect the Congo "against the present external 
aggression which is a threat to international peace". The 
Secretary General, utilizing Article 99 of the Charter, asked that 
the President of the Council convene that body (118). The 
resultant resolution was the work of Hammarskjöld, as were the 
two subsequent Council resolutions. 
On July 14 1960 the Council adopted resolution 143, which 
made no jurisdictional finding but called upon Belgium to withdraw 
and decided to authorize the Secretary General to take the 
necessary steps to provide military assistance, "in consultation 
with the Government of the Congo" until the Congolese security 
forces could fully meet their tasks. To all intents and purposes 
this appears to be another case of the United Nations filling the 
vacuum created by the breakdown in security, but the simplicity of 
this belies the complexity of the civil war situation facing the 
United Nations. ONUC was to assist the government in restoring 
law and order "but which government? that of Lumumba? Kasavubu? 
Ilea? Mobutu? " (119). 
Despite the creation of ONUC the situation deteriorated and 
on July 11 1960 Tshombe, President of the Katangese Provincial 
government, declared Katangess secession. Belgian troops remained 
despite resolution 143. Again on the Secretary General's 
initiative the Security Council adopted resolution 145 on July 22 
1960. The resolution recognized the unity of the Congo, again 
called on the Belgians to withdraw while authorizing the Secretary 
General "to take all necessary action to this effect". It also 
requested that all states refrain from interference which might 
undermine the territorial integrity and political independence of 
the Congo. 
Belgium refused to withdraw from Katanga with the consequence 
that ONUC could not enter the province without using force - an 
event which the previous resolutions had not catered for. Under 
these circumstances the Council adopted resolution 146 on August 9 
1960. The resolution called on the government of Belgium to 
withdraw its troops from Katanga; declared that ONUC should enter 
Katanga; reaffirmed that ONUC "will not be a party to or in any 
way influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional 
or otherwise"; and called upon Members "to accept and carry out 
the decisions of the Security Council" in accordance with Articles 
25 and 49. 
By September 1960 the Congo was in a state of constitutional 
as well as military upheaval with Kasavubu and Lumumba dismissing 
each other from office followed by the coup by the army chief of 
staff General Mobutu on 14 September. This combined with the 
continuing attempt to secede by Katanga and the problem of how 
much force was to be used to enable ONUC to carry out its mandate 
divided the Council. The Soviet Union was particularly critical 
of the Secretary General who had so far masterminded the operation 
(120). This resulted in the Soviet veto of another 
Hammarskjöld-proposed resolution (121). The deadlock in the 
Council was a reflection of the increasing internationalization 
of the civil war, 
"Lumumba had already called on Moscow for 
direct military intervention and, in response, 
a fleet of Soviet air transports and 
technicians as well as Czechoslovak military 
officers had begun to arrive. President 
Nkrumah of Ghana sent his friend Lumumba funds 
and advice even while providing contingents 
for ONUC. The US supported President Kasavubu 
diplomatically while aiding ONUC logistically. 
The Belgians, French and British appeared to 
be supporting Katanga President Tshombe's 
right to secede. " (122) 
The United States proposed that the matter be transferred to the 
General Assembly under the auspices of the Uniting for Peace 
resolution. This proposal was adopted by procedural vote (123) 
despite the negative votes of the Soviet Union and Poland who 
stated that the Uniting for Peace resolution was illegal (124). 
Besides, they argued, the Assembly was about to start its regular 
annual session anyway. 
Although opposed by the Eastern bloc the Assembly adopted a 
resolution on September 20 1960 (125). This resolution stated, 
inter alia, that to safeguard international peace it was 
"essential for the United Nations to continue to assist the 
Central Government of the Congo" and to this end requested the 
Secretary General to take "vigorous action" to restore law and 
order and to preserve the unity, integrity and political 
independence" of the Congo. It also requested all states to 
refrain from intervening and reminded Members of Articles 25 and 
49 (126). However, the Assembly then split into factions none of 
which could form the necessary majority to adopt a significant 
resolution (127). 
The death of Lumumba (128) and the deterioration of the 
situation into civil war finally united the Council sufficiently 
to enable it to adopt resolution 161 on the 27 February 1961 (129) 
which contained two parts. Part A categorized the crisis as a 
"threat to international peace and security" and a "serious civil 
war situation". It urged that, 
the United Nations take immediately 
all appropriate measures to prevent the 
occurrence of a civil war in the Congo, 
including arrangements for cease-fires, the 
halting of all military operations, the 
prevention of clashes, and the use of force, 
if necessary, in the last resort. " 
It also urged the withdrawal of all Belgian troops and advisers as 
well as mercenaries; and decided to investigate the death of 
Lumumba. Part B also found a "threat to international peace and 
security". It also noted the violation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the Congo and urged self-determination 
through free and fair elections without outside interference 
(130). 
On November 24 1961 the Security Council adopted resolution 
169 (131) which reaffirmed the mandate of ONUC in the following 
terms: 
"(a) To maintain the territorial integrity and 
political independence of the Republic of the 
Congo; 
(b) To assist the Central Government of the 
Congo in the restoration and maintenance of 
law and order; 
(c) To prevent the occurrence of civil war in 
the Congo; 
(d) To secure the immediate withdrawal and 
evacuation from the Congo of all foreign 
military, paramilitary and advisory personnel 
not under United Nations' command, and 
mercenaries; and 
(e) To render technical assistance. " 
It welcomed the restoration of a Central Government on August 2 
1961 in accordance with the Loi Fondamentale, and deplored armed 
action against the government specifically by the secessionists in 
Katanga aided by external resources and mercenaries. it 
completely rejected the claim that Katanga was a "sovereign 
independent nation". To this end the resolution authorized the 
Secretary General to take "vigorous action", including the 
requisite measure of force "if necessary" for the expulsion of 
foreign military personnel not under United Nations' command. 
The Council resolutions establishing and mandating ONUC (143, 
145,146) were essentially the work of Secretary General 
Hammarskjöld. It is important, therefore, to ascertain his 
views as to their basis. His use of Article 99 to start the 
Council in motion gives the first indication as to the possible 
constitutional base of the action for he believed that his use of 
Article 99 necessarily implied a finding by himself of a situation 
falling within Article 39 of the Charter (132). However, he did 
not want to categorize the Belgian intervention as "aggression" in 
order to obtain the support of the Western powers on the Council. 
On the other hand, a characterization of the situation as a mere 
breakdown in internal law and order would have indirectly 
justified Belgian intervention and would not have been acceptable 
to either the Socialist or Afro-Asian members of the Council. 
Hammarskjöld found a path through this minefield by proposing 
to create such conditions as to facilitate Belgian withdrawal with 
a United Nations force filling the vacuum (133). 
It must be noted that the first three enabling resolutions 
made no finding under Article 39 despite the Secretary General's 
belief that Article 99 necessarily implied a "threat to the 
peace". The Secretary General was intent on obtaining a mandate 
for the force, hence the resolutions had to be constitutionally 
ambiguous in order to obtain sufficient consensus. 
However, they do contain inferences as to where they could be 
placed under the Charter. Resolutions 143 and 146 contained 
provisions indicating that the force was to comply with Article 
2(7) 
- 
ONUC was to provide military assistance in consultation 
with the Congolese government and would not intervene or influence 
the outcome of any internal conflict. Indeed, the Secretary 
General initially seemed to view ONUC as similar to 
interpositional, consensual peacekeeping as being undertaken at 
the time by UNEF I (134). This would seem to suggest that ONUC 
was either created under the recommendatory powers of Chapter VI 
or under the doctrine of implied powers since Chapter VI does not 
contain any specific provision under which a peacekeeping force 
could be established. 
However, the last of Hammarskjöld's inspired resolutions 
- 
146 
- 
contained references to Article 25 suggesting that the 
resolutions were "decisions" not recommendations and so were 
mandatory without containing an express or implied finding under 
Article 39. As the situation deteriorated so the Council began to 
cross the threshold into Chapter VII. References to 
non-intervention in resolution 146 probably signified that the 
authorization to ONUC to enter Katanga was, theoretically, not 
seen as enforcement action under Article 42 but as a provisional 
measure under Article 40 (135). This certainly accords with the 
Secretary General's revised view (136). Without a determination 
within the terms of Article 39, which necessarily 
internationalizes the situation (137), provisional measures under 
Article 40, although made mandatory by reference to Article 25, 
cannot escape the limitation in Article 2(7), because they are not 
enforcement measures. 
Assuming, after resolution 146, that ONUC was operating under 
Article 40, could the General Assembly then take over the 
operation of the force when the Security Council became paralysed 
by the veto? The day-to-day operation of the force did not 
require supervision by the Security Council or by the General 
Assembly; the only action required by either organ was when the 
mandate of the force needed adjusting. Thus if the mandate 
provided by the Security Council was sufficient for the force to 
continue day-to-day operations, there would be no legal need for 
the General Assembly to adopt a resolution. However, there was a 
political need to show that a majority of Members supported the 
action. 
The problem is whether the General Assembly, acting under the 
Uniting for Peace resolution (138), altered the mandate in its 
resolution 1474. There are suggestions that it did for it 
requested that the Secretary General take "vigorous action" to 
restore the unity and independence of the Congo. By itself, this 
request could, at the most, be classified as a recommendation of 
enforcement action, which would have been within the Assembly's 
powers, but would have constituted an alteration of the mandate. 
The Security Council had only called for mandatory provisional 
measures under Article 40. The General Assembly could be seen as 
recommending enforcement action similar to the power exercised by 
both the Security Council and the General Assembly during the 
United Nations' action in Korea (139). This would put ONUC beyond 
the pale of a peacekeeping force and would have made it an 
enforcement action. 
However, there are suggestions in Assembly resolution 1474, 
that all that body intended was a reaffirmation of the Security 
Council's resolutions; in other words, it did not intend to alter 
the mandate (140). References in the resolution to Articles 25 
and 49 indicate a confirmation of Council resolution 146 for such 
Articles do not apply to Assembly recommendations. If the 
Assembly was trying to take mandatory enforcement action that 
would have been unconstitutional. This was affirmed in the 
Expenses Case (141) in which the World Court opined that the 
Assembly had not taken enforcement action as regards its handling 
of ONUC. Although its reasoning is not clear, the Court's 
judgement also suggests that the Assembly's contribution to ONUC's 
mandate was not recommendation of enforcement action, but simply a 
reaffirmation or possibly a reinterpretation of the mandate 
created by the Security Council. 
The following Council resolution 
- 
161 
- 
made arguments 
relating to the legality of the Assembly's contribution somewhat 
academic, for it comprehensively reinterpreted ONUC's mandate in 
terms which went beyond those in the Assembly's resolution. The 
Council found a "threat to the peace". Such an implied finding 
within the terms of Article 39 placed the whole operation under 
Chapter Vii. So even if the operation remained under Article 40, 
there was the possibility of making it into enforcement action at 
a later stage (142). Also, it is arguable that such a finding 
renders the limitation contained in Article 2(7) redundant (143). 
There appears to be two alternatives; either resolution 161 
went beyond provisional measures, or the finding of a "threat to 
the peace" was merely a sign of a deteriorating situation rather 
than a method by which the mandate could be changed. It appeared 
to go further than previous Council resolutions in that the 
emphasis was no longer on helping the Congolese government which 
appeared to have disintegrated, instead it was reduced to 
maintaining the Congo's integrity - to prevent its break-up by 
factionalization and secession -a Congo in which a new government 
could be elected. To this end it authorized the use of force in 
the last resort. The International Court was of the opinion that 
this did not amount to enforcement action (144). Nevertheless, 
for one thing, Article 2(7) no longer seemed important to the 
Council, to the extent of involving the consent of the Congolese 
government, for one did not exist at the time (145). For another, 
resolution 161 authorized the use of force by ONUC "in the last 
resort" 
- 
in other words the use of force was not limited to 
merely self-defence. This last factor seems to push ONUC beyond a 
force overseeing the implementation of provisional measures to a 
force authorized to use enforcement measures. However, such a 
mandate can be reconciled with Article 40. The authorization to 
use force "in the last resort" came at the end of a list of 
provisional measures - "cease-fires", "halting of all military 
operations" and "the prevention of clashes" 
- 
and so can be seen 
as coming within an authorization merely to enforce provisional 
measures as provided by the last sentence of Article 40 which 
reads, ".... the Security Council shall duly take account of a 
failure to comply with such provisional measures" (146). 
Security Council resolution 169 contained a comprehensive 
restatement of ONUC's mandate (147). It was able to contain a 
reassertion that ONUC was assisting the Congolese government 
because the central government had been restored (148). The force 
therefore returned, to some extent, to the consensual type of 
peacekeeping force exemplified by UNEF. However, the mandate also 
referred to the prevention of civil war as one of the force's 
purposes (149). This must be read in conjunction with the 
mandate's requirement (d) of ensuring the withdrawal of foreign 
military personnel and mercenaries, for it was the 
internationalization of the civil war that constituted the "threat 
to the peace" (150). 
The mandate contained in resolution 169 was in the nature of 
a series of widely drawn provisional measures. It was meant to 
enable ONUC to preserve the Congo intact to enable a peaceful 
settlement between all the factions to occur. It was not an 
authorization for ONUC to enforce a political solution. Efforts 
to prevent secession may have appeared as if ONUC was being used 
by the Central Government to enforce its will on the 
secessionists. However, the basis of ONUC's action towards 
secession was that it arose because of foreign intervention and 
foreign engineering of a revolt, which was not in accord with the 
widest interpretation of ONUC's mandate 
- 
the protection of the 
territorial integrity and independence of the Congo. 
The Congo was to remain as a whole, but if the secession was 
wholly or mainly indigenous, ONUC's action would have been an 
enforcement of that aim. However, the Council resolutions made it 
clear that that organ believed that the secession was being caused 
from outside the country. This was evidenced by resolution 169 
which authorized the use of force solely for the expulsion of 
foreign military elements. Whether there would have been a 
Katangese secession anyway remains conjecture; the fact remains 
that foreign military involvement provided the situation with the 
necessary international element to have allowed ONUC to operate 
without ONUC technically becoming an enforcement action under 
Article 42, in that its use of force was confined to the 
enforcement of the provisional measures outlined in the mandate. 
Nevertheless, enforcement of provisional measures is in many 
respects similar to enforcement action under Article 42, 
particularly when the provisional measures are so widely drawn as 
to include the maintenance of the integrity of a nation. This has 
led Bowett to descibe ONUC's constitutional base as being wider 
than Article 40, 
"....... having made on implicit finding 
under Article 39, the Council acted under 
Chapter VII of the Charter so as to establish 
a force for the purpose of supervising and 
enforcing compliance with the provisional 
measures ordered under Article 40 and for 
other purposes which were consistent with the 
general powers of the Council under Article 
39. " (151) 
This involves recognizing that ONUC had gone beyond Article 40, 
but not as far as Article 42, by suggesting that the general 
powers of Article 39 were utilized. It must be pointed out, 
however, that the provisions of Article 39 have been used as 
authority for the recommendation of enforcement action (152). 
It would be best to summarize ONUC's actions as having their 
constitutional base as the enforcement of provisional measures 
under Article 40, but since these measures were increasingly 
widely drawn so as to cope with an ever-deteriorating crisis, 
they, in fact, amounted to de facto mandatory enforcement action 
(153). 
(iii). UNFICYP 1964-present 
Violence broke out between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
communities after the President of Cyprus - Archbishop Makarios 
- 
had proposed constitutional amendments on 30 November 1963. A 
threat of Turkish intervention arose (154). This led to proposals 
for a joint British/Turkish/Greek (155) "peacemaking" force to be 
interposed between the two communities (156). The Soviet Union 
characterized this proposal as enforcement by NATO and stated that 
only the Security Council could take any practical measures (157). 
The Cypriot government wanted a United Nations', not a 
guaranteeing powers', presence (158). 
The non-permanent members of the Council, excluding 
Czechoslovakia, sponsored resolution 186 which was adopted by the 
Council on March 4 1964. The resolution noted that the situation 
"with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace 
and security 
.. 
"; called on Members "to refrain from any action or 
threat of action likely to worsen the situation in 
... 
Cyprus, or 
to endanger international peace"; asked the government of Cyprus 
which had "the responsibility for the maintenance of law and 
order" to take measures to stop the violence; recommended the 
creation "with the consent of the Government of Cyprus" of 
UNFICYP; and recommended that the "function of the force should 
be, in the interest of preserving international peace and 
security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the 
fighting, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law 
and order and a return to normal conditions" (159). 
The Secretary General's interpretation of UNFICYP's mandate 
made it clear that what was contemplated was a consensual type 
peacekeeping operation based on UNEF I, avoiding any action 
"designed to influence the political situation in Cyprus except 
... 
through creating an improved climate in which political 
solutions may be sought" (160). This neutralist policy was meant 
to allay fears of enforcement. Nevertheless, ONUC's actions under 
a neutralist stance came perilously close to enforcement, and the 
Secretary General's interpretation of the use of force by UNFICYP 
had a similar potential; 
"The troops of the force carry arms which, 
however, are only to be employed in 
self-defence, should this become necessary in 
the discharge of its functions, in the 
interest of preserving international peace and 
security, of seeking to prevent a recurrence 
of fighting, and contributing to the 
maintenance and restoration of law and order 
and a return to normal conditions. " (161) 
This envisages the use of force by UNFIYP to carry out its 
mandate. As with ONUC, UNFICYP's mandate, outlined in resolution 
186, contained a series of widely drawn provisional measures. 
However, unlike in the Congo situation where the Council was faced 
with a "threat to the peace", here the Council did not make a 
crucial Article 39 finding. Thus UNFICYP was created following 
non-mandatory provisional measures and so could not undertake 
enforcement action without a finding in the terms of Article 39 
(162). 
Between 1964 and 1974, UNFICYP did not act as a buffer force 
between the two communities, but rather as a police force since 
there were not, as such, definable cease-fire lines. This 
situation changed in 1974. A Greek backed coup against Makarios 
and the imminent invasion by Turkey led the Council to meet on 
July 16 1974 at the request of Secretary General Waldheim (163) 
and the Cypriot representative (164). In the Council's first 
meeting some of the members stated that there was a threat to 
international peace (165). Indeed, resolution 353, adopted on 
July 20 1974 (166) stated that there was a "serious threat to 
international peace and security", and demanded "an end to foreign 
military intervention" in Cyprus. This implied finding under 
Article 39 combined with the peremptory language and a call for a 
cease-fire suggests mandatory provisional measures under Article 
40. 
Nonetheless, UNFICYP's original constitutional basis 
- 
based 
on non-mandatory provisional measures 
- 
was not changed and 
brought within Chapter VII, although its functions were to change 
from it being an intra-state to, factually, an inter-state 
peacekeeping force. The Secretary General reported on the 
measures proposed by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Britain and 
Turkey (but not Cyprus), that UNFICYP should create a security 
zone between the Turkish forces in the north of the island and the 
Greek Cypriot forces in the south. The Security Council requested 
that he implement his report (167). 
Although Cyprus had consented to the original emplacement of 
UNFICYP in 1964, it objected somewhat to the new deployment saying 
that it appeared to perpetuate foreign military intervention 
(168). It did not go as far as to withdraw its consent (169) but 
its cooperation seemed to become unimportant with all the 
negotiations about the security zone taking place between Greece, 
Britain, Turkey and the Secretary General (170). However, 
although there was no effective government for the whole island, 
there was a need to involve the two Cypriot factions as well as 
the guaranteeing powers to obtain a lasting cease-fire and to 
allow UNFICYP to perform its new functions (171). 
To summarize 
- 
UNFICYP was created in 1964 as a necessary 
corollary for the implementation of non-mandatory provisional 
measures. Although the Security Council found a "threat to the 
peace" in 1974, it did not alter UNFICYP's constitutional base 
although it did change its functions from that of policing an 
intra-state conflict to one of separating belligerents in what was 
effectively an inter-state conflict. 
(iv). UNEF II 1973-1979 
Unlike the preceding three Middle Eastern wars, the Yom 
Kippur war of 1973 did not follow a period of heightened tension 
in the region. Consequently, the international community was 
largely unprepared when on October 10 1973 the armed forces of 
Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated attack against Israeli 
positions in Sinai and the Golan Heights. The tactic of surprise 
enabled Egypt and Syria to be initially successful in their main 
aims 
- 
the recapture of territories lost in 1967 (172). 
The outbreak of war also took the Security Council by 
surprise. Although the Council was convened on 8 October (173), 
it was unable to take any steps for seventeen days, and, indeed, 
it did not meet at all between 13 and 21 October. The pro-Arab 
members of the Council were pleased at the initial Arab success 
(174), whereas Israel and the United States played for time to 
enable the Israelis to regain lost ground (175). For a cease-fire 
to be called and for it to hold required not only the cooperation 
of the belligerents' backers - the two superpowers - which would 
enable the Council to call for a cease-fire - but would also 
require the parties (Israel, Egypt and Syria) to have come to a 
stage in their hostilities where a cease-fire would appeal to them 
all. Inevitably, these two requirements did not coincide for a 
considerable length of time. With increasing Arab losses the 
Soviets sought a cease-fire and invited Secretary of State 
Kissinger to Moscow. The result of this diplomacy was a joint 
superpower sponsored resolution which was virtually forced through 
the Council on a take it or leave it basis (176). The resolution 
simply called upon the parties to "terminate all military 
activity" no later than 12 hours after the resolution's adoption 
and then to implement resolution 242 (177). The resolution 
appeared to be adopted as a provisional measure under Article 40 
but without an express or implied finding (178) under Article 39 
it is doubtful whether it could be classified as a mandatory 
decision (179). 
Nevertheless, although the Arabs were in retreat, Israel had 
not yet accomplished its political and military objectives and so 
there was a time-lag between the superpower sponsored call for a 
cease-fire and all the combatants accepting it. Non-compliance 
with the cease-fire resulted in another United States/Soviet Union 
proposed resolution (180), which confirmed the Security Council's 
previous "decision" and urged the forces to return to the 
positions they occupied at the moment the cease-fire had been 
called for (181). 
However, continued fighting brought about threats of 
superpower intervention (182) and the consequent danger of 
escalation into a global conflict (183). The situation was 
rescued by the seven Non Aligned members of the Council (184), who 
intoduced resolution 340 on October 25. It "demanded" an 
immediate cease-fire, "decided" to set up, under Council 
authority, a United Nations Emergency Force, and, in the meantime, 
requested the Secretary General to increase the number of UNTSO 
observers on each side. 
The Secretary General interpreted UNEF II's mandate as 
requiring supervision of the implementation of the cease-fire 
called for in resolution 340. He also outlined the general 
characteristics of the force on a similar basis to UNEF I, in that 
it must operate with the full cooperation of the parties; have 
freedom of movement and communications; use force only in 
self-defence including self-defence against "resistance to 
attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its 
duties.. "; and "in performing its functions, the force will act 
with complete impartiality and avoid actions which could prejudice 
the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned... " 
(185). 
The latter phrase suggests that UNEF II was in the nature of 
a provisional measure - or more correctly would not interfere with 
the positions of the parties under the provisional measures 
(cease-fire and withdrawal) it was to supervise. Article 40 would 
seem to be the origin of UNEF, but although resolution 340 could 
be interpreted as a mandatory demand for compliance with 
provisional measures, UNEF II could not be interpreted as an 
enforcement measure. As we have seen there is no necessary 
equation between a mandatory Chapter VII resolution under Article 
40 and the establishment of an enforcement agency. The emphasis 
on consent and self-defence indicates the 
non-enforcement nature of UNEF II (186). 
essentially 
However, UNEF II differed from UNEF I in that it originated 
in the Security Council whereas the latter was authorized by the 
Assembly, although both were concerned with the supervision of 
provisional measures. The permanent members (187) worried about 
the predictably of the Assembly were concerned to keep 
peacekeeping in the Council, and not to allow the Secretary 
General to have effective control over peacekeeping operations. 
Any alterations of the functions would require the agreement of 
the Council which renewed UNEF's mandate every six months in order 
to keep a tight rein on the situation (188). 
Apart from Council control UNEF II appeared little different 
from UNEF I. However, the fact of Council control seems to have 
led some members to assert that UNEF II's position on Egyptian 
territory was stronger than that of UNEF I. The representative of 
the United States referred to withdrawal only occurring "when the 
Council so decides" (189). This was probably prompted by a fear 
of host state consent being withdrawn in similar circumstances to 
that of Egypt's in 1967. However, it is doubtful if UNEF II's 
presence somehow limited Egypt's or Israel's sovereignty (190) 
which would prevent their denial of consent at some future point 
leading to UNEF II's withdrawal. The only event which would 
prevent withdrawal under these circumstances would be if the 
Council changed UNEF II's mandate into one of enforcement which 
obviously does not require consent. As we shall see UNEF II's 
withdrawal arose under different circumstances to UNEF I's. 
(v). UNDOF 1974-present 
Whereas UNEF II was interposed between Egypt and Israel on 
the initiative of the Council following the 1973 conflict, on the 
Syrian front the parties accepted the cease-fire and negotiated 
their own Disengagement Agreement which called for the 
establishment of UNDOF to supervise it. The Security council 
approved the establishment of UNDOF in resolution 350 on May 31 
1974, again exercising tight control by giving UNDOF short, 
renewable mandate periods of six months. 
The Council approved the Secretary General's report (191) 
which interpreted UNDOF's functions as the supervision of 
disengagement and the observation of cease-fire lines. The 
general principles governing UNDOF would be the same as UNEF II 
(192). 
UNDOF's constitutional origin is basically the same as UNEF's 
- 
the supervision, with the consent of the parties, of provisional 
measures adopted under Article 40 of the Charter by the Council, 
and in this case embodied in an agreement between the parties. 
(vi). UNIFIL 1978-present 
Israel invaded southern Lebanon in March 1978 (193). The 
Security Council responded with resolution 425 on 19 March which 
expressed grave concern at "the deterioration of the situation 
.. 
and its consequences for international peace". It called on 
Israel to "cease its military action" and to withdraw its forces 
from Lebanese territory. The resolution also established UNIFIL 
at the request of the Lebanese government to confirm Israeli 
withdrawal and then to ensure "the effective restoration of 
Lebanese sovereignty" (194). This remains UNIFIL's mandate to 
date. 
The Secretary General interpreted the Council's mandate as 
authorizing him to establish a peacekeeping force based on UNEF II 
and UNDOF, with UNIFIL acting only in self-defence, persuing a 
neutralist approach of not undertaking "the responsibilities of 
the Lebanese Governnment" and being under the exclusive control of 
the Security Council (195). 
By basing UNIFIL firmly on the consensual type peacekeeping 
of UNEF and UNDOF the Council and Secretary General made it clear 
that enforcement was not contemplated. Resolution 425 contained a 
non-mandatory call for provisional measures based on Article 40. 
However, when Israel and various other factions in southern 
Lebanon prevented the second part of UNIFIL's mandate from being 
fulfilled (196) various members of the Council (197) referred to 
Article 25. Even if such references could somehow make resolution 
425 retroactively mandatory, such an effect would only make the 
call for provisional measures mandatory, it would in no way affect 
the functions of UNIFIL in supervising those measures. UNIFIL's 
mandate remains dependent on cooperation. The question of whether 
the provisional measures are mandatory or not only goes to the 
effectivness of those measures, and not to the nature of the force 
set up to supervise them. 
UNIFIL was based on other inter-state peacekeeping forces 
because at the time the situation was viewed essentially as a 
dispute between Israel and Lebanon. However, it became 
increasingly clear that Lebanon was in a state of civil war with 
various factions, including foreign states such as Syria, having 
more power and influence than the central government (198). This 
made UNIFIL'S mandate unrealistic - it should have been more 
adapted to deal with an intra-state conflict as ONUC was in the 
Congo. Although the Security Council had, in the case of UNFICYP, 
changed a peacekeeping force's functions from being of an 
intra-state nature to being of an inter-state nature, it has not 
yet been prepared to change UNILFIL's essentially inter-state 
structure. This, in turn, has greatly impeded UNIFIL's success in 
implementing its mandate. 
3. Conclusions as to the Constitutional Basis of Peacekeeping 
Forces 
Generally, both observation teams and peacekeeping forces are 
established as corollaries to the adoption of provisional measures 
(199). Such teams or forces provide the machinery by which 
provisional measures become acceptable to the parties, as well as 
providing the means by which compliance with such measures can be 
monitored (200). Since peacekeeping follows the adoption of 
provisional measures, it follows that the logical basis in the 
Charter for the power to create peacekeping forces lies in Article 
40. This presents no problem for forces authorized by the 
Security Council; for those authorized by the General Assembly, 
voluntary provisional measures as operated by the Council in its 
interpretation of Article 40, are encompassed by the wide 
recommendatory powers granted to the Assembly under Articles 10, 
11 and 14. 
Observation, supervision and enforcement are the three levels 
of military involvement by the United Nations. Peacekeeping, at 
the most, involves the first two, although the boundary between 
the last two is very narrow when a peacekeeping force, such as 
ONUC, is authorized to enforce provisional measures under Article 
40. Depending on how wide the provisional measures have been 
drawn, such enforcement can be little different from full 
enforcement action either of a mandatory kind authorized under 
Article 42 or of a recommendatory kind authorized under Article 
39. Nevertheless, true peacekeeping, whether observation or 
observation and supervision, is based on consent and cooperation 
and is therefore not affected by the mandatory or non-mandatory 
nature of the provisional measures which are antecedent to the 
establishment of a force. Since peacekeeping depends on host 
state consent, the withdrawal of that consent means the effective 
and legal termination of the operation. To continue would be to 
convert the peacekeeping operation into an enforcement action. 
Also, because peacekeeping does not involve enforcement, it can be 
clearly authorized by the General Assembly as well as by the 
Security Council, for generally, the Security Council is the only 
organ authorized to call for mandatory enforcement action. 
However, it is arguable that the Assembly, by a combination of its 
practice as regards Korea and the Uniting for Peace procedure, has 
the authority to recommend enforcement action. Thus, 
theoretically, the Assembly has the power to change a force's 
mandate from peacekeeping to enforcement. 
With the Non Aligned now in the majority in the Assembly 
there has arisen political and financial pressure from the 
permanent members of the Security Council, particularly the 
superpowers, to keep the peacekeeping function of the United 
Nations within the sole ambit of the Council. This appears to be 
the trend with the Assembly having only created three peacekeeping 
forces 
- 
UNSCOB, UNEF I and UNSF since 1945 and none since the 
mid-1960's. A significant aspect of the polarization of the 
peacekeeping function towards the Security Council is the 
limitation it has produced on the power of the Secretary General. 
He is no longer the main instigator and controller of peacekeeping 
operations; instead, he is now the administrator of the force and 
is answerable on a regular basis to the Security Council, although 
he still takes initiatives with the consent of the Council. This 
involves a move away from a liberal interpretation of Article 99 
to a more literal one. 
Finally, the functions and mandate of a peacekeeping force 
are affected by the nature of the conflict and if a force is given 
a mandate unsuited to the type of conflict in which it is 
positioned it will be unable to achieve its purposes. A 
peacekeeping force in a civil war situation, particularly an 
internationalized civil war, requires a mandate verging on 
enforcement. It was only by giving ONUC this mandate, that the 
United Nations was able to prevent a permanent factionalization of 
the Congo. To deny it de facto enforcement powers is to render it 
ineffective for the purposes of fulfilling its mandate. 
Peacekeeping in an inter-state conflict is much easier to carry 
out and probably, therefore, is authorised more readily by the 
United Nations, requiring a UNEF-type mandate. Observation by 
itself, however, is generally equally suitable to both inter and 
intra-state conflicts. 
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(197) SCOR, 33rd year, 2085 mtg, 18.9.1978, p. 3, US rep': "My 
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(198) See Franck supra note (119) at p. 177. 
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(200) See representative of Indonesia, SCOR, 28th year, 1750 
mtg, 25.10.1973. For an analysis of the functions of 
peacekeeping forces and observer teams see Bowett 
pp. 267-274. For an indeterminate overview of the 
constitutional basis of such forces see Bowett 
pp. 274-312. 
CHAPTER 9 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PEACEKEEPING 
We have already seen from Chapter 7 that peacekeeping is 
limited by the global distribution of power blocs so that it is 
confined to the "intermediate areas" of the world, although 
observation, since it is less intrusive, may be authorised nearer 
to a "power frontier" than a full peacekeeping force (1). 
Given this significant global limitation on the effectiveness 
of peacekeeping, we will now confine the analysis of effectiveness 
to those areas in which peacekeeping has actually been authorised. 
Such an examination will entail an analysis of each force's 
success in fulfilling its mandate accompanied by a discussion on 
the effect that peacekeeping has on the final resolution of a 
dispute. The determination of the success of peacekeeping, per 
se, should be strictly confined to the purposes for which it was 
created, which are often very limited (2), and do not generally 
extend to the peacemaking process. Nevertheless, because 
peacekeeping has an effect on peacemaking it would be salient to 
ascertain that effect. 
1. United Nations Observation Teams 
UN Observers in Indonesia 1947-1950 
We have seen that the United Nations observers were given a 
broad mandate to lend assistance to the Consular Commission, the 
Good Offices Committee and the United Nations' Commission on 
Indonesia. These bodies were assigned the task of achieving an 
end to hostilities between the Dutch and the Indonesians and of 
facilitating a rapid progress towards Indonesian independence. 
The observers, through fulfilling their mandate of reporting on 
each stage, contributed to the eventual success in achieving these 
objectives (3). This is perhaps one of the few cases where 
peacekeeping and peacemaking went hand-in-hand. Wiseman agrees 
that the observers ".. played a key role in guiding events to the 
ultimate transfer of sovereignty to .. Indonesia " (4). 
(ii) UNSCOB 1947-1954 
Only one of UNSCOB's functions was observation, the others 
were set out in General Assembly resolution 109, namely, to 
promote the cessation of external support for the Greek guerrillas 
and the establishment of normal diplomatic and friendly relations 
in combination with the pacific settlement of frontier incidents. 
Most of these objectives had been achieved by the mid-1950's, 
although it is doubtful whether UNSCOB's observation team made any 
great contribution to this. It was severely limited by only 
having Western support which resulted in its presence on Greek 
soil only. The detailed reports of the observers (5) certainly 
cannot be said to have impeded the solution of the problem, but 
because UNSCOB was motivated by Cold War factors, they can have 
had little influence on events (6). Yugoslavia's defection from 
the Communist camp, it should be pointed out, was of far greater 
significance (7). 
iii UNTSO 1949-present 
The continuing functions of UNTSO are those of observation 
and reporting. Its success should be measured in the fulfilment 
of these functions which it has done admirably since the 1949 
armistice (8). UNTSO, like all peacekeeping operations, was not 
designed to stop wars and so its effectiveness should not be 
measured by the frequency with which conflicts occur in the Middle 
East. 
Indeed, it is precisely because of that frequency that UNTSO 
is so important. This was amply illustrated on the outbreak of 
the Yom Kippur War in 1973. The Secretary General reported to the 
Council that Egypt had struck first (9). Egypt had asserted the 
opposite (10), but so accurate was the Secretary General's report 
that the Egyptian government abandoned its version (11). At a 
time of heightened international tension with the danger of 
hostilities escalating, the correct ascertainment of the facts was 
essential. 
A body of UNTSO observers was sent to Beirut in 1982 by the 
Security Council (12) to observe on three things; namely, the 
multinational force, Israeli withdrawal, and the situation in the 
refugee camps (13). Known as the Observer Group in Beirut (OGB), 
their success has been summarised thus, 
"In dangerous and very difficult circumstances 
they have maintained their observation and 
patrolling activities, particularly during the 
recent heavy fighting in and around Beirut. 
Although their numbers are small and unarmed, 
the observers are an important source of 
information in a most sensitive area. The 
presence of OGB in and around the city also 
represents the concern of the international 
community and its desire to be of assistance 
to the heavily afflicted people of the area. " 
(14) 
The function of the Observer Group in Beirut is observation and it 
has been successful in fufilling that. However, its presence has 
contributed little to decreasing the lawlessness in the city 
evidenced by kidnappings, street fighting and starvation in the 
refugee camps leading to Syrian military intervention in February 
1987 (15). 
(iv) UNMOGIP 1949-present 
UNMOGIP successfully carried out its mandate of observing the 
cease-fire line in Kashmir. Although its presence may well have 
helped to restrain the parties (16), the cease-fire line was 
breached in 1965 and 1971 during conflicts on a wider front than 
that patrolled by UNMOGIP (17). Nevertheless, the 1965 
hostilities and in particular the 1971 conflict were not disputes 
directly over the status of Kashmir and so it appears to be a 
reasonable assumption that without UNMOGIP there may well have 
been more wars over the disputed area. 
Paradoxically, although UNMOGIP may have contributed 
effectively to preventing either side from resorting to force to 
settle their dispute, it has effectively helped to cement the 
status quo during which the dispute is unlikely to be resolved. 
The cease-fire patrolled by UNMOGIP is seen by both sides as 
preferable to either of them giving concessions following 
diplomatic negotiations. Peacekeeping has had the effect of 
making provisional measures permanent by hindering the peacemaking 
process. On the other hand, it has helped to prevent the evil of 
war (18). 
ýL UNOGIL 1958 
UNOGIL observed and reported that there was no significant 
infiltration of Lebanon from the United Arab Republic (19) and to 
that extent it had fulfilled the terms of its mandate. However, 
on a wider view, its reports did not prevent military intervention 
by the United States, although its continued presence along with 
the American marines in addition to the establishment of a new 
government under General Chehab, probably had the effect of 
stabilising the situation (21). 
Again there is a wide gulf between the relative success of 
the united Nations group in fulfilling its mandate and the 
relative failure of any wider, "knock on" effects such as pacific 
settlement which the Security Council may have hoped for when it 
created UNOGIL. One cannot help thinking that the enabling 
resolutions do not state all the purposes of such a force. The 
mandate is deliberately limited because that is all that can be 
achieved practically and any greater impact on the situation that 
might be hoped for is too uncertain to be mentioned. 
vi UNSF 1962-1963 
UNSF was wholly successful in fulfilling its mandate. It 
managed to secure an effective cease-fire on West Irian in just 
over one month (22). It then went on to effectively maintain law 
and order during the transition period as well as completing the 
establishment of a viable police force capable of taking over on 
UNTEA's withdrawal (23). Such success was guaranteed by the 
complete cooperation of the parties who had agreed on the pacific 
settlement of the dispute. Nevertheless, UNSF, which was 
withdrawn in 1963, had little influence on the refusal by 
Indonesia to hold a plebiscite before 1970 as agreed with the 
Netherlands (24). Although a solution to the dispute was achieved 
it was not the solution intended. 
vii UNYOM 1962-1963 
UNYOM had a very limited purpose, namely the observation and 
certification of the Disengagement Agreement. "The parties 
themselves" were "totally responsible for fulfilling the terms of 
the disengagement" (25). Nevertheless, UNYOM was too small even 
to carry out its limited mandate (26). UNYOM not only failed in 
this respect, but after its departure in September 1964, the civil 
war continued for several years with the continuing involvement of 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia (27). 
viii UNIPOM 1965-1966 
UNIPOM was concerned with overseeing the implementation of 
the cease-fire and withdrawal orders of the Security Council along 
the international frontier beyond Kashmir. The observers worked 
well in helping to implement the cease-fire between forces which 
were sometimes only 50 metres apart (28), although sporadic 
fighting continued for some time. 
Nevertheless, before UNIPOM could supervise the cease-fire 
both parties had to agree upon it (29). As with all peacekeeping 
initiatives, success depends on the parties accepting and 
maintaining a cease-fire. On January 10 1966 a solution to the 
conflict, apart from the area of Kashmir, was agreed by the 
parties at Tashkent, whereby all the military personnel of India 
and Pakistan would be withdrawn to positions held before August 5 
1965. The withdrawal, under UNIPOM's supervision was carried out 
on schedule (30). Peacekeeping was accomapanied by peacemaking on 
this occasion although it must be remembered that the central 
problem of Kashmir remained requiring the continued presence of 
the United Nations in the form of UNMOGIP. 
2. United Nations Peacekeeping Forces 
(j) UNEF 1 1956-1967 
UNEF I's mandate had four aspects; to secure the cease-fire 
which was rapidly achieved with the cooperation of the parties to 
the conflict (31); to supervise the withdrawal of foreign troops 
which was achieved relatively slowly due to the reticence of 
Britain and France (32); and to patrol the armistice lines. As 
regards the latter, UNEF took over most of UNTSO's patrols and was 
reasonably efficient taking into account Israel's repudiation of 
the Israeli-Egyptian Armistice in 1956 and its consequent 
withdrawal from the Mixed Armistice Commission (33). Israel's 
withdrawal from the Commission had a potential influence on the 
fourth aspect of UNEF's mandate, namely to observe the Armistice 
Agreement. Nevertheless, although no longer recognising the 
Agreement de jure, Israel continued to recognise it de facto (34), 
which contributed to UNEF's success in reducing the number of 
fedayeen raids from the Gaza Strip and in keeping the number of 
border incidents to a minimum level during the force's stay (35). 
UNEF I "ranked among the most effective of United Nations' 
peacekeeping operations" (36) in that it not only fulfilled its 
mandate, but also helped to secure over a decade of relative peace 
in the Middle East. On the other hand, it could be said that UNEF 
I did not contribute anything towards a peaceful solution of even 
part of the Middle Eastern question. One could perhaps go further 
and argue that the parties, particularly Egypt, used the decade in 
which UNEF was in situ as a breathing space in which it rearmed in 
preparation for the next conflict, using the UNEF's buffer to hide 
behind. Certainly UNEF's contribution to peace was severly 
questioned when President Nasser withdrew Egypt's consent to the 
presence of UNEF which led to its withdrawal; an action which, in 
itself, suggested that Egypt no longer wanted peace and therefore 
no longer required UNEF. Despite arguments to the effect that 
Egypt had no right to withdraw consent (37), it is doubtful 
whether a peacekeeping force could remain on a state's territory 
without that state's consent. This represents a severe limitation 
on the effectiveness of the peacekeeping function as a whole, a 
fact recognised by Higgins, 
"In spite of the manner of its withdrawal, it 
is hard to see, given the jealous protection 
of its sovereign rights by UN Members, that it 
will be possible in any future peacekeeping 
operations to provide any different basis for 
the presence of UN forces. Those nations who 
complained in 1967 that UNEF's withdrawal was 
'taking away the umbrella when it began to 
rain' were the same nations who in 1956 
accepted as realistic the basis of UNEF's 
presence in Egypt. Nor would they be likely 
to accept a UN force on their own territory 
with any lesser degree of ultimate control. " 
(38) 
ii ONUC 1960-1964 
The effectiveness of ONUC in fulfilling its mandate can be 
determined by examining the Secretary General's report on the 
implementation of the Security Council's resolutions relating to 
the Congo (39). He refers to the purposes listed (a) to (e) in 
Council resolution 169 (40). 
As regards the directive to ONUC to maintain the territorial 
integrity and political independence of the Congo, the Secretary 
General states that the most serious threat to this was from the 
Katangese secessionists. Although integrity was restored in a 
"symbolic" sense in August 1960 with Tshombe's consent to ONUC's 
entry into Katanga, further secessionist activities meant that the 
full integration of the province was only achieved when a public 
renunciation of secession was announced by Tshombe combined with 
the complete freedom of movement achieved by ONUC throughout 
Katanga, the neutralization and disarming of the Katangese 
gendarmerie, the elimination of Katange's airforce and the flight 
of the mercenaries (41). 
In relation to assisting the Congolese government in the 
restoration and maintenance of law and order, the Secretary 
General notes that until the formation of a recognisable central 
government in August 1961, ONUC was unsuccessful in this part of 
its mandate. After that date, particularly with the termination 
of Katanga's secession, ONUC restored law and order to the whole 
of the Congo by 1963. The formation of a central government 
acceptable to all the parties, including, eventually, Katanga, 
also helped ONUC to carry out successfully the third part of its 
mandate 
- 
the prevention of civil war in the Congo. The ending of 
the Katangese provincial government's secession necessarily 
entailed ONUC effectively carrying out the fourth part of its 
mandate, namely, the removal of foreign military and paramilitary 
personnel and mercenaries. 
It can be seen from the above that ONUC's success depended 
heavily on it ending the Katangese secession and as we have seen 
(42), ONUC's operation to carry this out came perilously close to 
being enforcement action. It is submitted that ONUC was 
successful because it overstepped basic peacekeeping principles. 
Its mandate was so widely drawn that its fulfilment entailed going 
beyond the maintenance of the status quo, which is the normal 
purpose of peacekeeping forces, to providing a solution to the 
conflict. In the case of intra-state conflict there is a great 
deal to be said for combining peacekeeping with peacemaking, 
otherwise the force will be faced with intractable problems, as 
are facing UNIFIL today. 
From the once disintegrating Congo there has arisen a stable 
African state, Zaire, a fact that must, in part, be due to the 
United Nations' operation in the Congo (43). Lefever provides a 
reasonable synopsis of ONUC's contribution to international peace, 
"The Congo peacekeeping effort was a novel, 
controversial, and less-than- efficient 
enterprise. It made many small mistakes. It 
was assailed on all sides. It precipitated a 
financial crisis for the United Nations. But 
in the final analysis, the UN force must be 
judged on its contribution to international 
stability, regardless of what other interests 
might have been served. So judged, the 
mission succeeded. It contributed to peace 
and security in Central Africa and in the 
wider world. " (44) 
In terms of its contribution to the settlement of a crisis and to 
international peace, ONUC must be judged one of the most, if not 
the most, successful peacekeeping operation by the United Nations. 
iii UNFICYP 1964-present 
In the period 1964 to 1974, UNFICYP, after initial 
difficulties (45), succeeded in securing a virtual end to the 
fighting on the island (46), although its attempts at creating a 
return to normal conditions on Cyprus were a limited success (47). 
As early as 1967, the Secretary General warned that excessive 
confidence in the presence of UNFICYP had reduced the parties' 
willingness to negotiate a settlement (48). 
Thus in the period before the Turkish invasion, UNFICYP's 
major preoccupation was to try to maintain the status quo on the 
island (49). This remained its position towards the new status 
quo imposed on the island following the Turkish invasion and 
occupation of the northern part of the island in 1974. UNFICYP 
was powerless to prevent the invasion, instead its functions were 
changed to that of a buffer force. In carrying out its revised 
mandate successfully, UNFICYP has helped to entrench the post 1974 
position on the island (50). 
The Security Council has encouraged peacemaking through the 
Secretary General's good offices and has called upon all states 
not to recognise any Cypriot state other than the Republic of 
Cyprus (51). A parallel can be drawn with the Congo situation 
where the Council was also concerned to keep the nation intact. 
However, in that case the Council took positive action through its 
peacekeeping force to maintain the integrity of the Congo, whereas 
UNFICYP is used to maintain a division of the island state whilst 
any progress towards reintegration must come about via separate 
peacemaking attempts by the Secretary General (52). 
The Security Council continues to renew UNFICYP's mandate on 
a six monthly basis (53). This must be explained by a belief held 
by the Council that to remove UNFICYP might lead to war not only 
between the two Cypriot communities but also involving Turkey and 
Greece, rather than being based on the Secretary General's 
optimism. In his recent reports to the Council on UNFICYP (54), 
the Secretary General states that the continued presence of 
DNFICYP on the island is indispensable, both in helping to 
maintain calm on the island and in creating conditions in which a 
search for a peaceful settlement could best be persued. The 
evidence is that UNFICYP, rather than creating conditions for 
peacemaking, is in fact detrimental to it. The reasons for this 
dysfunction are explained by Franck, 
"... neither the Turkish nor the Greek 
Cypriot community wishes to see the force 
removed. To each side, while the status quo 
is highly unsatisfactory, all but one of the 
alternatives is worse. The alternative, 
outright victory over the other side, would be 
extremely costly and is probably beyond the 
military capacity of either side. The 
respective governments in Athens, Ankara, and 
in the two Cypriot communities are realistic 
enough to know this, but are also politically 
aware that, were the UN not in the way, they 
would come under irresistible pressure from 
their own supporters to attempt a military 
solution. Thus UNFICYP, and other UN 
peacekeepers, also serve as a convenient 
excuse for governments not to persue 
popularity by courting disaster. "(55) 
It must be remembered that whereas peacekeeping may well prevent 
peacemaking, it does hinder war. It does not prevent war, 
however, as the Turkish invasion of 1974 vividly illustrates. 
IN) UNEF II 1973-1979 
For the six year period of its presence UNEF II successfully 
implemented its mandate of observing and supervising the 
cease-fire between Egypt and Israel (56). In his penultimate 
report to the Security Council on UNEF II (57), Secretary General 
Waldheim repeated his usual finding that, 
"The situation in the area of operations has 
remained stable. The force has continued 
efficiently to discharge its mandate and, with 
the cooperation of both parties, it has been 
able to contribute to the maintenance of the 
cease-fire called for by the Security Council 
in resolution 338 (1973). "(58) 
UNEF II had the potential to join ONUC as a fully successful 
peacekeeping force, not only in terms of fulfilling its mandate, 
but also of contributing to the ultimate solution of the dispute. 
The Camp David Accords leading to a Peace Treaty between Egypt and 
Israel on March 26 1979 provided for a continued United Nations' 
presence to oversee the implementation of the Treaty (59). 
Several factors prevented this, namely, the fact that the treaty 
was negotiated outside the United Nations set most of the Members 
against a continued United Nations' presence (60) and also the 
fact that the United States' sponsoring of the talks represented 
the final stage in Egypt's move away from Moscow to Washington 
(61). The Soviet Union was thus unwilling to alter the mandate of 
UNEF II to enable it to supervise a treaty between two states 
friendly to the United States (62). This is illustrative of the 
political factors which hamper the effectiveness of peacekeeping 
(63), particularly when it comes to a decision whether to change a 
force's mandate. Instead, a United States' backed, 
Western-in-composition, Multinational Force was created for the 
purpose (64). 
(yZ UNDOF 1974-present 
UNDOF has performed its functions of supervising the 
Disengagement Agreement between Israel and Syria very effectively 
to the present day, although there is no sign of a solution to the 
dispute over the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights. 
Nevertheless, although a final pacific settlement is not on the 
horizon, the ability of UNDOF to help prevent the parties going to 
war is perhaps a more important factor in an area where escalation 
is a distinct possibility. Israel has invaded the Lebanon twice 
since the establishment of UNDOF, in 1978 and 1982. The fact that 
Syria was not sucked into a conflict which could, in turn, have 
drawn in the superpowers, is due, to a considerable extent, to 
UNDOF's presence. 
After the Israeli invasion in 1978, the Secretary General was 
able to report that the "situation in the Israel-Syria sector 
remained quiet and there was no incidents of a serious nature". 
UNDOF's fortnightly inspections of areas designated as containing 
limited armaments and troops by the Disengagement Agreement, 
accompanied by liaison officers from Syria and Israel, probably 
facilitated the diffusion of the situation by preventing a 
build-up of arms by either party (65). 
UNDOF apparently had a similar effect following the June 1982 
invasion of Lebanon by Israel. The situation was summarized by 
the Secretary General as follows, 
"Despite the present quiet in the Israel-Syria 
sector, the situation in the Middle East as a 
whole continues to be potentially dangerous 
and is likely to remain so 
... 
In the 
prevailing circumstances, I consider the 
continued presence of UNDOF in the area is 
essential. "(66) 
The value of UNDOF in preventing escalation probably far outweighs 
its encouragement of the "frozen status quo" (67) and stalemate in 
the area (68). 
vii UNIFIL 1978-present 
Although Israel withdrew by the end of April 1978, the second 
part of UNIFIL's mandate - the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty 
- 
was (and is) almost impossible to achieve given the state of 
virtual civil war in southern Lebanon and the inability of the 
profoundly weak Lebanese government to assume any sort of 
responsibility for the area (69). Again a contrast can be made 
with the situation in the Congo in 1960-1961 when ONUC took 
positive, almost enforcement, action to end a civil war until a 
stronger central government could be established. UNIFIL's 
mandate, however, is one of peacekeeping, not of 
quasi-enforcement, and therein lies its weakness, for a solution 
to the problem is not feasible unless UNIFIL is given a mandate to 
enforce the peace (70), a mandate which is currently politically 
and militarily unachievable. Although the Security Council has 
threatened further action to ensure the full implementation of 
resolution 425 (71), it has, up to now, been content merely to 
renew UNIFIL's original mandate, composition and functions (72). 
Although it did not facilitate a restoration of Lebanese 
sovereignty, UNIFIL was successful in negotiating a cease-fire 
between Israel and the PLO which lasted from July 1981 to April 
1982 (73). However, this success was shortlived for whereas the 
PLO regarded the cease-fire as confined to the Israeli-Lebanese 
border, the Israeli authorities interpreted the agreement as 
proscribing all hostile measures against Israeli or Jewish targets 
overseas (74). So when on June 3 1982 Israel's ambassador in 
London was shot by Arab gunmen, the precarious cease-fire 
collapsed and Israel commenced operation "Peace for Galilee" (75) 
by invading Lebanon. 
Israel forewarned UNIFIL of its action (76) and passed 
through the force's lines. Neither UNIFIL's mandate, nor size, 
nor armaments, enabled it to resist (77). With Israel pushing 
further into Lebanon, UNIFIL's original mandate was impossible to 
achieve, nevertheless, the Council renewed its mandate, while 
directing it, during the period of Israel's occupation, to 
undertake humanitarian assistance to the population of southern 
Lebanon (78). 
Throughout UNIFIL's stay, its mandate has always remained 
that of supervising a withdrawal of Israeli forces and of securing 
a restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. This remains a forlorn 
hope because even when Israel withdrew it established a security 
zone in southern Lebanon, south of the Litani river, policed by 
the Israeli-backed Southern Lebanese Army. At times there have 
been suggestions as to how UNIFIL could carry out the second part 
of its mandate. In one report (79), the Secretary General 
suggested that the Council should consider making UNIFIL's mandate 
more effective by allowing it to be temporarily deployed with 
elements of the Lebanese army and internal security forces. This 
would, to a certain extent, put UNIFIL at the disposal of the 
Lebanese government and could conceivably create an ONUC-type 
situation in which UNIFIL may be required to expel forcefully 
foreign military elements in order to fulfil its mandate. His 
hopes were dashed, however, when Israel adopted search and destroy 
tactics in February 1985 after being attacked by Lebanese 
resistance groups. UNIFIL was again powerless to prevent this. 
The Secretary General contradicted his earlier suggestion of 
adopting a changed mandate when he reported on the Israeli 
measures, 
"There is no easy solution to the dilemna of 
UNIFIL. To withdraw the force would not be in 
the interests of the Government and of the 
people of Lebanon, while to involve it 
actively in the current violence would merely 
create a further complicating factor in the 
already extremely difficult situation. "(80) 
The Security Council continues to renew UNIFIL's mandate on a 
three monthly or six monthly basis on the premise of firm support 
for the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon (81). 
Theoretically, UNIFIL's mandate still includes that aim, 
practically, however, without authorising UNIFIL to use force "in 
the last resort" to fulfil its mandate (82), its functions will be 
severly limited. The Security Council appears unwilling to 
authorize UNIFIL to use force except in strict self-defence 
because it probably does not want to create another ONUC-type 
force, which although successful, severely divided and debilitated 
the United Nations. 
At present UNIFIL's function can be classified as a 
stabilizing one (83) whereas if it had an ONUC-type mandate it 
could actively disarm the various militia, expel foreign elements 
and actively restore Lebanese sovereignty in southern Lebanon 
(84). The problem of Lebanese sovereignty in the north where 
Syria has been in occupation for many years would then have to be 
considered, which would lead to the Soviet Union objecting to any 
action on the part of the United Nations. It is probably in the 
Soviet Union's interest to prevent any alteration of UNIFIL's 
mandate which would allow it to take positive action in the south 
because that might lead to calls for similar action as regards the 
rest of Lebanon. It is in the interests of all the major powers 
not to withdraw UNIFIL, even with its limited mandate, for fear of 
creating a vacuum into which the various factions in southern 
Lebanon would be drawn, leading to a further deterioration and 
possibly internationalization of the civil war (85). 
UNIFIL's soldiers will continue to be killed (86) and its 
mandate unfulfilled, unless all the factions in Lebanon, including 
the Israelis and Syrians, cooperate (87). Such a possibility 
seems remote. The most UNIFIL can hope for is to be a stabilizing 
influence preventing a further and possibly catastrophic 
deterioration of the civil war. 
3.0verview of Q. Effectiveness of Peacekeeping 
As we have seen, generally peacekeeping operations fulfil 
their mandates with the major exception of UNIFIL which is too 
inhibited and too inadequate to fulfil its too widely drawn 
mandate. In addition to this limited success, several United 
Nations' peacekeeping operations have positively contributed to 
the peacemaking process leading to the pacific settlement of the 
dispute. The United Nations' observers in Indonesia, UNSF, 
UNIPOM, ONUC, and to a certain extent, UNEF II, all helped in 
varying degrees to achieve a pacific settlement. However, there 
are several cases of interpositional or inter-state peacekeeping 
in which the mandates of the forces may be fulfilled but, 
"Even a successful UN peacekeeping operation 
is likely to produce a negative concomitant; 
its very success in defusing a confrontation 
conduces to stalemate. "(88) 
UNFICYp, UNMOGIP and UNDOF are examples of peacekeeping forces 
contributing to a frozen status quo. 
Nevertheless, the overall effectiveness of such inter-state 
peacekeeping forces such as UNDOF depends on whether the 
prevention of the conflict is relatively more important in terms 
of international peace than the enhancement of the possibility of 
achieving a peaceful solution. To say that peacekeeping inhibits 
(89) peacemaking denies that in certain cases and certainly in the 
case of UNDOF the keeping of the peace is more important than 
seeking a peaceful solution. Potential peacemaking intiatives 
could involve such a drastic change in the status quo as to lead 
to conflict. 
The solution would be to make peacemaking go hand-in-hand 
with peacekeeping. Often this would appear to be the only 
solution in intra-state conflicts. However, as the case of ONUC 
illustrates, such a solution pushes peacekeeping towards 
enforcement. Again the problem is relative. If UNIFIL was armed 
with an ONUC-type mandate instead of a UNEF-type mandate, it could 
help to make the peace in the Lebanon. However, this would 
necessarily involve the positive use of force which could 
potentially destabilize the situation. Thus UNIFIL might be more 
effective in its present role as a stabilizing influence. 
Nevertheless, the ONUC and UNIFIL experiences show that there is 
no such thing as "peacekeeping" in a civil war. The peace cannot 
be kept in such a situation by merely placing a defensive force in 
the midst of the conflict (UNIFIL), unless that force actively 
persues the attainment of its mandate and uses offensive force, as 
in the case of ONUC. 
There are other factors to be taken account of when assessing 
the effectiveness of peacekeeping and in considering whether the 
emplacement of a peacekeeping force would contribute to 
maintaining the peace. It cannot always be said that the 
emplacement of a peacekeeping force will necessarily prevent 
further conflict and freeze the status quo between the disputants. 
Further hostilities may occur. This factor is illustrated by 
UNFICYP's inability to prevent the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 
1974. In addition the withdrawal of a peacekeeping force may 
unfreeze the status quo resulting in conflict rather than the 
peaceful settlement of a dispute. It may be conceded that the 
presence of a buffer force inhibits the peacemaking process, but 
it also must be conceded that the absence of a peacekeeping force 
increases the likelihood of fresh hostilities breaking out. A 
good example of withdrawal leading to hostilities is the 
occurrence of the Six Day War ensuing upon the withdrawal of UNEF 
I in 1967. 
Given these general propositions derived from experience, the 
effectiveness of each force in terms of international peace and 
security depends on whether the maintenance of the status quo is 
more important than a change in that status. In terms of 
inter-state conflict the "frozen status quo" means military and 
diplomatic statemate, whereas in intra-state conflicts a 
maintenance of the status quo means limiting the level of a civil 
war and preventing it from spreading. In terms of United Nations' 
forces still on station, their effectiveness under the above 
principles can be briefly assessed. 
In the case of UNMOGIP it could be said that by helping to 
maintain the status quo this observer team has inhibited either 
side from taking diplomatic initiatives. If that status quo were 
changed by the withdrawal of the team, the war which may possibly 
follow would probably not escalate to global proportions. 
Previous wars in 1965 and 1971 (which were not prevented by 
UNMOGIP's presence) between India and Pakistan did not escalate. 
The chance that a change in the status quo might produce a 
settlement could be taken on the basis of this analysis. Again in 
the case of UNFICYP, the frozen status quo has quashed the 
possibility of peaceful settlement. A change in that position may 
force the parties to reach a peaceful solution or it may force 
them to war. Such a war, within NATO members, would probably not 
escalate. It did not in 1974. 
However, in the case of UNDOF, the danger of escalation is 
too high to risk changing the stalemate. In 1973, the last time 
Israel and Syria fought directly, there was a very great risk of 
superpower intervention. The same can be said of UNIFIL with the 
risk of an increasing internationalization of the conflict being 
too great to sanction UNIFIL's withdrawal, although it is 
questionable whether UNIFIL is able to prevent the civil war 
spreading anyway. 
By measuring peacekeeping in terms of balancing the 
possibility of peaceful settlement against the possibility of 
escalating conflict, UNDOF and UNIFIL are effective, whereas there 
are doubts about UNFICYP and UNMOGIP. However, all wars are 
destructive and threaten international peace and so to speak 
coldly in terms of non-escalating wars should perhaps lead to the 
conclusion that all peacekeeping operations are successful as long 
as they reduce the risks or effects of war, even though they 
reduce the chances of peaceful settlement, particularly when 
bearing in mind Wiseman's comments quoted in the introduction to 
Part 3 which point out that the propensity to go to war is greater 
than the desire to seek a solution by peaceful means. 
There remains the question of whether the peacekeeping 
function of the United Nations can be improved. As we have seen 
in this chapter, it would be very difficult to improve on the 
effectiveness of a peacekeeping force in situ (90). However, 
effectiveness might be enhanced if the procedure for the 
establishment of such forces were institutionalized instead of 
being of an ad hoc nature. Such a development would be akin to 
the agreements and machinery for United Nations' armed forces 
envisaged in Article 43 (91). However, agreement over 
peacekeeping forces has not materialised for similar reasons as 
those encountered over Article 43, namely disagreements over size, 
stationing, composition, control and whether there should be one 
general mandate for all peacekeeping forces. The General 
Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping established in 1965 
has made very little progress (92) and appears to be unlikely to 
do so. 
It is likely that peacekeeping will continue to progress in 
an incremental fashion based on the Council's crisis management 
technique (93). It will be unlikely that the General Assembly 
will have any significant future contribution to make to 
peacekeeping (94), and while the Secretary General will continue 
to be the chief administrator of peacekeeping forces, the Council 
will not allow him as much freedom as in the past. 
The creation of the United Nations' Transition Group for 
Namibia is the major exception to the Council's crisis management 
approach to peacekeeping. It will depend on South Africa's 
withdrawal and the cooperation of all other parties before it can 
be emplaced. It is based to some extent on UNSF, in other words, 
UNTAG will act both as a peacekeeping force to monitor frontiers 
and as an internal police force to maintain order during Namibia's 
transition to independence (95). Although a welcome move towards 
a more preventative approach to maintaining international peace, 
UNTAG is unlikely to be emplaced during the life of the present 
Pretoria government (96). Nevertheless, if Namibia does achieve 
independence, UNTAG will be able to prevent the occurrence of 
chaos similar to that which followed the Congo's independence in 
1960. The advantage of having a peacekeeping force ready (97) to 
be emplaced at the start of the crisis over an ad hoc force 
created after the crisis has developed is that the situation is 
not allowed to deteriorate to such an extent that mere 
peacekeeping is inadequate and the force, as in ONUC's case, has 
to come close to enforcing the peace. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In terms of substantive powers, the Security Council and the 
General Assembly have undergone something of a role reversal. 
Certainly, when considering recommendatory powers, the General 
Assembly has developed its Charter powers to the extent that one 
can state, with reasonable confidence, that it has a similar range 
of recommendatory powers as the Security Council has under 
Chapters VI and VII. 
Indeed, in geopolitical terms, the General Assembly has a 
wider sphere of operation than the Security Council because 
despite the contents of Article 27(3) of the Charter, the Security 
Council's recommendatory powers have, in practice, been subject to 
the veto, even where one or more of the permanent members are 
parties to the dispute. 
The only doubt hangs over the Assembly's ability to recommend 
enforcement measures. Its power to ask for voluntary sanctions to 
be imposed against a state has not been opposed, to any great 
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extent. The main area of contention is over the question whether 
the General Assembly can recommend enforcement measures of a 
military nature. It did so for a brief time in the Korean war 
when the Soviet Union returned to its permanent seat on the 
Security Council, and it has expressly granted itself the power to 
do so via the Uniting for Peace Resolution. It is this writer's 
opinion that once the Security Council used its inherent power to 
recommend military action, as it did in the Korean case, the 
General Assembly also acquired that power under the principle that 
Articles 10 and 14 give the Assembly the same recommendatory 
powers as the Council. "Action" in Article 11(2) refers to 
mandatory action not recommendatory action. The International 
Court in the Expenses Case did not express anything contrary to 
this opinion although the tenor of the judgement may be felt to go 
against the idea that the Assembly has any power of enforcement. 
The problem is that one can easily distinguish between 
mandatory and recommendatory enforcement action when talking about 
sanctions - voluntary sanctions leave it up to the individual 
Members whereas mandatory sanctions are binding upon all Members. 
The problem remains; is there really a difference between 
recommending military enforcement action and deciding (or making 
mandatory) such action? Could states ever be bound to supply 
troops and weapons and logistical support? The answer to both 
these questions is yes. Articles 42 and 43 provide for mandatory 
military measures under pre-existing agreements under which states 
would be bound to provide forces and support. The fact remains 
that such powers exist in theory only and so, in practice, there 
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only exists the power to recommend military action under Article 
39. Nevertheless, it is still possible to distinguish between 
recommendatory or voluntary military measures and mandatory 
military measures - only the latter is within the exclusive sphere 
of competence of the Security Council (1). 
it follows from the above argument that the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution was unnecessary because all it did was to make express 
the Assembly's inherent powers. To the extent that the Resolution 
recognises the Assembly's power to recommend enforcement action, 
it is merely declaratory, but the doubts as to its legality 
remain. However, these doubts mainly centre on the use of the 
procedural vote in the Council to transfer a matter 
from that body 
to the Assembly using the Uniting for Peace Resolution. 
However, the dispute as to the legitimacy of the procedure of 
the Resolution has drifted into obscurity to some extent. Uniting 
for Peace was invented by the West to be used by it during a 
period of Western domination, to transfer a matter from a Western 
dominated Security Council, where Western votes could easily 
secure a procedural vote in the face of a negative Eastern bloc 
vote, to a Western dominated Assembly where the necessary vote 
could be obtained. However, since the emergence of the Non 
Aligned bloc, the West (or indeed the Soviet bloc) is unlikely to 
want to transfer a matter to the 
General Assembly unless it can be 
sure of Non Aligned support. This usually only arises when one 
superpower has illegally used 
force to maintain its bloc or 
hemispheric solidarity - the other superpower may want to use the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution to transfer a matter to the Assembly 
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where the majority of states are fairly consistent in their 
condemnations of the illegitimate use of force. However, if one 
remembers that the Uniting for Peace Resolution also provides for 
a majority of the Assembly convening an Emergency Special Session, 
in other matters the device of the Resolution is in the hands of 
the Non Aligned majority. This has meant that the Uniting for 
Peace procedure is used in a similar fashion to the device of the 
Special Session provided for in Article 20 of the Charter, namely, 
to extend the duration of the General Assembly's powers beyond the 
annual session. The powers purportedly provided by the Resolution 
are now recognised as inherent and so can be used either in 
annual, special or emergency special meetings. 
Once one has accepted the wide range of powers possessed by 
the Assembly, it can be seen that it is not the subsidiary organ 
as far as non-mandatory powers are concerned. Indeed, in the 
field of disarmament and in the adoption of resolutions embodying 
general principles, the Assembly is paramount. In addition, its 
power of condemnation, used when a state has illegally used force 
against another state, has significant weight, in that, if the 
vast majority of states condemn another state's use of force as 
contrary to the Charter and international law, then although not 
mandatory in terms of the constitutional powers of the General 
Assembly, it is binding to the extent that the resolution reflects 
customary international law. Year after year, since the Soviet 
Union intervened in Afghanistan, the Assembly has condemned this 
use of force as contrary to the principles of the Charter and the 
norms of international law. The United Nations Mediator, Diego 
- 
493 
- 
Cordovez, thus has the weight of the world community as well as 
international law behind his as he gradually helps the parties 
towards a peaceful settlement of the Afghan situation involving a 
withdrawal of Soviet troops (2). 
The problem remains that on occasions the majority in the 
General Assembly is unwilling to condemn a clear breach of 
international law because of political reasons. The initial Iraqi 
"aggression" against Iran in 1980 has remained uncondemned because 
the majority of states do not want to "side" even rhetorically 
with Iran in the war. Yet such a finding might placate the 
Iranians and bring them to the negotiating table -a table at 
which the Iraqis appear willing to sit (3). For the Assembly to 
make a determination of an "act of aggression" may upset the 
permanent members of the Security Council who have recently found 
that the situation in the Gulf is a "breach of the peace" -a more 
neutral finding - but the majority of the Assembly has, in the 
past, felt no qualms about making determinations within the terms 
of Article 39 in advance of the Security Council (4). 
There is recent evidence to suggest that the General Assembly 
is not only, or has the potential, to be effective by the bold use 
of condemnatory resolutions. Its unanimous support for the Costa 
Rican peace plan at its 42nd session was followed by a tentative 
cease-fire between the Contra rebels and the Sandinista government 
in Nicaragua. Hopefully, this will lead to the permanent 
settlement of the conflict (5). One of the reasons why this 
latest peace plan appears to have more chance of success than 
other Contadora proposals is probably 
due to the overwhelming 
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support of the world community expressed by the General Assembly. 
On this occasion the situation required a balanced resolution 
designed at securing maximum support whilst in other cases, such 
as the Gulf War, in which any number of well-balanced resolutions 
have been adopted by the Assembly and by the Council, a 
condemnatory resolution is required. This is not to say that the 
Assembly would be biased towards Iran because its condemnation 
would be based on a clear breach of international law by Iraq. 
The Assembly is often accused of being anti-South African and 
anti-Israeli. The vehemently anti-apartheid resolutions may not 
be conducive to pacific settlement, but they too are based on 
international law - that apartheid is a violation of the 
majority's human rights and a "crime against humanity", that South 
Africa's occupation of Namibia is illegal and that its 
destabilization of surrounding states constitutes a series of 
aggressions and a threat to the peace. The Assembly's 
condemnation of Israel in terms of Zionism being equated with 
racism appears extreme, but one must remember the basic fact that 
Israel's continued occupation of territory gained in the 1967 war 
is illegal. It may be said that such condemnations make the 
Israelis more intransigent, but after years of intransigence there 
is a lot to be said for recognising the Assembly's right to 
express the majority of the world community's views in a 
forthright manner. 
Nevertheless, despite the ever-expanding competence of the 
General Assembly, the ultimate weapon of the United Nations in the 
maintenence of international peace and security, namely, mandatory 
enforcement action, remains in the hands of the Security Council. 
As we have seen, mandatory military action remains on paper only, 
so the ultimate weapon is mandatory economic action under Article 
41 of the Charter (ignoring the recommendation of military 
measures as in Korea -a situation which is unlikely to occur 
again). The Assembly may cajole and demand that the Security 
Council adopt mandatory economic sanctions, it may even make a 
determination that there exists a situation within the terms of 
Article 39 before the Security Council, but it cannot adopt such 
measures itself. So the ultimate weapon of the organization is 
with the Security Council and so is heavily restricted by 
political factors, resulting in mandatory sanctions only being 
imposed against two countries in over 40 years. 
The comprehensive set of mandatory sanctions imposed against 
Southern Rhodesia did not produce such dramatic results so as to 
convince states that they are an adequate alternative to military 
coercion. However, it is this writer's opinion that if the 
political will of the world community had been behind those 
sanctions, a dramatic success could have been achieved. As it 
was, the imposition of sanctions, though it was half-hearted by 
some members, played a large part in the eventual transfer of 
power in Zimbabwe. 
In the case of South Africa, the Security Council, at present 
does not appear to be willing to adopt any wider mandatory 
sanctions than the already leaky (6) arms embargo, in spite of the 
international pressure heaped on the recalcitrant permanent 
members (7). On 10 March 1988, the United States and the United 
Kingdom again vetoed a draft resolution which would have imposed 
selective mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa. The 
representative of the United Kingdom stated that it is up to 
individual states to take what action they considered necessary 
against South Africa (8). This is an unfortunate reaffirmation of 
the approach that eventually led to the demise of the League of 
Nations. The United Nations came into being in the hope that 
collective interests would be paramount over national interests. 
The United Kingdom's view illustrates that the old approach still 
prevails, and this, to a large extent, explains the 
ineffectiveness of the Organization. 
The imposition of mandatory sanctions, whether selective or 
comprehensive, appears to be the next logical and legal step to be 
taken against South Africa. Even if one accepts, and this writer 
does not, that Article 2(7) operates to exclude the system of 
apartheid from being labelled, as in itself, a "threat to the 
peace", then South Africa's continued illegal occupation of 
Namibia and its aggressive destabilizations of neighbouring states 
(9), are sufficient to designate South Africa, as the instigator 
and perpetrator of these actions, as a "threat to the peace". 
South Africa's total disregard of the norms of customary 
international law and of the principles of the Charter accompanied 
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by its intransigent approach to peaceful settlement, require a 
finding under Article 39 that South Africa is a "threat to the 
peace", and require the imposition of mandatory economic 
sanctions. The move into Chapter VII, for better or for worse, 
whether effective or not, should be made by the Security Council 
in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. 
The only move remaining for the Security Council in relation 
to South Africa is the imposition of mandatory sanctions because 
it has nearly reached the top of the gradual scale of severity 
that describes the Council's powers. In other areas, the Council 
is quite correctly dealing with the situation in terms of pacific 
settlement. This is the approach taken as regards the Middle 
East, where the interests of the superpowers suggests that there 
has to be an improvement in their relations, as well as in the 
relations between the Middle Eastern states, before any peaceful 
settlement can be achieved (10). A narrowing of the gap between 
the Soviet Union and the United States on the question of 
Palestinian rights, which forms the core of the Middle Eastern 
problem, is perhaps illustrated by the Council's adoption of a 
resolution deploring the "policies and practices" of 
Israel in the 
Occupied Territories (11). However, the United States abstained 
on the resolution, and has more recently vetoed a 
draft resolution 
(12) which would have called on Israel to accept the applicability 
of the 1949 Geneva Convention concerned with protecting civilians 
in time of war. In addition, it would have called on Israel to 
comply with its obligations under the 
Convention and to desist 
from its policies and practices which violate the human rights of 
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the Palestinians. These recent developments suggest that it will 
be some time before a constructive Security Council approach, 
building on resolution 242 adopted over twenty years ago, is made. 
The Security Council has always benefited from accurate and 
rapid information on the Middle East provided by UNTSO. This 
raises the point whether such observer teams, or indeed 
investigatory bodies under Article 34, should be deployed 
throughout the world. For example a Central American UN team 
could have reported to the Security Council on the facts relating 
to the alleged Nicaraguan "attack" on Honduras which was followed 
by the landing of 3200 United States' troops on March 18 1988 
(13). Such a team would have provided the Security Council with a 
set of objective facts. As it was, the Council sent a team to 
investigate after the event (14), illustrating its crisis 
management technique, which crudely summarised means that the 
Council often meets after hostilities have broken out, and then if 
it can decide on a fact finding body, that body will be sent only 
after hostilities have ended. Fact determination at the time of 
dispute is an essential prerequisite to effective Council action. 
A lack of preventative Security Council action has meant that 
it almost invariably fails to deal adequately with local or 
regional conflicts. On the other hand, it could be argued that it 
has helped to prevent such conflicts from escalating, a good 
example being the initial Security Council inaction during the Yom 
Kippur War in 1973 which soon became positive action including 
peacekeeping measures when the situation 
looked like involving one 
or both superpowers. Indeed, the general corridor 
diplomacy that 
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takes place on a daily basis in the United Nations has helped to 
prevent major wars and possible nuclear annihilation - for example 
during the Cuban Missile crisis in 1962. 
Indeed, the prevention of local conflicts escalating into 
global ones seems to be one of the major purposes behind 
peacekeeping by the United Nations, particularly those forces 
still present in the Middle East - UNIFIL (15) and UNDOF. 
However, other peacekeeping operations such as UNFICYP and UNMOGIP 
seem to serve more limited purposes, principally to prevent the 
reoccurrence of the local conflict. Nevertheless, whether the 
force serves global or regional peace, on the basis that the main 
aim of the United Nations should be the prevention of war, all 
United Nations' peacekeeping operations have been valuable. 
Indeed, with the relaxation in bipolarism, there appears to be 
more potential for UN peacekeeping operations in hitherto 
forbidden areas - in the superpowers hemispheric spheres 
Afghanistan and Central America (16) appear to be possibilities. 
The Nicaraguan request for a United Nations' peacekeeping 
force to patrol its frontier with Honduras as part of a permanent 
cease-fire between the Contras and Nicaragua might not be blocked 
by the United States for several reasons. It might be politically 
unwise for the United States to disturb the peace process which it 
has supported. If it blocks the creation of such a force in the 
Security Council there is the possibility that the General 
Assembly might, to the consternation of all the permanent members, 
reassert its peacekeeping power. Such a move 
by the United States 
might be seen as requiring a reciprocal move 
by the Soviet Union 
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when it withdraws from Afghanistan. However, it may be that the 
United States government will be persuaded by geopolitical reasons 
to block a peacekeeping force following the old tradition that the 
area is within the United States' "backyard" and so any outside 
presence, including that of the United Nations, is unwelcome. To 
do so would be a pity, because the Security Council's future 
greatly depends on it being able to penetrate areas formerly 
beyond its purview. 
However, herein lies the paradox, for to open up large areas 
of the world to effective United Nations' involvement, in other 
words to action by the Security Council as well as condemnation by 
the General Assembly, requires the cooperation of the superpowers. 
This one has come full circle back to the drafting of the United 
Nations' Charter which was undertaken on the premise of Great 
Power cooperation. If such cooperation is not forthcoming over 
potentially escalating situations such as South Africa, Namibia, 
Angola, Vietnam and the Middle East as well as over more regional 
conflicts such as Western Sahara, East Timor, Chad, the Gulf, 
]Kashmir and Cyprus, one must expect the General Assembly to become 
even more divorced from the Security Council by developing its 
powers further to deal with these disputes itself, including 
attempts to re-seize the peacekeeping function. 
The geopolitical factors inhibiting the Security Council must 
be rolled back before the United Nations can become effective in 
maintaining peace and security. Recent superpower cooperation 
will not be sufficient if they merely agree to regularize the 
spheres of influence that have been 
in operation for the past 
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forty years. To do so would make the Non Aligned even more 
antagonistic towards the Security Council. Already the Council is 
viewed as a "private club" to which Non Aligned members are often 
unwelcome. The Non Aligned thus puts its faith in the General 
Assembly which in turn is viewed as anti-Western by Western states 
and with suspicion by the Eastern bloc. 
This antagonism between the two organs has reduced the United 
Nations' ability to act. Much as one may deplore the use of the 
Organization as a Western tool in the first decade of its 
existence, its ability to act effectively by both organs working 
together and complementing each other was shown in the Korean war, 
and to a lesser extent several years later in the Congo. Both 
these situations can be deemed an eventual success as far as the 
achievement of the aims of the United Nations were concerned. 
Both relied on the Assembly continuing the work of the Security 
Council when the Council became paralysed because of geopolitical 
factors. A combination of the Security Council, still 
representing the "teeth" of the Organization, and the General 
Assembly, embodying the "will" of the world community, proved 
effective in those situations. To recreate this dynamism, the gap 
between the two organs must be narrowed (17). 
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(15) See UN Doc, SC res 609 (1988), 29 Jan, mimeograph, which 
extended the force's mandate for a further 6 months 
following the Secretary General's report that the 
situation was basically unchanged, UN Doc, S/19445, 
22.1.1988, mimeograph. 
(16) See supra note (13). 
(17) The current view at the United Nations is that the 
Security Council should be left to deal with matters of 
international peace and security, particularly at regular 
informal and private meetings. The recent practice of 
the Assembly seems to support this; take for instance the 
non-adoption of a resolution on the Gulf War at its 42nd 
session - the idea being that the situation is being 
dealt with by the Security Council. This impression was 
gained from interviews at the United Nations in New York 
with R Zacklin, Principal Officer in the Office of the 
Legal Counsel on 19.4.1988 and D Edwards, Legal 
Counsellor with the UK Mission to the United Nations on 
20.4.1988. 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 
Statistical Analysis of the work of the Security Council in the 
years 1950,1955,1960,1965,1970,1975,1985 
Number of meetings from January 1 to 31 December in each sample 
year 
1950: 71 meetings 
1955: 23 meetings 
1960: 71 meetings 
1965: 81 meetings 
1970: 37 meetings 
1975: 57 meetings 
1985: 73 meetings 
Averse number of speakers per meeting 
Speaker being defined as any representative of a state (member, 
non-member, party, non-party) or organization making a speech 
before the Council not in explanation of vote. 
YEAR NO of SPEAKERS NO of MEETINGS AVERAGE 
1950 186 71 3 
1955 111 23 5 
1960 413 71 6 
1965 344 81 4 
1970 226 37 6 
1975 305 57 5 
1985 561 73 8 
Proportion of invited speakers who are non-members and non-parties 
to the dispute 
I took the number of states (not solely representatives of 
organizations) which were non-members of the Council and 
non-parties to the dispute or situation, and expressed them as a 
proportion of the total number of speakers over the year. The 
percentage includes states appearing on a "double mandate", namely 
speaking for themselves and for a group, as long as they were 
non-members and non-parties, but it does not include organizations 
per se. 
YEAR NO of PARTIES NO of % of INVITED 
(NON-MEMBERS) SPEAKERS SPEAKERS BEING 
(NON-PARTIES) NON-PARTIES AND 
NON-MEMBERS 
1950 0 186 0 
1955 0 111 0 
1960 28 413 7 
1965 50 344 15 
1970 39 226 13 
1975 75 305 25 
1985 279 561 50 
APPENDIX 2 
Matters currently seized by the Security Council 
Persuant to rule 11 of the provisional rules of procedure of the 
Security Council, the Secretary General submits the list of items 
with which the Security Council is currently seized. UN Doc, 
S/16880,7.1.1985, mimeograph, has been used as the principal 
source of the information below. It contains a list of matters 
still seized by the Security Council up to 1.1.1985. This has 
been updated by using the lists of new items seized by the 
Security Council contained in "Resolutions and Decisions of the 
Security Council" 1985 at p. 29,1986 at p. 22 and 1987 p. 16. I 
have edited the list to exclude merely procedural items and items 
not relating to international peace and security. The list below 
contains a reference to the meeting and date on which the item was 
adopted on the Council's agenda. 
_ 
The Egyptian question, 159 mtg 17.7.1947. 
_ 
The Palestine question, 222 mtg 9.12.1947. 
_ 
The India-Pakistan question, 268 mtg 6.1.1948. 
- 
The Hyderabad question, 357 mtq 16.9.1948. 
The Berlin situation 362 mtg 5.10.1948. 
Complaint by Taiwan of armed invasion, 492 mtg 29.8.1950. 
Complaint by China of the bombing of its territory, 493 
mtg 31.8.1950. 
_ 
Complaint by Thailand against the Viet-Minh, 672 mtg 
3.6.1954. 
_ 
Complaint by Guatemala, 675 mtg 20.6.1954. 
Complaint by USA of an attack on one of its aircraft by 
the USSR, 679 mtg 10.9.1954. 
Hostilities off the coast of China, 690 mtg 31.1.1955. 
_ 
The Suez crisis, 690 mtg 26.9.1956. 
The situation in Hungary, 746 mtg 28.10.1956. 
Complaint by the USSR of overflights by US military 
aircraft, 813 mtg 21.4.1958. 
Complaint by Laos, 847 mtg 7.9.1959. 
The situation in South Africa, 851 mtg 30.3.1960. 
Complaint by the USSR of aggressive acts by the USA, 857 
mtg 23.5.1960. 
The Congo question, 865 mtg 22.6.1960. 
Complaint by Cuba, 874 mtg 18.7.1960. 
Question relating to Angola, 944 mtg 10.3.1961. 
Complaint by Kuwait against Iraq and by Iraq against the 
UK, 957 mtg 2.7.1961. 
Question relating to the Dominican Republic, 980 mtg 
22.11.1961. 
Question relating to the situation in the Caribbean, 1022 
mtg 23.10.1962. 
_ 
Complaint by Haiti, 1035 mtg 5.5.1963. 
Situation in Yemen, 1037 mtg 10.6.1963. 
Question of Portuguese territories, 1040 mtg 22.7.1963. 
Apartheid in South Africa, 1040 mtg 22.7.1963. 
Question relating to the Panama Canal Zone, 1086 mtg 
10.1.1964. 
_ 
Complaint by the Yemen against the UK, 1106 mtg 2.4.1964. 
_ 
Complaint of aggression against Cambodia, 1118 mtg 
19.5.1964. 
Gulf of Tonkin incident, 1140 mtg 4.8.1964. 
Question of relations between Malaysia and Indonesia, 
1144 mtg 3.9.1964. 
Question of relations between Greece and Turkey, 1146 mtg 
11.9.1964. 
The situation in the Dominican Republic, 1196 mtg 
3.5.1965. 
_ 
The situation in Vietnam, 1273 mtg 2.2.1966. 
The question of the frontier between Yemen and Saudi 
Arabia, 1296 mtg 4.8.1966. 
_ 
The situation in the Middle East, 1343 mtg 29.5.1967. 
The situation in Namibia, 1388 mtg 25.1.1968. 
Complaint by Haiti, 1427 mtg 27.5.1968. 
Question concerning Czechoslovakia, 1441 mtg 21.8.1968. 
Complaint by Zambia against Southern Rhodesia, 1486 mtg 
18.7.1969. 
Complaint by Guinea, 1522 mtg 15.12.1969. 
_ 
Situation in the India-Pakistan sub-continent, 1606 mtq 
4.12.1971. 
The situation in Cyprus, 1179 mtq 16.7.1974. 
The situation concerning Western Sahara, 1849 20.10.1975. 
The situation in Timor, 1864 mtg 15.12.1975. 
Question submitted by Iceland, 1866 mtg 16.12.1975. 
The Middle East problem including the Palestinian 
question, 1870 mtg 12.1.1976. 
The situation in the Comoros, 1886 mtg 4.2.1976. 
_ 
The Occupied Arab territories, 1916 mtg 4.5.1976. 
Aggression by South Africa against Angola, 1900 mtg 
26.3.1976. 
The question of the exercise of the inalienable rights of 
the Palestinian people, 1924 mtg 9.6.1976. 
The Entebbe incident, 1939 mtg 9.7.1976. 
_ 
Complaint against South Africa by Zambia, 1944 mtg 
27.7.1976. 
_ 
Complaint by Greece against Turkey, 1949 mtg 12.8.1976. 
Complaint by Lesotho against South Africa, 1981 mtg 
21.12.1976. 
Complaint by Benin, 1986 mtg 7.2.1977. 
Complaint against South Africa by Angola, 2077 mtg 
5.5.1978. 
_ 
The situation in Kampuchea, 2108 mtg 11.1.1979. 
The situation in South-East Asia, 2114 mtg 23.2.1979. 
The situation in Afghanistan, 2185 mtg 5.1.1980. 
Maltese complaint against Libya, 2246 mtg 4.9.1980. 
_ 
Situation between Iran and Iraq, 2247 mtg 26.9.1980. 
Complaint by Iraq (re Israeli attack on nuclear reactor), 
2280 mtg 12.6.1981. 
_ 
Complaint by the Seychelles, 2314 mtg 15.12.1981. 
Complaint by Nicaragua, 2335 mtg 25.3.1982. 
The Falklands conflict, 2345 mtg 1.4.1982. 
Complaint against Libya by Chad, 2358 mtg 30.4.1982. 
- 
Libyan complaints against US, 2415 mtg 22.2.1983. 
_ 
The situation in Grenada, 2487 mtg 25.10.1983. 
_ 
Sudanese complaint against Libya, 2520 mtg 27.3.1984. 
_ 
Complaint by Gulf stags, 2541 mtg 25.5.1984. 
Complaint against South Africa by Botswana, 2598 mtg 
21.6.1985. 
Complaint by Tunisia (re Israeli attack against PLO 
headquarters), 2610 mtg 2.10.1985. 
The above list only includes items of which the Security 
Council is currently seized. In some situations such as Cyprus, 
the item was seized much earlier than 1974, for the Council dealt 
with the issue in 1964, but then dropped it off its agenda until 
1974. The situation in South Africa has been seized by the 
Council since 1960, although it had been adopted under different 
titles at later stages. The Palestine question has been seized on 
and off since 1947, and the Middle East situation since 1967. 
Again these topics have been adopted on the agenda under varying 
titles since that date but it is doubtful whether it could be 
argued that if the Assembly inscribed the topic under a different 
name it could be said that it was not one of the matters with 
which the Council was seized and so by that method escape the 
provisions of Article 12. 
Obviously some items which were on the Council's agenda for 
many years are not included in the above list because they have 
been dropped before the current list was compiled. For example, 
the question of Southern Rhodesia was on the list from 9.9.1963 
when it was adopted on the agenda of the Council's 1064th mtg. It 
was dropped from the agenda in 1981 when the situation was 
resolved (see 8/14326). 
APPENDIX 3 
Emergency Special Sessions of the General Assembly 
SESSION 
First 
Second 
Third 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Sixth 
Seventh 
(Part 1) 
Eighth 
Ninth 
Seventh 
(Part 2) 
DATES 
1.11.1956- 
10.11.1956. 
4.11.1956- 
10.11.1956. 
8.8.1958- 
21.8.1958. 
17.9.1960- 
19.9.1960. 
17.6.1967- 
18.9.1967. 
10.1.1980- 
14.1.1980. 
22.7.1980- 
29.7.1980. 
3.9.1981- 
14.9.1981. 
29.1.1982- 
5.2.1982. 
20.4.1982- 
24.9.1982. 
SUBJECT 
UNEF 
Hungary 
Lebanon and Jordan 
Congo 
Middle East 
Afghanistan 
Palestine 
Namibia 
Israeli occupied 
territories 
Palestine 
APPENDIX 4 
Special Sessions of the General Assembly 
SESSION DATES SUBJECT 
First 
Second 
Third 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Sixth 
Seventh 
Eighth 
Ninth 
Tenth 
Eleventh 
Twelth 
29.4.1947- 
14.5.1947. 
16.4.1948- 
15.5.1948. 
21.8.1961- 
25.8.1961. 
14.5.1963 
27.6.1963. 
21.4.1967- 
13.6.1967. 
9.4.1974- 
2.5.1974. 
1.9.1975- 
16.9.1975. 
20.4.1978- 
21.4.1978. 
24.4.1978- 
3.5.1978. 
23.5.1978- 
27.5.1978. 
25.8.1980- 
15.9.1980. 
7.6.1982- 
10.7.1982. 
Thirteenth 27.5.1986- 
1.6.1986. 
Fourteenth 17.9.1986- 
20.9.1986. 
Palestine 
Palestine 
Tunisia 
Expenses of UNEF 
and ONUC. 
S. W. Africa 
Raw materials 
Economic cooperation 
UNIFIL (finance) 
Namibia 
Disarmament 
New economic 
order. 
Disarmament 
Critical economic 
situation in 
Africa. 
Namibia. 
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